-/* crypto/ec/ec_key.c */
/*
- * Written by Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * Copyright 2002-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
*
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
- * Portions originally developed by SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and
- * contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+
+/*
+ * ECDSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
+ * internal use.
*/
+#include "internal/deprecated.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <string.h>
-#include "ec_lcl.h"
+#include "ec_local.h"
+#include "internal/refcount.h"
#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/self_test.h>
+#include "crypto/bn.h"
+
+static int ecdsa_keygen_pairwise_test(EC_KEY *eckey, OSSL_CALLBACK *cb,
+ void *cbarg);
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new(void)
{
- EC_KEY *ret;
-
- ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EC_KEY));
- if (ret == NULL) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return (NULL);
- }
+ return ec_key_new_method_int(NULL, NULL, NULL);
+}
+#endif
- ret->version = 1;
- ret->flags = 0;
- ret->group = NULL;
- ret->pub_key = NULL;
- ret->priv_key = NULL;
- ret->enc_flag = 0;
- ret->conv_form = POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED;
- ret->references = 1;
- ret->method_data = NULL;
- return (ret);
+EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_with_libctx(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, const char *propq)
+{
+ return ec_key_new_method_int(ctx, propq, NULL);
}
-EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(int nid)
+EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name_with_libctx(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx,
+ const char *propq, int nid)
{
- EC_KEY *ret = EC_KEY_new();
+ EC_KEY *ret = EC_KEY_new_with_libctx(ctx, propq);
if (ret == NULL)
return NULL;
- ret->group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid);
+ ret->group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name_with_libctx(ctx, propq, nid);
if (ret->group == NULL) {
EC_KEY_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
+ if (ret->meth->set_group != NULL
+ && ret->meth->set_group(ret, ret->group) == 0) {
+ EC_KEY_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
return ret;
}
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(int nid)
+{
+ return EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name_with_libctx(NULL, NULL, nid);
+}
+#endif
+
void EC_KEY_free(EC_KEY *r)
{
int i;
if (r == NULL)
return;
- i = CRYPTO_add(&r->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EC);
-#ifdef REF_PRINT
- REF_PRINT("EC_KEY", r);
-#endif
+ CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock);
+ REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_KEY", r);
if (i > 0)
return;
-#ifdef REF_CHECK
- if (i < 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, "EC_KEY_free, bad reference count\n");
- abort();
- }
+ REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
+
+ if (r->meth != NULL && r->meth->finish != NULL)
+ r->meth->finish(r);
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
+ ENGINE_finish(r->engine);
#endif
+ if (r->group && r->group->meth->keyfinish)
+ r->group->meth->keyfinish(r);
+
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY, r, &r->ex_data);
+#endif
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock);
EC_GROUP_free(r->group);
EC_POINT_free(r->pub_key);
- if (r->priv_key != NULL)
- BN_clear_free(r->priv_key);
-
- EC_EX_DATA_free_all_data(&r->method_data);
+ BN_clear_free(r->priv_key);
+ OPENSSL_free(r->propq);
OPENSSL_clear_free((void *)r, sizeof(EC_KEY));
}
EC_KEY *EC_KEY_copy(EC_KEY *dest, const EC_KEY *src)
{
- EC_EXTRA_DATA *d;
-
if (dest == NULL || src == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_COPY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return NULL;
}
+ if (src->meth != dest->meth) {
+ if (dest->meth->finish != NULL)
+ dest->meth->finish(dest);
+ if (dest->group && dest->group->meth->keyfinish)
+ dest->group->meth->keyfinish(dest);
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
+ if (ENGINE_finish(dest->engine) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ dest->engine = NULL;
+#endif
+ }
+ dest->libctx = src->libctx;
/* copy the parameters */
- if (src->group) {
- const EC_METHOD *meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(src->group);
+ if (src->group != NULL) {
/* clear the old group */
EC_GROUP_free(dest->group);
- dest->group = EC_GROUP_new(meth);
+ dest->group = ec_group_new_with_libctx(src->libctx, src->propq,
+ src->group->meth);
if (dest->group == NULL)
return NULL;
if (!EC_GROUP_copy(dest->group, src->group))
return NULL;
- }
- /* copy the public key */
- if (src->pub_key && src->group) {
- EC_POINT_free(dest->pub_key);
- dest->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(src->group);
- if (dest->pub_key == NULL)
- return NULL;
- if (!EC_POINT_copy(dest->pub_key, src->pub_key))
- return NULL;
- }
- /* copy the private key */
- if (src->priv_key) {
- if (dest->priv_key == NULL) {
- dest->priv_key = BN_new();
- if (dest->priv_key == NULL)
+
+ /* copy the public key */
+ if (src->pub_key != NULL) {
+ EC_POINT_free(dest->pub_key);
+ dest->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(src->group);
+ if (dest->pub_key == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ if (!EC_POINT_copy(dest->pub_key, src->pub_key))
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* copy the private key */
+ if (src->priv_key != NULL) {
+ if (dest->priv_key == NULL) {
+ dest->priv_key = BN_new();
+ if (dest->priv_key == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (!BN_copy(dest->priv_key, src->priv_key))
+ return NULL;
+ if (src->group->meth->keycopy
+ && src->group->meth->keycopy(dest, src) == 0)
return NULL;
}
- if (!BN_copy(dest->priv_key, src->priv_key))
- return NULL;
}
- /* copy method/extra data */
- EC_EX_DATA_free_all_data(&dest->method_data);
- for (d = src->method_data; d != NULL; d = d->next) {
- void *t = d->dup_func(d->data);
-
- if (t == NULL)
- return 0;
- if (!EC_EX_DATA_set_data
- (&dest->method_data, t, d->dup_func, d->free_func,
- d->clear_free_func))
- return 0;
- }
/* copy the rest */
dest->enc_flag = src->enc_flag;
dest->conv_form = src->conv_form;
dest->version = src->version;
dest->flags = src->flags;
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY,
+ &dest->ex_data, &src->ex_data))
+ return NULL;
+#endif
+
+ if (src->meth != dest->meth) {
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
+ if (src->engine != NULL && ENGINE_init(src->engine) == 0)
+ return NULL;
+ dest->engine = src->engine;
+#endif
+ dest->meth = src->meth;
+ }
+
+ if (src->meth->copy != NULL && src->meth->copy(dest, src) == 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ dest->dirty_cnt++;
return dest;
}
EC_KEY *EC_KEY_dup(const EC_KEY *ec_key)
{
- EC_KEY *ret = EC_KEY_new();
+ EC_KEY *ret = ec_key_new_method_int(ec_key->libctx, ec_key->propq,
+ ec_key->engine);
+
if (ret == NULL)
return NULL;
+
if (EC_KEY_copy(ret, ec_key) == NULL) {
EC_KEY_free(ret);
return NULL;
int EC_KEY_up_ref(EC_KEY *r)
{
- int i = CRYPTO_add(&r->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EC);
-#ifdef REF_PRINT
- REF_PRINT("EC_KEY", r);
-#endif
-#ifdef REF_CHECK
- if (i < 2) {
- fprintf(stderr, "EC_KEY_up, bad reference count\n");
- abort();
- }
-#endif
+ int i;
+
+ if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_KEY", r);
+ REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
}
-int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
+ENGINE *EC_KEY_get0_engine(const EC_KEY *eckey)
{
- int ok = 0;
- BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL, *order = NULL;
- EC_POINT *pub_key = NULL;
+ return eckey->engine;
+}
- if (!eckey || !eckey->group) {
+int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+ if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return 0;
}
+ if (eckey->meth->keygen != NULL) {
+ int ret;
- if ((order = BN_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ ret = eckey->meth->keygen(eckey);
+ if (ret == 1)
+ eckey->dirty_cnt++;
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY, EC_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int ossl_ec_key_gen(EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = eckey->group->meth->keygen(eckey);
+
+ if (ret == 1)
+ eckey->dirty_cnt++;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ECC Key generation.
+ * See SP800-56AR3 5.6.1.2.2 "Key Pair Generation by Testing Candidates"
+ *
+ * Params:
+ * libctx A context containing an optional self test callback.
+ * eckey An EC key object that contains domain params. The generated keypair
+ * is stored in this object.
+ * pairwise_test Set to non zero to perform a pairwise test. If the test
+ * fails then the keypair is not generated,
+ * Returns 1 if the keypair was generated or 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int ec_generate_key(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, EC_KEY *eckey, int pairwise_test)
+{
+ int ok = 0;
+ BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL;
+ const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *pub_key = NULL;
+ const EC_GROUP *group = eckey->group;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_secure_new_ex(eckey->libctx);
+
+ if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
- priv_key = BN_new();
+ priv_key = BN_secure_new();
if (priv_key == NULL)
goto err;
} else
priv_key = eckey->priv_key;
- if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(eckey->group, order, ctx))
+ /*
+ * Steps (1-2): Check domain parameters and security strength.
+ * These steps must be done by the user. This would need to be
+ * stated in the security policy.
+ */
+
+ order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
+ if (order == NULL)
goto err;
+ /*
+ * Steps (3-7): priv_key = DRBG_RAND(order_n_bits) (range [1, n-1]).
+ * Although this is slightly different from the standard, it is effectively
+ * equivalent as it gives an unbiased result ranging from 1..n-1. It is also
+ * faster as the standard needs to retry more often. Also doing
+ * 1 + rand[0..n-2] would effect the way that tests feed dummy entropy into
+ * rand so the simpler backward compatible method has been used here.
+ */
do
- if (!BN_rand_range(priv_key, order))
+ if (!BN_priv_rand_range_ex(priv_key, order, ctx))
goto err;
while (BN_is_zero(priv_key)) ;
if (eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
- pub_key = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group);
+ pub_key = EC_POINT_new(group);
if (pub_key == NULL)
goto err;
} else
pub_key = eckey->pub_key;
- if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, pub_key, priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx))
+ /* Step (8) : pub_key = priv_key * G (where G is a point on the curve) */
+ if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, pub_key, priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx))
goto err;
eckey->priv_key = priv_key;
eckey->pub_key = pub_key;
+ priv_key = NULL;
+ pub_key = NULL;
+
+ eckey->dirty_cnt++;
+
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ pairwise_test = 1;
+#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
ok = 1;
+ if (pairwise_test) {
+ OSSL_CALLBACK *cb = NULL;
+ void *cbarg = NULL;
- err:
- if (order)
- BN_free(order);
- if (eckey->pub_key == NULL)
- EC_POINT_free(pub_key);
- if (priv_key != NULL && eckey->priv_key == NULL)
- BN_free(priv_key);
- if (ctx != NULL)
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- return (ok);
+ OSSL_SELF_TEST_get_callback(libctx, &cb, &cbarg);
+ ok = ecdsa_keygen_pairwise_test(eckey, cb, cbarg);
+ }
+err:
+ /* Step (9): If there is an error return an invalid keypair. */
+ if (!ok) {
+ BN_clear(eckey->priv_key);
+ if (eckey->pub_key != NULL)
+ EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, eckey->pub_key);
+ }
+
+ EC_POINT_free(pub_key);
+ BN_clear_free(priv_key);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return ok;
+}
+
+int ec_key_simple_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+ return ec_generate_key(NULL, eckey, 0);
+}
+
+int ec_key_simple_generate_public_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ /*
+ * See SP800-56AR3 5.6.1.2.2: Step (8)
+ * pub_key = priv_key * G (where G is a point on the curve)
+ */
+ ret = EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, eckey->priv_key, NULL,
+ NULL, NULL);
+
+ if (ret == 1)
+ eckey->dirty_cnt++;
+
+ return ret;
}
int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
{
- int ok = 0;
- BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
+ if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL || eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (eckey->group->meth->keycheck == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return eckey->group->meth->keycheck(eckey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check the range of the EC public key.
+ * See SP800-56A R3 Section 5.6.2.3.3 (Part 2)
+ * i.e.
+ * - If q = odd prime p: Verify that xQ and yQ are integers in the
+ * interval[0, p - 1], OR
+ * - If q = 2m: Verify that xQ and yQ are bit strings of length m bits.
+ * Returns 1 if the public key has a valid range, otherwise it returns 0.
+ */
+static int ec_key_public_range_check(BN_CTX *ctx, const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ BIGNUM *x, *y;
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ x = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ y = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (y == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(key->group, key->pub_key, x, y, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (EC_GROUP_get_field_type(key->group) == NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
+ if (BN_is_negative(x)
+ || BN_cmp(x, key->group->field) >= 0
+ || BN_is_negative(y)
+ || BN_cmp(y, key->group->field) >= 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ int m = EC_GROUP_get_degree(key->group);
+ if (BN_num_bits(x) > m || BN_num_bits(y) > m) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ECC Key validation as specified in SP800-56A R3.
+ * Section 5.6.2.3.3 ECC Full Public-Key Validation.
+ */
+int ec_key_public_check(const EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
EC_POINT *point = NULL;
+ const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
- if (!eckey || !eckey->group || !eckey->pub_key) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL || eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
+ ECerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return 0;
}
+ /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 1): Q != infinity */
if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
- goto err;
+ ECerr(0, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
+ return 0;
}
- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
- if ((point = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group)) == NULL)
+ point = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group);
+ if (point == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 2) Test if the public key is in range */
+ if (!ec_key_public_range_check(ctx, eckey)) {
+ ECerr(0, EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE);
goto err;
+ }
- /* testing whether the pub_key is on the elliptic curve */
- if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, ctx)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
+ /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 3) is the pub_key on the elliptic curve */
+ if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, ctx) <= 0) {
+ ECerr(0, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
goto err;
}
- /* testing whether pub_key * order is the point at infinity */
+
order = eckey->group->order;
if (BN_is_zero(order)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
+ ECerr(0, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
goto err;
}
+ /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 4) : pub_key * order is the point at infinity. */
if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, NULL, eckey->pub_key, order, ctx)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ ECerr(0, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, point)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
+ ECerr(0, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
goto err;
}
- /*
- * in case the priv_key is present : check if generator * priv_key ==
- * pub_key
- */
- if (eckey->priv_key) {
- if (BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, order) >= 0) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, eckey->priv_key,
- NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- if (EC_POINT_cmp(eckey->group, point, eckey->pub_key, ctx) != 0) {
- ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY);
+ ret = 1;
+err:
+ EC_POINT_free(point);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ECC Key validation as specified in SP800-56A R3.
+ * Section 5.6.2.1.2 Owner Assurance of Private-Key Validity
+ * The private key is in the range [1, order-1]
+ */
+int ec_key_private_check(const EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+ if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL || eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
+ ECerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, BN_value_one()) < 0
+ || BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, eckey->group->order) >= 0) {
+ ECerr(0, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ECC Key validation as specified in SP800-56A R3.
+ * Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency (b)
+ * Check if generator * priv_key = pub_key
+ */
+int ec_key_pairwise_check(const EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ EC_POINT *point = NULL;
+
+ if (eckey == NULL
+ || eckey->group == NULL
+ || eckey->pub_key == NULL
+ || eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
+ ECerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ point = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group);
+ if (point == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+
+ if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, eckey->priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
+ ECerr(0, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EC_POINT_cmp(eckey->group, point, eckey->pub_key, ctx) != 0) {
+ ECerr(0, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+err:
+ EC_POINT_free(point);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * ECC Key validation as specified in SP800-56A R3.
+ * Section 5.6.2.3.3 ECC Full Public-Key Validation
+ * Section 5.6.2.1.2 Owner Assurance of Private-Key Validity
+ * Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency
+ * NOTES:
+ * Before calling this method in fips mode, there should be an assurance that
+ * an approved elliptic-curve group is used.
+ * Returns 1 if the key is valid, otherwise it returns 0.
+ */
+int ec_key_simple_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+ int ok = 0;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+ if (eckey == NULL) {
+ ECerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(eckey->libctx)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!ec_key_public_check(eckey, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (eckey->priv_key != NULL) {
+ if (!ec_key_private_check(eckey)
+ || !ec_key_pairwise_check(eckey, ctx))
goto err;
- }
}
ok = 1;
- err:
- if (ctx != NULL)
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- EC_POINT_free(point);
- return (ok);
+err:
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return ok;
}
int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x,
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *tx, *ty;
EC_POINT *point = NULL;
- int ok = 0, tmp_nid, is_char_two = 0;
+ int ok = 0;
- if (!key || !key->group || !x || !y) {
+ if (key == NULL || key->group == NULL || x == NULL || y == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return 0;
}
- ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- if (!ctx)
- goto err;
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(key->libctx);
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
point = EC_POINT_new(key->group);
- if (!point)
+ if (point == NULL)
goto err;
- tmp_nid = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(key->group));
-
- if (tmp_nid == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
- is_char_two = 1;
-
tx = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
ty = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
- if (is_char_two) {
- if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(key->group, point,
- x, y, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(key->group, point,
- tx, ty, ctx))
- goto err;
- } else
-#endif
- {
- if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(key->group, point,
- x, y, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(key->group, point,
- tx, ty, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
+ if (ty == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates(key->group, point, x, y, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(key->group, point, tx, ty, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
/*
- * Check if retrieved coordinates match originals and are less than field
- * order: if not values are out of range.
+ * Check if retrieved coordinates match originals. The range check is done
+ * inside EC_KEY_check_key().
*/
- if (BN_cmp(x, tx) || BN_cmp(y, ty)
- || (BN_cmp(x, key->group->field) >= 0)
- || (BN_cmp(y, key->group->field) >= 0)) {
+ if (BN_cmp(x, tx) || BN_cmp(y, ty)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE);
goto err;
}
+ /* EC_KEY_set_public_key updates dirty_cnt */
if (!EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point))
goto err;
ok = 1;
err:
- if (ctx)
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
EC_POINT_free(point);
return ok;
}
+OPENSSL_CTX *ec_key_get_libctx(const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ return key->libctx;
+}
+
+const char *ec_key_get0_propq(const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ return key->propq;
+}
+
const EC_GROUP *EC_KEY_get0_group(const EC_KEY *key)
{
return key->group;
int EC_KEY_set_group(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *group)
{
+ if (key->meth->set_group != NULL && key->meth->set_group(key, group) == 0)
+ return 0;
EC_GROUP_free(key->group);
key->group = EC_GROUP_dup(group);
+ key->dirty_cnt++;
return (key->group == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
}
int EC_KEY_set_private_key(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *priv_key)
{
- if (key->priv_key)
- BN_clear_free(key->priv_key);
- key->priv_key = BN_dup(priv_key);
- return (key->priv_key == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
+ int fixed_top;
+ const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *tmp_key = NULL;
+
+ if (key->group == NULL || key->group->meth == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Not only should key->group be set, but it should also be in a valid
+ * fully initialized state.
+ *
+ * Specifically, to operate in constant time, we need that the group order
+ * is set, as we use its length as the fixed public size of any scalar used
+ * as an EC private key.
+ */
+ order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(key->group);
+ if (order == NULL || BN_is_zero(order))
+ return 0; /* This should never happen */
+
+ if (key->group->meth->set_private != NULL
+ && key->group->meth->set_private(key, priv_key) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (key->meth->set_private != NULL
+ && key->meth->set_private(key, priv_key) == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * We should never leak the bit length of the secret scalar in the key,
+ * so we always set the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag on the internal `BIGNUM`
+ * holding the secret scalar.
+ *
+ * This is important also because `BN_dup()` (and `BN_copy()`) do not
+ * propagate the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag from the source `BIGNUM`, and
+ * this brings an extra risk of inadvertently losing the flag, even when
+ * the caller specifically set it.
+ *
+ * The propagation has been turned on and off a few times in the past
+ * years because in some conditions has shown unintended consequences in
+ * some code paths, so at the moment we can't fix this in the BN layer.
+ *
+ * In `EC_KEY_set_private_key()` we can work around the propagation by
+ * manually setting the flag after `BN_dup()` as we know for sure that
+ * inside the EC module the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` is always treated
+ * correctly and should not generate unintended consequences.
+ *
+ * Setting the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag alone is never enough, we also have
+ * to preallocate the BIGNUM internal buffer to a fixed public size big
+ * enough that operations performed during the processing never trigger
+ * a realloc which would leak the size of the scalar through memory
+ * accesses.
+ *
+ * Fixed Length
+ * ------------
+ *
+ * The order of the large prime subgroup of the curve is our choice for
+ * a fixed public size, as that is generally the upper bound for
+ * generating a private key in EC cryptosystems and should fit all valid
+ * secret scalars.
+ *
+ * For preallocating the BIGNUM storage we look at the number of "words"
+ * required for the internal representation of the order, and we
+ * preallocate 2 extra "words" in case any of the subsequent processing
+ * might temporarily overflow the order length.
+ */
+ tmp_key = BN_dup(priv_key);
+ if (tmp_key == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ BN_set_flags(tmp_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+ fixed_top = bn_get_top(order) + 2;
+ if (bn_wexpand(tmp_key, fixed_top) == NULL) {
+ BN_clear_free(tmp_key);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ BN_clear_free(key->priv_key);
+ key->priv_key = tmp_key;
+ key->dirty_cnt++;
+
+ return 1;
}
const EC_POINT *EC_KEY_get0_public_key(const EC_KEY *key)
int EC_KEY_set_public_key(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub_key)
{
+ if (key->meth->set_public != NULL
+ && key->meth->set_public(key, pub_key) == 0)
+ return 0;
EC_POINT_free(key->pub_key);
key->pub_key = EC_POINT_dup(pub_key, key->group);
+ key->dirty_cnt++;
return (key->pub_key == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
}
EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(key->group, cform);
}
-void *EC_KEY_get_key_method_data(EC_KEY *key,
- void *(*dup_func) (void *),
- void (*free_func) (void *),
- void (*clear_free_func) (void *))
-{
- void *ret;
-
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EC);
- ret =
- EC_EX_DATA_get_data(key->method_data, dup_func, free_func,
- clear_free_func);
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EC);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-void *EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data(EC_KEY *key, void *data,
- void *(*dup_func) (void *),
- void (*free_func) (void *),
- void (*clear_free_func) (void *))
-{
- EC_EXTRA_DATA *ex_data;
-
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EC);
- ex_data =
- EC_EX_DATA_get_data(key->method_data, dup_func, free_func,
- clear_free_func);
- if (ex_data == NULL)
- EC_EX_DATA_set_data(&key->method_data, data, dup_func, free_func,
- clear_free_func);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EC);
-
- return ex_data;
-}
-
void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *key, int flag)
{
if (key->group != NULL)
EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(key->group, flag);
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
int EC_KEY_precompute_mult(EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
if (key->group == NULL)
return 0;
return EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(key->group, ctx);
}
+#endif
int EC_KEY_get_flags(const EC_KEY *key)
{
void EC_KEY_set_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags)
{
key->flags |= flags;
+ key->dirty_cnt++;
}
void EC_KEY_clear_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags)
{
key->flags &= ~flags;
+ key->dirty_cnt++;
+}
+
+size_t EC_KEY_key2buf(const EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t form,
+ unsigned char **pbuf, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (key == NULL || key->pub_key == NULL || key->group == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ return EC_POINT_point2buf(key->group, key->pub_key, form, pbuf, ctx);
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_oct2key(EC_KEY *key, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
+ BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (key == NULL || key->group == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (key->pub_key == NULL)
+ key->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(key->group);
+ if (key->pub_key == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (EC_POINT_oct2point(key->group, key->pub_key, buf, len, ctx) == 0)
+ return 0;
+ key->dirty_cnt++;
+ /*
+ * Save the point conversion form.
+ * For non-custom curves the first octet of the buffer (excluding
+ * the last significant bit) contains the point conversion form.
+ * EC_POINT_oct2point() has already performed sanity checking of
+ * the buffer so we know it is valid.
+ */
+ if ((key->group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_CUSTOM_CURVE) == 0)
+ key->conv_form = (point_conversion_form_t)(buf[0] & ~0x01);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+size_t EC_KEY_priv2oct(const EC_KEY *eckey,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ if (eckey->group == NULL || eckey->group->meth == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (eckey->group->meth->priv2oct == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_PRIV2OCT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return eckey->group->meth->priv2oct(eckey, buf, len);
+}
+
+size_t ec_key_simple_priv2oct(const EC_KEY *eckey,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ size_t buf_len;
+
+ buf_len = (EC_GROUP_order_bits(eckey->group) + 7) / 8;
+ if (eckey->priv_key == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (buf == NULL)
+ return buf_len;
+ else if (len < buf_len)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Octetstring may need leading zeros if BN is to short */
+
+ if (BN_bn2binpad(eckey->priv_key, buf, buf_len) == -1) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_PRIV2OCT, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return buf_len;
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_oct2priv(EC_KEY *eckey, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (eckey->group == NULL || eckey->group->meth == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (eckey->group->meth->oct2priv == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_OCT2PRIV, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ret = eckey->group->meth->oct2priv(eckey, buf, len);
+ if (ret == 1)
+ eckey->dirty_cnt++;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int ec_key_simple_oct2priv(EC_KEY *eckey, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ if (eckey->priv_key == NULL)
+ eckey->priv_key = BN_secure_new();
+ if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_OCT2PRIV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ eckey->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(buf, len, eckey->priv_key);
+ if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_OCT2PRIV, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ eckey->dirty_cnt++;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+size_t EC_KEY_priv2buf(const EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned char **pbuf)
+{
+ size_t len;
+ unsigned char *buf;
+
+ len = EC_KEY_priv2oct(eckey, NULL, 0);
+ if (len == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_PRIV2BUF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ len = EC_KEY_priv2oct(eckey, buf, len);
+ if (len == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *pbuf = buf;
+ return len;
+}
+
+int EC_KEY_can_sign(const EC_KEY *eckey)
+{
+ if (eckey->group == NULL || eckey->group->meth == NULL
+ || (eckey->group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_NO_SIGN))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * FIPS 140-2 IG 9.9 AS09.33
+ * Perform a sign/verify operation.
+ *
+ * NOTE: When generating keys for key-agreement schemes - FIPS 140-2 IG 9.9
+ * states that no additional pairwise tests are required (apart from the tests
+ * specified in SP800-56A) when generating keys. Hence pairwise ECDH tests are
+ * omitted here.
+ */
+static int ecdsa_keygen_pairwise_test(EC_KEY *eckey, OSSL_CALLBACK *cb,
+ void *cbarg)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ unsigned char dgst[16] = {0};
+ int dgst_len = (int)sizeof(dgst);
+ ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
+ OSSL_SELF_TEST *st = NULL;
+
+ st = OSSL_SELF_TEST_new(cb, cbarg);
+ if (st == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ OSSL_SELF_TEST_onbegin(st, OSSL_SELF_TEST_TYPE_PCT,
+ OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_PCT_ECDSA);
+
+ sig = ECDSA_do_sign(dgst, dgst_len, eckey);
+ if (sig == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ OSSL_SELF_TEST_oncorrupt_byte(st, dgst);
+
+ if (ECDSA_do_verify(dgst, dgst_len, sig, eckey) != 1)
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = 1;
+err:
+ OSSL_SELF_TEST_onend(st, ret);
+ OSSL_SELF_TEST_free(st);
+ ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
+ return ret;
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff