DH, DSA, EC_KEY: Fix exporters to allow domain parameter keys
[openssl.git] / crypto / ec / ec_ameth.c
index c4e8177c2800ee445c758ffbde7e9e765241d065..944fc05835c026eeb5b3fa597407c87580bba19c 100644 (file)
@@ -630,6 +630,7 @@ int ec_pkey_export_to(const EVP_PKEY *from, void *to_keydata,
     OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
     const BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL;
     const EC_POINT *pub_point = NULL;
+    int selection = 0;
     int rv = 0;
 
     if (from == NULL
@@ -637,58 +638,105 @@ int ec_pkey_export_to(const EVP_PKEY *from, void *to_keydata,
             || (ecg = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL)
         return 0;
 
+    /*
+     * If the EC_KEY method is foreign, then we can't be sure of anything,
+     * and can therefore not export or pretend to export.
+     */
+    if (EC_KEY_get_method(eckey) != EC_KEY_OpenSSL())
+        return 0;
+
     ossl_param_bld_init(&tmpl);
 
     /* export the domain parameters */
     if (!ecparams_to_params(eckey, &tmpl))
-        return 0;
+        goto err;
+    selection |= OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS;
 
     priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(eckey);
     pub_point = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(eckey);
 
-    /* public_key must be present, priv_key is optional */
-    if (pub_point == NULL)
-        return 0;
+    if (pub_point != NULL) {
+        /* convert pub_point to a octet string according to the SECG standard */
+        if ((pub_key_buflen = EC_POINT_point2buf(ecg, pub_point,
+                                                 POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED,
+                                                 &pub_key_buf, NULL)) == 0
+            || !ossl_param_bld_push_octet_string(&tmpl,
+                                                 OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
+                                                 pub_key_buf,
+                                                 pub_key_buflen))
+            goto err;
+        selection |= OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PUBLIC_KEY;
+    }
 
-    /* convert pub_point to a octet string according to the SECG standard */
-    if ((pub_key_buflen = EC_POINT_point2buf(ecg, pub_point,
-                                             POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED,
-                                             &pub_key_buf, NULL)) == 0)
-        return 0;
+    if (priv_key != NULL) {
+        size_t sz;
+        int ecbits;
+        int ecdh_cofactor_mode;
 
-    if (!ossl_param_bld_push_octet_string(&tmpl,
-                OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
-                pub_key_buf,
-                pub_key_buflen))
-        goto err;
+        /*
+         * Key import/export should never leak the bit length of the secret
+         * scalar in the key.
+         *
+         * For this reason, on export we use padded BIGNUMs with fixed length.
+         *
+         * When importing we also should make sure that, even if short lived,
+         * the newly created BIGNUM is marked with the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag as
+         * soon as possible, so that any processing of this BIGNUM might opt for
+         * constant time implementations in the backend.
+         *
+         * Setting the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag alone is never enough, we also have
+         * to preallocate the BIGNUM internal buffer to a fixed public size big
+         * enough that operations performed during the processing never trigger
+         * a realloc which would leak the size of the scalar through memory
+         * accesses.
+         *
+         * Fixed Length
+         * ------------
+         *
+         * The order of the large prime subgroup of the curve is our choice for
+         * a fixed public size, as that is generally the upper bound for
+         * generating a private key in EC cryptosystems and should fit all valid
+         * secret scalars.
+         *
+         * For padding on export we just use the bit length of the order
+         * converted to bytes (rounding up).
+         *
+         * For preallocating the BIGNUM storage we look at the number of "words"
+         * required for the internal representation of the order, and we
+         * preallocate 2 extra "words" in case any of the subsequent processing
+         * might temporarily overflow the order length.
+         */
+        ecbits = EC_GROUP_order_bits(ecg);
+        if (ecbits <= 0)
+            goto err;
+
+        sz = (ecbits + 7 ) / 8;
+        if (!ossl_param_bld_push_BN_pad(&tmpl,
+                                        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY,
+                                        priv_key, sz))
+            goto err;
+        selection |= OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY;
 
-    if (priv_key != NULL) {
         /*
          * The ECDH Cofactor Mode is defined only if the EC_KEY actually
          * contains a private key, so we check for the flag and export it only
          * in this case.
          */
-        int ecdh_cofactor_mode =
+        ecdh_cofactor_mode =
             (EC_KEY_get_flags(eckey) & EC_FLAG_COFACTOR_ECDH) ? 1 : 0;
 
-        /* Export the actual private key */
-        if (!ossl_param_bld_push_BN(&tmpl,
-                                    OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY,
-                                    priv_key))
-            goto err;
-
         /* Export the ECDH_COFACTOR_MODE parameter */
         if (!ossl_param_bld_push_int(&tmpl,
                                      OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_USE_COFACTOR_ECDH,
                                      ecdh_cofactor_mode))
             goto err;
+        selection |= OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_OTHER_PARAMETERS;
     }
 
     params = ossl_param_bld_to_param(&tmpl);
 
     /* We export, the provider imports */
-    rv = evp_keymgmt_import(to_keymgmt, to_keydata, OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_ALL,
-                            params);
+    rv = evp_keymgmt_import(to_keymgmt, to_keydata, selection, params);
 
  err:
     ossl_param_bld_free(params);