ASN1_verify, ASN1_item_verify: cleanse and free buf_in on error path

[openssl.git] / crypto / asn1 / a_verify.c

diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c b/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
index d34e2871773dedf55af6a7ee91d1b87f16e16cb6..aacf4763b585c267dc5762f0c57742f3dba06eec 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c
@@ -70,11 +70,11 @@
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "asn1_locl.h"
 
 #ifndef NO_ASN1_OLD
 
-int ASN1_verify(int (*i2d)(void *, unsigned char **),
-               X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature,
+int ASN1_verify(i2d_of_void *i2d, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature,
                char *data, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
        {
        EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
@@ -101,12 +101,21 @@ int ASN1_verify(int (*i2d)(void *, unsigned char **),
        p=buf_in;
 
        i2d(data,&p);
-       EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&ctx,type, NULL);
-       EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)buf_in,inl);
+       ret=
+               EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&ctx,type, NULL)
+               && EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)buf_in,inl);
 
        OPENSSL_cleanse(buf_in,(unsigned int)inl);
        OPENSSL_free(buf_in);
 
+       if (!ret)
+               {
+               ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+               goto err;
+               }
+       ret = -1;
+
+
        if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&ctx,(unsigned char *)signature->data,
                        (unsigned int)signature->length,pkey) <= 0)
                {
@@ -126,46 +135,96 @@ err:
 #endif
 
 
-int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature,
-            void *asn, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a,
+               ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, void *asn, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
        {
        EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
-       const EVP_MD *type;
        unsigned char *buf_in=NULL;
-       int ret= -1,i,inl;
+       int ret= -1,inl;
+
+       int mdnid, pknid;
+
+       if (!pkey)
+               {
+               ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+               return -1;
+               }
 
        EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-       i=OBJ_obj2nid(a->algorithm);
-       type=EVP_get_digestbyname(OBJ_nid2sn(i));
-       if (type == NULL)
+
+       /* Convert signature OID into digest and public key OIDs */
+       if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(a->algorithm), &mdnid, &pknid))
                {
-               ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
+               ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
                goto err;
                }
+       if (mdnid == NID_undef)
+               {
+               if (!pkey->ameth || !pkey->ameth->item_verify)
+                       {
+                       ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+                       goto err;
+                       }
+               ret = pkey->ameth->item_verify(&ctx, it, asn, a,
+                                                       signature, pkey);
+               /* Return value of 2 means carry on, anything else means we
+                * exit straight away: either a fatal error of the underlying
+                * verification routine handles all verification.
+                */
+               if (ret != 2)
+                       goto err;
+               ret = -1;
+               }
+       else
+               {
+               const EVP_MD *type;
+               type=EVP_get_digestbynid(mdnid);
+               if (type == NULL)
+                       {
+                       ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
+                       goto err;
+                       }
+
+               /* Check public key OID matches public key type */
+               if (EVP_PKEY_type(pknid) != pkey->ameth->pkey_id)
+                       {
+                       ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ASN1_R_WRONG_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE);
+                       goto err;
+                       }
+
+               if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&ctx, NULL, type, NULL, pkey))
+                       {
+                       ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+                       ret=0;
+                       goto err;
+                       }
+
+               }
 
        inl = ASN1_item_i2d(asn, &buf_in, it);
        
        if (buf_in == NULL)
                {
-               ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+               ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                goto err;
                }
 
-       if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&ctx,type, NULL))
-               {
-               ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
-               ret=0;
-               goto err;
-               }
-       EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)buf_in,inl);
+       ret = EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&ctx,buf_in,inl);
 
        OPENSSL_cleanse(buf_in,(unsigned int)inl);
        OPENSSL_free(buf_in);
 
-       if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&ctx,(unsigned char *)signature->data,
-                       (unsigned int)signature->length,pkey) <= 0)
+       if (!ret)
                {
-               ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+               ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+               goto err;
+               }
+       ret = -1;
+
+       if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&ctx,signature->data,
+                       (size_t)signature->length) <= 0)
+               {
+               ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
                ret=0;
                goto err;
                }