+ *) Extensive audit of libcrypto with DEBUG_UNUSED. Fix many cases where
+ return value is ignored. NB. The functions RAND_add(), RAND_seed(),
+ BIO_set_cipher() and some obscure PEM functions were changed so they
+ can now return an error. The RAND changes required a change to the
+ RAND_METHOD structure.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New macro __owur for "OpenSSL Warn Unused Result". This makes use of
+ a gcc attribute to warn if the result of a function is ignored. This
+ is enable if DEBUG_UNUSED is set. Add to several functions in evp.h
+ whose return value is often ignored.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2a and 1.0.2b [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+ *) Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop
+
+ When processing an ECParameters structure OpenSSL enters an infinite loop
+ if the curve specified is over a specially malformed binary polynomial
+ field.
+
+ This can be used to perform denial of service against any
+ system which processes public keys, certificate requests or
+ certificates. This includes TLS clients and TLS servers with
+ client authentication enabled.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Joseph Barr-Pixton.
+ (CVE-2015-1788)
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time
+
+ X509_cmp_time does not properly check the length of the ASN1_TIME
+ string and can read a few bytes out of bounds. In addition,
+ X509_cmp_time accepts an arbitrary number of fractional seconds in the
+ time string.
+
+ An attacker can use this to craft malformed certificates and CRLs of
+ various sizes and potentially cause a segmentation fault, resulting in
+ a DoS on applications that verify certificates or CRLs. TLS clients
+ that verify CRLs are affected. TLS clients and servers with client
+ authentication enabled may be affected if they use custom verification
+ callbacks.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Swiecki (Google), and
+ independently by Hanno Böck.
+ (CVE-2015-1789)
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ *) PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent
+
+ The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing inner EncryptedContent
+ correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs
+ with missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing.
+
+ Applications that decrypt PKCS#7 data or otherwise parse PKCS#7
+ structures from untrusted sources are affected. OpenSSL clients and
+ servers are not affected.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
+ (CVE-2015-1790)
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ *) CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function
+
+ When verifying a signedData message the CMS code can enter an infinite loop
+ if presented with an unknown hash function OID. This can be used to perform
+ denial of service against any system which verifies signedData messages using
+ the CMS code.
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Johannes Bauer.
+ (CVE-2015-1792)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) Race condition handling NewSessionTicket
+
+ If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when attempting to
+ reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur potentially leading to
+ a double free of the ticket data.
+ (CVE-2015-1791)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Only support 256-bit or stronger elliptic curves with the
+ 'ecdh_auto' setting (server) or by default (client). Of supported
+ curves, prefer P-256 (both).
+ [Emilia Kasper]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2 and 1.0.2a [19 Mar 2015]
+
+ *) ClientHello sigalgs DoS fix
+
+ If a client connects to an OpenSSL 1.0.2 server and renegotiates with an
+ invalid signature algorithms extension a NULL pointer dereference will
+ occur. This can be exploited in a DoS attack against the server.
+
+ This issue was was reported to OpenSSL by David Ramos of Stanford
+ University.
+ (CVE-2015-0291)
+ [Stephen Henson and Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Multiblock corrupted pointer fix
+
+ OpenSSL 1.0.2 introduced the "multiblock" performance improvement. This
+ feature only applies on 64 bit x86 architecture platforms that support AES
+ NI instructions. A defect in the implementation of "multiblock" can cause
+ OpenSSL's internal write buffer to become incorrectly set to NULL when
+ using non-blocking IO. Typically, when the user application is using a
+ socket BIO for writing, this will only result in a failed connection.
+ However if some other BIO is used then it is likely that a segmentation
+ fault will be triggered, thus enabling a potential DoS attack.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Daniel Danner and Rainer Mueller.
+ (CVE-2015-0290)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Segmentation fault in DTLSv1_listen fix
+
+ The DTLSv1_listen function is intended to be stateless and processes the
+ initial ClientHello from many peers. It is common for user code to loop
+ over the call to DTLSv1_listen until a valid ClientHello is received with
+ an associated cookie. A defect in the implementation of DTLSv1_listen means
+ that state is preserved in the SSL object from one invocation to the next
+ that can lead to a segmentation fault. Errors processing the initial
+ ClientHello can trigger this scenario. An example of such an error could be
+ that a DTLS1.0 only client is attempting to connect to a DTLS1.2 only
+ server.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Per Allansson.
+ (CVE-2015-0207)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp fix
+
+ The function ASN1_TYPE_cmp will crash with an invalid read if an attempt is
+ made to compare ASN.1 boolean types. Since ASN1_TYPE_cmp is used to check
+ certificate signature algorithm consistency this can be used to crash any
+ certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any
+ application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including
+ OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication.
+ (CVE-2015-0286)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) Segmentation fault for invalid PSS parameters fix
+
+ The signature verification routines will crash with a NULL pointer
+ dereference if presented with an ASN.1 signature using the RSA PSS
+ algorithm and invalid parameters. Since these routines are used to verify
+ certificate signature algorithms this can be used to crash any
+ certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any
+ application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including
+ OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication.
+
+ This issue was was reported to OpenSSL by Brian Carpenter.
+ (CVE-2015-0208)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) ASN.1 structure reuse memory corruption fix
+
+ Reusing a structure in ASN.1 parsing may allow an attacker to cause
+ memory corruption via an invalid write. Such reuse is and has been
+ strongly discouraged and is believed to be rare.
+
+ Applications that parse structures containing CHOICE or ANY DEFINED BY
+ components may be affected. Certificate parsing (d2i_X509 and related
+ functions) are however not affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are
+ not affected.
+ (CVE-2015-0287)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) PKCS7 NULL pointer dereferences fix
+
+ The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing outer ContentInfo
+ correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs with
+ missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing.
+
+ Applications that verify PKCS#7 signatures, decrypt PKCS#7 data or
+ otherwise parse PKCS#7 structures from untrusted sources are
+ affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are not affected.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
+ (CVE-2015-0289)
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ *) DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix
+
+ A malicious client can trigger an OPENSSL_assert (i.e., an abort) in
+ servers that both support SSLv2 and enable export cipher suites by sending
+ a specially crafted SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message.
+
+ This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia Käsper
+ (OpenSSL development team).
+ (CVE-2015-0293)
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ *) Empty CKE with client auth and DHE fix
+
+ If client auth is used then a server can seg fault in the event of a DHE
+ ciphersuite being selected and a zero length ClientKeyExchange message
+ being sent by the client. This could be exploited in a DoS attack.
+ (CVE-2015-1787)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Handshake with unseeded PRNG fix
+
+ Under certain conditions an OpenSSL 1.0.2 client can complete a handshake
+ with an unseeded PRNG. The conditions are:
+ - The client is on a platform where the PRNG has not been seeded
+ automatically, and the user has not seeded manually
+ - A protocol specific client method version has been used (i.e. not
+ SSL_client_methodv23)
+ - A ciphersuite is used that does not require additional random data from
+ the PRNG beyond the initial ClientHello client random (e.g. PSK-RC4-SHA).
+
+ If the handshake succeeds then the client random that has been used will
+ have been generated from a PRNG with insufficient entropy and therefore the
+ output may be predictable.
+
+ For example using the following command with an unseeded openssl will
+ succeed on an unpatched platform:
+
+ openssl s_client -psk 1a2b3c4d -tls1_2 -cipher PSK-RC4-SHA
+ (CVE-2015-0285)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Use After Free following d2i_ECPrivatekey error fix
+
+ A malformed EC private key file consumed via the d2i_ECPrivateKey function
+ could cause a use after free condition. This, in turn, could cause a double
+ free in several private key parsing functions (such as d2i_PrivateKey
+ or EVP_PKCS82PKEY) and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption
+ for applications that receive EC private keys from untrusted
+ sources. This scenario is considered rare.
+
+ This issue was discovered by the BoringSSL project and fixed in their
+ commit 517073cd4b.
+ (CVE-2015-0209)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) X509_to_X509_REQ NULL pointer deref fix
+
+ The function X509_to_X509_REQ will crash with a NULL pointer dereference if
+ the certificate key is invalid. This function is rarely used in practice.
+
+ This issue was discovered by Brian Carpenter.
+ (CVE-2015-0288)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) Removed the export ciphers from the DEFAULT ciphers
+ [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1l and 1.0.2 [22 Jan 2015]
+
+ *) Facilitate "universal" ARM builds targeting range of ARM ISAs, e.g.
+ ARMv5 through ARMv8, as opposite to "locking" it to single one.
+ So far those who have to target multiple plaforms would compromise
+ and argue that binary targeting say ARMv5 would still execute on
+ ARMv8. "Universal" build resolves this compromise by providing
+ near-optimal performance even on newer platforms.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Accelerated NIST P-256 elliptic curve implementation for x86_64
+ (other platforms pending).
+ [Shay Gueron & Vlad Krasnov (Intel Corp), Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Add support for the SignedCertificateTimestampList certificate and
+ OCSP response extensions from RFC6962.
+ [Rob Stradling]
+
+ *) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.)
+ for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to
+ bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.)
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Initial support for PowerISA 2.0.7, first implemented in POWER8.
+ This covers AES, SHA256/512 and GHASH. "Initial" means that most
+ common cases are optimized and there still is room for further
+ improvements. Vector Permutation AES for Altivec is also added.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Add support for little-endian ppc64 Linux target.
+ [Marcelo Cerri (IBM)]
+
+ *) Initial support for AMRv8 ISA crypto extensions. This covers AES,
+ SHA1, SHA256 and GHASH. "Initial" means that most common cases
+ are optimized and there still is room for further improvements.
+ Both 32- and 64-bit modes are supported.
+ [Andy Polyakov, Ard Biesheuvel (Linaro)]
+
+ *) Improved ARMv7 NEON support.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Support for SPARC Architecture 2011 crypto extensions, first
+ implemented in SPARC T4. This covers AES, DES, Camellia, SHA1,
+ SHA256/512, MD5, GHASH and modular exponentiation.
+ [Andy Polyakov, David Miller]
+
+ *) Accelerated modular exponentiation for Intel processors, a.k.a.
+ RSAZ.
+ [Shay Gueron & Vlad Krasnov (Intel Corp)]
+
+ *) Support for new and upcoming Intel processors, including AVX2,
+ BMI and SHA ISA extensions. This includes additional "stitched"
+ implementations, AESNI-SHA256 and GCM, and multi-buffer support
+ for TLS encrypt.
+
+ This work was sponsored by Intel Corp.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Support for DTLS 1.2. This adds two sets of DTLS methods: DTLS_*_method()
+ supports both DTLS 1.2 and 1.0 and should use whatever version the peer
+ supports and DTLSv1_2_*_method() which supports DTLS 1.2 only.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Use algorithm specific chains in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file():
+ this fixes a limiation in previous versions of OpenSSL.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Extended RSA OAEP support via EVP_PKEY API. Options to specify digest,
+ MGF1 digest and OAEP label.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add EVP support for key wrapping algorithms, to avoid problems with
+ existing code the flag EVP_CIPHER_CTX_WRAP_ALLOW has to be set in
+ the EVP_CIPHER_CTX or an error is returned. Add AES and DES3 wrap
+ algorithms and include tests cases.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add functions to allocate and set the fields of an ECDSA_METHOD
+ structure.
+ [Douglas E. Engert, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New functions OPENSSL_gmtime_diff and ASN1_TIME_diff to find the
+ difference in days and seconds between two tm or ASN1_TIME structures.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add -rev test option to s_server to just reverse order of characters
+ received by client and send back to server. Also prints an abbreviated
+ summary of the connection parameters.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New option -brief for s_client and s_server to print out a brief summary
+ of connection parameters.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add callbacks for arbitrary TLS extensions.
+ [Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net> and Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) New option -crl_download in several openssl utilities to download CRLs
+ from CRLDP extension in certificates.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New options -CRL and -CRLform for s_client and s_server for CRLs.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function X509_CRL_diff to generate a delta CRL from the difference
+ of two full CRLs. Add support to "crl" utility.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New functions to set lookup_crls function and to retrieve
+ X509_STORE from X509_STORE_CTX.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Print out deprecated issuer and subject unique ID fields in
+ certificates.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Extend OCSP I/O functions so they can be used for simple general purpose
+ HTTP as well as OCSP. New wrapper function which can be used to download
+ CRLs using the OCSP API.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Delegate command line handling in s_client/s_server to SSL_CONF APIs.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) SSL_CONF* functions. These provide a common framework for application
+ configuration using configuration files or command lines.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) SSL/TLS tracing code. This parses out SSL/TLS records using the
+ message callback and prints the results. Needs compile time option
+ "enable-ssl-trace". New options to s_client and s_server to enable
+ tracing.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New ctrl and macro to retrieve supported points extensions.
+ Print out extension in s_server and s_client.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New functions to retrieve certificate signature and signature
+ OID NID.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add functions to retrieve and manipulate the raw cipherlist sent by a
+ client to OpenSSL.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New Suite B modes for TLS code. These use and enforce the requirements
+ of RFC6460: restrict ciphersuites, only permit Suite B algorithms and
+ only use Suite B curves. The Suite B modes can be set by using the
+ strings "SUITEB128", "SUITEB192" or "SUITEB128ONLY" for the cipherstring.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New chain verification flags for Suite B levels of security. Check
+ algorithms are acceptable when flags are set in X509_verify_cert.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make tls1_check_chain return a set of flags indicating checks passed
+ by a certificate chain. Add additional tests to handle client
+ certificates: checks for matching certificate type and issuer name
+ comparison.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) If an attempt is made to use a signature algorithm not in the peer
+ preference list abort the handshake. If client has no suitable
+ signature algorithms in response to a certificate request do not
+ use the certificate.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) If server EC tmp key is not in client preference list abort handshake.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add support for certificate stores in CERT structure. This makes it
+ possible to have different stores per SSL structure or one store in
+ the parent SSL_CTX. Include distint stores for certificate chain
+ verification and chain building. New ctrl SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN
+ to build and store a certificate chain in CERT structure: returing
+ an error if the chain cannot be built: this will allow applications
+ to test if a chain is correctly configured.
+
+ Note: if the CERT based stores are not set then the parent SSL_CTX
+ store is used to retain compatibility with existing behaviour.
+
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function ssl_set_client_disabled to set a ciphersuite disabled
+ mask based on the current session, check mask when sending client
+ hello and checking the requested ciphersuite.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New ctrls to retrieve and set certificate types in a certificate
+ request message. Print out received values in s_client. If certificate
+ types is not set with custom values set sensible values based on
+ supported signature algorithms.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Support for distinct client and server supported signature algorithms.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add certificate callback. If set this is called whenever a certificate
+ is required by client or server. An application can decide which
+ certificate chain to present based on arbitrary criteria: for example
+ supported signature algorithms. Add very simple example to s_server.
+ This fixes many of the problems and restrictions of the existing client
+ certificate callback: for example you can now clear an existing
+ certificate and specify the whole chain.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add new "valid_flags" field to CERT_PKEY structure which determines what
+ the certificate can be used for (if anything). Set valid_flags field
+ in new tls1_check_chain function. Simplify ssl_set_cert_masks which used
+ to have similar checks in it.
+
+ Add new "cert_flags" field to CERT structure and include a "strict mode".
+ This enforces some TLS certificate requirements (such as only permitting
+ certificate signature algorithms contained in the supported algorithms
+ extension) which some implementations ignore: this option should be used
+ with caution as it could cause interoperability issues.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Update and tidy signature algorithm extension processing. Work out
+ shared signature algorithms based on preferences and peer algorithms
+ and print them out in s_client and s_server. Abort handshake if no
+ shared signature algorithms.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add new functions to allow customised supported signature algorithms
+ for SSL and SSL_CTX structures. Add options to s_client and s_server
+ to support them.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function SSL_certs_clear() to delete all references to certificates
+ from an SSL structure. Before this once a certificate had been added
+ it couldn't be removed.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Integrate hostname, email address and IP address checking with certificate
+ verification. New verify options supporting checking in opensl utility.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fixes and wildcard matching support to hostname and email checking
+ functions. Add manual page.
+ [Florian Weimer (Red Hat Product Security Team)]
+
+ *) New functions to check a hostname email or IP address against a
+ certificate. Add options x509 utility to print results of checks against
+ a certificate.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix OCSP checking.
+ [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com> and Ben Laurie]