OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________
- Changes between 1.0.x and 1.1.0 [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 1.0.2 and 1.1.0 [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+ *) config has been changed so that by default OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED is used.
+ Access to deprecated functions can be re-enabled by running config with
+ "enable-deprecated". In addition applications wishing to use deprecated
+ functions must define OPENSSL_USE_DEPRECATED. Note that this new behaviour
+ will, by default, disable some transitive includes that previously existed
+ in the header files (e.g. ec.h will no longer, by default, include bn.h)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Added support for OCB mode. OpenSSL has been granted a patent license
+ compatible with the OpenSSL license for use of OCB. Details are available
+ at https://www.openssl.org/docs/misc/OCB-patent-grant-OpenSSL.pdf. Support
+ for OCB can be removed by calling config with no-ocb.
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) SSLv2 support has been removed. It still supports receiving a SSLv2
+ compatible client hello.
+ [Kurt Roeckx]
+
+ *) Increased the minimal RSA keysize from 256 to 512 bits [Rich Salz],
+ done while fixing the error code for the key-too-small case.
+ [Annie Yousar <a.yousar@informatik.hu-berlin.de>]
+
+ *) Remove various unsupported platforms:
+ Sony NEWS4
+ BEOS and BEOS_R5
+ NeXT
+ SUNOS
+ MPE/iX
+ Sinix/ReliantUNIX RM400
+ DGUX
+ [Rich Salz]
+
+ *) Experimental support for a new, fast, unbiased prime candidate generator,
+ bn_probable_prime_dh_coprime(). Not currently used by any prime generator.
+ [Felix Laurie von Massenbach <felix@erbridge.co.uk>]
+
+ *) New output format NSS in the sess_id command line tool. This allows
+ exporting the session id and the master key in NSS keylog format.
+ [Martin Kaiser <martin@kaiser.cx>]
+
+ *) Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display
+ compilation flags.
+ [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]
+
+ *) Fix eckey_priv_encode so it immediately returns an error upon a failure
+ in i2d_ECPrivateKey.
+ [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]
+
+ *) Fix some double frees. These are not thought to be exploitable.
+ [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]
+
+ *) A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
+ can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
+ server.
+
+ Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
+ Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
+ preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
+ [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL
+ ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack"
+ by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from:
+ http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140
+
+ Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this
+ flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076)
+ [Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger]
+
+ *) Use algorithm specific chains in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file():
+ this fixes a limitation in previous versions of OpenSSL.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Experimental encrypt-then-mac support.
+
+ Experimental support for encrypt then mac from
+ draft-gutmann-tls-encrypt-then-mac-02.txt
+
+ To enable it set the appropriate extension number (0x42 for the test
+ server) using e.g. -DTLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac=0x42
+
+ For non-compliant peers (i.e. just about everything) this should have no
+ effect.
+
+ WARNING: EXPERIMENTAL, SUBJECT TO CHANGE.
- *) Add callbacks supporting generation and retrieval of supplemental
- data entries.
- [Scott Deboy <sdeboy@apache.org>, Trevor Perrin and Ben Laurie]
+ [Steve Henson]
*) Add EVP support for key wrapping algorithms, to avoid problems with
existing code the flag EVP_CIPHER_CTX_WRAP_ALLOW has to be set in
MGF1 digest and OAEP label.
[Steve Henson]
- *) Add callbacks for arbitrary TLS extensions.
- [Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net> and Ben Laurie]
-
- *) Support for DTLS 1.2. This adds two sets of DTLS methods: DTLS_*_method()
- supports both DTLS 1.2 and 1.0 and should use whatever version the peer
- supports and DTLSv1_2_*_method() which supports DTLS 1.2 only.
- [Steve Henson]
-
*) Make openssl verify return errors.
[Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com> and Ben Laurie]
- *) Fix OCSP checking.
- [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com> and Ben Laurie]
-
- *) New option -crl_download in several openssl utilities to download CRLs
- from CRLDP extension in certificates.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Integrate hostname, email address and IP address checking with certificate
- verification. New verify options supporting checking in openssl utility.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New function X509_CRL_diff to generate a delta CRL from the difference
- of two full CRLs. Add support to "crl" utility.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New options -CRL and -CRLform for s_client and s_server for CRLs.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Extend OCSP I/O functions so they can be used for simple general purpose
- HTTP as well as OCSP. New wrapper function which can be used to download
- CRLs using the OCSP API.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New functions to set lookup_crls callback and to retrieve
- X509_STORE from X509_STORE_CTX.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New ctrl and macro to retrieve supported points extensions.
- Print out extension in s_server and s_client.
- [Steve Henson]
-
*) New function ASN1_TIME_diff to calculate the difference between two
ASN1_TIME structures or one structure and the current time.
[Steve Henson]
- *) Fixes and wildcard matching support to hostname and email checking
- functions. Add manual page.
- [Florian Weimer (Red Hat Product Security Team)]
-
- *) New experimental SSL_CONF* functions. These provide a common framework
- for application configuration using configuration files or command lines.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New functions to check a hostname email or IP address against a
- certificate. Add options x509 utility to print results of checks against
- a certificate.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add -rev test option to s_server to just reverse order of characters
- received by client and send back to server. Also prints an abbreviated
- summary of the connection parameters.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New option -brief for s_client and s_server to print out a brief summary
- of connection parameters.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add functions to retrieve and manipulate the raw cipherlist sent by a
- client to OpenSSL.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New Suite B modes for TLS code. These use and enforce the requirements
- of RFC6460: restrict ciphersuites, only permit Suite B algorithms and
- only use Suite B curves. The Suite B modes can be set by using the
- strings "SUITEB128", "SUITEB192" or "SUITEB128ONLY" for the cipherstring.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New chain verification flags for Suite B levels of security. Check
- algorithms are acceptable when flags are set in X509_verify_cert.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Make tls1_check_chain return a set of flags indicating checks passed
- by a certificate chain. Add additional tests to handle client
- certificates: checks for matching certificate type and issuer name
- comparison.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) If an attempt is made to use a signature algorithm not in the peer
- preference list abort the handshake. If client has no suitable
- signature algorithms in response to a certificate request do not
- use the certificate.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) If server EC tmp key is not in client preference list abort handshake.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add support for certificate stores in CERT structure. This makes it
- possible to have different stores per SSL structure or one store in
- the parent SSL_CTX. Include distinct stores for certificate chain
- verification and chain building. New ctrl SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN
- to build and store a certificate chain in CERT structure: returning
- an error if the chain cannot be built: this will allow applications
- to test if a chain is correctly configured.
-
- Note: if the CERT based stores are not set then the parent SSL_CTX
- store is used to retain compatibility with existing behaviour.
-
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New function ssl_set_client_disabled to set a ciphersuite disabled
- mask based on the current session, check mask when sending client
- hello and checking the requested ciphersuite.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New ctrls to retrieve and set certificate types in a certificate
- request message. Print out received values in s_client. If certificate
- types is not set with custom values set sensible values based on
- supported signature algorithms.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Support for distinct client and server supported signature algorithms.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add certificate callback. If set this is called whenever a certificate
- is required by client or server. An application can decide which
- certificate chain to present based on arbitrary criteria: for example
- supported signature algorithms. Add very simple example to s_server.
- This fixes many of the problems and restrictions of the existing client
- certificate callback: for example you can now clear an existing
- certificate and specify the whole chain.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add new "valid_flags" field to CERT_PKEY structure which determines what
- the certificate can be used for (if anything). Set valid_flags field
- in new tls1_check_chain function. Simplify ssl_set_cert_masks which used
- to have similar checks in it.
-
- Add new "cert_flags" field to CERT structure and include a "strict mode".
- This enforces some TLS certificate requirements (such as only permitting
- certificate signature algorithms contained in the supported algorithms
- extension) which some implementations ignore: this option should be used
- with caution as it could cause interoperability issues.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Update and tidy signature algorithm extension processing. Work out
- shared signature algorithms based on preferences and peer algorithms
- and print them out in s_client and s_server. Abort handshake if no
- shared signature algorithms.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Add new functions to allow customised supported signature algorithms
- for SSL and SSL_CTX structures. Add options to s_client and s_server
- to support them.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New function SSL_certs_clear() to delete all references to certificates
- from an SSL structure. Before this once a certificate had been added
- it couldn't be removed.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Initial SSL tracing code. This parses out SSL/TLS records using the
- message callback and prints the results. Needs compile time option
- "enable-ssl-trace". New options to s_client and s_server to enable
- tracing.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) New functions to retrieve certificate signature and signature
- OID NID.
- [Steve Henson]
-
- *) Print out deprecated issuer and subject unique ID fields in
- certificates.
- [Steve Henson]
-
*) Update fips_test_suite to support multiple command line options. New
test to induce all self test errors in sequence and check expected
failures.
sign or verify all in one operation.
[Steve Henson]
- *) Add fips_algvs: a multicall fips utility incorporaing all the algorithm
+ *) Add fips_algvs: a multicall fips utility incorporating all the algorithm
test programs and fips_test_suite. Includes functionality to parse
the minimal script output of fipsalgest.pl directly.
[Steve Henson]
security.
[Emilia Käsper <emilia.kasper@esat.kuleuven.be> (Google)]
- *) New function OPENSSL_gmtime_diff to find the difference in days
- and seconds between two tm structures. This will be used to provide
- additional functionality for ASN1_TIME.
+ *) New -verify_name option in command line utilities to set verification
+ parameters by name.
[Steve Henson]
- *) Add -trusted_first option which attempts to find certificates in the
- trusted store even if an untrusted chain is also supplied.
+ *) Initial CMAC implementation. WARNING: EXPERIMENTAL, API MAY CHANGE.
+ Add CMAC pkey methods.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Experimental renegotiation in s_server -www mode. If the client
+ browses /reneg connection is renegotiated. If /renegcert it is
+ renegotiated requesting a certificate.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add an "external" session cache for debugging purposes to s_server. This
+ should help trace issues which normally are only apparent in deployed
+ multi-process servers.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Extensive audit of libcrypto with DEBUG_UNUSED. Fix many cases where
+ return value is ignored. NB. The functions RAND_add(), RAND_seed(),
+ BIO_set_cipher() and some obscure PEM functions were changed so they
+ can now return an error. The RAND changes required a change to the
+ RAND_METHOD structure.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New macro __owur for "OpenSSL Warn Unused Result". This makes use of
+ a gcc attribute to warn if the result of a function is ignored. This
+ is enable if DEBUG_UNUSED is set. Add to several functions in evp.h
+ whose return value is often ignored.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1k and 1.0.2 [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+ *) Facilitate "universal" ARM builds targeting range of ARM ISAs, e.g.
+ ARMv5 through ARMv8, as opposite to "locking" it to single one.
+ So far those who have to target multiple plaforms would compromise
+ and argue that binary targeting say ARMv5 would still execute on
+ ARMv8. "Universal" build resolves this compromise by providing
+ near-optimal performance even on newer platforms.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Accelerated NIST P-256 elliptic curve implementation for x86_64
+ (other platforms pending).
+ [Shay Gueron & Vlad Krasnov (Intel Corp), Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Add support for the SignedCertificateTimestampList certificate and
+ OCSP response extensions from RFC6962.
+ [Rob Stradling]
+
+ *) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.)
+ for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to
+ bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.)
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Initial support for PowerISA 2.0.7, first implemented in POWER8.
+ This covers AES, SHA256/512 and GHASH. "Initial" means that most
+ common cases are optimized and there still is room for further
+ improvements. Vector Permutation AES for Altivec is also added.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Add support for little-endian ppc64 Linux target.
+ [Marcelo Cerri (IBM)]
+
+ *) Initial support for AMRv8 ISA crypto extensions. This covers AES,
+ SHA1, SHA256 and GHASH. "Initial" means that most common cases
+ are optimized and there still is room for further improvements.
+ Both 32- and 64-bit modes are supported.
+ [Andy Polyakov, Ard Biesheuvel (Linaro)]
+
+ *) Improved ARMv7 NEON support.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Support for SPARC Architecture 2011 crypto extensions, first
+ implemented in SPARC T4. This covers AES, DES, Camellia, SHA1,
+ SHA256/512, MD5, GHASH and modular exponentiation.
+ [Andy Polyakov, David Miller]
+
+ *) Accelerated modular exponentiation for Intel processors, a.k.a.
+ RSAZ.
+ [Shay Gueron & Vlad Krasnov (Intel Corp)]
+
+ *) Support for new and upcoming Intel processors, including AVX2,
+ BMI and SHA ISA extensions. This includes additional "stitched"
+ implementations, AESNI-SHA256 and GCM, and multi-buffer support
+ for TLS encrypt.
+
+ This work was sponsored by Intel Corp.
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Support for DTLS 1.2. This adds two sets of DTLS methods: DTLS_*_method()
+ supports both DTLS 1.2 and 1.0 and should use whatever version the peer
+ supports and DTLSv1_2_*_method() which supports DTLS 1.2 only.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Use algorithm specific chains in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file():
+ this fixes a limiation in previous versions of OpenSSL.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Extended RSA OAEP support via EVP_PKEY API. Options to specify digest,
+ MGF1 digest and OAEP label.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add EVP support for key wrapping algorithms, to avoid problems with
+ existing code the flag EVP_CIPHER_CTX_WRAP_ALLOW has to be set in
+ the EVP_CIPHER_CTX or an error is returned. Add AES and DES3 wrap
+ algorithms and include tests cases.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add functions to allocate and set the fields of an ECDSA_METHOD
+ structure.
+ [Douglas E. Engert, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New functions OPENSSL_gmtime_diff and ASN1_TIME_diff to find the
+ difference in days and seconds between two tm or ASN1_TIME structures.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add -rev test option to s_server to just reverse order of characters
+ received by client and send back to server. Also prints an abbreviated
+ summary of the connection parameters.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New option -brief for s_client and s_server to print out a brief summary
+ of connection parameters.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add callbacks for arbitrary TLS extensions.
+ [Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net> and Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) New option -crl_download in several openssl utilities to download CRLs
+ from CRLDP extension in certificates.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New options -CRL and -CRLform for s_client and s_server for CRLs.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function X509_CRL_diff to generate a delta CRL from the difference
+ of two full CRLs. Add support to "crl" utility.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New functions to set lookup_crls function and to retrieve
+ X509_STORE from X509_STORE_CTX.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Print out deprecated issuer and subject unique ID fields in
+ certificates.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Extend OCSP I/O functions so they can be used for simple general purpose
+ HTTP as well as OCSP. New wrapper function which can be used to download
+ CRLs using the OCSP API.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Delegate command line handling in s_client/s_server to SSL_CONF APIs.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) SSL_CONF* functions. These provide a common framework for application
+ configuration using configuration files or command lines.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) SSL/TLS tracing code. This parses out SSL/TLS records using the
+ message callback and prints the results. Needs compile time option
+ "enable-ssl-trace". New options to s_client and s_server to enable
+ tracing.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New ctrl and macro to retrieve supported points extensions.
+ Print out extension in s_server and s_client.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New functions to retrieve certificate signature and signature
+ OID NID.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add functions to retrieve and manipulate the raw cipherlist sent by a
+ client to OpenSSL.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New Suite B modes for TLS code. These use and enforce the requirements
+ of RFC6460: restrict ciphersuites, only permit Suite B algorithms and
+ only use Suite B curves. The Suite B modes can be set by using the
+ strings "SUITEB128", "SUITEB192" or "SUITEB128ONLY" for the cipherstring.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New chain verification flags for Suite B levels of security. Check
+ algorithms are acceptable when flags are set in X509_verify_cert.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make tls1_check_chain return a set of flags indicating checks passed
+ by a certificate chain. Add additional tests to handle client
+ certificates: checks for matching certificate type and issuer name
+ comparison.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) If an attempt is made to use a signature algorithm not in the peer
+ preference list abort the handshake. If client has no suitable
+ signature algorithms in response to a certificate request do not
+ use the certificate.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) If server EC tmp key is not in client preference list abort handshake.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add support for certificate stores in CERT structure. This makes it
+ possible to have different stores per SSL structure or one store in
+ the parent SSL_CTX. Include distint stores for certificate chain
+ verification and chain building. New ctrl SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN
+ to build and store a certificate chain in CERT structure: returing
+ an error if the chain cannot be built: this will allow applications
+ to test if a chain is correctly configured.
+
+ Note: if the CERT based stores are not set then the parent SSL_CTX
+ store is used to retain compatibility with existing behaviour.
+
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New function ssl_set_client_disabled to set a ciphersuite disabled
+ mask based on the current session, check mask when sending client
+ hello and checking the requested ciphersuite.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) New ctrls to retrieve and set certificate types in a certificate
+ request message. Print out received values in s_client. If certificate
+ types is not set with custom values set sensible values based on
+ supported signature algorithms.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Support for distinct client and server supported signature algorithms.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add certificate callback. If set this is called whenever a certificate
+ is required by client or server. An application can decide which
+ certificate chain to present based on arbitrary criteria: for example
+ supported signature algorithms. Add very simple example to s_server.
+ This fixes many of the problems and restrictions of the existing client
+ certificate callback: for example you can now clear an existing
+ certificate and specify the whole chain.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add new "valid_flags" field to CERT_PKEY structure which determines what
+ the certificate can be used for (if anything). Set valid_flags field
+ in new tls1_check_chain function. Simplify ssl_set_cert_masks which used
+ to have similar checks in it.
+
+ Add new "cert_flags" field to CERT structure and include a "strict mode".
+ This enforces some TLS certificate requirements (such as only permitting
+ certificate signature algorithms contained in the supported algorithms
+ extension) which some implementations ignore: this option should be used
+ with caution as it could cause interoperability issues.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Update and tidy signature algorithm extension processing. Work out
+ shared signature algorithms based on preferences and peer algorithms
+ and print them out in s_client and s_server. Abort handshake if no
+ shared signature algorithms.
[Steve Henson]
- *) Initial experimental support for explicitly trusted non-root CAs.
- OpenSSL still tries to build a complete chain to a root but if an
- intermediate CA has a trust setting included that is used. The first
- setting is used: whether to trust or reject.
+ *) Add new functions to allow customised supported signature algorithms
+ for SSL and SSL_CTX structures. Add options to s_client and s_server
+ to support them.
[Steve Henson]
- *) New -verify_name option in command line utilities to set verification
- parameters by name.
+ *) New function SSL_certs_clear() to delete all references to certificates
+ from an SSL structure. Before this once a certificate had been added
+ it couldn't be removed.
[Steve Henson]
- *) Initial CMAC implementation. WARNING: EXPERIMENTAL, API MAY CHANGE.
- Add CMAC pkey methods.
+ *) Integrate hostname, email address and IP address checking with certificate
+ verification. New verify options supporting checking in opensl utility.
[Steve Henson]
- *) Experimental regnegotiation in s_server -www mode. If the client
- browses /reneg connection is renegotiated. If /renegcert it is
- renegotiated requesting a certificate.
- [Steve Henson]
+ *) Fixes and wildcard matching support to hostname and email checking
+ functions. Add manual page.
+ [Florian Weimer (Red Hat Product Security Team)]
- *) Add an "external" session cache for debugging purposes to s_server. This
- should help trace issues which normally are only apparent in deployed
- multi-process servers.
+ *) New functions to check a hostname email or IP address against a
+ certificate. Add options x509 utility to print results of checks against
+ a certificate.
[Steve Henson]
- *) Extensive audit of libcrypto with DEBUG_UNUSED. Fix many cases where
- return value is ignored. NB. The functions RAND_add(), RAND_seed(),
- BIO_set_cipher() and some obscure PEM functions were changed so they
- can now return an error. The RAND changes required a change to the
- RAND_METHOD structure.
- [Steve Henson]
+ *) Fix OCSP checking.
+ [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com> and Ben Laurie]
- *) New macro __owur for "OpenSSL Warn Unused Result". This makes use of
- a gcc attribute to warn if the result of a function is ignored. This
- is enable if DEBUG_UNUSED is set. Add to several functions in evp.h
- whose return value is often ignored.
+ *) Initial experimental support for explicitly trusted non-root CAs.
+ OpenSSL still tries to build a complete chain to a root but if an
+ intermediate CA has a trust setting included that is used. The first
+ setting is used: whether to trust (e.g., -addtrust option to the x509
+ utility) or reject.
[Steve Henson]
- Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.0.2 [xx XXX xxxx]
+ *) Add -trusted_first option which attempts to find certificates in the
+ trusted store even if an untrusted chain is also supplied.
+ [Steve Henson]
*) MIPS assembly pack updates: support for MIPS32r2 and SmartMIPS ASE,
platform support for Linux and Android.
[Andy Polyakov]
- *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
- the right response is stapled. Also change current certificate to
- the certificate actually sent.
- See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
- [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
-
*) Support for linux-x32, ILP32 environment in x86_64 framework.
[Andy Polyakov]
- *) RFC 5878 support.
- [Emilia Kasper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie (Google)]
-
*) Experimental multi-implementation support for FIPS capable OpenSSL.
When in FIPS mode the approved implementations are used as normal,
when not in FIPS mode the internal unapproved versions are used instead.
certificates.
[Steve Henson]
- Changes between 1.0.1c and 1.0.1d [xx XXX xxxx]
+ *) New function i2d_re_X509_tbs for re-encoding the TBS portion of
+ the certificate.
+ Note: Related 1.0.2-beta specific macros X509_get_cert_info,
+ X509_CINF_set_modified, X509_CINF_get_issuer, X509_CINF_get_extensions and
+ X509_CINF_get_signature were reverted post internal team review.
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1j and 1.0.1k [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+ *) Abort handshake if server key exchange message is omitted for ephemeral
+ ECDH ciphersuites.
+
+ Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA for
+ reporting this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3572)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Remove non-export ephemeral RSA code on client and server. This code
+ violated the TLS standard by allowing the use of temporary RSA keys in
+ non-export ciphersuites and could be used by a server to effectively
+ downgrade the RSA key length used to a value smaller than the server
+ certificate. Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at
+ INRIA or reporting this issue.
+ (CVE-2015-0204)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Ensure that the session ID context of an SSL is updated when its
+ SSL_CTX is updated via SSL_set_SSL_CTX.
+
+ The session ID context is typically set from the parent SSL_CTX,
+ and can vary with the CTX.
+ [Adam Langley]
+
+ *) Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
+
+ By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
+ certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
+ Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
+ this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
+ certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
+
+ 1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
+
+ If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
+ the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
+
+ 2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
+
+ Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
+ certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
+ errors for some broken certificates.
+
+ Thanks to Konrad Kraszewski from Google for reporting this issue.
+
+ 3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
+
+ Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
+ signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
+
+ This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
+ (thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
+ program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
+ (negative or with leading zeroes).
+
+ Further analysis was conducted and fixes were developed by Stephen Henson
+ of the OpenSSL core team.
+
+ (CVE-2014-8275)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Do not resume sessions on the server if the negotiated protocol
+ version does not match the session's version. Resuming with a different
+ version, while not strictly forbidden by the RFC, is of questionable
+ sanity and breaks all known clients.
+ [David Benjamin, Emilia Käsper]
+
+ *) Tighten handling of the ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) message: reject
+ early CCS messages during renegotiation. (Note that because
+ renegotiation is encrypted, this early CCS was not exploitable.)
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ *) Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
+ ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
+ the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
+ reuse the old extension state and thus accept a session ticket if one was
+ announced in the initial ServerHello.
+
+ Similarly, ensure that the client requires a session ticket if one
+ was advertised in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
+ ignore a missing NewSessionTicket message.
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1i and 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014]
+
+ *) SRTP Memory Leak.
+
+ A flaw in the DTLS SRTP extension parsing code allows an attacker, who
+ sends a carefully crafted handshake message, to cause OpenSSL to fail
+ to free up to 64k of memory causing a memory leak. This could be
+ exploited in a Denial Of Service attack. This issue affects OpenSSL
+ 1.0.1 server implementations for both SSL/TLS and DTLS regardless of
+ whether SRTP is used or configured. Implementations of OpenSSL that
+ have been compiled with OPENSSL_NO_SRTP defined are not affected.
+
+ The fix was developed by the OpenSSL team.
+ (CVE-2014-3513)
+ [OpenSSL team]
+
+ *) Session Ticket Memory Leak.
+
+ When an OpenSSL SSL/TLS/DTLS server receives a session ticket the
+ integrity of that ticket is first verified. In the event of a session
+ ticket integrity check failing, OpenSSL will fail to free memory
+ causing a memory leak. By sending a large number of invalid session
+ tickets an attacker could exploit this issue in a Denial Of Service
+ attack.
+ (CVE-2014-3567)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Build option no-ssl3 is incomplete.
+
+ When OpenSSL is configured with "no-ssl3" as a build option, servers
+ could accept and complete a SSL 3.0 handshake, and clients could be
+ configured to send them.
+ (CVE-2014-3568)
+ [Akamai and the OpenSSL team]
+
+ *) Add support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.
+ Client applications doing fallback retries should call
+ SSL_set_mode(s, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV).
+ (CVE-2014-3566)
+ [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Add additional DigestInfo checks.
+
+ Reencode DigestInto in DER and check against the original when
+ verifying RSA signature: this will reject any improperly encoded
+ DigestInfo structures.
+
+ Note: this is a precautionary measure and no attacks are currently known.
+
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1h and 1.0.1i [6 Aug 2014]
+
+ *) Fix SRP buffer overrun vulnerability. Invalid parameters passed to the
+ SRP code can be overrun an internal buffer. Add sanity check that
+ g, A, B < N to SRP code.
+
+ Thanks to Sean Devlin and Watson Ladd of Cryptography Services, NCC
+ Group for discovering this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3512)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) A flaw in the OpenSSL SSL/TLS server code causes the server to negotiate
+ TLS 1.0 instead of higher protocol versions when the ClientHello message
+ is badly fragmented. This allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to force a
+ downgrade to TLS 1.0 even if both the server and the client support a
+ higher protocol version, by modifying the client's TLS records.
+
+ Thanks to David Benjamin and Adam Langley (Google) for discovering and
+ researching this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3511)
+ [David Benjamin]
+
+ *) OpenSSL DTLS clients enabling anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuites are subject
+ to a denial of service attack. A malicious server can crash the client
+ with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an anonymous (EC)DH
+ ciphersuite and sending carefully crafted handshake messages.
+
+ Thanks to Felix Gröbert (Google) for discovering and researching this
+ issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3510)
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ *) By sending carefully crafted DTLS packets an attacker could cause openssl
+ to leak memory. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
+ Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3507)
+ [Adam Langley]
+
+ *) An attacker can force openssl to consume large amounts of memory whilst
+ processing DTLS handshake messages. This can be exploited through a
+ Denial of Service attack.
+ Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3506)
+ [Adam Langley]
+
+ *) An attacker can force an error condition which causes openssl to crash
+ whilst processing DTLS packets due to memory being freed twice. This
+ can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
+ Thanks to Adam Langley and Wan-Teh Chang for discovering and researching
+ this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3505)
+ [Adam Langley]
+
+ *) If a multithreaded client connects to a malicious server using a resumed
+ session and the server sends an ec point format extension it could write
+ up to 255 bytes to freed memory.
+
+ Thanks to Gabor Tyukasz (LogMeIn Inc) for discovering and researching this
+ issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3509)
+ [Gabor Tyukasz]
+
+ *) A malicious server can crash an OpenSSL client with a null pointer
+ dereference (read) by specifying an SRP ciphersuite even though it was not
+ properly negotiated with the client. This can be exploited through a
+ Denial of Service attack.
+
+ Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamäki (Codenomicon) for
+ discovering and researching this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-5139)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) A flaw in OBJ_obj2txt may cause pretty printing functions such as
+ X509_name_oneline, X509_name_print_ex et al. to leak some information
+ from the stack. Applications may be affected if they echo pretty printing
+ output to the attacker.
+
+ Thanks to Ivan Fratric (Google) for discovering this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-3508)
+ [Emilia Käsper, and Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.)
+ for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to
+ bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.)
+ [Bodo Moeller]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1g and 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014]
+
+ *) Fix for SSL/TLS MITM flaw. An attacker using a carefully crafted
+ handshake can force the use of weak keying material in OpenSSL
+ SSL/TLS clients and servers.
+
+ Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for discovering and
+ researching this issue. (CVE-2014-0224)
+ [KIKUCHI Masashi, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix DTLS recursion flaw. By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an
+ OpenSSL DTLS client the code can be made to recurse eventually crashing
+ in a DoS attack.
+
+ Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue.
+ (CVE-2014-0221)
+ [Imre Rad, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability. A buffer overrun attack can
+ be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments to an OpenSSL DTLS
+ client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run arbitrary
+ code on a vulnerable client or server.
+
+ Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195)
+ [Jüri Aedla, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix bug in TLS code where clients enable anonymous ECDH ciphersuites
+ are subject to a denial of service attack.
+
+ Thanks to Felix Gröbert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering
+ this issue. (CVE-2014-3470)
+ [Felix Gröbert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display
+ compilation flags.
+ [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]
+
+ *) Fix eckey_priv_encode so it immediately returns an error upon a failure
+ in i2d_ECPrivateKey.
+ [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]
+
+ *) Fix some double frees. These are not thought to be exploitable.
+ [mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1f and 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014]
+
+ *) A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
+ can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
+ server.
+
+ Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
+ Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
+ preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
+ [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller]
+
+ *) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL
+ ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack"
+ by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from:
+ http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140
+
+ Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this
+ flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076)
+ [Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger]
+
+ *) TLS pad extension: draft-agl-tls-padding-03
+
+ Workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771): if the
+ TLS client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and
+ less that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it
+ is at least 512 bytes long.
+
+ [Adam Langley, Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1e and 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014]
+
+ *) Fix for TLS record tampering bug. A carefully crafted invalid
+ handshake could crash OpenSSL with a NULL pointer exception.
+ Thanks to Anton Johansson for reporting this issues.
+ (CVE-2013-4353)
+
+ *) Keep original DTLS digest and encryption contexts in retransmission
+ structures so we can use the previous session parameters if they need
+ to be resent. (CVE-2013-6450)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add option SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) which
+ avoids preferring ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be
+ Safari on OS X. Safari on OS X 10.8..10.8.3 advertises support for
+ several ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers, but fails to negotiate them. The bug
+ is fixed in OS X 10.8.4, but Apple have ruled out both hot fixing
+ 10.8..10.8.3 and forcing users to upgrade to 10.8.4 or newer.
+ [Rob Stradling, Adam Langley]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1d and 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013]
+
+ *) Correct fix for CVE-2013-0169. The original didn't work on AES-NI
+ supporting platforms or when small records were transferred.
+ [Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.1c and 1.0.1d [5 Feb 2013]
+
+ *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
+
+ This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by
+ Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
+ at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/
+
+ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+ Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+ (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
+ Emilia Käsper for the initial patch.
+ (CVE-2013-0169)
+ [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix flaw in AESNI handling of TLS 1.2 and 1.1 records for CBC mode
+ ciphersuites which can be exploited in a denial of service attack.
+ Thanks go to and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for discovering
+ and detecting this bug and to Wolfgang Ettlinger
+ <wolfgang.ettlinger@gmail.com> for independently discovering this issue.
+ (CVE-2012-2686)
+ [Adam Langley]
+
+ *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
+ This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Make openssl verify return errors.
+ [Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com> and Ben Laurie]
+
+ *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
+ the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
+ so it returns the certificate actually sent.
+ See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
+ [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
*) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 1.0.1b and 1.0.1c [10 May 2012]
*) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in TLS
- 1.2, 1.1 and DTLS to avoid DoS attack.
+ 1.2, 1.1 and DTLS to fix DoS attack.
Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
fuzzing as a service testing platform.
*) OpenSSL 1.0.0 sets SSL_OP_ALL to 0x80000FFFL and OpenSSL 1.0.1 and
1.0.1a set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to 0x00000400L which would unfortunately
mean any application compiled against OpenSSL 1.0.0 headers setting
- SSL_OP_ALL would also set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, unintentionally disabling
+ SSL_OP_ALL would also set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, unintentionally disablng
TLS 1.1 also. Fix this by changing the value of SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to
0x10000000L Any application which was previously compiled against
OpenSSL 1.0.1 or 1.0.1a headers and which cares about SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
in unlike event, limit maximum offered version to TLS 1.0 [see below].
[Steve Henson]
- *) In order to ensure interoperability SSL_OP_NO_protocolX does not
+ *) In order to ensure interoperabilty SSL_OP_NO_protocolX does not
disable just protocol X, but all protocols above X *if* there are
protocols *below* X still enabled. In more practical terms it means
that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favor of TLS1.1 and
[Adam Langley]
*) Workarounds for some broken servers that "hang" if a client hello
- record length exceeds 255 bytes:
-
+ record length exceeds 255 bytes.
+
1. Do not use record version number > TLS 1.0 in initial client
hello: some (but not all) hanging servers will now work.
2. If we set OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH this will truncate
- the number of ciphers sent in the client hello. This should be
+ the number of ciphers sent in the client hello. This should be
set to an even number, such as 50, for example by passing:
-DOPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH=50 to config or Configure.
Most broken servers should now work.
3. If all else fails setting OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT will disable
- TLS 1.2 client support entirely.
+ TLS 1.2 client support entirely.
[Steve Henson]
*) Fix SEGV in Vector Permutation AES module observed in OpenSSH.
Add command line options to s_client/s_server.
[Steve Henson]
+ Changes between 1.0.0j and 1.0.0k [5 Feb 2013]
+
+ *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
+
+ This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by
+ Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
+ at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/
+
+ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+ Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+ (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
+ Emilia Käsper for the initial patch.
+ (CVE-2013-0169)
+ [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
+ This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
+ the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
+ so it returns the certificate actually sent.
+ See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
+ (This is a backport)
+ [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
+
+ *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0i and 1.0.0j [10 May 2012]
+
+ [NB: OpenSSL 1.0.0i and later 1.0.0 patch levels were released after
+ OpenSSL 1.0.1.]
+
+ *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
+ to fix DoS attack.
+
+ Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
+ fuzzing as a service testing platform.
+ (CVE-2012-2333)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
+ Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.0i [19 Apr 2012]
+
+ *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
+ BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
+ in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
+
+ Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
+ issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
+ (CVE-2012-2110)
+ [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
+
Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]
*) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
*) New option -sigopt to dgst utility. Update dgst to use
EVP_Digest{Sign,Verify}*. These two changes make it possible to use
- alternative signing parameters such as X9.31 or PSS in the dgst
+ alternative signing paramaters such as X9.31 or PSS in the dgst
utility.
[Steve Henson]
most recently disabled ciphersuites when "HIGH" is parsed).
Also, change ssl_create_cipher_list() (using this new
- functionality) such that between otherwise identical
+ funcionality) such that between otherwise identical
cihpersuites, ephemeral ECDH is preferred over ephemeral DH in
the default order.
[Bodo Moeller]
functional reference processing.
[Steve Henson]
- *) New functions EVP_Digest{Sign,Verify)*. These are enhance versions of
+ *) New functions EVP_Digest{Sign,Verify)*. These are enchance versions of
EVP_{Sign,Verify}* which allow an application to customise the signature
process.
[Steve Henson]
'-key2 ...', '-servername_fatal' (subject to change). This allows
testing the HostName extension for a specific single host name ('-cert'
and '-key' remain fallbacks for handshakes without HostName
- negotiation). If the unrecogninzed_name alert has to be sent, this by
+ negotiation). If the unrecognized_name alert has to be sent, this by
default is a warning; it becomes fatal with the '-servername_fatal'
option.
*) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default.
[NTT]
+ Changes between 0.9.8x and 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013]
+
+ *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
+
+ This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by
+ Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
+ at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/
+
+ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+ Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+ (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
+ Emilia Käsper for the initial patch.
+ (CVE-2013-0169)
+ [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
+ This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
+ the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
+ so it returns the certificate actually sent.
+ See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
+ (This is a backport)
+ [Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>]
+
+ *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8w and 0.9.8x [10 May 2012]
+
+ *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
+ to fix DoS attack.
+
+ Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
+ fuzzing as a service testing platform.
+ (CVE-2012-2333)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
+ Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8v and 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012]
+
+ *) The fix for CVE-2012-2110 did not take into account that the
+ 'len' argument to BUF_MEM_grow and BUF_MEM_grow_clean is an
+ int in OpenSSL 0.9.8, making it still vulnerable. Fix by
+ rejecting negative len parameter. (CVE-2012-2131)
+ [Tomas Hoger <thoger@redhat.com>]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8u and 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012]
+
+ *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
+ BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
+ in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
+
+ Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
+ issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
+ (CVE-2012-2110)
+ [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8t and 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012]
+
+ *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness
+ in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for
+ content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack
+ needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The
+ old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the
+ CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where
+ an MMA defence is not necessary.
+ Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering
+ this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a
+ client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to
+ Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering this bug.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
Changes between 0.9.8s and 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012]
*) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.
Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
[Antonio Martin]
-
+
Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]
*) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension
*) Fix for double free bug in ssl/s3_clnt.c CVE-2010-2939
[Steve Henson]
- *) Don't re-encode certificate when calculating signature: cache and use
+ *) Don't reencode certificate when calculating signature: cache and use
the original encoding instead. This makes signature verification of
some broken encodings work correctly.
[Steve Henson]
processed after finishing the corresponding handshake. There is
currently no limitation to this buffer allowing an attacker to perform
a DOS attack with sending records with future epochs until there is no
- memory left. This patch adds the pqueue_size() function to detemine
+ memory left. This patch adds the pqueue_size() function to determine
the size of a buffer and limits the record buffer to 100 entries.
(CVE-2009-1377)
[Robin Seggelmann, discovered by Daniel Mentz]
ChangeCipherSpec as first record (CVE-2009-1386).
[PR #1679]
- *) Fix a state transitition in s3_srvr.c and d1_srvr.c
+ *) Fix a state transition in s3_srvr.c and d1_srvr.c
(was using SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B, should be ..._ST_SW_SRVR_...).
[Nagendra Modadugu]
This work was sponsored by Logica.
[Steve Henson]
- *) Fix bug in X509_ATTRIBUTE creation: don't set attribute using
+ *) Fix bug in X509_ATTRIBUTE creation: dont set attribute using
ASN1_TYPE_set1 if MBSTRING flag set. This bug would crash certain
- attribute creation routines such as certificate requests and PKCS#12
+ attribute creation routines such as certifcate requests and PKCS#12
files.
[Steve Henson]
Changes between 0.9.8g and 0.9.8h [28 May 2008]
*) Fix flaw if 'Server Key exchange message' is omitted from a TLS
- handshake which could lead to a client crash as found using the
+ handshake which could lead to a cilent crash as found using the
Codenomicon TLS test suite (CVE-2008-1672)
[Steve Henson, Mark Cox]
[Ian Lister (tweaked by Geoff Thorpe)]
*) Backport of CMS code to OpenSSL 0.9.8. This differs from the 0.9.9
- implementation in the following ways:
+ implemention in the following ways:
Lack of EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD means algorithm parameters have to be
hard coded.
'-key2 ...', '-servername_fatal' (subject to change). This allows
testing the HostName extension for a specific single host name ('-cert'
and '-key' remain fallbacks for handshakes without HostName
- negotiation). If the unrecogninzed_name alert has to be sent, this by
+ negotiation). If the unrecognized_name alert has to be sent, this by
default is a warning; it becomes fatal with the '-servername_fatal'
option.
The proper fix will be to use different bits for AES128 and
AES256, which would have avoided the problems from the beginning;
however, bits are scarce, so we can only do this in a new release
- (not just a patch level) when we can change the SSL_CIPHER
+ (not just a patchlevel) when we can change the SSL_CIPHER
definition to split the single 'unsigned long mask' bitmap into
multiple values to extend the available space.
unofficial, and the ID has long expired.
[Bodo Moeller]
- *) Fix RSA blinding Heisenbug (problems sometimes occurred on
+ *) Fix RSA blinding Heisenbug (problems sometimes occured on
dual-core machines) and other potential thread-safety issues.
[Bodo Moeller]
(see http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/info/chiteki.html).
Also, add Camellia TLS ciphersuites from RFC 4132.
- To minimize changes between patch levels in the OpenSSL 0.9.8
+ To minimize changes between patchlevels in the OpenSSL 0.9.8
series, Camellia remains excluded from compilation unless OpenSSL
is configured with 'enable-camellia'.
[NTT]
*) Disable the padding bug check when compression is in use. The padding
bug check assumes the first packet is of even length, this is not
- necessarily true if compression is enabled and can result in false
+ necessarily true if compresssion is enabled and can result in false
positives causing handshake failure. The actual bug test is ancient
code so it is hoped that implementations will either have fixed it by
now or any which still have the bug do not support compression.
to SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file() and SSL_use_PrivateKey_file()
[Walter Goulet]
- *) Remove buggy and incomplete DH certificate support from
+ *) Remove buggy and incomplete DH cert support from
ssl/ssl_rsa.c and ssl/s3_both.c
[Nils Larsch]
[Ben Laurie]
*) Change ./Configure so that certain algorithms can be disabled by default.
- The new counter piece to "no-xxx" is "enable-xxx".
+ The new counterpiece to "no-xxx" is "enable-xxx".
The patented RC5 and MDC2 algorithms will now be disabled unless
"enable-rc5" and "enable-mdc2", respectively, are specified.
we can fix the problem directly in the 'ca' utility.)
[Steve Henson]
- *) Reduced header interdependencies by declaring more opaque objects in
+ *) Reduced header interdepencies by declaring more opaque objects in
ossl_typ.h. As a consequence, including some headers (eg. engine.h) will
give fewer recursive includes, which could break lazy source code - so
this change is covered by the OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED symbol. As always,
*) Key-generation can now be implemented in RSA_METHOD, DSA_METHOD
and DH_METHOD (eg. by ENGINE implementations) to override the normal
software implementations. For DSA and DH, parameter generation can
- also be overridden by providing the appropriate method callbacks.
+ also be overriden by providing the appropriate method callbacks.
[Geoff Thorpe]
*) Change the "progress" mechanism used in key-generation and
the "shared" options was given to ./Configure or ./config.
Otherwise, they are inserted in libcrypto.a.
/usr/local/ssl/engines is the default directory for dynamic
- engines, but that can be overridden at configure time through
+ engines, but that can be overriden at configure time through
the usual use of --prefix and/or --openssldir, and at run
time with the environment variable OPENSSL_ENGINES.
[Geoff Thorpe and Richard Levitte]
unofficial, and the ID has long expired.
[Bodo Moeller]
- *) Fix RSA blinding Heisenbug (problems sometimes occurred on
+ *) Fix RSA blinding Heisenbug (problems sometimes occured on
dual-core machines) and other potential thread-safety issues.
[Bodo Moeller]
[Steve Henson]
*) Add new Windows build target VC-32-GMAKE for VC++. This uses GNU make
- from a Windows bash shell such as MSYS. It is auto-detected from the
+ from a Windows bash shell such as MSYS. It is autodetected from the
"config" script when run from a VC++ environment. Modify standard VC++
build to use fipscanister.o from the GNU make build.
[Steve Henson]
[Steve Henson]
*) Perform some character comparisons of different types in X509_NAME_cmp:
- this is needed for some certificates that re-encode DNs into UTF8Strings
+ this is needed for some certificates that reencode DNs into UTF8Strings
(in violation of RFC3280) and can't or wont issue name rollover
certificates.
[Steve Henson]
done
To be absolutely sure not to disturb the source tree, a "make clean"
- is a good thing. If it isn't successful, don't worry about it,
+ is a good thing. If it isn't successfull, don't worry about it,
it probably means the source directory is very clean.
[Richard Levitte]
[Steve Henson]
*) Move default behaviour from OPENSSL_config(). If appname is NULL
- use "openssl_conf". If filename is NULL use default openssl config file.
+ use "openssl_conf" if filename is NULL use default openssl config file.
[Steve Henson]
*) Add an argument to OPENSSL_config() to allow the use of an alternative
default_algorithms = RSA, DSA, RAND, CIPHERS, DIGESTS
[Steve Henson]
- *) Prelminary ENGINE config module.
+ *) Preliminary ENGINE config module.
[Steve Henson]
*) New experimental application configuration code.
*) Major restructuring to the underlying ENGINE code. This includes
reduction of linker bloat, separation of pure "ENGINE" manipulation
(initialisation, etc) from functionality dealing with implementations
- of specific crypto interfaces. This change also introduces integrated
+ of specific crypto iterfaces. This change also introduces integrated
support for symmetric ciphers and digest implementations - so ENGINEs
can now accelerate these by providing EVP_CIPHER and EVP_MD
implementations of their own. This is detailed in crypto/engine/README
missing functions (including a catch-all ENGINE_cpy that duplicates
all ENGINE values onto a new ENGINE except reference counts/state).
- Removed NULL parameter checks in get/set functions. Setting a method
- or function to NULL is a way of canceling out a previously set
+ or function to NULL is a way of cancelling out a previously set
value. Passing a NULL ENGINE parameter is just plain stupid anyway
and doesn't justify the extra error symbols and code.
- Deprecate the ENGINE_FLAGS_MALLOCED define and move the area for
[Steve Henson]
*) Enhance mkdef.pl to be more accepting about spacing in C preprocessor
- lines, recognise more "algorithms" that can be deselected, and make
+ lines, recognice more "algorithms" that can be deselected, and make
it complain about algorithm deselection that isn't recognised.
[Richard Levitte]
*) New function X509V3_add1_i2d(). This automatically encodes and
adds an extension. Its behaviour can be customised with various
flags to append, replace or delete. Various wrappers added for
- certificates and CRLs.
+ certifcates and CRLs.
[Steve Henson]
*) Fix to avoid calling the underlying ASN1 print routine when
[Lenka Fibikova <fibikova@exp-math.uni-essen.de>, Bodo Moeller]
#if 0
- The following entry accidentily appeared in the CHANGES file
+ The following entry accidentally appeared in the CHANGES file
distributed with OpenSSL 0.9.7. The modifications described in
it do *not* apply to OpenSSL 0.9.7.
Changes between 0.9.6h and 0.9.6i [19 Feb 2003]
*) In ssl3_get_record (ssl/s3_pkt.c), minimize information leaked
- via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrect
+ via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrrect
block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure
against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish
between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078)
[Nils Larsch <nla@trustcenter.de>]
*) Fix BASE64 decode (EVP_DecodeUpdate) for data with CR/LF ended lines:
- an end-of-file condition would erroneously be flagged, when the CRLF
+ an end-of-file condition would erronously be flagged, when the CRLF
was just at the end of a processed block. The bug was discovered when
processing data through a buffering memory BIO handing the data to a
BASE64-decoding BIO. Bug fund and patch submitted by Pavel Tsekov
*) Fix ssl/s3_enc.c, ssl/t1_enc.c and ssl/s3_pkt.c so that we don't
reveal whether illegal block cipher padding was found or a MAC
- verification error occurred. (Neither SSLerr() codes nor alerts
+ verification error occured. (Neither SSLerr() codes nor alerts
are directly visible to potential attackers, but the information
may leak via logfiles.)
[Sven Uszpelkat <su@celocom.de>]
*) Major change in util/mkdef.pl to include extra information
- about each symbol, as well as presentig variables as well
+ about each symbol, as well as presenting variables as well
as functions. This change means that there's n more need
to rebuild the .num files when some algorithms are excluded.
[Richard Levitte]
*) When some versions of IIS use the 'NET' form of private key the
key derivation algorithm is different. Normally MD5(password) is
used as a 128 bit RC4 key. In the modified case
- MD5(MD5(password) + "SGCKEYSALT") is used instead. Added some
+ MD5(MD5(password) + "SGCKEYSALT") is used instead. Added some
new functions i2d_RSA_NET(), d2i_RSA_NET() etc which are the same
as the old Netscape_RSA functions except they have an additional
'sgckey' parameter which uses the modified algorithm. Also added
its own key.
ssl_cert_dup, which is used by SSL_new, now copies DH keys in addition
to parameters -- in previous versions (since OpenSSL 0.9.3) the
- 'default key' from SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh would always be lost, meanings
- you effectively got SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE when using this macro.
+ 'default key' from SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh would always be lost, meaning
+ you effectivly got SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE when using this macro.
[Bodo Moeller]
*) New s_client option -ign_eof: EOF at stdin is ignored, and
*) In util/mkerr.pl (which implements 'make errors'), preserve
reason strings from the previous version of the .c file, as
- the default to have only lowercase letters (and digits) in
+ the default to have only downcase letters (and digits) in
automatically generated reasons codes is not always appropriate.
[Bodo Moeller]
include a #define from the old name to the new. The original intent
was that statically linked binaries could for example just call
SSLeay_add_all_ciphers() to just add ciphers to the table and not
- link with digests. This never worked becayse SSLeay_add_all_digests()
+ link with digests. This never worked because SSLeay_add_all_digests()
and SSLeay_add_all_ciphers() were in the same source file so calling
one would link with the other. They are now in separate source files.
[Steve Henson]
*) Changes to X509_ATTRIBUTE utilities. These have been renamed from
X509_*() to X509at_*() on the grounds that they don't handle X509
- structures and behave in an analagous way to the X509v3 functions:
+ structures and behave in an analogous way to the X509v3 functions:
they shouldn't be called directly but wrapper functions should be used
instead.
*) Bugfix: ssl23_get_client_hello did not work properly when called in
state SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, i.e. when the first 7 bytes of
a SSLv2-compatible client hello for SSLv3 or TLSv1 could be read,
- but a retry condition occurred while trying to read the rest.
+ but a retry condition occured while trying to read the rest.
[Bodo Moeller]
*) The PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT_new() function was setting the content type as
*) Change type of various DES function arguments from des_cblock
(which means, in function argument declarations, pointer to char)
to des_cblock * (meaning pointer to array with 8 char elements),
- which allows the compiler to do more type checking; it was like
+ which allows the compiler to do more typechecking; it was like
that back in SSLeay, but with lots of ugly casts.
Introduce new type const_des_cblock.
[Matthias Loepfe <Matthias.Loepfe@adnovum.ch>]
*) Fix Makefile.org so CC,CFLAG etc are passed to 'make links' add
- advapi32.lib to Win32 build and change the pem test comparision
+ advapi32.lib to Win32 build and change the pem test comparison
to fc.exe (thanks to Ulrich Kroener <kroneru@yahoo.com> for the
suggestion). Fix misplaced ASNI prototypes and declarations in evp.h
and crypto/des/ede_cbcm_enc.c.
*) General source tree makefile cleanups: Made `making xxx in yyy...'
display consistent in the source tree and replaced `/bin/rm' by `rm'.
- Additonally cleaned up the `make links' target: Remove unnecessary
+ Additionally cleaned up the `make links' target: Remove unnecessary
semicolons, subsequent redundant removes, inline point.sh into mklink.sh
to speed processing and no longer clutter the display with confusing
stuff. Instead only the actually done links are displayed.
*) Merged the various old/obsolete SSLeay documentation files (doc/xxx.doc)
into a single doc/ssleay.txt bundle. This way the information is still
preserved but no longer messes up this directory. Now it's new room for
- the new set of documenation files.
+ the new set of documentation files.
[Ralf S. Engelschall]
*) SETs were incorrectly DER encoded. This was a major pain, because they
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff