Changes between 1.0.0 and 1.1.0 [xx XXX xxxx]
+ *) Initial CMAC implementation. WARNING: EXPERIMENTAL, API MAY CHANGE.
+ Add CMAC pkey methods.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Experiemental regnegotiation in s_server -www mode. If the client
+ browses /reneg connection is renegotiated. If /renegcert it is
+ renegotiated requesting a certificate.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
*) Add an "external" session cache for debugging purposes to s_server. This
should help trace issues which normally are only apparent in deployed
multi-process servers.
Changes between 0.9.8m (?) and 1.0.0 [xx XXX xxxx]
+ *) Add "missing" function EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(). This copies a cipher
+ context. The operation can be customised via the ctrl mechanism in
+ case ENGINEs want to include additional functionality.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Tolerate yet another broken PKCS#8 key format: private key value negative.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Add new -subject_hash_old and -issuer_hash_old options to x509 utility to
+ output hashes compatible with older versions of OpenSSL.
+ [Willy Weisz <weisz@vcpc.univie.ac.at>]
+
*) Fix compression algorithm handling: if resuming a session use the
compression algorithm of the resumed session instead of determining
it from client hello again. Don't allow server to change algorithm.
Changes between 0.9.8l (?) and 0.9.8m (?) [xx XXX xxxx]
+ *) The code that handled flushing of data in SSL/TLS originally used the
+ BIO_CTRL_INFO ctrl to see if any data was pending first. This caused
+ the problem outlined in PR#1949. The fix suggested there however can
+ trigger problems with buggy BIO_CTRL_WPENDING (e.g. some versions
+ of Apache). So instead simplify the code to flush unconditionally.
+ This should be fine since flushing with no data to flush is a no op.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Handle TLS versions 2.0 and later properly and correctly use the
+ highest version of TLS/SSL supported. Although TLS >= 2.0 is some way
+ off ancient servers have a habit of sticking around for a while...
+ [Steve Henson]
+
+ *) Modify compression code so it frees up structures without using the
+ ex_data callbacks. This works around a problem where some applications
+ call CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data() before application exit (e.g. when
+ restarting) then use compression (e.g. SSL with compression) later.
+ This results in significant per-connection memory leaks and
+ has caused some security issues including CVE-2008-1678 and
+ CVE-2009-4355.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
*) Add option SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT which will allow clients to
connect (but not renegotiate) with servers which do not support RI.
Until RI is more widely deployed this option is enabled by default.
[Steve Henson]
*) If client attempts to renegotiate and doesn't support RI respond with
- a no_renegotiation alert as required by draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation.
- Some renegotiating TLS clients will continue a connection gracefully
- when they receive the alert. Unfortunately OpenSSL mishandled
- this alert and would hang waiting for a server hello which it will never
- receive. Now we treat a received no_renegotiation alert as a fatal
- error. This is because applications requesting a renegotiation might well
- expect it to succeed and would have no code in place to handle the server
- denying it so the only safe thing to do is to terminate the connection.
+ a no_renegotiation alert as required by RFC5746. Some renegotiating
+ TLS clients will continue a connection gracefully when they receive
+ the alert. Unfortunately OpenSSL mishandled this alert and would hang
+ waiting for a server hello which it will never receive. Now we treat a
+ received no_renegotiation alert as a fatal error. This is because
+ applications requesting a renegotiation might well expect it to succeed
+ and would have no code in place to handle the server denying it so the
+ only safe thing to do is to terminate the connection.
[Steve Henson]
*) Add ctrl macro SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() which returns 1 if
the updated NID creation version. This should correctly handle UTF8.
[Steve Henson]
- *) Implement draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation. Re-enable
- renegotiation but require the extension as needed. Unfortunately,
- SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION turns out to be a
- bad idea. It has been replaced by
+ *) Implement RFC5746. Re-enable renegotiation but require the extension
+ as needed. Unfortunately, SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
+ turns out to be a bad idea. It has been replaced by
SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION which can be set with
SSL_CTX_set_options(). This is really not recommended unless you
know what you are doing.
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff