### Changes between 1.1.1 and 3.0 [xx XXX xxxx]
-* Removed FIPS_mode() and FIPS_mode_set(). These functions are legacy API's
+ * Deprecated EC_POINT_make_affine() and EC_POINTs_make_affine(). These
+ functions are not widely used and now OpenSSL automatically perform this
+ conversion when needed.
+
+ *Billy Bob Brumley*
+
+ * Deprecated EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(), EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult(), and
+ EC_KEY_precompute_mult(). These functions are not widely used and
+ applications should instead switch to named curves which OpenSSL has
+ hardcoded lookup tables for.
+
+ *Billy Bob Brumley*
+
+ * Deprecated EC_POINTs_mul(). This function is not widely used and applications
+ should instead use the L<EC_POINT_mul(3)> function.
+
+ *Billy Bob Brumley*
+
+ * Removed FIPS_mode() and FIPS_mode_set(). These functions are legacy API's
that are not applicable to the new provider model. Applications should
instead use EVP_default_properties_is_fips_enabled() and
EVP_default_properties_enable_fips().
*Shane Lontis*
+ * The SSL option SSL_OP_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF is introduced. If that option
+ is set, an unexpected EOF is ignored, it pretends a close notify was received
+ instead and so the returned error becomes SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN.
+
+ *Dmitry Belyavskiy*
+
* Deprecated EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp() and
EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(). These functions are not widely
used and applications should instead use the
*Richard Levitte*
* Added an implementation of CMP and CRMF (RFC 4210, RFC 4211 RFC 6712).
- This adds crypto/cmp/, crpyto/crmf/, and test/cmp_*.
- See L<OSSL_CMP_exec_IR_ses(3)> as starting point.
+ This adds crypto/cmp/, crpyto/crmf/, apps/cmp.c, and test/cmp_*.
+ See L<openssl-cmp(1)> and L<OSSL_CMP_exec_IR_ses(3)> as starting points.
- *David von Oheimb*
+ *David von Oheimb, Martin Peylo*
* Generalized the HTTP client code from crypto/ocsp/ into crpyto/http/.
The legacy OCSP-focused and only partly documented API is retained.
*Steve Henson*
- *) Correct Bignum squaring. Bignum squaring (BN_sqr) may produce incorrect
- results on some platforms, including x86_64. This bug occurs at random
- with a very low probability, and is not known to be exploitable in any
- way, though its exact impact is difficult to determine. Thanks to Pieter
- Wuille (Blockstream) who reported this issue and also suggested an initial
- fix. Further analysis was conducted by the OpenSSL development team and
- Adam Langley of Google. The final fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of
- the OpenSSL core team.
- [CVE-2014-3570][]
+ * Correct Bignum squaring. Bignum squaring (BN_sqr) may produce incorrect
+ results on some platforms, including x86_64. This bug occurs at random
+ with a very low probability, and is not known to be exploitable in any
+ way, though its exact impact is difficult to determine. Thanks to Pieter
+ Wuille (Blockstream) who reported this issue and also suggested an initial
+ fix. Further analysis was conducted by the OpenSSL development team and
+ Adam Langley of Google. The final fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of
+ the OpenSSL core team.
+ [CVE-2014-3570][]
*Andy Polyakov*
- *) Do not resume sessions on the server if the negotiated protocol
- version does not match the session's version. Resuming with a different
- version, while not strictly forbidden by the RFC, is of questionable
- sanity and breaks all known clients.
+ * Do not resume sessions on the server if the negotiated protocol
+ version does not match the session's version. Resuming with a different
+ version, while not strictly forbidden by the RFC, is of questionable
+ sanity and breaks all known clients.
*David Benjamin, Emilia Käsper*
- *) Tighten handling of the ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) message: reject
- early CCS messages during renegotiation. (Note that because
- renegotiation is encrypted, this early CCS was not exploitable.)
+ * Tighten handling of the ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) message: reject
+ early CCS messages during renegotiation. (Note that because
+ renegotiation is encrypted, this early CCS was not exploitable.)
*Emilia Käsper*
- *) Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
- ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
- the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
- reuse the old extension state and thus accept a session ticket if one was
- announced in the initial ServerHello.
+ * Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
+ ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
+ the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
+ reuse the old extension state and thus accept a session ticket if one was
+ announced in the initial ServerHello.
- Similarly, ensure that the client requires a session ticket if one
- was advertised in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
- ignore a missing NewSessionTicket message.
+ Similarly, ensure that the client requires a session ticket if one
+ was advertised in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
+ ignore a missing NewSessionTicket message.
*Emilia Käsper*
*Steve Henson*
- *) Correct Bignum squaring. Bignum squaring (BN_sqr) may produce incorrect
- results on some platforms, including x86_64. This bug occurs at random
- with a very low probability, and is not known to be exploitable in any
- way, though its exact impact is difficult to determine. Thanks to Pieter
- Wuille (Blockstream) who reported this issue and also suggested an initial
- fix. Further analysis was conducted by the OpenSSL development team and
- Adam Langley of Google. The final fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of
- the OpenSSL core team.
- [CVE-2014-3570][]
+ * Correct Bignum squaring. Bignum squaring (BN_sqr) may produce incorrect
+ results on some platforms, including x86_64. This bug occurs at random
+ with a very low probability, and is not known to be exploitable in any
+ way, though its exact impact is difficult to determine. Thanks to Pieter
+ Wuille (Blockstream) who reported this issue and also suggested an initial
+ fix. Further analysis was conducted by the OpenSSL development team and
+ Adam Langley of Google. The final fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of
+ the OpenSSL core team.
+ [CVE-2014-3570][]
- *Andy Polyakov*
+ *Andy Polyakov*
- *) Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
+ * Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff