2 * Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
13 #include <openssl/bio.h>
14 #include <openssl/x509.h>
15 #include <openssl/pem.h>
16 #include <openssl/err.h>
19 static const char *roots_f;
20 static const char *untrusted_f;
21 static const char *bad_f;
23 static STACK_OF(X509) *load_certs_from_file(const char *filename)
25 STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
29 bio = BIO_new_file(filename, "r");
35 certs = sk_X509_new_null();
43 x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, 0, NULL);
44 if (x != NULL && !sk_X509_push(certs, x)) {
45 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
48 } else if (x == NULL) {
50 * We probably just ran out of certs, so ignore any errors
63 * Test for CVE-2015-1793 (Alternate Chains Certificate Forgery)
65 * Chain is as follows:
67 * rootCA (self-signed)
71 * subinterCA subinterCA (self-signed)
73 * leaf ------------------
77 * rootCA, interCA, subinterCA, subinterCA (ss) all have CA=TRUE
78 * leaf and bad have CA=FALSE
80 * subinterCA and subinterCA (ss) have the same subject name and keys
82 * interCA (but not rootCA) and subinterCA (ss) are in the trusted store
84 * leaf and subinterCA are in the untrusted list (untrusted.pem)
85 * bad is the certificate being verified (bad.pem)
87 * Versions vulnerable to CVE-2015-1793 will fail to detect that leaf has
88 * CA=FALSE, and will therefore incorrectly verify bad
91 static int test_alt_chains_cert_forgery(void)
96 STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = NULL;
98 X509_STORE_CTX *sctx = NULL;
99 X509_STORE *store = NULL;
100 X509_LOOKUP *lookup = NULL;
102 store = X509_STORE_new();
106 lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(store, X509_LOOKUP_file());
109 if (!X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, roots_f, X509_FILETYPE_PEM))
112 untrusted = load_certs_from_file(untrusted_f);
114 if ((bio = BIO_new_file(bad_f, "r")) == NULL)
117 if ((x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, 0, NULL)) == NULL)
120 sctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
124 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(sctx, store, x, untrusted))
127 i = X509_verify_cert(sctx);
129 if (i == 0 && X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(sctx) == X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA) {
130 /* This is the result we were expecting: Test passed */
134 X509_STORE_CTX_free(sctx);
137 sk_X509_pop_free(untrusted, X509_free);
138 X509_STORE_free(store);
142 static int test_store_ctx(void)
144 X509_STORE_CTX *sctx = NULL;
147 int testresult = 0, ret;
149 bio = BIO_new_file(bad_f, "r");
153 x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, 0, NULL);
157 sctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
161 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(sctx, NULL, x, NULL))
164 /* Verifying a cert where we have no trusted certs should fail */
165 ret = X509_verify_cert(sctx);
168 /* This is the result we were expecting: Test passed */
173 X509_STORE_CTX_free(sctx);
179 OPT_TEST_DECLARE_USAGE("roots.pem untrusted.pem bad.pem\n")
181 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
182 static int test_sm2_id(void)
184 /* we only need an X509 structure, no matter if it's a real SM2 cert */
188 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *v = NULL, *v2 = NULL;
189 char *sm2id = "this is an ID";
191 bio = BIO_new_file(bad_f, "r");
195 x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, 0, NULL);
199 v = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
203 if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(v, (unsigned char *)sm2id, (int)strlen(sm2id))) {
204 ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(v);
208 X509_set0_sm2_id(x, v);
210 v2 = X509_get0_sm2_id(x);
212 || !TEST_int_eq(ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(v, v2), 0))
223 int setup_tests(void)
225 if (!TEST_ptr(roots_f = test_get_argument(0))
226 || !TEST_ptr(untrusted_f = test_get_argument(1))
227 || !TEST_ptr(bad_f = test_get_argument(2)))
230 ADD_TEST(test_alt_chains_cert_forgery);
231 ADD_TEST(test_store_ctx);
232 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
233 ADD_TEST(test_sm2_id);