2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, size_t ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, size_t sesslen,
26 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
27 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
29 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
33 tls1_generate_master_secret,
34 tls1_change_cipher_state,
35 tls1_final_finish_mac,
36 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
37 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
39 tls1_export_keying_material,
41 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
42 tls_close_construct_packet,
46 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
50 tls1_generate_master_secret,
51 tls1_change_cipher_state,
52 tls1_final_finish_mac,
53 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
54 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
56 tls1_export_keying_material,
57 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
58 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
59 tls_close_construct_packet,
63 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
67 tls1_generate_master_secret,
68 tls1_change_cipher_state,
69 tls1_final_finish_mac,
70 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
71 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
73 tls1_export_keying_material,
74 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
75 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
76 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
77 tls_close_construct_packet,
81 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
85 tls1_generate_master_secret,
86 tls1_change_cipher_state,
87 tls1_final_finish_mac,
88 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
89 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
91 tls1_export_keying_material,
92 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
93 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
94 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
95 tls_close_construct_packet,
99 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
102 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
103 * http, the cache would over fill
105 return (60 * 60 * 2);
112 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
116 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
118 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
122 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
125 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
126 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
128 s->version = s->method->version;
131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
134 int nid; /* Curve NID */
135 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
136 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
140 * Table of curve information.
141 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
142 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
144 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
145 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
146 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
147 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
148 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
149 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
150 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
151 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
152 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
153 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
154 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
155 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
156 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
157 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
158 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
159 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
160 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
161 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
162 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
163 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
164 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
165 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
166 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
167 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
168 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
169 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
170 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
171 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
172 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
173 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
176 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
177 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
178 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
179 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
182 /* The default curves */
183 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
184 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
185 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
186 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
187 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
190 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
191 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
192 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
193 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
194 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
195 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
196 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
197 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
200 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
201 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
203 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
204 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
205 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
206 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
207 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
208 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
209 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
210 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
211 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
212 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
213 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
214 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
215 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
216 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
217 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
218 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
219 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
220 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
221 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
222 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
223 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
224 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
227 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
228 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
229 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
232 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
234 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
235 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
236 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
238 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
240 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
244 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
247 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
248 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
255 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
257 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
258 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
259 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
260 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
261 * lists in the first place.
262 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
263 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
264 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
266 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
267 const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
269 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
271 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
272 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
274 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
275 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
276 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
277 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
278 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
281 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
282 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
286 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
287 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
291 *pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
292 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
295 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
296 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
300 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
301 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
302 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
306 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
311 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
312 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
314 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
317 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
319 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
320 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
321 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
324 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
327 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
328 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
330 const unsigned char *curves;
331 size_t num_curves, i;
332 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
333 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
335 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
337 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
340 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
341 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
343 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
344 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
346 } else /* Should never happen */
349 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
351 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
352 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
353 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
359 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
360 * if there is no match.
361 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
362 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
363 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
365 int tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
367 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
368 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
370 /* Can't do anything on client side */
374 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
376 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
377 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
379 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
380 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
381 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
382 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
383 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
384 /* Should never happen */
387 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
391 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
392 * but s->options is a long...
394 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
395 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
397 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
398 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
399 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
400 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
401 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
404 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
407 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
409 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
410 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
411 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
413 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
417 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
418 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
419 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
420 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
421 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
424 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
425 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
433 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
437 int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
438 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
440 unsigned char *glist, *p;
443 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
446 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
447 glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * 2);
450 for (i = 0, p = glist; i < ngroups; i++) {
451 unsigned long idmask;
453 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
454 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]);
456 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
465 *pextlen = ngroups * 2;
469 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
473 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
476 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
478 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
484 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
486 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
488 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
490 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
491 if (nid == NID_undef)
492 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
493 if (nid == NID_undef)
494 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
495 if (nid == NID_undef)
497 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
498 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
500 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
504 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
505 int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
509 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
513 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
516 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
517 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
524 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
525 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
528 /* Determine curve ID */
529 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
530 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
531 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
535 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
537 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
539 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
540 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
542 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
543 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
545 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
551 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
552 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
553 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
555 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
556 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
559 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
560 * supported (see RFC4492).
562 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
563 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
564 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
565 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
566 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
569 if (i == num_formats)
574 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
575 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
576 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
578 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
580 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
581 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
582 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
583 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
584 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
588 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
589 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
594 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
601 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
605 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
607 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
608 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
609 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
611 *pformats = ecformats_default;
612 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
614 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
616 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
621 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
622 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
624 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
626 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
629 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
632 /* If not EC nothing to do */
633 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
635 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
639 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
642 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
646 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
647 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
649 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
655 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
656 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
657 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
658 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
659 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
661 return 0; /* Should never happen */
662 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
663 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
665 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
667 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
668 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
669 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
671 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
677 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
679 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
681 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
683 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
684 * is compatible with the client extensions.
686 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
688 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
691 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
694 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
695 unsigned char curve_id[2];
696 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
697 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
698 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
699 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
700 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
704 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
705 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
709 /* Need a shared curve */
710 if (tls1_shared_group(s, 0))
714 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
718 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
723 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
726 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
727 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
730 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
731 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
733 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
736 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
737 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
739 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
743 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
745 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
748 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
749 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
750 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
751 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
753 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
754 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
755 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
756 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
757 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
758 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
759 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
760 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
761 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
762 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
766 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
767 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
768 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
769 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
772 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
775 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
779 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
780 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
781 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
782 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
784 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
785 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
788 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
789 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
793 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
794 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
795 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
796 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
797 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
798 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
799 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
801 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
802 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
807 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
808 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
810 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
811 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
813 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
814 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
815 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
816 /* Should never happen */
819 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
820 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
824 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
825 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
826 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
827 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
828 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
830 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
831 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
834 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
835 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
838 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
839 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
840 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
841 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
844 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
845 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
846 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
847 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
853 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
857 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
858 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
859 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
860 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
863 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
864 if (i == sent_sigslen
865 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
866 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
867 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
870 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
872 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
875 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
876 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
877 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
882 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
884 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
889 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
890 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
891 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
893 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
896 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
898 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
900 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
901 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
902 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
903 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
905 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
906 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
907 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
908 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
910 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
912 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
913 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
914 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
920 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
921 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
922 * @c: cipher to check
923 * @op: Security check that you want to do
925 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
927 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
929 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
930 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
932 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
934 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
935 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
937 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
938 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
941 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
944 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
946 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
948 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
951 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
953 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
954 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
964 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
965 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
966 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
967 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
968 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
971 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
973 PACKET extensions = *packet;
974 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
975 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
978 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
979 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
982 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
983 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
989 if (num_extensions <= 1)
992 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
993 if (extension_types == NULL) {
994 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
998 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
999 extensions = *packet;
1000 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1002 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
1003 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
1004 /* This should not happen. */
1005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1010 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1014 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1015 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1016 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1017 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1022 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1026 int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1028 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1029 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1031 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1033 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1034 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1036 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1037 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1039 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1040 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1041 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1042 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1050 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1051 if (s->renegotiate) {
1052 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1053 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1054 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1055 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1056 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1061 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1062 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1065 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1066 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1067 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1068 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
1069 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1070 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
1071 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1072 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
1073 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname,
1074 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname))
1075 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1076 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1077 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1081 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1082 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1083 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1084 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1085 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
1086 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1087 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1088 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
1089 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
1090 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
1091 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
1092 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1093 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1100 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1103 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1105 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1106 size_t num_curves, num_formats;
1109 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1111 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1112 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
1113 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1114 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
1115 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1121 * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
1123 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */
1124 pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
1125 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
1126 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1130 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
1131 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
1132 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1133 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1137 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1138 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1139 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1140 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurves[0])
1141 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurves[1])) {
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1143 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1148 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1149 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1153 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1155 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1157 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1158 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1159 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1160 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1161 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1162 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1163 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
1164 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1167 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1168 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1169 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1172 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1173 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1176 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1177 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick,
1179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1185 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1187 const unsigned char *salg;
1189 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1191 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1192 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
1193 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1194 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
1195 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1196 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
1197 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1198 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1199 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1203 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1204 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1207 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1208 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
1209 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1210 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1211 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
1212 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1216 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1217 unsigned char *idbytes;
1221 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1222 idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1224 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
1225 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
1226 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
1227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1231 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1232 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1236 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1237 unsigned char *extbytes;
1238 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1244 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
1245 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes)
1247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1251 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1257 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1258 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1263 * 1: peer may send requests
1264 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1266 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1267 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1269 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1271 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1272 /* Sub-packet for Hearbeat extension */
1273 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1274 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, mode)
1275 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1282 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1283 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1285 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1286 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1288 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1289 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1297 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1298 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1299 * (see longer comment below)
1301 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1302 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1303 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1304 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
1305 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1306 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1307 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1308 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1312 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1314 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1315 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1316 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
1317 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1320 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1321 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
1322 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1323 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
1324 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1328 ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
1329 for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) {
1330 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1331 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
1332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1336 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1337 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
1338 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1339 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1345 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1346 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1347 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, pkt, al)) {
1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1352 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
1353 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1354 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1361 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1362 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
1363 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1370 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1371 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1376 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1377 int min_version, max_version, reason, currv;
1378 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
1379 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1380 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1384 reason = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version);
1386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, reason);
1390 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to wheter
1391 * we should include versions <TLS1.2. For the moment we do. To be
1394 for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
1395 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this first if clause prior to release!! */
1396 if (currv == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1397 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)) {
1398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1399 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1402 } else if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
1403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1407 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1408 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1414 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1415 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1416 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1419 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1420 unsigned char *padbytes;
1423 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
1424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1428 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1429 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1435 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
1436 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
1437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1440 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
1448 int ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1450 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1451 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1453 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1454 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1455 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1456 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1457 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1460 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1461 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH)) {
1462 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1466 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1467 !ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, pkt)) {
1468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1472 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1473 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1476 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1477 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1478 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1479 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1484 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1486 const unsigned char *plist;
1489 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1491 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1493 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1494 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1495 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
1496 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1502 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1505 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1507 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1508 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1509 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1515 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1518 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1521 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1522 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1523 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1528 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1529 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1530 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1531 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1532 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1533 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1534 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1535 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1542 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1543 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1544 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1545 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1546 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1547 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1548 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1549 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1550 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1551 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1553 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1554 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1558 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1559 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1560 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1564 * 1: peer may send requests
1565 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1567 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1568 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1570 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1572 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1573 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1574 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, mode)
1575 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1576 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1584 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1585 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1586 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1587 const unsigned char *npa;
1588 unsigned int npalen;
1591 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1593 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1594 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1595 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1596 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1600 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1604 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, pkt, al)) {
1605 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1609 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1611 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1612 * for other cases too.
1614 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1615 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1616 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1617 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1618 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1620 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1621 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1622 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1627 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1628 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1629 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1630 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1635 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1636 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1637 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1638 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1639 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1640 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
1641 s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
1642 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1643 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1644 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1650 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1651 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1658 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1659 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1660 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1661 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1663 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1665 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1667 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1669 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1670 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1674 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1676 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1677 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1678 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1681 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1683 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1684 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1685 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1693 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1694 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1695 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1697 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
1699 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1700 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1702 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1703 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1704 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1705 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1706 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1708 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1709 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1710 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1711 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1712 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1715 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1716 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1717 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1718 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1721 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1731 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1732 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1733 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1738 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1739 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1740 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1741 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1743 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1749 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1750 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1751 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1752 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1753 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1754 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1755 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1757 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1758 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1759 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1760 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1761 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1762 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1763 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1764 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1765 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1766 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1767 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1768 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1769 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1772 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1773 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1775 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1777 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1778 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1779 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1783 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1786 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1787 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1789 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1792 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1795 * Loop through all remaining ClientHello extensions that we collected earlier
1796 * and haven't already processed. For each one parse it and update the SSL
1797 * object as required.
1799 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1800 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1803 * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1804 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1806 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, int *al)
1809 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1811 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1812 s->servername_done = 0;
1813 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1814 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1815 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1818 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1819 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1820 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1821 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
1822 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
1823 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1824 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1825 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1826 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1830 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1831 ssl_check_for_safari(s, hello);
1832 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1834 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1835 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1836 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1837 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1839 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1840 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1841 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1844 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1847 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
1848 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
1851 for (loop = 0; loop < hello->num_extensions; loop++) {
1852 RAW_EXTENSION *currext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[loop];
1854 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1855 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, currext->type,
1856 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
1857 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
1858 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1860 if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1861 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s,
1862 &currext->data, al))
1864 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1865 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1868 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1870 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1871 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1872 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1873 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1874 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1875 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1876 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1877 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1878 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1879 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1880 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1881 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1882 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1883 * the value of the Host: field.
1884 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1885 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1886 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1888 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1892 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1893 unsigned int servname_type;
1894 PACKET sni, hostname;
1896 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data, &sni)
1897 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
1898 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
1903 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
1904 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
1905 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
1907 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
1908 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
1909 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
1911 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
1912 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
1914 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
1915 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
1916 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
1921 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1922 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1926 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
1927 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1931 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
1932 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1936 s->servername_done = 1;
1939 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
1940 * fall back to a full handshake.
1942 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1943 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
1944 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
1947 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1948 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
1951 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data, &srp_I))
1954 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
1958 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
1959 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
1961 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
1962 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1968 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1969 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
1970 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
1972 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data,
1973 &ec_point_format_list)
1974 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
1979 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
1980 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
1982 session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
1983 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1987 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups) {
1988 PACKET supported_groups_list;
1990 /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
1991 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data,
1992 &supported_groups_list)
1993 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
1994 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
1999 if (!PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list,
2000 &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist,
2002 session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length)) {
2003 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2008 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2009 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2010 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2011 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s,
2012 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2013 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
2014 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
2015 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2018 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2019 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
2021 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data,
2022 &supported_sig_algs)
2023 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
2024 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
2029 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
2030 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2034 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2035 if (!PACKET_get_1(&currext->data,
2036 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
2040 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2041 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2042 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2043 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
2044 (&currext->data, &responder_id_list))
2048 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
2049 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
2051 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
2053 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2054 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
2055 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
2056 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2060 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
2063 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2065 PACKET responder_id;
2066 const unsigned char *id_data;
2068 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2070 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2074 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2075 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
2076 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2077 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2081 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2082 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2086 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2087 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2088 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2093 /* Read in request_extensions */
2094 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(
2095 &currext->data, &exts))
2098 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2099 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2100 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2101 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2102 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2103 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2104 (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2105 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2106 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2114 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2116 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2119 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2120 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2121 unsigned int hbtype;
2123 if (!PACKET_get_1(&currext->data, &hbtype)
2124 || PACKET_remaining(&currext->data)) {
2125 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2129 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2130 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2132 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2133 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2134 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2137 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2142 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2143 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
2144 && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2146 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2149 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2150 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2151 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2152 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2153 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2154 * anything like that, but this might change).
2156 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2157 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2158 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2159 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2160 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2162 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2166 else if (currext->type
2167 == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
2168 && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2169 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s,
2170 &currext->data, al))
2174 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2175 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2176 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2177 && currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2178 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s,
2179 &currext->data, al))
2183 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2184 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC))
2185 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2187 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2188 * tls_check_client_ems_support()
2192 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2193 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2194 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2195 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2196 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2199 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, currext->type,
2200 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2201 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data), al) <= 0)
2206 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2208 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2209 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2210 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2212 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2217 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2218 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2219 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2220 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2225 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
2228 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2229 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, hello, &al) <= 0) {
2230 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2233 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2242 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2243 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2244 * fill the length of the block.
2246 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2248 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2250 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2251 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2252 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2260 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2262 unsigned int length, type, size;
2263 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2264 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2266 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2267 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2269 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2271 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2272 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2273 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2274 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2275 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2278 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2280 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2282 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2285 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2286 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2290 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2291 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2295 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2296 const unsigned char *data;
2299 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2300 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2303 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2304 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2306 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2307 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2309 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2310 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2311 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2312 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2313 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2316 tlsext_servername = 1;
2318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2319 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2320 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2321 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2322 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2323 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2327 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2328 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2329 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2330 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2331 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2334 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2335 ecpointformatlist_length;
2336 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2337 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2338 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2339 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2345 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2347 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2348 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2349 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2350 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2352 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2355 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2356 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2359 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2360 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2362 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2365 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2366 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2369 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2370 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2374 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2375 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2376 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2378 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2379 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2380 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2381 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2382 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2383 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2385 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2387 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2388 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2389 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2392 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2396 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2397 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2398 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2399 unsigned char *selected;
2400 unsigned char selected_len;
2401 /* We must have requested it. */
2402 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2403 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2406 /* The data must be valid */
2407 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2408 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2411 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2414 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2415 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2416 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2420 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
2421 * a single Serverhello
2423 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
2424 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2425 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2426 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2429 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2430 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2431 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2435 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2437 /* We must have requested it. */
2438 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2439 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2443 * The extension data consists of:
2444 * uint16 list_length
2445 * uint8 proto_length;
2446 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2448 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2449 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2450 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2451 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2454 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2455 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2456 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2457 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2460 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2461 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2464 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2466 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2467 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2468 unsigned int hbtype;
2469 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2470 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2474 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2475 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2477 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2478 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2479 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2482 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2487 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2488 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2489 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2493 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2494 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2495 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) &&
2496 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2497 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2498 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2499 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2500 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2502 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2505 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2506 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2508 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2512 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2513 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2517 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2518 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2519 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2520 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2521 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2522 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2523 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2527 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2536 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2537 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2538 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2539 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2540 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2542 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2543 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2544 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2546 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2552 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2555 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2556 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2557 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2558 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2566 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2568 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2572 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2577 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2579 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2580 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2582 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2584 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2585 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2588 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2589 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2593 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2595 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2596 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2597 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2598 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2600 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2602 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2605 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2606 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2609 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2610 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2613 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2614 s->servername_done = 0;
2620 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2621 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2623 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2624 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2625 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2627 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2628 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2629 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2631 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2632 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2634 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2635 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2638 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2639 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2640 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2644 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2649 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2650 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2651 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2652 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2653 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2654 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2655 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2656 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2659 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2660 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2661 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2662 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2663 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2666 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2667 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2668 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2669 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2670 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2674 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2678 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2683 * Upon success, returns 1.
2684 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2686 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2688 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2691 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2692 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2693 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2694 * influence which certificate is sent
2696 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2698 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2699 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2700 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2701 if (certpkey != NULL) {
2703 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2704 * et al can pick it up.
2706 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2707 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2709 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2710 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2711 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2713 /* status request response should be sent */
2714 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2715 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2716 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2718 /* something bad happened */
2719 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2721 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2727 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
2734 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2736 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2737 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2739 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2741 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2742 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2743 * must contain uncompressed.
2745 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2746 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2747 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2748 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2749 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2750 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2751 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2752 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2754 unsigned char *list;
2755 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2756 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2757 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2758 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2759 found_uncompressed = 1;
2763 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2765 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2769 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2770 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2772 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2774 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2775 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2776 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2777 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2779 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2781 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2784 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2785 * that we don't receive a status message
2787 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2788 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2789 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = 0;
2792 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2793 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2796 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2797 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2800 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2801 s->servername_done = 0;
2807 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2810 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2812 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2813 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2817 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2818 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2825 * Given a list of extensions that we collected earlier, find one of a given
2826 * type and return it.
2828 * |exts| is the set of extensions previously collected.
2829 * |numexts| is the number of extensions that we have.
2830 * |type| the type of the extension that we are looking for.
2832 * Returns a pointer to the found RAW_EXTENSION data, or NULL if not found.
2834 RAW_EXTENSION *tls_get_extension_by_type(RAW_EXTENSION *exts, size_t numexts,
2839 for (loop = 0; loop < numexts; loop++) {
2840 if (exts[loop].type == type)
2848 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
2850 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
2851 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2852 * point to the resulting session.
2854 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2855 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2856 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2859 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2860 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2861 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2862 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2863 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2864 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2865 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2868 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2869 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2870 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2871 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2872 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2873 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2875 int tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
2879 const unsigned char *etick;
2881 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
2884 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2887 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2890 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
2893 ticketext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
2894 hello->num_extensions,
2895 TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket);
2896 if (ticketext == NULL)
2899 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
2902 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2905 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2908 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2910 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2911 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2912 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2913 * calculate the master secret later.
2917 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ticketext->data, &etick, size)) {
2918 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2921 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, hello->session_id,
2922 hello->session_id_len, ret);
2924 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2925 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2928 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2931 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2932 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2935 default: /* fatal error */
2941 * Sets the extended master secret flag if the extension is present in the
2947 int tls_check_client_ems_support(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
2949 RAW_EXTENSION *emsext;
2951 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2953 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION)
2956 emsext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
2957 hello->num_extensions,
2958 TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret);
2961 * No extensions is a success - we have successfully discovered that the
2962 * client doesn't support EMS.
2967 /* The extensions must always be empty */
2968 if (PACKET_remaining(&emsext->data) != 0)
2971 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2977 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2979 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2980 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
2981 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2982 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2983 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2984 * point to the resulting session.
2987 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
2988 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2989 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2990 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2991 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2993 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
2994 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
2995 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
2998 unsigned char *sdec;
2999 const unsigned char *p;
3000 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1, declen;
3002 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3003 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3004 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
3005 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3007 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3008 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3011 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3016 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3017 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3018 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3029 /* Check key name matches */
3030 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3031 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
3035 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3036 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3037 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3038 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
3039 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3040 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
3046 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3049 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3053 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3055 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
3060 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3061 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3062 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3065 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3066 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3067 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3070 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3071 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3072 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3073 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3074 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3075 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
3076 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
3077 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3081 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
3082 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3087 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3091 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3095 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3096 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3097 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3101 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3102 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3111 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3115 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3116 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3120 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3127 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3128 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3129 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3130 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3131 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3132 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3133 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3134 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3135 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3136 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3139 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3140 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3141 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3142 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3143 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3144 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3145 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3148 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3151 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3152 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3158 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3161 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3162 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3163 return table[i].nid;
3168 int tls12_get_sigandhash(WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3174 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3177 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3180 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, md_id) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sig_id))
3186 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3188 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3195 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3198 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3199 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3200 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3201 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3202 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3203 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3204 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3205 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3206 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
3207 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3208 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
3209 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3212 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3218 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
3219 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3220 return tls12_md_info + i;
3226 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3228 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3229 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3231 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3234 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3237 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3241 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3242 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3244 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3245 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3246 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3248 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3249 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3250 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3253 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3254 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3256 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3257 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3259 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3260 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3266 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3267 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3268 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3270 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3271 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3273 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3274 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3276 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3278 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3279 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3281 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3283 if (psignhash_nid) {
3284 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3285 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
3286 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3290 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3291 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3293 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3294 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3295 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3297 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3298 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3300 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3301 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3305 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3306 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3310 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3312 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3313 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3314 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3316 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3317 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3318 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3320 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3321 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3322 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3324 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3325 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3329 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3330 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3331 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3335 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3336 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3337 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3344 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3346 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3348 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3351 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
3352 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3356 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3357 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3358 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[0])
3359 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[1]))
3366 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3367 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3368 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3369 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3371 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3372 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3373 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3374 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3375 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3377 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3378 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3381 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3382 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3383 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3385 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3395 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3396 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3398 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3399 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3401 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3403 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3405 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3406 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3407 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3408 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3409 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3410 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3411 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3412 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3413 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3414 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3416 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3417 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3420 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3421 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3425 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3426 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3428 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3430 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3433 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3437 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3438 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3442 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3444 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, size_t dsize)
3447 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3448 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3450 /* Should never happen */
3454 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3455 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3456 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3458 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3459 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3463 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3468 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3469 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3471 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3472 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3475 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3476 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3477 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3478 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3479 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3481 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3482 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3483 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3484 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3490 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3491 * the certificate for signing.
3493 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3495 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3496 * supported it stays as NULL.
3498 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3499 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3500 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3502 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3503 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3504 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3505 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3508 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3509 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3510 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3512 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3513 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3514 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3515 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3516 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
3517 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3518 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3519 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
3520 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3526 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3527 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3528 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3530 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3531 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3532 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
3536 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3543 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3545 return (int)numsigalgs;
3548 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3549 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3550 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3552 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3553 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
3554 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
3558 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3560 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3562 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3564 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3566 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3567 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3570 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3574 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3577 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3579 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3580 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3581 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3582 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3583 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3584 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3586 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3587 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3588 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3592 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3594 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3597 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3600 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3602 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3604 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3606 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3614 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3615 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3617 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3620 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3621 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3624 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3625 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3630 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3631 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3633 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3637 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3641 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3644 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3646 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3651 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3652 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3654 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3655 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3656 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3658 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3665 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3666 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3667 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3669 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3670 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3671 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3677 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3681 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3685 if (default_nid == -1)
3687 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3689 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3690 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3691 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3696 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3697 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3701 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3702 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3703 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3710 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3711 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3712 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3713 * attempting to use them.
3716 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3718 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3719 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3720 /* Strict mode flags */
3721 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3722 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3723 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3725 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3730 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3731 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3734 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3735 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3737 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3740 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
3742 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3743 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3745 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3747 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3748 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3754 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3757 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3759 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3760 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3762 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3769 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3770 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3771 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3772 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3773 else if (!check_flags)
3778 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3779 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3781 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3783 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3784 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3786 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3789 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3790 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3791 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3792 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3795 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3796 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3797 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3801 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3802 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3805 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3806 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3807 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3810 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3811 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3812 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3815 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3816 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3817 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3826 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3827 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3829 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3831 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3832 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3833 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3836 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3843 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3844 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3848 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3849 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3850 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3851 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3853 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3860 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3861 else if (check_flags)
3862 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3864 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3865 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3866 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3867 else if (!check_flags)
3870 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3871 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3872 else if (strict_mode) {
3873 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3874 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3875 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3876 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3878 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3885 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3886 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3888 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3890 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3893 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3896 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3900 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3904 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
3906 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
3907 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
3909 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
3910 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
3911 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3915 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
3918 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3920 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
3922 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
3923 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3925 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3926 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
3927 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3929 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3930 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3931 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3932 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
3933 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3938 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
3941 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3943 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
3944 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
3948 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3949 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
3950 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3951 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
3952 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3954 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3957 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
3961 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
3964 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
3965 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3972 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
3973 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
3975 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
3976 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
3977 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
3978 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
3979 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
3980 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
3981 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
3984 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
3985 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
3987 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
3990 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3991 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
3993 int dh_secbits = 80;
3994 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
3995 return DH_get_1024_160();
3996 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
3997 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4002 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4003 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4006 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4014 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4015 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4017 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4018 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
4026 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4027 return DH_get_2048_224();
4028 return DH_get_1024_160();
4032 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4035 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4038 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4039 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4040 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4041 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4043 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4046 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4048 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4051 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4053 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4054 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4055 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4056 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4058 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4059 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4061 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4062 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4065 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4067 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4070 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4073 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4075 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4076 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4078 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4079 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4081 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4082 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4087 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4088 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4089 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4092 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4094 int rv, start_idx, i;
4096 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4101 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4105 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4106 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4107 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);