2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
26 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
27 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
29 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
33 tls1_generate_master_secret,
34 tls1_change_cipher_state,
35 tls1_final_finish_mac,
36 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
37 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
38 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
40 tls1_export_keying_material,
42 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
43 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
44 tls_close_construct_packet,
48 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
52 tls1_generate_master_secret,
53 tls1_change_cipher_state,
54 tls1_final_finish_mac,
55 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
56 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
57 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
59 tls1_export_keying_material,
60 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
61 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
62 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
63 tls_close_construct_packet,
67 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
71 tls1_generate_master_secret,
72 tls1_change_cipher_state,
73 tls1_final_finish_mac,
74 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
75 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
76 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
78 tls1_export_keying_material,
79 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
80 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
81 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
82 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
83 tls_close_construct_packet,
87 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
90 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
91 * http, the cache would over fill
100 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
104 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
106 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
110 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
113 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
114 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
116 s->version = s->method->version;
119 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
122 int nid; /* Curve NID */
123 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
124 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
128 * Table of curve information.
129 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
130 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
132 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
133 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
134 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
135 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
136 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
137 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
138 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
139 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
140 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
141 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
142 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
143 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
144 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
145 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
146 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
147 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
148 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
149 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
150 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
151 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
152 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
153 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
154 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
155 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
156 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
157 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
158 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
159 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
160 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
161 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
164 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
165 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
166 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
167 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
170 /* The default curves */
171 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
172 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
173 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
174 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
175 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
178 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
179 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
180 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
181 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
182 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
183 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
184 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
185 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
188 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
189 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
191 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
192 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
193 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
194 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
195 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
196 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
197 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
198 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
199 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
200 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
201 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
202 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
203 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
204 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
205 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
206 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
207 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
208 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
209 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
210 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
211 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
212 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
215 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
216 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
217 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
220 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
222 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
223 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
224 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
226 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
228 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
232 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
235 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
236 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
243 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
245 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
246 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
247 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
248 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
249 * lists in the first place.
250 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
251 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
252 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
254 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
255 const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
257 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
259 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
260 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
262 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
263 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
264 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
265 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
266 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
269 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
270 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
274 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
275 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
279 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
280 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
283 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
284 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
288 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
289 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
290 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
294 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
299 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
300 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
302 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
305 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
307 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
308 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
309 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
312 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
315 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
316 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
318 const unsigned char *curves;
319 size_t num_curves, i;
320 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
321 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
323 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
325 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
328 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
329 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
331 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
332 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
334 } else /* Should never happen */
337 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
339 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
340 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
341 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
347 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
348 * if there is no match.
349 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
350 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
351 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
353 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
355 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
356 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
358 /* Can't do anything on client side */
362 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
364 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
365 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
367 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
368 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
369 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
370 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
371 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
372 /* Should never happen */
375 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
379 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
380 * but s->options is a long...
382 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
383 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
385 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
386 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
387 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
388 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
389 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
392 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
395 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
397 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
398 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
399 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
401 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
405 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
406 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
407 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
408 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
409 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
412 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
413 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
421 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
425 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
426 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
428 unsigned char *clist, *p;
431 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
434 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
435 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
438 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
439 unsigned long idmask;
441 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
443 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
452 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
456 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
460 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
463 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
465 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
471 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
473 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
475 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
477 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
478 if (nid == NID_undef)
479 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
480 if (nid == NID_undef)
481 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
482 if (nid == NID_undef)
484 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
485 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
487 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
491 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
492 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
496 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
500 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
503 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
504 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
511 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
512 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
515 /* Determine curve ID */
516 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
517 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
518 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
522 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
524 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
526 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
527 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
529 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
530 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
532 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
538 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
539 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
540 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
542 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
543 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
546 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
547 * supported (see RFC4492).
549 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
550 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
551 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
552 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
553 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
556 if (i == num_formats)
561 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
562 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
563 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
565 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
567 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
568 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
569 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
570 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
571 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
575 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
576 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
581 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
588 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
592 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
594 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
595 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
596 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
598 *pformats = ecformats_default;
599 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
601 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
603 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
608 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
609 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
611 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
613 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
616 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
619 /* If not EC nothing to do */
620 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
622 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
626 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
629 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
633 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
634 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
636 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
642 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
643 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
644 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
645 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
646 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
648 return 0; /* Should never happen */
649 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
650 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
652 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
654 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
655 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
656 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
658 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
664 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
666 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
668 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
670 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
671 * is compatible with the client extensions.
673 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
675 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
678 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
681 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
682 unsigned char curve_id[2];
683 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
684 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
685 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
686 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
687 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
691 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
692 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
696 /* Need a shared curve */
697 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
701 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
705 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
710 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
713 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
714 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
717 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
718 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
720 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
723 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
724 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
726 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
730 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
732 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
735 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
736 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
737 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
738 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
740 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
741 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
742 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
743 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
744 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
745 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
746 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
747 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
748 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
749 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
753 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
754 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
755 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
756 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
759 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
762 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
765 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
766 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
767 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
768 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
769 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
771 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
772 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
775 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
776 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
780 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
781 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
782 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
783 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
784 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
785 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
786 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
788 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
789 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
794 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
795 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
797 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
798 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
800 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
801 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
802 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
803 /* Should never happen */
806 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
807 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
808 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
811 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
812 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
813 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
814 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
815 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
817 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
818 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
821 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
822 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
825 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
826 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
827 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
828 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
831 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
832 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
833 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
834 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
840 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
844 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
845 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
846 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
847 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
850 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
851 if (i == sent_sigslen
852 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
853 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
854 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
857 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
859 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
862 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
863 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
864 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
865 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
869 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
871 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
876 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
877 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
878 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
880 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
883 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
885 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
887 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
888 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
889 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
890 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
892 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
893 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
894 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
895 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
897 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
898 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
899 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
900 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
901 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
907 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
908 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
909 * @c: cipher to check
910 * @op: Security check that you want to do
912 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
914 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
916 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
917 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
919 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
921 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
922 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
924 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
925 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
928 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
931 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
933 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
935 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
938 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
940 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
941 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
951 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
952 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
953 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
954 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
955 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
958 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
960 PACKET extensions = *packet;
961 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
962 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
965 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
966 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
969 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
970 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
976 if (num_extensions <= 1)
979 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
980 if (extension_types == NULL) {
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
985 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
986 extensions = *packet;
987 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
989 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
990 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
991 /* This should not happen. */
992 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
997 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
998 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1001 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1002 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1003 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1004 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1009 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1013 int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1015 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1016 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1018 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1020 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1021 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1023 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1024 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1026 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1027 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1028 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1029 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1037 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1038 if (s->renegotiate) {
1039 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1040 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1041 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1042 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1043 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1044 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1048 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1049 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1052 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1053 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1054 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1055 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
1056 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1057 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
1058 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1059 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
1060 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname,
1061 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname))
1062 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1063 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1068 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1069 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1070 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1071 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1072 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
1073 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1074 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1075 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
1076 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
1077 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
1078 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
1079 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1080 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1087 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1090 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1092 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1093 size_t num_curves, num_formats;
1096 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1098 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1099 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
1100 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1101 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
1102 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1108 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1110 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1111 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
1112 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1116 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
1117 /* Sub-packet for curves extension */
1118 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1119 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1120 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1123 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1124 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1125 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1126 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurves[0])
1127 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurves[1])) {
1128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1129 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1134 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1139 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1141 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1143 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1144 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1145 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1146 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1147 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1148 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1149 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
1150 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1153 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1154 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1155 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1158 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1159 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1162 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1163 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick,
1165 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1171 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1173 const unsigned char *salg;
1175 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1177 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1178 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
1179 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1180 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
1181 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1182 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
1183 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1184 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1189 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1190 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1193 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1194 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
1195 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1196 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1197 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
1198 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1199 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1202 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1203 unsigned char *idbytes;
1207 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1208 idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1210 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
1211 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
1212 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
1213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1217 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1218 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1222 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1223 unsigned char *extbytes;
1224 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1230 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
1231 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes)
1233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1237 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1244 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1249 * 1: peer may send requests
1250 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1252 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1253 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1255 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1257 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1258 /* Sub-packet for Hearbeat extension */
1259 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1260 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, mode)
1261 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1268 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1269 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1271 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1272 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1274 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1275 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1283 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1284 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1285 * (see longer comment below)
1287 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1288 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1289 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1290 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
1291 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1292 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1293 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1294 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1298 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1300 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1301 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1302 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
1303 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1306 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1307 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
1308 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1309 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
1310 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1311 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1314 ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
1315 for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) {
1316 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1317 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
1318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1322 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1323 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
1324 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1325 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1331 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1332 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1333 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, pkt, al)) {
1334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1338 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
1339 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1340 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1346 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1347 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1348 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
1349 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1350 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1356 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1357 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1363 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1364 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1365 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1368 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1369 unsigned char *padbytes;
1372 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
1373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1377 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1378 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1384 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
1385 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
1386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1389 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
1397 int ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1400 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1402 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1403 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1404 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1405 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1406 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1409 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1410 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH)) {
1411 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1415 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1416 !ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, pkt)) {
1417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1421 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1422 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1425 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1426 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1427 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1428 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1435 const unsigned char *plist;
1438 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1440 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1442 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1443 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1444 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
1445 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1451 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1454 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1456 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1457 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1458 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1464 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1467 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1470 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1471 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1472 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1478 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1479 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1480 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1481 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1482 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1483 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1484 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1491 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1492 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1493 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1494 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1495 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1496 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1497 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1498 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1499 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1500 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1502 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1503 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1507 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1508 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1509 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1513 * 1: peer may send requests
1514 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1516 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1517 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1519 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1521 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1522 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1523 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, mode)
1524 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1525 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1532 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1533 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1534 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1535 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1536 const unsigned char *npa;
1537 unsigned int npalen;
1540 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1542 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1543 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1544 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1545 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1549 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1553 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, pkt, al)) {
1554 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1558 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1560 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1561 * for other cases too.
1563 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1564 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1565 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1566 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1567 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1569 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1570 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1571 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1576 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1577 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1578 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1579 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1584 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1585 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1586 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1587 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1588 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1589 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
1590 s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
1591 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1592 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1593 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1599 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1600 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1607 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1608 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1609 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1610 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1612 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1614 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1616 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1618 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1619 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1623 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1625 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1626 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1627 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1630 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1632 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1633 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1634 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1642 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1643 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1644 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1646 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
1648 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1649 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1651 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1652 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1653 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1654 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1655 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1657 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1658 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1659 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1660 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1661 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1664 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1665 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1666 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1667 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1670 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1678 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1680 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1681 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|.
1682 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1687 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1688 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1689 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1690 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1692 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1698 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1699 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1700 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1701 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1702 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1703 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1704 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1706 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1707 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1708 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1709 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1710 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1711 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1712 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1713 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1714 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1715 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1716 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1717 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1718 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1721 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1722 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1726 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1727 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1728 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1732 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1735 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1736 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1738 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1741 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1744 * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of
1745 * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions.
1747 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1748 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1751 * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1752 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1754 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1757 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1760 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1761 s->servername_done = 0;
1762 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1764 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1767 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1768 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1769 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1770 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
1771 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
1772 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1773 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1774 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1775 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1779 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1780 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1781 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1783 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1784 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1785 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1786 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1788 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1789 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1790 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1793 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1795 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1798 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
1801 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
1805 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
1806 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
1809 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
1811 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
1814 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1815 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
1816 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1817 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1819 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1820 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
1822 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1823 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1826 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1828 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1829 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1830 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1831 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1832 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1833 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1834 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1835 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1836 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1837 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1838 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1839 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1840 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1841 * the value of the Host: field.
1842 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1843 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1844 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1846 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1850 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1851 unsigned int servname_type;
1852 PACKET sni, hostname;
1854 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
1855 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
1856 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
1861 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
1862 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
1863 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
1865 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
1866 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
1867 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
1869 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
1870 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
1872 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
1873 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
1874 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
1879 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1880 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1884 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
1885 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1889 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
1890 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1894 s->servername_done = 1;
1897 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
1898 * fall back to a full handshake.
1900 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1901 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
1902 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
1905 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1906 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
1909 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
1912 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
1916 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
1917 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
1919 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
1920 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1926 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1927 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
1928 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
1930 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &ec_point_format_list)
1931 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
1936 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
1937 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
1939 session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
1940 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1944 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
1945 PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
1947 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
1948 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list)
1949 || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
1950 || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
1955 if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
1956 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
1958 session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
1959 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1964 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1965 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
1966 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1967 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
1968 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1969 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1971 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1974 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
1975 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
1977 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
1978 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
1979 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
1984 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
1985 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
1989 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
1990 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
1991 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
1994 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1995 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1996 const unsigned char *ext_data;
1997 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
1998 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
1999 (&extension, &responder_id_list))
2003 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
2004 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
2006 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
2008 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2009 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
2010 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
2011 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2015 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
2018 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2020 PACKET responder_id;
2021 const unsigned char *id_data;
2023 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2025 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2029 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2030 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2031 PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2035 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2036 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2040 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2041 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2042 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2047 /* Read in request_extensions */
2048 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
2051 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2052 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2053 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2054 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2055 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2056 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2057 PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2058 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2059 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2067 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2069 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2072 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2073 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2074 unsigned int hbtype;
2076 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
2077 || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
2078 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2082 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2083 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2085 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2086 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2087 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2090 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2095 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2096 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2097 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2099 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2102 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2103 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2104 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2105 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2106 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2107 * anything like that, but this might change).
2109 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2110 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2111 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2112 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2113 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2115 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2119 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2120 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2121 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
2125 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2127 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2128 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2129 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
2133 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac &&
2134 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC))
2135 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2137 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2138 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2142 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2143 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2144 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2145 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2146 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2149 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
2150 PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
2155 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2157 * tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens.
2159 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2165 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2167 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2168 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2169 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2170 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2171 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2176 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2177 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2178 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2179 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2184 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2187 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2188 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2189 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2192 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2199 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2201 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2202 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2203 * fill the length of the block.
2205 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2207 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2209 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2210 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2211 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2219 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2221 unsigned int length, type, size;
2222 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2223 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2226 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2228 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2230 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2231 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2232 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2233 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2234 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2237 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2239 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2241 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2244 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2245 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2249 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2250 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2254 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2255 const unsigned char *data;
2258 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2259 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2262 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2263 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2265 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2266 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2268 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2269 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2270 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2271 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2272 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2275 tlsext_servername = 1;
2277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2278 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2279 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2280 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2281 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2282 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2286 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2287 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2288 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2289 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2290 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2293 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2294 ecpointformatlist_length;
2295 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2296 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2297 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2298 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2304 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2306 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2307 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2308 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2309 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2311 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2314 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2315 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2318 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2319 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2321 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2324 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2325 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2328 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2329 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2331 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2333 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2334 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2335 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2337 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2338 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2339 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2340 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2341 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2342 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2344 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2346 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2347 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2348 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2351 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2355 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2356 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2357 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2358 unsigned char *selected;
2359 unsigned char selected_len;
2360 /* We must have requested it. */
2361 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2362 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2365 /* The data must be valid */
2366 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2367 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2370 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2373 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2374 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2375 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2379 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
2380 * a single Serverhello
2382 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
2383 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2384 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2385 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2388 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2389 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2390 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2394 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2396 /* We must have requested it. */
2397 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2398 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2402 * The extension data consists of:
2403 * uint16 list_length
2404 * uint8 proto_length;
2405 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2407 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2408 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2409 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2410 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2413 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2414 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2415 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2416 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2419 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2420 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2423 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2426 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2427 unsigned int hbtype;
2428 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2429 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2433 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2434 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2436 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2437 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2438 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2441 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2446 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2447 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2448 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2452 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2453 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2454 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) &&
2455 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2456 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2457 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2458 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2459 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2461 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2464 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2465 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2467 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2471 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2472 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2476 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2477 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2478 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2479 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2480 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2481 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2482 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2486 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2495 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2496 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2497 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2498 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2499 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2501 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2502 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2503 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2505 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2511 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2514 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2515 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2516 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2517 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2525 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2527 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2531 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2536 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2538 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2539 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2543 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2544 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2547 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2548 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2552 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2554 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2555 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2556 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2557 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2559 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2561 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2564 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2565 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2568 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2569 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2572 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2573 s->servername_done = 0;
2579 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2580 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2582 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2584 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2586 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2587 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2588 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2590 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2591 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2593 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2594 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2596 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2597 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2598 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2599 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2603 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2608 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2609 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2610 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2611 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2612 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2613 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2614 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2615 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2618 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2619 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2620 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2621 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2622 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2625 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2626 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2627 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2628 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2629 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2633 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2637 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2642 * Upon success, returns 1.
2643 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2645 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2647 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2650 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2651 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2652 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2653 * influence which certificate is sent
2655 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2657 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2658 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2659 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2660 if (certpkey != NULL) {
2662 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2663 * et al can pick it up.
2665 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2666 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2668 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2669 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2670 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2672 /* status request response should be sent */
2673 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2674 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2675 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2677 /* something bad happened */
2678 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2680 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2686 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
2693 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2695 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2696 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2698 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2700 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2701 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2702 * must contain uncompressed.
2704 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2705 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2706 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2707 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2708 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2709 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2710 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2711 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2713 unsigned char *list;
2714 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2715 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2716 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2717 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2718 found_uncompressed = 1;
2722 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2723 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2724 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2728 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2729 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2731 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2733 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2734 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2735 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2736 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2738 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2740 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2743 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2744 * that we don't receive a status message
2746 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2747 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2748 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2751 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2752 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2755 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2756 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2759 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2760 s->servername_done = 0;
2766 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2769 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2771 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2772 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2776 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2777 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2784 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2785 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2786 * need to be handled at the same time.
2788 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2791 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2792 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2793 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2794 * point to the resulting session.
2796 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2797 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2798 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2801 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2802 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2803 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2804 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2805 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2806 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2807 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2810 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2811 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2812 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2813 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2814 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2815 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2817 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2820 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2821 const PACKET *session_id,
2825 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2828 int have_ticket = 0;
2829 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2832 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2833 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2836 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2839 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2842 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2846 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2847 unsigned int type, size;
2849 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2850 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2851 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2855 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
2859 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
2861 const unsigned char *etick;
2863 /* Duplicate extension */
2864 if (have_ticket != 0) {
2872 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2875 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2879 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2881 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2882 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2883 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2884 * calculate the master secret later.
2889 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
2890 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2894 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
2895 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
2897 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2898 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2901 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2904 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2905 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2908 default: /* fatal error */
2914 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
2915 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2916 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
2922 if (have_ticket == 0)
2929 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2931 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2932 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
2933 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2934 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2935 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2936 * point to the resulting session.
2939 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
2940 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2941 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2942 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2943 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2945 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
2946 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
2947 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
2950 unsigned char *sdec;
2951 const unsigned char *p;
2952 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
2953 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2954 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2955 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
2956 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2958 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2959 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
2962 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2967 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
2968 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2969 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2980 /* Check key name matches */
2981 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
2982 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
2986 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
2987 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
2988 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
2989 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
2990 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
2991 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
2997 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3000 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3004 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3006 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
3011 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3012 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3013 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3016 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3017 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3018 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3021 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3022 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3023 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3024 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3025 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3026 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3027 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3031 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3032 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3037 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3041 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3045 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3046 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3047 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3051 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3052 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3061 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3065 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3066 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3070 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3077 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3078 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3079 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3080 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3081 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3082 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3083 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3084 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3085 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3086 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3089 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3090 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3091 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3092 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3093 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3094 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3095 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3098 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3101 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3102 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3108 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3111 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3112 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3113 return table[i].nid;
3118 int tls12_get_sigandhash(WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3124 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3127 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3130 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, md_id) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sig_id))
3136 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3138 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3145 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3148 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3149 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3150 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3151 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3152 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3153 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3154 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3155 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3156 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
3157 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3158 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
3159 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3162 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3168 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
3169 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3170 return tls12_md_info + i;
3176 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3178 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3179 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3181 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3184 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3187 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3191 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3192 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3194 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3195 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3196 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3199 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3200 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3202 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3203 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3204 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3206 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3207 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3209 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3210 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3216 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3217 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3218 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3220 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3221 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3223 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3224 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3226 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3228 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3229 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3231 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3233 if (psignhash_nid) {
3234 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3235 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
3236 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3240 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3241 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3243 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3244 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3245 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3247 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3248 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3250 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3251 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3255 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3256 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3260 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3262 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3263 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3264 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3266 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3267 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3268 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3270 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3271 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3272 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3273 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3274 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3275 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3279 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3280 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3281 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3285 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3286 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3287 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3294 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3296 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3298 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3301 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
3302 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3306 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3307 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3308 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[0])
3309 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[1]))
3316 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3317 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3318 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3319 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3321 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3322 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3323 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3324 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3325 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3327 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3328 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3331 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3332 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3333 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3335 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3345 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3346 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3348 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3349 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3351 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3353 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3355 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3356 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3357 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3358 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3359 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3360 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3361 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3362 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3363 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3364 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3366 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3367 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3370 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3371 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3375 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3376 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3378 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3380 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3383 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3387 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3388 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3392 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3394 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3397 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3398 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3400 /* Should never happen */
3404 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3405 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3406 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3408 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3409 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3413 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3418 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3419 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3421 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3422 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3425 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3426 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3427 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3428 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3429 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3431 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3432 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3433 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3434 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3440 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3441 * the certificate for signing.
3443 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3445 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3446 * supported it stays as NULL.
3448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3449 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3450 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3452 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3453 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3454 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3455 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3458 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3459 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3460 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3463 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3464 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3465 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3466 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
3467 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3468 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3469 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
3470 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3476 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3477 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3478 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3480 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3485 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3492 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3494 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3497 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3498 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3499 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3501 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3502 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3506 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3508 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3510 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3512 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3514 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3515 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3518 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3522 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3525 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3527 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3528 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3529 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3530 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3531 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3532 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3534 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3535 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3536 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3540 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3542 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3545 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3548 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3550 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3552 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3554 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3562 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3563 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3565 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3568 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3569 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3572 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3573 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3578 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3579 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3581 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3585 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3589 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3592 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3594 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3599 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3600 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3602 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3603 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3604 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3606 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3613 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3614 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3615 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3617 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3618 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3619 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3625 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3629 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3633 if (default_nid == -1)
3635 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3637 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3638 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3639 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3644 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3645 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3649 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3650 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3651 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3658 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3659 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3660 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3661 * attempting to use them.
3664 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3666 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3667 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3668 /* Strict mode flags */
3669 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3670 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3671 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3673 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3678 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3679 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3682 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3683 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3685 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3688 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3690 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3691 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3693 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3695 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3696 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3702 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3705 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3707 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3708 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3710 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3717 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3718 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3719 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3720 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3721 else if (!check_flags)
3726 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3727 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3729 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3731 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3732 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3734 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3737 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3738 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3739 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3740 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3743 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3744 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3745 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3749 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3750 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3753 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3754 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3755 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3758 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3759 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3760 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3763 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3764 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3765 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3774 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3775 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3777 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3779 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3780 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3781 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3784 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3791 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3792 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3796 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3797 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3798 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3799 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3801 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3808 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3809 else if (check_flags)
3810 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3812 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3813 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3814 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3815 else if (!check_flags)
3818 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3819 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3820 else if (strict_mode) {
3821 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3822 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3823 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3824 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3826 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3833 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3834 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3836 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3838 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3841 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3844 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3848 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3852 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
3854 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
3855 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
3857 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
3858 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
3859 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3863 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
3866 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3868 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
3870 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
3871 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3873 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3874 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
3875 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3877 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3878 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3879 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3880 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
3881 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3886 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
3889 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3891 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
3892 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
3896 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3897 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
3898 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3899 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
3900 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3902 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3905 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
3909 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
3912 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
3913 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3920 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
3921 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
3923 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
3924 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
3925 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
3926 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
3927 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
3928 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
3929 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
3932 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
3933 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
3935 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
3938 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3939 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
3941 int dh_secbits = 80;
3942 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
3943 return DH_get_1024_160();
3944 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
3945 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
3950 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3951 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
3954 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
3962 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
3963 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
3965 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
3966 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
3974 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
3975 return DH_get_2048_224();
3976 return DH_get_1024_160();
3980 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
3983 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
3986 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
3987 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
3988 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
3989 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
3991 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
3994 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
3996 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
3999 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4001 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4002 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4003 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4004 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4006 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4007 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4009 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4010 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4013 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4015 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4018 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4021 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4023 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4024 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4026 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4027 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4029 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4030 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4035 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4036 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4037 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4040 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4042 int rv, start_idx, i;
4044 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4049 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4053 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4054 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4055 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);