2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, size_t ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, size_t sesslen,
27 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
31 tls1_generate_master_secret,
32 tls1_change_cipher_state,
33 tls1_final_finish_mac,
34 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
35 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
37 tls1_export_keying_material,
39 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
40 tls_close_construct_packet,
44 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
48 tls1_generate_master_secret,
49 tls1_change_cipher_state,
50 tls1_final_finish_mac,
51 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
52 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
54 tls1_export_keying_material,
55 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
56 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
57 tls_close_construct_packet,
61 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
65 tls1_generate_master_secret,
66 tls1_change_cipher_state,
67 tls1_final_finish_mac,
68 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
69 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
71 tls1_export_keying_material,
72 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
73 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
74 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
75 tls_close_construct_packet,
79 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
82 tls13_setup_key_block,
83 tls13_generate_master_secret,
84 tls13_change_cipher_state,
85 tls13_final_finish_mac,
86 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
87 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
89 tls1_export_keying_material,
90 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
91 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
92 tls_close_construct_packet,
96 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
99 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
100 * http, the cache would over fill
102 return (60 * 60 * 2);
109 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
113 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
115 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
119 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
122 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
123 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
125 s->version = s->method->version;
128 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
131 int nid; /* Curve NID */
132 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
133 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
137 * Table of curve information.
138 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
139 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
141 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
142 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
143 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
144 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
145 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
146 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
147 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
148 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
149 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
150 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
151 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
152 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
153 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
154 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
155 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
156 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
157 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
158 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
159 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
160 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
161 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
162 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
163 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
164 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
165 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
166 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
167 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
168 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
169 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
170 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
173 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
174 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
175 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
176 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
179 /* The default curves */
180 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
181 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
182 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
183 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
184 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
187 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
188 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
189 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
190 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
191 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
192 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
193 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
194 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
197 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
198 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
200 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
201 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
202 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
203 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
204 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
205 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
206 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
207 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
208 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
209 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
210 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
211 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
212 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
213 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
214 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
215 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
216 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
217 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
218 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
219 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
220 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
221 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
224 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
225 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
226 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
229 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
231 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
232 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
233 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
235 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
237 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
241 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
244 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
245 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
252 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
254 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
255 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
256 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
257 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
258 * lists in the first place.
259 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
260 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
261 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
263 int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, const unsigned char **pcurves,
266 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
268 *pcurves = s->session->ext.supportedgroups;
269 pcurveslen = s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len;
271 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
272 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
273 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
274 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
275 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
278 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
279 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
283 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
284 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
288 *pcurves = s->ext.supportedgroups;
289 pcurveslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
292 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
293 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
297 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
298 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
299 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
303 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
308 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
309 int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
311 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
314 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
316 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
317 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
318 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
321 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
324 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
325 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
327 const unsigned char *curves;
328 size_t num_curves, i;
329 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
330 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
332 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
334 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
337 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
338 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
340 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
341 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
343 } else /* Should never happen */
346 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
348 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
349 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
350 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
356 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
357 * if there is no match.
358 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
359 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
360 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
362 int tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
364 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
365 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
367 /* Can't do anything on client side */
371 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
373 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
374 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
376 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
377 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
378 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
379 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
380 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
381 /* Should never happen */
384 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
388 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
389 * but s->options is a long...
391 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
392 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
394 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
395 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
396 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
397 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
398 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
401 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
404 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
406 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
407 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
408 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
410 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
414 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
415 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
416 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
417 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
418 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
421 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
422 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
430 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
434 int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
435 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
437 unsigned char *glist, *p;
440 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
443 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
444 glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * 2);
447 for (i = 0, p = glist; i < ngroups; i++) {
448 unsigned long idmask;
450 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
451 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]);
453 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
462 *pextlen = ngroups * 2;
466 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
470 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
473 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
475 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
481 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
483 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
485 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
487 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
488 if (nid == NID_undef)
489 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
490 if (nid == NID_undef)
491 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
492 if (nid == NID_undef)
494 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
495 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
497 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
501 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
502 int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
506 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
510 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
513 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
514 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
521 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
522 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
525 /* Determine curve ID */
526 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
527 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
528 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
532 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
534 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
536 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
537 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
539 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
540 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
542 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
548 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
549 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
550 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
552 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
553 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
556 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
557 * supported (see RFC4492).
559 if (comp_id && s->session->ext.ecpointformats) {
560 pformats = s->session->ext.ecpointformats;
561 num_formats = s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len;
562 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
563 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
566 if (i == num_formats)
571 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
572 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
573 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
575 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
577 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
578 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
579 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
580 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
581 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
585 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
586 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
591 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
598 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
602 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
604 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
605 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
606 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
608 *pformats = ecformats_default;
609 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
611 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
613 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
618 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
619 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
621 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
623 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
626 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
629 /* If not EC nothing to do */
630 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
632 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
636 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
639 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
643 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
644 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
646 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
652 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
653 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
654 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
655 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
656 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
658 return 0; /* Should never happen */
659 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
660 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
662 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
664 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
665 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
666 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
668 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
674 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
676 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
678 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
680 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
681 * is compatible with the client extensions.
683 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
685 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
688 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
691 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
692 unsigned char curve_id[2];
693 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
694 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
695 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
696 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
697 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
701 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
702 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
706 /* Need a shared curve */
707 if (tls1_shared_group(s, 0))
711 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
715 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
720 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
722 /* Default sigalg schemes */
723 static const unsigned int tls12_sigalgs[] = {
724 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
725 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
726 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
727 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
730 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
731 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
732 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
734 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
735 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
736 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
739 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
740 static const unsigned int suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
741 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
742 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
746 typedef struct sigalg_lookup_st {
752 SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
753 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
754 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
755 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
756 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
757 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256, TLSEXT_signature_rsa_pss},
758 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384, TLSEXT_signature_rsa_pss},
759 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512, TLSEXT_signature_rsa_pss},
760 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
761 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
762 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
763 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
764 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
765 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
766 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
767 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
768 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
769 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512},
770 {TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001}
773 static unsigned int tls_sigalg_get_hash(unsigned int sigalg)
778 for (i = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
780 if (curr->sigalg == sigalg)
787 static unsigned int tls_sigalg_get_sig(unsigned int sigalg)
792 for (i = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
794 if (curr->sigalg == sigalg)
801 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned int **psigs)
804 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
807 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
808 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
809 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
810 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
811 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
813 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
814 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
817 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
818 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
822 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
823 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
824 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
825 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
826 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
827 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
828 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
830 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
831 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
836 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
837 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
839 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s, unsigned int sig,
842 const unsigned int *sent_sigs;
844 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
845 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
846 /* Should never happen */
849 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
850 if ((unsigned int)sigalg != tls_sigalg_get_sig(sig)) {
851 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
854 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
855 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
856 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
857 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
858 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
860 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
861 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
864 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
865 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
868 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
869 if (tls_sigalg_get_hash(sig) != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
870 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
871 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
874 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
875 if (tls_sigalg_get_hash(sig) != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
876 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
877 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
883 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
887 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
888 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
889 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i ++, sent_sigs++) {
890 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
893 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
894 if (i == sent_sigslen
895 && (tls_sigalg_get_hash(sig) != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
896 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
897 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
900 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(tls_sigalg_get_hash(sig));
902 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
906 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical reasons we
907 * have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
909 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
910 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
911 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
912 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
913 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
914 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
918 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
920 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
925 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
926 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
927 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
929 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
932 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
934 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
936 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
937 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
938 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
939 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
940 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
941 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
942 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
943 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
944 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
946 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
947 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
948 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
949 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
950 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
956 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
957 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
958 * @c: cipher to check
959 * @op: Security check that you want to do
961 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
963 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
965 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
966 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
968 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
970 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
971 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
973 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
974 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
977 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
980 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
982 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) || SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
984 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
987 /* Initialise digests to default values */
988 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
990 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
991 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
992 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
994 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
995 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
996 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
998 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
999 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
1001 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1002 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
1004 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1005 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
1006 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
1007 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
1011 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1016 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1017 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1018 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1019 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1020 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1021 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1022 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
1023 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1026 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
1027 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
1028 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1029 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1030 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1033 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
1034 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
1035 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
1036 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1037 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1041 ssl_set_default_md(s);
1045 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1050 * Given a list of extensions that we collected earlier, find one of a given
1051 * type and return it.
1053 * |exts| is the set of extensions previously collected.
1054 * |numexts| is the number of extensions that we have.
1055 * |type| the type of the extension that we are looking for.
1057 * Returns a pointer to the found RAW_EXTENSION data, or NULL if not found.
1059 RAW_EXTENSION *tls_get_extension_by_type(RAW_EXTENSION *exts, size_t numexts,
1064 for (loop = 0; loop < numexts; loop++) {
1065 if (exts[loop].type == type)
1073 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1075 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1076 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1077 * point to the resulting session.
1079 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
1080 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
1081 * never be decrypted, nor will s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1084 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
1085 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
1086 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
1087 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
1088 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
1089 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
1090 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
1093 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1094 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1095 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1096 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1097 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1098 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1100 int tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1105 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1108 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1111 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1112 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1115 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1118 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1119 if (!ticketext->present)
1122 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1125 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1128 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1131 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1133 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1134 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1135 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1136 * calculate the master secret later.
1141 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1142 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1144 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
1145 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1148 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
1151 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
1152 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1155 default: /* fatal error */
1161 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1163 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1164 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1165 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1166 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1167 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1168 * point to the resulting session.
1171 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
1172 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
1173 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
1174 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
1175 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
1177 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1178 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1179 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1182 unsigned char *sdec;
1183 const unsigned char *p;
1184 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1, declen;
1186 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1187 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
1188 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
1189 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
1191 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1192 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
1195 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1200 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
1201 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1202 int rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
1213 /* Check key name matches */
1214 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1215 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) != 0) {
1219 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
1220 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
1221 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
1222 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
1223 tctx->ext.tick_aes_key,
1224 etick + sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) <=
1230 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1233 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
1237 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1239 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1244 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1245 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1246 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
1249 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1250 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1251 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1254 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1255 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1256 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1257 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1258 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1259 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1260 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1261 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1265 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1266 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1271 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1275 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1279 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1280 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1281 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1285 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1286 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1295 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1299 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1300 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1304 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
1311 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
1312 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
1313 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
1314 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
1315 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
1316 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
1317 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
1318 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
1319 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
1320 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
1323 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
1324 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
1325 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
1326 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
1327 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
1328 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
1329 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
1332 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
1335 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
1336 if (table[i].nid == nid)
1342 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
1345 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
1346 if ((table[i].id) == id)
1347 return table[i].nid;
1352 int tls12_get_sigandhash(WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
1358 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
1361 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
1364 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, md_id) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sig_id))
1370 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
1372 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
1379 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
1382 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
1383 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
1384 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
1385 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
1386 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
1387 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
1388 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
1389 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
1390 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
1391 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
1392 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
1393 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
1396 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
1402 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
1403 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
1404 return tls12_md_info + i;
1410 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
1412 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
1413 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
1415 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
1418 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
1421 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
1424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1425 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1426 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
1428 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1429 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1430 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
1432 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1433 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1434 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
1436 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1437 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
1438 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
1440 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
1441 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
1443 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
1444 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
1450 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
1451 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
1452 int *psignhash_nid, unsigned int data)
1454 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
1455 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
1457 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
1458 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(tls_sigalg_get_hash(data), tls12_md,
1459 OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
1461 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
1463 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
1464 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(tls_sigalg_get_sig(data), tls12_sig,
1465 OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
1467 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
1469 if (psignhash_nid) {
1470 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
1471 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
1472 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
1476 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1477 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, unsigned int ptmp)
1479 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
1480 const tls12_hash_info *hinf
1481 = tls12_get_hash_info(tls_sigalg_get_hash(ptmp));
1482 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
1484 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
1486 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1487 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(tls_sigalg_get_sig(ptmp)) == -1)
1489 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1490 sigalgstr[0] = (ptmp >> 8) & 0xff;
1491 sigalgstr[1] = ptmp & 0xff;
1492 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)sigalgstr);
1496 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1497 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1501 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
1503 const unsigned int *sigalgs;
1504 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1505 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1507 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
1508 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
1509 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
1511 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1512 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i ++, sigalgs++) {
1513 switch (tls_sigalg_get_sig(*sigalgs)) {
1514 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1515 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1516 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, *sigalgs))
1520 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1521 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1522 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, *sigalgs))
1526 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1527 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1528 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, *sigalgs))
1535 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1537 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1539 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1542 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1543 const unsigned int *psig, size_t psiglen)
1547 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
1548 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, *psig)) {
1549 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
1556 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1557 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
1558 const unsigned int *pref, size_t preflen,
1559 const unsigned int *allow, size_t allowlen)
1561 const unsigned int *ptmp, *atmp;
1562 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
1563 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
1564 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1565 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, *ptmp))
1567 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
1568 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
1571 shsig->rhash = tls_sigalg_get_hash(*ptmp);
1572 shsig->rsign = tls_sigalg_get_sig(*ptmp);
1573 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
1575 &shsig->signandhash_nid, *ptmp);
1585 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1586 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1588 const unsigned int *pref, *allow, *conf;
1589 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
1591 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
1593 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
1595 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
1596 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1597 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1598 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1599 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1600 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
1601 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
1602 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1603 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
1604 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
1606 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
1607 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
1610 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1611 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1615 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1616 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1618 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1620 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
1623 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1627 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
1628 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
1632 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1634 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1639 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1640 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1642 /* Should never happen */
1646 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1648 /* Invalid data length */
1649 if ((size & 1) != 0)
1654 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1655 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(unsigned int));
1656 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
1658 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = size;
1659 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs[i]);
1669 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1674 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
1675 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
1677 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
1678 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
1681 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
1682 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
1683 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
1684 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
1685 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
1687 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
1688 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
1689 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
1690 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
1696 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
1697 * the certificate for signing.
1699 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1701 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
1702 * supported it stays as NULL.
1704 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1705 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
1706 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
1708 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1709 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
1710 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
1711 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
1714 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1715 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
1716 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
1718 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1719 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
1720 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
1721 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
1722 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
1723 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
1724 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
1725 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
1726 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
1732 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1733 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1734 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1736 unsigned int *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1737 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1738 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
1741 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
1745 *rhash = tls_sigalg_get_hash(*psig);
1747 *rsig = tls_sigalg_get_sig(*psig);
1748 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, *psig);
1750 return (int)numsigalgs;
1753 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1754 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1755 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1757 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
1758 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
1759 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
1763 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
1765 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
1767 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
1769 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
1771 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
1772 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
1775 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
1779 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
1782 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
1784 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
1785 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1786 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
1787 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1788 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1789 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1791 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
1792 if (*phash == NID_undef)
1793 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
1797 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
1799 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
1802 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
1805 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
1807 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
1809 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
1811 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
1819 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
1820 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
1822 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
1825 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
1826 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
1829 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
1830 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
1835 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
1836 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
1838 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
1842 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
1846 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
1849 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
1851 unsigned int *sigalgs, *sptr;
1856 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
1857 if (sigalgs == NULL)
1859 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
1860 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
1861 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
1863 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
1870 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
1871 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1872 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
1874 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
1875 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1876 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
1882 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
1886 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
1890 if (default_nid == -1)
1892 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
1894 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
1895 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
1896 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
1901 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
1902 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
1906 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1907 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
1908 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
1915 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
1916 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
1917 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
1918 * attempting to use them.
1921 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
1923 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
1924 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
1925 /* Strict mode flags */
1926 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
1927 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
1928 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
1930 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
1935 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
1936 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
1939 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
1940 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
1942 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
1945 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
1947 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
1948 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
1950 pk = cpk->privatekey;
1952 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
1953 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
1959 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
1962 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
1964 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
1965 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
1967 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
1974 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
1975 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
1976 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
1977 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
1978 else if (!check_flags)
1983 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
1984 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
1986 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
1988 unsigned char rsign = 0;
1989 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
1991 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
1994 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
1995 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
1996 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
1997 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
2000 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
2001 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
2002 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
2006 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
2007 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
2010 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
2011 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
2012 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
2015 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
2016 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
2017 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
2020 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
2021 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
2022 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
2031 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2032 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2034 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
2036 const unsigned int *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
2037 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
2038 if (tls_sigalg_get_hash(*p) == TLSEXT_hash_sha1
2039 && tls_sigalg_get_sig(*p) == rsign)
2042 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2049 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2050 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
2054 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2055 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2056 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2057 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2059 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2066 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2067 else if (check_flags)
2068 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2070 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2071 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
2072 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2073 else if (!check_flags)
2076 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2077 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2078 else if (strict_mode) {
2079 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2080 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2081 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2082 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2084 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2091 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2092 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2094 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
2096 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2099 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2102 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2106 const unsigned char *ctypes;
2110 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
2112 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
2113 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
2115 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
2116 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
2117 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2121 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2124 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2126 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
2128 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2129 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2131 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2132 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2133 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2135 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2136 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2137 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2138 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2139 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2144 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2147 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2149 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2150 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2154 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
2155 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
2156 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2157 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
2158 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2160 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2163 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2167 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
2170 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2171 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2178 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2179 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2181 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
2182 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
2183 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2184 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2185 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2186 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2187 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2190 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
2191 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2193 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2196 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2197 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2199 int dh_secbits = 80;
2200 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
2201 return DH_get_1024_160();
2202 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2203 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2208 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2209 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
2212 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
2220 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2221 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2223 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2224 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
2232 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2233 return DH_get_2048_224();
2234 return DH_get_1024_160();
2238 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2241 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2244 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2245 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2246 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2247 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2249 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2252 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2254 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2257 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2259 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2260 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
2261 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2262 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2264 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2265 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
2267 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
2268 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
2271 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
2273 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
2276 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2279 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2281 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2282 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2284 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2285 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2287 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2288 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2293 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
2294 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2295 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2298 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2300 int rv, start_idx, i;
2302 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
2307 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
2311 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
2312 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
2313 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);