2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
27 tls1_generate_master_secret,
28 tls1_change_cipher_state,
29 tls1_final_finish_mac,
30 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
31 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
33 tls1_export_keying_material,
35 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
36 tls_close_construct_packet,
40 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
44 tls1_generate_master_secret,
45 tls1_change_cipher_state,
46 tls1_final_finish_mac,
47 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
48 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
50 tls1_export_keying_material,
51 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
52 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
53 tls_close_construct_packet,
57 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
61 tls1_generate_master_secret,
62 tls1_change_cipher_state,
63 tls1_final_finish_mac,
64 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
65 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
67 tls1_export_keying_material,
68 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
69 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
70 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
71 tls_close_construct_packet,
75 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
78 tls13_setup_key_block,
79 tls13_generate_master_secret,
80 tls13_change_cipher_state,
81 tls13_final_finish_mac,
82 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
83 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
85 tls1_export_keying_material,
86 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
87 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
88 tls_close_construct_packet,
92 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
95 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
96 * http, the cache would over fill
105 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
109 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
111 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
115 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
118 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
119 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
121 s->version = s->method->version;
124 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
127 int nid; /* Curve NID */
128 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
129 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
133 * Table of curve information.
134 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
135 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
137 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
138 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
139 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
140 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
141 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
142 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
143 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
144 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
145 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
146 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
147 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
148 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
149 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
150 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
151 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
152 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
153 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
154 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
155 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
156 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
157 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
158 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
159 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
160 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
161 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
162 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
163 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
164 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
165 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
166 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
169 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
170 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
171 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
172 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
175 /* The default curves */
176 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
177 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
178 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
179 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
180 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
183 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
184 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
185 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
188 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
190 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
191 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
192 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
194 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
196 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
200 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
203 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
204 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
211 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
213 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
214 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
215 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
216 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
217 * lists in the first place.
218 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
219 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
220 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
222 int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, const unsigned char **pcurves,
225 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
228 *pcurves = s->session->ext.supportedgroups;
229 pcurveslen = s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len;
231 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
232 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
233 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
234 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
235 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
238 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
239 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
243 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
244 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
248 *pcurves = s->ext.supportedgroups;
249 pcurveslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
252 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
253 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
257 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
258 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
259 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
263 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
267 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
268 int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
270 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
273 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
275 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
276 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
277 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
280 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
283 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
284 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
286 const unsigned char *curves;
287 size_t num_curves, i;
288 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
289 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
291 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
293 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
296 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
297 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
299 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
300 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
302 } else /* Should never happen */
305 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
307 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
308 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
309 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
315 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
316 * if there is no match.
317 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
318 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
319 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
321 int tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
323 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
324 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
327 /* Can't do anything on client side */
331 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
333 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
334 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
336 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
338 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
339 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
340 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
341 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
342 /* Should never happen */
345 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
349 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
350 * but s->options is a long...
352 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
353 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0,
355 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
356 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
357 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
358 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0,
360 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
362 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
363 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
365 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
366 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
367 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
370 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
372 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
380 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
384 int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
385 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
387 unsigned char *glist, *p;
390 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
393 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
394 glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * 2);
397 for (i = 0, p = glist; i < ngroups; i++) {
398 unsigned long idmask;
400 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
401 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]);
403 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
412 *pextlen = ngroups * 2;
416 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
420 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
423 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
425 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
431 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
433 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
435 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
437 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
438 if (nid == NID_undef)
439 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
440 if (nid == NID_undef)
441 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
442 if (nid == NID_undef)
444 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
445 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
447 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
451 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
452 int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
456 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
460 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
463 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
464 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
471 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
472 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
475 /* Determine curve ID */
476 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
477 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
478 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
482 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
484 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
486 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
487 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
489 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
490 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
492 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
498 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
499 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
500 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
502 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
503 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
506 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
507 * supported (see RFC4492).
509 if (comp_id && s->session->ext.ecpointformats) {
510 pformats = s->session->ext.ecpointformats;
511 num_formats = s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len;
512 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
513 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
516 if (i == num_formats)
521 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
522 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
523 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
525 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
527 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
528 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
529 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
530 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
531 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
535 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
536 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
541 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
548 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
552 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
554 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
555 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
556 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
558 *pformats = ecformats_default;
559 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
561 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
563 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
568 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
569 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
571 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
573 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
576 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
579 /* If not EC nothing to do */
580 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
582 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
586 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
589 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
593 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
594 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
596 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
602 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
603 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
604 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
605 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
606 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
608 return 0; /* Should never happen */
609 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
610 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
612 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
614 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
615 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
616 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
618 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
624 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
626 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
628 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
630 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
631 * is compatible with the client extensions.
633 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
635 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
638 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
641 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
642 unsigned char curve_id[2];
643 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
644 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
645 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
646 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
647 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
651 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
652 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
656 /* Need a shared curve */
657 if (tls1_shared_group(s, 0))
661 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
665 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
670 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
672 /* Default sigalg schemes */
673 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
675 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
676 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
677 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
680 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256,
681 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384,
682 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512,
684 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
685 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
686 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
688 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
689 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
691 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
692 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
693 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
695 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
696 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
697 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
702 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
703 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
704 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
708 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
709 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
710 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
711 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
712 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
713 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
714 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
715 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1},
716 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
717 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
718 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1},
719 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
720 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
721 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef},
723 {"rsa_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256,
724 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
725 NID_undef, NID_undef},
726 {"rsa_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384,
727 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
728 NID_undef, NID_undef},
729 {"rsa_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512,
730 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
731 NID_undef, NID_undef},
732 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
733 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
734 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
735 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
736 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
737 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
738 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
739 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
740 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
741 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
742 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
743 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
744 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
745 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
746 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
747 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef},
748 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
749 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
750 NID_undef, NID_undef},
751 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
752 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
753 NID_undef, NID_undef},
754 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
755 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
756 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef},
758 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
759 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
760 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
761 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
762 NID_undef, NID_undef},
763 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
764 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
765 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
766 NID_undef, NID_undef},
767 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
768 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
769 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
770 NID_undef, NID_undef}
773 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
774 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
775 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
776 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
777 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
782 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
783 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
785 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
786 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
787 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
788 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
789 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
790 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
791 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512 /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
794 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
795 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg)
798 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
800 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
802 if (s->sigalg == sigalg)
808 * Return a signature algorithm for TLS < 1.2 where the signature type
809 * is fixed by the certificate type.
811 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
813 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
815 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
816 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
818 if (lu == NULL || ssl_md(lu->hash_idx) == NULL) {
823 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
825 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
826 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
828 int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
830 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
833 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
837 static int tls_sigalg_get_sig(uint16_t sigalg)
839 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *r = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sigalg);
841 return r != NULL ? r->sig : 0;
844 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
847 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
850 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
851 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
852 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
853 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
854 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
856 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
857 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
860 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
861 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
866 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
867 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
868 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
870 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
871 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
872 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
873 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
874 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
875 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
877 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
878 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
883 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
884 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
887 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
889 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
890 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
892 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
893 int pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
894 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
896 /* Should never happen */
899 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
900 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
901 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
902 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
905 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
906 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
907 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
909 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig);
911 * Check sigalgs is known and key type is consistent with signature:
912 * RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
914 if (lu == NULL || (pkeyid != lu->sig
915 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
916 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
919 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
920 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
921 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
922 int curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
924 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
925 /* For TLS 1.3 check curve matches signature algorithm */
927 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
928 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
932 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
934 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
935 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, ec))
937 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
938 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
941 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
942 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
943 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
944 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
945 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
946 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
950 * Suite B also requires P-256+SHA256 and P-384+SHA384:
951 * this matches the TLS 1.3 requirements so we can just
952 * check the curve is the expected TLS 1.3 value.
953 * If this fails an inappropriate digest is being used.
955 if (curve != lu->curve) {
956 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
957 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
962 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
967 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
968 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
969 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
970 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
973 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
974 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
975 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
976 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
979 md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
985 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical reasons we
986 * have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
988 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
989 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
990 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
991 EVP_MD_size(md) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md),
992 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
993 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
996 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
997 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1001 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1003 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1005 *pnid = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1010 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1011 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1012 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1014 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1017 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1019 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1021 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1022 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1023 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1024 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
1025 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1026 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1027 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1028 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1029 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1031 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1032 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1033 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1034 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1035 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1041 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1042 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1043 * @c: cipher to check
1044 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1046 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1048 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1050 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1051 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1053 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
1055 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
1056 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
1058 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
1059 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
1062 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1065 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1067 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1069 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1072 /* Initialise digests to default values */
1073 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
1075 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
1076 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1077 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
1079 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1080 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1081 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
1083 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
1085 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1086 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
1088 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1089 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
1090 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
1091 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
1095 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1100 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1101 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1102 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1103 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1104 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1105 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1106 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
1107 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1110 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
1111 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
1112 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1113 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1114 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1117 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
1118 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
1119 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
1120 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1121 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1125 ssl_set_default_md(s);
1129 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1134 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1136 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1137 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1138 * point to the resulting session.
1140 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
1141 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
1142 * never be decrypted, nor will s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1145 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
1146 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
1147 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
1148 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
1149 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
1150 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
1151 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
1154 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1155 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1156 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1157 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1158 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1159 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1161 TICKET_RETURN tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1166 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1169 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1172 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1173 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1176 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1179 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1180 if (!ticketext->present)
1183 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1186 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1189 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1190 return TICKET_EMPTY;
1192 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1194 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1195 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1196 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1197 * calculate the master secret later.
1199 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1202 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1203 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1205 case TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
1206 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1207 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1209 case TICKET_SUCCESS:
1210 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1212 case TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
1213 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1214 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1217 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1222 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1224 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1225 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1226 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1227 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1228 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1229 * point to the resulting session.
1231 TICKET_RETURN tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1232 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1233 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1236 unsigned char *sdec;
1237 const unsigned char *p;
1238 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1239 TICKET_RETURN ret = TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1241 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1242 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
1243 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
1244 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1246 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1247 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
1249 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1250 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1252 ret = TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1255 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
1256 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1257 int rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
1262 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1268 /* Check key name matches */
1269 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1270 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) != 0) {
1271 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1274 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
1275 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
1276 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
1277 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
1278 tctx->ext.tick_aes_key,
1280 + sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) <= 0) {
1285 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1288 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
1292 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1294 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1295 ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1299 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1300 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1301 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
1304 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1305 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1306 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1307 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1309 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1310 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1311 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1312 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1313 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1314 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1315 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1316 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1318 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1320 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1321 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1323 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1326 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1330 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1334 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1335 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1336 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1340 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1341 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1344 return TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1346 return TICKET_SUCCESS;
1350 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1352 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1354 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1355 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1359 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(int sig_nid)
1362 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1364 return SSL_PKEY_RSA;
1366 * For now return RSA key for PSS. When we support PSS only keys
1367 * this will need to be updated.
1369 case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS:
1370 return SSL_PKEY_RSA;
1372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1374 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
1376 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1378 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
1380 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1381 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001:
1382 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
1384 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256:
1385 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
1387 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512:
1388 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
1394 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1395 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, uint16_t ptmp)
1397 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(ptmp);
1398 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
1401 /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
1402 if (lu == NULL || ssl_md(lu->hash_idx) == NULL)
1404 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1405 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(lu->sig) == -1)
1407 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1408 secbits = EVP_MD_size(ssl_md(lu->hash_idx)) * 4;
1409 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1410 sigalgstr[0] = (ptmp >> 8) & 0xff;
1411 sigalgstr[1] = ptmp & 0xff;
1412 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
1416 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1417 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1421 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
1423 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
1424 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1425 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1427 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
1428 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
1429 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
1431 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
1432 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i ++, sigalgs++) {
1433 switch (tls_sigalg_get_sig(*sigalgs)) {
1434 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1435 /* Any RSA-PSS signature algorithms also mean we allow RSA */
1436 case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS:
1438 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, *sigalgs))
1442 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1444 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, *sigalgs))
1448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1450 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, *sigalgs))
1457 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1459 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1461 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1464 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1465 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
1469 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
1470 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, *psig)) {
1471 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
1478 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1479 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
1480 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
1481 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
1483 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
1484 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
1485 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
1486 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1487 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, *ptmp))
1489 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
1490 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
1493 *shsig = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp);
1503 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1504 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1506 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
1507 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
1509 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
1511 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
1513 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
1514 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1515 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1516 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1517 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1518 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
1519 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
1520 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1521 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
1522 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
1524 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
1525 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
1528 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1529 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1533 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1534 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1536 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1538 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs));
1541 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1545 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
1546 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
1550 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1552 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1558 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1559 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1561 /* Should never happen */
1565 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1567 /* Invalid data length */
1568 if ((size & 1) != 0)
1573 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1574 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(size
1575 * sizeof(*s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs));
1576 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
1578 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = size;
1579 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
1580 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs[i] = stmp;
1588 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1593 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
1594 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
1597 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
1600 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
1601 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs[i];
1603 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1604 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1606 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->sig);
1607 if (idx >= 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
1608 md = ssl_md(sigptr->hash_idx);
1610 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
1614 * In strict mode or TLS1.3 leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
1615 * use the certificate for signing.
1617 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
1618 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1620 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
1621 * supported it stays as NULL.
1623 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1624 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
1625 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
1627 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1628 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA] == NULL) {
1629 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA] = EVP_sha1();
1632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1633 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
1634 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
1636 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1637 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
1638 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
1639 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
1640 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
1641 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
1642 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
1643 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
1644 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
1650 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1651 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1652 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1654 uint16_t *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1655 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1656 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
1659 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1661 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
1665 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
1667 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
1668 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1670 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
1672 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
1673 if (psignhash != NULL)
1674 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
1676 return (int)numsigalgs;
1679 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1680 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1681 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1683 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
1684 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs == NULL
1686 || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
1687 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
1689 shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[idx];
1691 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
1693 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
1694 if (psignhash != NULL)
1695 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
1697 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
1699 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
1700 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
1703 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
1704 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
1708 int sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
1711 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
1713 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
1714 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1715 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
1716 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1717 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
1718 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1719 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1720 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1722 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
1723 if (*phash == NID_undef)
1724 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
1727 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
1728 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
1730 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
1732 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
1734 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
1735 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
1738 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
1740 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
1742 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
1744 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
1745 /* See if we have a match for TLS 1.3 names */
1747 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
1749 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1751 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
1762 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
1763 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
1766 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
1769 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
1770 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
1773 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
1774 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
1779 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
1780 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
1782 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
1786 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
1790 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
1793 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
1795 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
1800 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs));
1801 if (sigalgs == NULL)
1803 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
1805 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
1806 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
1807 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
1809 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1811 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
1812 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
1817 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
1822 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
1823 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1824 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
1826 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
1827 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1828 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
1834 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
1838 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
1842 if (default_nid == -1)
1844 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
1846 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
1847 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
1848 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
1853 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
1854 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
1858 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1859 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
1860 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
1867 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
1868 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
1869 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
1870 * attempting to use them.
1873 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
1875 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
1876 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
1877 /* Strict mode flags */
1878 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
1879 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
1880 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
1882 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
1887 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
1888 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
1891 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
1892 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
1894 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
1897 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
1899 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
1900 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
1902 pk = cpk->privatekey;
1904 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
1905 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
1911 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
1914 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
1916 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
1917 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
1919 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
1926 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
1927 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
1928 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
1929 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
1930 else if (!check_flags)
1935 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
1936 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
1938 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
1941 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
1943 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
1947 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1948 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
1951 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
1952 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1953 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
1957 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1958 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
1961 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
1962 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
1963 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
1966 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
1967 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
1968 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
1971 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
1972 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
1973 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
1982 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
1983 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
1985 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
1987 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
1988 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
1989 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p);
1991 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
1994 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2001 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2002 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
2006 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2007 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2008 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2009 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2011 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2018 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2019 else if (check_flags)
2020 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2022 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2023 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
2024 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2025 else if (!check_flags)
2028 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2029 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2030 else if (strict_mode) {
2031 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2032 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2033 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2034 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2036 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2043 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2044 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2046 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
2048 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2051 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2054 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2058 const unsigned char *ctypes;
2062 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
2064 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
2065 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
2067 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
2068 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
2069 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2073 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2076 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2078 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
2080 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2081 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2083 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2084 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2085 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2087 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2088 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2089 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2090 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2091 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2096 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2099 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2101 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2102 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2106 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
2107 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
2108 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2109 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
2110 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2112 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2115 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2119 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
2122 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2123 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2130 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2131 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2133 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2134 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2135 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2136 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2137 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2138 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2141 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
2142 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2144 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2148 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2150 int dh_secbits = 80;
2151 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
2152 return DH_get_1024_160();
2153 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2154 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2159 if (s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL)
2161 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey);
2164 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
2172 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2173 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2175 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2176 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
2184 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2185 return DH_get_2048_224();
2186 return DH_get_1024_160();
2190 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2193 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2196 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2197 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2198 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2199 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2201 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2204 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2206 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2209 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2211 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2212 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
2213 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2214 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2216 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2217 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
2219 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
2220 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
2223 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
2225 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
2228 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2231 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2233 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2234 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2236 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2237 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2239 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2240 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2245 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
2246 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2247 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2250 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2252 int rv, start_idx, i;
2254 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
2259 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
2263 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
2264 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
2265 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
2273 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
2274 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
2276 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error
2277 * and an appropriate error code is set and the TLS alert set in *al.
2279 * For clients al is set to NULL. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
2280 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
2281 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
2283 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int *al)
2286 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
2288 s->s3->tmp.cert = NULL;
2289 s->s3->tmp.sigalg = NULL;
2291 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2293 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2297 /* Look for a certificate matching shared sigaglgs */
2298 for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2299 lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
2301 /* Skip DSA and RSA if not PSS */
2302 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2304 if (ssl_md(lu->hash_idx) == NULL)
2307 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
2309 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
2310 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2312 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
2314 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2316 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
2324 if (i == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
2327 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2328 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2329 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2334 /* Find index corresponding to ciphersuite */
2335 idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
2336 /* If no certificate for ciphersuite return */
2339 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC) {
2340 /* Work out which GOST certificate is avaiable */
2341 if (ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512)) {
2342 idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
2343 } else if (ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256)) {
2344 idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
2345 } else if (ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_GOST01)) {
2346 idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
2350 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2351 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2354 } else if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx)) {
2357 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2358 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2362 /* Find index for client certificate */
2363 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
2364 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
2368 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2369 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2373 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
2376 for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2377 lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
2378 if (lu->sig_idx == idx)
2380 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
2383 if (i == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
2386 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2387 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2392 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
2394 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
2395 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
2397 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx)) == NULL) {
2400 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2401 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2405 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
2406 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
2407 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
2408 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs)
2411 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
2414 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2415 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2420 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx)) == NULL) {
2423 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2424 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2431 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2432 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2436 s->s3->tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[idx];
2437 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
2438 s->s3->tmp.sigalg = lu;