2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 # include <openssl/dh.h>
120 # include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
125 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
126 SSL_SESSION **psess);
127 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
128 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
182 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
183 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
184 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
188 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
191 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
192 * http, the cache would over fill
194 return (60 * 60 * 2);
201 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
205 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
207 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
211 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
214 s->version = s->method->version;
217 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
220 int nid; /* Curve NID */
221 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
222 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
225 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
226 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
228 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
229 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
230 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
231 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
232 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
233 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
235 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
236 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
237 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
238 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
239 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
240 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
241 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
242 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
243 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
244 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
245 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
246 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
247 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
248 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
249 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
250 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
251 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
252 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
253 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
254 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
255 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
256 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
259 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
260 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
261 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
262 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
265 /* The client's default curves / the server's 'auto' curves. */
266 static const unsigned char eccurves_auto[] = {
267 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
268 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
269 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
270 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
271 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
272 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
273 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
274 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
275 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
276 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
277 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
278 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
279 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
280 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
281 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
282 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
285 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
286 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
287 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
288 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
289 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
290 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
291 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
292 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
293 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
294 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
295 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
296 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
297 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
298 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
299 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
300 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
301 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
303 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
304 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
306 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
307 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
308 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
309 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
310 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
311 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
312 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
313 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
314 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
315 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
316 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
317 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
318 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
319 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
320 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
324 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
325 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
326 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
329 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
331 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
332 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
334 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
337 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
339 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
341 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
343 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
345 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
347 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
349 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
351 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
353 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
355 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
357 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
359 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
361 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
363 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
365 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
367 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
369 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
371 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
373 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
375 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
377 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
379 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
381 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
383 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
385 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
387 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
389 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
391 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
393 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
395 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
403 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
405 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
406 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
407 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
408 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
409 * lists in the first place.
410 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
411 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
412 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
414 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
415 const unsigned char **pcurves,
418 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
420 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
421 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
423 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
424 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
425 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
426 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
427 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
430 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
431 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
435 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
436 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
440 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
441 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
444 if (!s->server || (s->cert && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)) {
445 *pcurves = eccurves_auto;
446 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_auto);
448 *pcurves = eccurves_all;
449 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_all);
454 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
455 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
456 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
460 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
465 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
466 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
468 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
471 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
473 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
474 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
475 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
478 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
481 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
482 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
484 const unsigned char *curves;
485 size_t num_curves, i;
486 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
487 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
489 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
491 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
494 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
495 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
497 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
498 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
500 } else /* Should never happen */
503 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
505 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
506 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
507 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
513 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
514 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
515 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
516 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
518 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
520 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
521 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
523 /* Can't do anything on client side */
527 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
529 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
530 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
532 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
533 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
534 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
535 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
536 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
537 /* Should never happen */
540 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
544 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
545 * but s->options is a long...
547 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
548 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
550 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
551 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
552 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
553 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
555 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
558 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
561 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
563 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
564 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
565 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
567 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
571 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
572 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
573 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
574 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
575 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
578 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
579 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
587 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
591 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
592 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
594 unsigned char *clist, *p;
597 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
600 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
601 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
604 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
605 unsigned long idmask;
607 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
609 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
618 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
622 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
626 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
629 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
631 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
637 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
639 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
641 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
643 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
644 if (nid == NID_undef)
645 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
646 if (nid == NID_undef)
647 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
648 if (nid == NID_undef)
650 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
651 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
653 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
657 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
658 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
663 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
667 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
670 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
671 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
676 const EC_METHOD *meth;
679 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
680 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
683 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
686 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
690 /* Determine curve ID */
691 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
692 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
693 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
696 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
705 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
707 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
709 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
711 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
713 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
718 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
719 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
720 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
722 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
723 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
726 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
727 * supported (see RFC4492).
729 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
730 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
731 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
732 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
733 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
736 if (i == num_formats)
741 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
742 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
743 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
745 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
747 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
748 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
749 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
750 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
751 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
755 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
756 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
761 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
768 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
772 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
774 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
775 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
776 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
778 *pformats = ecformats_default;
779 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
781 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
783 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
788 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
789 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
791 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
793 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
796 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
799 /* If not EC nothing to do */
800 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
804 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
809 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
812 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
816 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
817 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
819 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
825 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
826 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
827 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
828 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
829 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
831 return 0; /* Should never happen */
832 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
833 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
835 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
837 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
838 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
839 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
841 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
847 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
848 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
849 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
851 unsigned char curve_id[2];
852 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
853 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
854 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
855 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
859 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
862 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
863 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
864 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
865 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
866 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
867 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
871 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
872 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
874 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
875 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
877 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
879 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
882 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
884 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
890 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
891 /* Need a shared curve */
892 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
898 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
903 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
905 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
909 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
912 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
916 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
921 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
924 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
925 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
928 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
929 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
931 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
934 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
935 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
937 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
941 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
943 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
946 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
947 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
948 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
949 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
951 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
952 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
953 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
954 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
955 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
956 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
959 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
960 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
961 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
962 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
965 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
968 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
971 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
972 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
973 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
974 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
975 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
977 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
978 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
981 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
982 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
986 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
987 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
988 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
989 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
990 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
991 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
992 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
994 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
995 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
1000 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1001 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
1003 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
1004 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1006 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
1007 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
1008 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
1009 /* Should never happen */
1012 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1013 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
1014 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1017 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1018 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1019 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
1020 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
1021 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
1023 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
1024 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1027 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1028 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1031 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
1032 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
1033 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1034 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1037 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
1038 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1040 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1046 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1050 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1051 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1052 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1053 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1056 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1057 if (i == sent_sigslen
1058 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1059 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1060 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1063 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1068 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1069 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1070 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1072 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1076 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1078 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
1083 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1084 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1085 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1088 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1090 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1091 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1092 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1093 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1094 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1096 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
1097 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1099 * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
1102 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1103 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1104 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1105 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1106 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1107 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1108 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1109 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1110 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1111 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1112 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1114 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1115 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1116 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1117 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1118 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1123 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1125 if (c->algorithm_ssl & s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl
1126 || c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1127 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1129 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1132 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1134 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1136 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1139 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1140 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1143 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1144 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1145 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1146 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1148 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1150 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1151 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1153 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1154 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1156 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1157 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1158 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)
1159 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1170 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1172 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1173 if (s->renegotiate) {
1176 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1181 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1184 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1187 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1194 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1195 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1198 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1199 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1200 unsigned long size_str;
1204 * check for enough space.
1205 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1206 * 2 for servernamelist length
1207 * 1 for the hostname type
1208 * 2 for hostname length
1212 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1214 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1217 /* extension type and length */
1218 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1219 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1221 /* length of servername list */
1222 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1224 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1225 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1227 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1230 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1231 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1232 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1233 * Client Hello message */
1235 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1236 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1242 * check for enough space.
1243 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1244 * 1 for the srp user identity
1245 * + srp user identity length
1247 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1250 /* fill in the extension */
1251 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1252 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1253 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1254 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1259 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1262 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1265 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1266 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1268 unsigned char *etmp;
1270 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1272 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1274 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1276 if (num_formats > 255) {
1277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1281 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1282 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1283 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1284 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1285 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1289 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1291 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1292 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1295 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1297 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1299 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1300 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1304 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1306 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1307 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1308 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1309 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1310 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1314 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1316 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1317 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1318 ret += curves_list_len;
1320 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1322 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1324 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1325 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1326 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1327 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1328 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1329 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1330 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1332 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1333 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1334 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1337 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1338 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1341 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1344 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1346 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1349 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1355 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1357 const unsigned char *salg;
1358 unsigned char *etmp;
1359 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1360 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1362 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1364 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1366 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1367 /* Fill in lengths */
1368 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1373 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1375 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1379 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1380 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1381 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1387 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1388 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1394 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1396 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1397 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1399 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1400 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1402 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1403 /* save position of id len */
1404 unsigned char *q = ret;
1405 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1406 /* skip over id len */
1408 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1414 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1416 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1417 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1418 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1420 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1424 * 1: peer may send requests
1425 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1427 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1428 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1430 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1434 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1436 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1437 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1439 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1441 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1446 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1447 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1449 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1450 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1451 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1452 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1453 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1455 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1456 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1459 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1460 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1461 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1465 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1468 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1471 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1478 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1479 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1480 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1482 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1483 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1486 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1490 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1491 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1492 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1495 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1496 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1498 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1499 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1505 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1507 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1514 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1517 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1521 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1522 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1525 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1526 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1527 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1528 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1531 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1532 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1533 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1534 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1535 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1540 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1542 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1545 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1550 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1553 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1556 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1564 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1565 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1568 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1569 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1570 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1573 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1576 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1578 const unsigned char *plist;
1581 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1585 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1587 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1589 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1591 if (plistlen > 255) {
1592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1596 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1597 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1598 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1599 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1604 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1607 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1609 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1610 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1612 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1616 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1617 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1619 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1623 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1624 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1627 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1628 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1629 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1632 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1635 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1638 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1639 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1646 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1647 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1648 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1649 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1650 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1651 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1652 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1653 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1654 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1655 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1657 if (limit - ret < 36)
1659 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1663 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1664 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1665 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1666 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1668 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1672 * 1: peer may send requests
1673 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1675 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1676 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1678 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1683 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1684 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1685 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1686 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1687 const unsigned char *npa;
1688 unsigned int npalen;
1691 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1693 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1694 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1695 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1697 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1699 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1701 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1705 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1707 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1708 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1710 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1711 * for other cases too.
1713 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1714 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
1715 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1717 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1722 if (!s->hit && s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
1723 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1727 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1728 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1729 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1731 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1733 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1737 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1743 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1746 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1751 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1752 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1753 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1754 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1757 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1759 unsigned int data_len;
1760 unsigned int proto_len;
1761 const unsigned char *selected;
1762 unsigned char *data;
1763 unsigned char selected_len;
1766 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1770 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1771 * length-prefixed strings.
1773 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &data_len)
1774 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != data_len
1775 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, data_len))
1779 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &proto_len)
1781 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, proto_len))
1783 } while (PACKET_remaining(pkt));
1785 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1786 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1787 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1788 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1789 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1790 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1791 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1794 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1795 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1800 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1804 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1806 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1807 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1808 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1813 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1814 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1815 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1816 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1818 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1820 unsigned int type, size;
1821 unsigned char *eblock1, *eblock2;
1823 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1824 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1825 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1826 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1827 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1828 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1829 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1831 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1832 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1833 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1834 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1837 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1838 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1839 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1840 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1841 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1842 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1843 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1844 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1845 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1846 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1849 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1850 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type)
1851 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)
1852 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, size))
1855 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1858 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1859 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1860 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1862 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &eblock1, len1)
1863 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &eblock2, len2)
1864 || PACKET_remaining(pkt))
1866 if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1868 if (memcmp(eblock2, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1871 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1873 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &eblock1, len)
1874 || PACKET_remaining(pkt))
1876 if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1880 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1882 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1884 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1889 unsigned char *data;
1890 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1892 s->servername_done = 0;
1893 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1895 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1898 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1899 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1900 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1901 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1902 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1905 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1906 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1907 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1908 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1910 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1911 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1912 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1913 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1914 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1917 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1918 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1919 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1922 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1924 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1927 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len))
1930 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
1933 if (!PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, size))
1936 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1937 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1939 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, size))
1942 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1943 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
1945 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1946 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1949 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1951 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1952 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1953 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1954 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1955 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1956 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1957 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1958 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1959 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1960 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1961 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1962 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1963 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1964 * the value of the Host: field.
1965 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1966 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1967 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1969 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1973 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1974 unsigned char *sdata;
1975 unsigned int servname_type;
1979 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
1980 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
1983 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) > 3) {
1984 if (!PACKET_get_1(&ssubpkt, &servname_type)
1985 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &len)
1986 || PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < len)
1989 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1990 switch (servname_type) {
1991 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1993 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1996 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1997 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2000 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2001 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
2002 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2005 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ssubpkt,
2006 (unsigned char *)s->session
2009 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2012 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
2013 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2014 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2015 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2016 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2019 s->servername_done = 1;
2022 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &sdata, len)) {
2023 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2026 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2027 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2028 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2029 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2038 /* We shouldn't have any bytes left */
2039 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) != 0)
2043 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2044 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2045 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &len)
2046 || s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2049 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2051 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt, (unsigned char *)s->srp_ctx.login,
2054 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2056 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len
2057 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt))
2062 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2063 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2064 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2066 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2067 || ecpointformatlist_length == 0)
2071 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2072 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2073 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2074 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2075 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2076 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2079 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2080 ecpointformatlist_length;
2081 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
2082 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2083 ecpointformatlist_length))
2085 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2088 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2089 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2090 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2093 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2094 unsigned int ellipticcurvelist_length;
2096 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1 */
2097 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &ellipticcurvelist_length)
2098 || ellipticcurvelist_length == 0
2099 || (ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) != 0)
2103 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2106 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2107 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2108 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2109 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2112 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2113 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2114 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
2115 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
2116 ellipticcurvelist_length))
2118 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
2121 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2122 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2126 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2127 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2128 if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, size)
2129 || (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2130 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2131 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))) {
2132 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2135 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2138 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs
2139 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2142 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
2143 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt) != 0
2144 || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2147 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2150 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt,
2151 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type))
2154 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2155 const unsigned char *sdata;
2157 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2158 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2159 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
2162 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt)) {
2164 unsigned int idsize;
2166 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < 4
2167 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &idsize)
2168 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &data, idsize)) {
2173 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2176 if (data != sdata) {
2177 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2180 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2181 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2182 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2183 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2184 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2187 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2188 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2189 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2194 /* Read in request_extensions */
2195 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2196 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
2197 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2202 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2203 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2204 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2205 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2206 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata))
2211 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2214 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2216 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2217 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2218 unsigned int hbtype;
2220 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &hbtype)
2221 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2222 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2226 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2227 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2229 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2230 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2231 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2234 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2239 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2240 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2241 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2242 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2244 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2247 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2248 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2249 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2250 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2251 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2252 * anything like that, but this might change).
2254 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2255 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2256 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2257 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2258 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2260 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2264 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2265 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2266 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &subpkt, al) != 0)
2268 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2269 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2270 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2274 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2275 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2276 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2277 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2278 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
2282 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2283 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2284 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2286 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2288 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2291 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2292 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2293 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2294 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2295 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2298 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2303 /* Spurious data on the end */
2304 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0)
2309 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2311 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2312 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2313 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2315 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2321 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2325 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2328 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2329 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2330 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2334 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2341 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2343 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2344 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2345 * fill the length of the block.
2347 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2349 unsigned int off = 0;
2362 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2363 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2365 unsigned short length;
2366 unsigned short type;
2367 unsigned short size;
2368 unsigned char *data = *p;
2369 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2370 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2373 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2375 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2377 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2378 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2379 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2380 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2381 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2384 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2385 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2388 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
2392 if (data + length != d + n) {
2393 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2397 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
2401 if (data + size > (d + n))
2404 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2405 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2407 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2408 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2410 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2411 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2412 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2413 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2414 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2417 tlsext_servername = 1;
2419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2420 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2421 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2422 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2424 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2425 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2429 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2430 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2431 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2432 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2433 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2436 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2437 ecpointformatlist_length;
2438 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2439 ecpointformatlist_length);
2442 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2444 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2445 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2446 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2447 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2449 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2452 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2453 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2456 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2458 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2460 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2463 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2464 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2467 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2468 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2470 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2471 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2472 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2473 unsigned char *selected;
2474 unsigned char selected_len;
2476 /* We must have requested it. */
2477 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2478 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2481 /* The data must be valid */
2482 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
2483 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2487 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2489 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2490 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2491 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2494 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2495 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
2496 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2499 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2500 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2501 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2505 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2508 /* We must have requested it. */
2509 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2510 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2514 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2518 * The extension data consists of:
2519 * uint16 list_length
2520 * uint8 proto_length;
2521 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2526 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
2527 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2531 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
2532 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2535 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2536 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2537 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2538 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2541 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2542 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2544 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2545 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2547 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2548 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2550 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2551 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2552 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2555 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2560 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2561 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2562 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2566 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2567 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2568 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2569 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2570 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2571 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2574 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2576 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2579 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2580 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2582 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2588 if (data != d + n) {
2589 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2593 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2594 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2595 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2596 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2597 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2598 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2602 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2613 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2614 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2615 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2616 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2617 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2618 * initial connect only.
2620 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2621 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2622 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2623 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2624 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2631 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2637 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2642 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2644 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2645 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2647 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2649 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2650 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2653 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2654 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2658 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2660 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2661 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2662 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2663 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2665 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2667 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2670 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2671 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2674 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2675 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2678 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2679 s->servername_done = 0;
2684 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2685 static void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2687 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2688 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2689 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
2691 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2692 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
2693 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
2695 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2696 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
2700 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2704 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2705 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2706 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2707 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2708 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2709 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2710 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2711 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2714 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2715 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2716 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2717 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2718 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2721 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2722 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2723 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2724 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2725 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2729 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2733 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2737 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2739 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2740 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2743 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2744 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2745 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2746 * influence which certificate is sent
2748 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2750 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2751 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2752 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2753 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2754 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2758 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2759 * et al can pick it up.
2761 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2762 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2764 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2765 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2766 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2768 /* status request response should be sent */
2769 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2770 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2771 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2773 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2775 /* something bad happened */
2776 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2777 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2778 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2782 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2786 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2787 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2790 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2791 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2799 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2801 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2802 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2804 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2806 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2807 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2808 * must contain uncompressed.
2810 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2811 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2812 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2813 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2814 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2815 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2816 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
2817 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2818 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2820 unsigned char *list;
2821 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2822 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2823 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2824 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2825 found_uncompressed = 1;
2829 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2831 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2835 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2836 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2838 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2840 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2841 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2842 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2843 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2845 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2847 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2850 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
2853 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2854 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2857 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
2860 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2861 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2862 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2863 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2865 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2866 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2869 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2870 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2875 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2876 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2879 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2880 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2883 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2884 s->servername_done = 0;
2890 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2894 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2896 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2897 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2901 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2902 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2909 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2910 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2911 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2913 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2914 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2915 * extension, if any.
2916 * len: the length of the session ID.
2917 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2918 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2919 * point to the resulting session.
2921 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2922 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2923 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2926 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2927 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2928 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2929 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2930 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2931 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2932 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2935 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2936 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2937 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2938 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2939 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2940 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2942 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned char *session_id,
2943 int len, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2946 size_t bookmark = 0;
2950 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2953 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2956 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
2958 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2961 if (!PACKET_get_bookmark(pkt, &bookmark)) {
2965 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2966 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2967 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i)
2968 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, i)) {
2973 /* Skip past cipher list and compression algorithm list */
2974 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
2975 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, i)
2976 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i)
2977 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, i)) {
2982 /* Now at start of extensions */
2983 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)) {
2987 while (PACKET_remaining (pkt) >= 4) {
2988 unsigned int type, size;
2990 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type)
2991 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2992 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2996 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) < size) {
3000 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
3002 unsigned char *etick;
3006 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3009 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3013 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3015 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3016 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3017 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3018 * calculate the master secret later.
3023 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &etick, size)) {
3024 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3028 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, session_id, len, ret);
3030 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3031 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3034 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3037 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3038 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3041 default: /* fatal error */
3047 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, size)) {
3055 if (!PACKET_goto_bookmark(pkt, bookmark))
3061 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3063 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3064 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3065 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3066 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3067 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3068 * point to the resulting session.
3071 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3072 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3073 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3074 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3076 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3077 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3078 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3081 unsigned char *sdec;
3082 const unsigned char *p;
3083 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3084 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3087 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3088 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3091 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3092 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3093 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3094 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3095 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3096 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3105 /* Check key name matches */
3106 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3108 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3109 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
3110 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3111 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3114 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3117 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3119 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3123 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3124 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3125 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3126 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3127 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3128 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3131 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3132 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3133 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3134 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3135 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3137 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3140 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3141 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3142 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3147 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3150 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3154 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3155 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3156 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3160 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3161 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3170 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3175 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3182 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3183 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3184 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3185 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3186 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3187 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3188 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3191 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3192 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3193 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3194 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3197 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3200 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3201 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3207 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3210 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3211 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3212 return table[i].nid;
3217 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3223 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3226 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3229 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3230 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3234 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3236 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3242 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc) (void);
3245 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3246 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3249 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3251 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3252 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3253 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3254 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3255 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3258 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3262 if (hash_alg > OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info))
3264 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3267 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3269 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3270 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3272 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3273 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3275 return inf->mfunc();
3278 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3282 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3283 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3285 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3286 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3287 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3289 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3290 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3291 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3297 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3298 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3299 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3301 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3302 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3304 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3305 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3307 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3309 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3310 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3312 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3314 if (psignhash_nid) {
3315 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3316 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
3318 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3322 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3323 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3325 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3326 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3327 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3329 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3330 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3332 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3333 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3337 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3338 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3342 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3344 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3345 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3346 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3348 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3349 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3350 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3352 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3353 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3354 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3355 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3356 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3357 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3362 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3363 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3367 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3368 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3369 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3376 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3378 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3380 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3383 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3384 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3386 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3388 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3389 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3390 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3391 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3394 return tmpout - out;
3397 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3398 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3399 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3400 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3402 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3403 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3404 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3405 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3406 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3408 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3409 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3412 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3413 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3414 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3416 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3426 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3427 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3429 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3430 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3432 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3434 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3436 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3437 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3438 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3439 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3440 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3441 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3442 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3443 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3444 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3445 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3447 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3448 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3451 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3452 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3456 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3457 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3459 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3461 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3464 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3468 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3469 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3473 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3475 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3478 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3479 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3481 /* Should never happen */
3485 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3486 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3487 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3489 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3490 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3494 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3499 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3500 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3502 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3503 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3506 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3507 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3509 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3510 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3512 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3514 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3516 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3518 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3519 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3521 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3522 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3523 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3524 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3530 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3531 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3532 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3533 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3534 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3536 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3537 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3538 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3539 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3545 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3546 * the certificate for signing.
3548 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3550 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3551 * supported it stays as NULL.
3553 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3554 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3555 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3558 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3559 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3560 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3563 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3564 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3565 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3571 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3572 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3573 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3575 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3580 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3587 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3589 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3592 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3593 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3594 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3596 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3597 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3601 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3603 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3605 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3607 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3609 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3610 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3614 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length)
3617 unsigned short hbtype;
3618 unsigned int payload;
3619 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3621 if (s->msg_callback)
3622 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3624 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3626 /* Read type and payload length first */
3627 if (1 + 2 + 16 > length)
3628 return 0; /* silently discard */
3631 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > length)
3632 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3635 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3636 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3640 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3641 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3643 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3644 if (buffer == NULL) {
3645 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3650 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3651 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3653 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3655 /* Random padding */
3656 if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
3657 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3661 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3662 3 + payload + padding);
3664 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3665 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3666 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3667 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3669 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3673 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3677 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3678 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3682 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3684 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3691 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3693 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3695 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3696 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3698 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3699 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3700 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3701 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3705 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3706 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3707 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3711 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3712 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
3713 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3718 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
3719 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3721 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3724 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3725 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3726 * some random stuff.
3727 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3728 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3729 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3730 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3733 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3735 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3740 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3741 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3743 /* Sequence number */
3744 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3745 /* 16 random bytes */
3746 if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) {
3747 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3751 /* Random padding */
3752 if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) {
3753 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3757 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3759 if (s->msg_callback)
3760 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3761 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3762 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3764 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3773 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3777 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3780 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3782 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3783 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3784 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3785 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3786 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3787 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3789 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3790 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3791 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3795 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3797 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3800 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3803 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3805 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3807 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3809 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3817 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3818 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3820 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3823 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3824 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3827 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3828 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3833 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3834 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3836 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3840 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3844 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3847 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3850 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3855 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3856 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3858 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3859 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3860 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3862 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3869 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3870 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3871 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3873 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3874 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3875 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3881 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3885 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3889 if (default_nid == -1)
3891 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3893 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3894 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3895 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3900 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3901 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3905 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3906 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3907 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3914 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3915 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3916 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3917 * attempting to use them.
3920 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3922 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3923 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3924 /* Strict mode flags */
3925 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3926 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3927 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3929 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3934 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3935 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3938 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3939 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3941 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3944 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3946 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3947 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3949 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3951 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3952 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3955 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3956 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3957 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3958 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
3959 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3967 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3970 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3971 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3973 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3974 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3976 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3983 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3984 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3985 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3986 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3987 else if (!check_flags)
3992 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3993 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3995 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3997 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3998 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
4000 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4003 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4004 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4005 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4006 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4007 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4010 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4011 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4012 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4013 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4017 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4018 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4027 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4028 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4030 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4032 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4033 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4034 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4037 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4044 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4045 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4049 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4050 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4051 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4052 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4054 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4061 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4062 else if (check_flags)
4063 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4065 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4066 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4067 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4068 else if (!check_flags)
4071 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4072 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4073 else if (strict_mode) {
4074 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4075 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4076 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4077 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4079 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4086 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4087 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4091 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4094 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4097 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4102 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4103 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4104 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4105 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4106 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4110 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4114 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4116 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4117 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4119 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4120 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4121 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4125 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4128 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4130 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4132 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4133 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4135 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4136 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4137 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4139 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4140 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4141 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4142 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4143 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4148 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4151 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4153 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4154 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4158 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4159 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4160 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4161 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4162 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4164 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4167 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4171 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4174 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4175 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4182 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4183 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4185 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4186 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4187 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4188 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4189 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4190 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4193 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4194 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4196 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4201 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4203 int dh_secbits = 80;
4204 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4205 return DH_get_1024_160();
4206 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
4207 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4212 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4213 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4216 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4222 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4223 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4224 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4226 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4227 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g) {
4233 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4234 return DH_get_2048_224();
4235 return DH_get_1024_160();
4239 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4242 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4244 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4245 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4249 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4251 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4254 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4256 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4257 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4258 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4259 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4261 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4262 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4265 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4267 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4270 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4273 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4275 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4276 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4278 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4279 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4281 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4282 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4287 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4288 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4289 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4292 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4294 int rv, start_idx, i;
4296 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4301 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4305 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4306 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4307 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);