2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
20 #include "internal/nelem.h"
22 #include <openssl/ct.h>
24 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
28 tls1_generate_master_secret,
29 tls1_change_cipher_state,
30 tls1_final_finish_mac,
31 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
32 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
34 tls1_export_keying_material,
36 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
37 tls_close_construct_packet,
41 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
45 tls1_generate_master_secret,
46 tls1_change_cipher_state,
47 tls1_final_finish_mac,
48 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
49 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
51 tls1_export_keying_material,
52 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
53 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
54 tls_close_construct_packet,
58 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
62 tls1_generate_master_secret,
63 tls1_change_cipher_state,
64 tls1_final_finish_mac,
65 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
66 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
68 tls1_export_keying_material,
69 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
70 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
71 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
72 tls_close_construct_packet,
76 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
79 tls13_setup_key_block,
80 tls13_generate_master_secret,
81 tls13_change_cipher_state,
82 tls13_final_finish_mac,
83 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
84 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
86 tls13_export_keying_material,
87 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
88 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
89 tls_close_construct_packet,
93 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
96 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
97 * http, the cache would over fill
106 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
112 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
114 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
118 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
123 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
124 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
126 s->version = s->method->version;
131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
134 * Table of curve information.
135 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
136 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
138 static const TLS_GROUP_INFO nid_list[] = {
139 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
140 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
141 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
142 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
143 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
144 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
145 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
146 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
147 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
148 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
149 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
150 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
151 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
152 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
153 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
154 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
155 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
156 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
157 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
158 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
159 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
160 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
161 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
162 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
163 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
164 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
165 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
166 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
167 {EVP_PKEY_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
168 {EVP_PKEY_X448, 224, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X448 (30) */
171 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
172 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
173 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
174 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
177 /* The default curves */
178 static const uint16_t eccurves_default[] = {
179 29, /* X25519 (29) */
180 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
182 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
183 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
186 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
191 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(uint16_t group_id)
193 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
194 if (group_id < 1 || group_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list))
196 return &nid_list[group_id - 1];
199 static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
202 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
203 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
204 return (uint16_t)(i + 1);
210 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
211 * the number of groups supported.
213 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
217 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
218 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
219 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
220 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
221 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
224 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
225 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
229 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
230 *pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1;
235 if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
236 *pgroups = eccurves_default;
237 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(eccurves_default);
239 *pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
240 *pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
246 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
247 int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t curve, int op)
249 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *cinfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(curve);
250 unsigned char ctmp[2];
254 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
255 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
258 ctmp[0] = curve >> 8;
259 ctmp[1] = curve & 0xff;
260 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)ctmp);
263 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
264 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen)
267 for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
274 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
275 * if there is no match.
276 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
277 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
278 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
280 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
282 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
283 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
286 /* Can't do anything on client side */
290 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
292 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
293 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
295 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
297 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
298 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
299 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
300 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
301 /* Should never happen */
304 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
308 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
309 * otherwise peer decides.
311 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
312 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
313 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
315 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
316 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
319 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
320 uint16_t id = pref[i];
322 if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp)
323 || !tls_curve_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
331 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
335 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
336 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
341 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
344 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
347 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
350 if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL) {
351 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
354 for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
355 unsigned long idmask;
357 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
358 id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
360 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
373 # define MAX_CURVELIST OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)
377 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
380 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
382 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
388 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
390 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
392 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
394 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
395 if (nid == NID_undef)
396 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
397 if (nid == NID_undef)
398 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
399 if (nid == NID_undef)
401 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
402 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
404 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
408 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
409 int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
413 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
417 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
419 /* Return group id of a key */
420 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
422 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
427 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
428 return tls1_nid2group_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp));
431 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
432 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
436 unsigned char comp_id;
439 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
440 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
442 ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
443 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
445 /* Get required compression id */
446 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
447 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
448 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
450 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
455 int field_type = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(grp));
457 if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
458 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
459 else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
460 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
465 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
466 * supported (see RFC4492).
468 if (s->session->ext.ecpointformats == NULL)
471 for (i = 0; i < s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len; i++) {
472 if (s->session->ext.ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
478 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
479 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int check_own_groups)
481 const uint16_t *groups;
487 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
488 if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
489 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
491 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
492 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
494 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
495 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
498 /* Should never happen */
503 if (check_own_groups) {
504 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
505 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
506 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len))
510 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
513 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
517 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
518 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
521 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
522 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
523 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
524 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
528 return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
531 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
535 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
537 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
538 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
539 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
541 *pformats = ecformats_default;
542 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
544 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
546 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
551 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
552 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
554 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
558 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
561 /* If not EC nothing to do */
562 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
564 /* Check compression */
565 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
567 group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
569 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
572 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id, !s->server))
575 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
578 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
583 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
584 if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
585 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
586 else if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
587 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
589 return 0; /* Should never happen */
590 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
591 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
600 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
602 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
604 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
605 * is compatible with the client extensions.
607 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
609 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
611 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
613 return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
615 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
618 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
619 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 1);
620 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
621 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_384, 1);
628 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
633 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
635 /* Default sigalg schemes */
636 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
638 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
639 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
640 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
641 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
645 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
646 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
647 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
648 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
649 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
650 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
652 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
653 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
654 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
656 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
657 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
658 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
660 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
661 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
663 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
664 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
666 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
667 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
668 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
671 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
672 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
673 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
677 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
678 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
679 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
680 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
684 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
685 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
686 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
687 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
688 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
689 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
690 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
691 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1},
692 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
693 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
694 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1},
695 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
696 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
697 NID_undef, NID_undef},
698 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
699 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_PKEY_ED448,
700 NID_undef, NID_undef},
701 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
702 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
703 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef},
704 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
705 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
706 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef},
708 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
709 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
710 NID_undef, NID_undef},
711 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
712 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
713 NID_undef, NID_undef},
714 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
715 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
716 NID_undef, NID_undef},
717 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
718 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
719 NID_undef, NID_undef},
720 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
721 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
722 NID_undef, NID_undef},
723 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
724 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
725 NID_undef, NID_undef},
726 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
727 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
728 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
729 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
730 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
731 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
732 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
733 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
734 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
735 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
736 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
737 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
738 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
739 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
740 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
742 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
743 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
744 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef},
745 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
746 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
747 NID_undef, NID_undef},
748 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
749 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
750 NID_undef, NID_undef},
751 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
752 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
753 NID_undef, NID_undef},
754 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
755 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
756 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef},
758 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
759 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
760 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
761 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
762 NID_undef, NID_undef},
763 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
764 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
765 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
766 NID_undef, NID_undef},
767 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
768 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
769 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
770 NID_undef, NID_undef}
773 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
774 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
775 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
776 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
777 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
782 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
783 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
785 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
786 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
787 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
788 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
789 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
790 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
791 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
792 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
793 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
794 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
797 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
798 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg)
801 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
803 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
805 if (s->sigalg == sigalg)
810 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
811 int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
816 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
817 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
820 md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
830 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
832 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
833 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
834 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
836 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
837 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(const RSA *rsa, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
843 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md) || md == NULL)
845 if (RSA_size(rsa) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
851 * Return a signature algorithm for TLS < 1.2 where the signature type
852 * is fixed by the certificate type.
854 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
860 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
861 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
862 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
864 if (clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
871 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
873 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST01 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aGOST01) {
876 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
878 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
885 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
888 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
890 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
891 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
893 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
897 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
899 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
900 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
903 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
905 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
907 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
910 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
914 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
917 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
920 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
921 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
922 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
923 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
924 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
926 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
927 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
930 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
931 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
936 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
937 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
938 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
940 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
941 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
942 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
943 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
944 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
945 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
947 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
948 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
953 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
954 * specified EC curve.
956 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s, int curve)
958 const uint16_t *sigs;
961 if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
962 sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
963 siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
965 sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
966 siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
969 for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
970 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sigs[i]);
974 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC
975 && lu->curve != NID_undef
976 && curve == lu->curve)
984 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
985 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
988 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
990 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
991 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
993 size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx;
994 int pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
995 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
997 /* Should never happen */
1000 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1001 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1002 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
1003 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1004 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1007 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1008 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1009 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1011 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig);
1013 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1014 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1017 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
1018 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
1019 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
1020 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1021 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1024 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1025 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey), &cidx)
1026 || lu->sig_idx != (int)cidx) {
1027 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1028 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1032 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1033 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1035 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1036 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
1037 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1038 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1039 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
1043 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1044 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1045 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
1046 int curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
1048 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
1049 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1050 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1054 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1055 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1056 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey), 1)) {
1057 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1058 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1061 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1062 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1063 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1064 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
1065 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1066 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1067 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1072 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1073 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1074 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1079 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1080 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1081 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
1082 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
1085 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1086 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
1087 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1088 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1089 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1092 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
1093 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1094 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1099 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1100 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1102 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1103 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1104 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1105 EVP_MD_size(md) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md),
1106 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
1107 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1108 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1112 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1113 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1117 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1119 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1121 *pnid = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1126 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1127 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1128 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1130 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1133 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1135 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1137 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1138 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1139 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1140 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver,
1141 &s->s3->tmp.max_ver, NULL) != 0)
1143 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1144 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1145 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1146 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1147 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1149 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1150 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1151 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1152 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1153 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1160 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1161 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1162 * @c: cipher to check
1163 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1164 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1166 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1168 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
1170 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1171 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1173 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
1175 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1176 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1179 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1180 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1182 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1183 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1184 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1186 if ((min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver))
1189 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
1190 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
1193 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1196 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1198 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1200 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1203 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1207 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1208 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1209 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1210 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1211 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1212 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1213 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1215 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1216 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1218 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
1219 && s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1220 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1221 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1223 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1224 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1229 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1230 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1231 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1232 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1240 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1241 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1242 SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1245 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1248 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1249 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
1250 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1255 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1257 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1258 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1259 * point to the resulting session.
1261 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1265 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1268 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1271 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1272 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1275 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1276 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1278 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1279 if (!ticketext->present)
1280 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1282 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1284 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1285 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1289 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1291 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1292 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1293 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1294 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1297 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1298 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1299 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1300 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1301 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1302 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1304 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1305 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1306 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1307 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1308 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1309 * point to the resulting session.
1311 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1312 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1313 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1315 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1316 unsigned char *sdec;
1317 const unsigned char *p;
1318 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1319 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1321 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1322 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
1323 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
1324 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1326 if (eticklen == 0) {
1328 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1329 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1331 ret = SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1334 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1336 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1337 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1338 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1339 * calculate the master secret later.
1341 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1345 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1346 if (eticklen < TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
1347 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1351 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1352 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
1354 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1357 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1359 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1362 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
1363 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1364 int rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick,
1365 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1368 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1372 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1378 /* Check key name matches */
1379 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1380 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
1381 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1384 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
1385 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
1386 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
1387 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
1388 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
1389 etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
1390 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1393 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1397 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1400 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
1402 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1406 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1408 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1409 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1413 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1414 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1415 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
1416 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1420 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1421 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1424 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1425 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1426 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1427 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1428 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1429 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1430 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1432 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1435 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1437 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1443 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1447 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1449 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1451 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1455 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1456 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1457 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1461 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1462 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1465 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1467 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1472 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1474 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1477 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1478 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1481 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
1482 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
1483 * performs any action
1485 if (s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb != NULL
1486 && (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
1487 || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
1488 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1489 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)) {
1490 size_t keyname_len = eticklen;
1493 if (keyname_len > TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
1494 keyname_len = TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH;
1495 retcb = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(s, sess, etick, keyname_len,
1497 s->session_ctx->ticket_cb_data);
1499 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT:
1500 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1503 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE:
1504 ret = SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1505 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1509 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW:
1510 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_EMPTY && ret != SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
1511 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1512 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
1513 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1517 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE:
1518 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW:
1519 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1520 && ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)
1521 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1522 else if (retcb == SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE)
1523 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1525 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1529 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1533 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb == NULL || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1535 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
1536 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
1537 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY:
1538 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1547 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1548 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1550 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
1553 /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
1554 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
1556 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
1557 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1559 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
1560 if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
1561 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
1562 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
1563 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
1566 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1567 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu->sig_idx))
1570 if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
1571 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
1572 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
1573 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
1574 if (s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1577 && s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1578 && s->s3->tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1580 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1583 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
1584 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
1585 * ciphersuites enabled.
1588 if (s->s3->tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
1591 sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1592 num = sk != NULL ? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) : 0;
1593 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
1594 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1596 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
1597 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
1598 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
1601 if ((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kGOST) != 0)
1609 if (lu->hash == NID_undef)
1611 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1612 secbits = EVP_MD_size(ssl_md(lu->hash_idx)) * 4;
1613 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1614 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
1615 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
1616 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
1620 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1621 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1625 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
1627 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
1628 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1629 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
1631 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
1634 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
1635 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
1636 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs);
1637 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1642 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
1646 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
1647 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
1648 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
1649 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
1651 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
1654 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1655 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
1660 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
1661 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1663 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1665 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
1668 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
1669 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
1671 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1672 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
1673 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
1674 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
1678 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
1682 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1683 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
1684 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
1685 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
1687 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
1688 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
1689 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
1690 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp);
1692 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1693 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
1695 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
1696 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
1707 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1708 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1710 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
1711 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
1713 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
1715 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
1717 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
1718 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1719 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1720 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1721 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1722 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
1723 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
1724 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1725 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
1726 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
1728 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
1729 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
1732 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1733 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1737 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1738 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1740 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1742 if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL) {
1743 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SHARED_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1746 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1750 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
1751 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
1755 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
1761 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1763 /* Invalid data length */
1764 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
1769 if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL) {
1770 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SAVE_U16, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1773 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
1781 OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
1788 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert)
1790 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1791 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1793 /* Should never happen */
1794 if (s->cert == NULL)
1798 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
1799 &s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
1801 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs,
1802 &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
1806 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1808 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1811 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
1814 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
1817 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1820 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
1821 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs[i];
1822 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
1824 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1825 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1827 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
1828 if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx))
1829 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1834 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1835 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1836 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1838 uint16_t *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1839 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1840 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
1843 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1845 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
1849 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
1851 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
1852 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1854 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
1856 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
1857 if (psignhash != NULL)
1858 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
1860 return (int)numsigalgs;
1863 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1864 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1865 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1867 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
1868 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs == NULL
1870 || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
1871 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
1873 shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[idx];
1875 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
1877 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
1878 if (psignhash != NULL)
1879 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
1881 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
1883 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
1884 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
1887 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
1888 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
1892 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
1893 uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
1896 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
1898 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
1899 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1900 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
1901 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1902 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
1903 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1904 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1905 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1907 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
1908 if (*phash == NID_undef)
1909 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
1912 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
1913 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
1915 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
1917 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
1919 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
1920 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
1921 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
1924 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
1926 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
1928 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
1930 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
1932 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
1933 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
1934 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
1935 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
1936 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
1937 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
1941 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1943 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
1944 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
1948 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
1955 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
1956 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
1957 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
1959 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1961 if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
1962 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
1966 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
1970 /* Reject duplicates */
1971 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
1972 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
1981 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
1982 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
1984 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
1988 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
1992 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
1995 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT *c, const uint16_t *psigs, size_t salglen,
2000 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_RAW_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2004 memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
2007 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2008 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2009 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
2011 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2012 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2013 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
2019 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
2021 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
2026 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2027 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2030 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
2032 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
2033 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
2034 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
2036 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2038 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
2039 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
2044 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2049 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2050 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2051 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2053 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2054 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2055 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2061 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
2065 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
2069 if (default_nid == -1)
2071 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2073 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
2074 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
2075 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
2080 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2081 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
2085 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
2086 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
2087 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
2094 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2095 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2096 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2097 * attempting to use them.
2100 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2102 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2103 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2104 /* Strict mode flags */
2105 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2106 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2107 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2109 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
2114 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
2115 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
2118 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
2119 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2121 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2124 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
2126 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
2127 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2129 pk = cpk->privatekey;
2131 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
2132 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2141 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
2144 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2146 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
2147 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
2149 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
2156 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2157 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
2158 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
2159 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2160 else if (!check_flags)
2165 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2166 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2168 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
2171 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
2172 || s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2174 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2178 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2179 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
2182 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
2183 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2184 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
2188 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2189 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
2192 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
2193 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
2194 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
2197 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
2198 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
2199 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
2202 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
2203 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
2204 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
2213 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2214 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2216 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
2218 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
2219 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
2220 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p);
2222 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
2225 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2232 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2233 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
2237 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2238 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2239 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2240 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2242 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2249 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2250 else if (check_flags)
2251 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2253 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2254 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2255 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2256 else if (!check_flags)
2259 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2260 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2261 else if (strict_mode) {
2262 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2263 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2264 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2265 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2267 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2274 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2275 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2277 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
2279 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2282 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2285 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2289 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3->tmp.ctype;
2292 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2293 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2294 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2298 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2301 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2304 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names;
2306 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2307 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2309 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2310 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2311 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2313 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2314 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2315 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2316 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2317 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2322 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2325 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2327 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2328 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2332 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2333 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2335 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2338 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2342 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2345 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2346 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2353 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2354 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2356 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2357 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
2358 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2359 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2360 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2361 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2362 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2363 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2364 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED448);
2367 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2368 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2370 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2373 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2374 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2376 int dh_secbits = 80;
2377 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
2378 return DH_get_1024_160();
2379 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2380 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2385 if (s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL)
2387 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey);
2390 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
2396 if (g == NULL || !BN_set_word(g, 2)) {
2401 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2402 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2404 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2405 if (p == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
2413 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2414 return DH_get_2048_224();
2415 return DH_get_1024_160();
2419 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2422 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2425 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2426 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2427 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2428 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2430 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2433 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2435 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2438 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2440 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2441 int secbits, nid, pknid;
2442 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2443 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2445 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
2447 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2448 if (nid == NID_undef)
2451 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
2453 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
2456 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2459 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2461 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2462 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2464 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2465 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2467 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2468 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2473 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2474 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2475 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2478 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2480 int rv, start_idx, i;
2482 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
2487 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
2491 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
2492 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
2493 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
2501 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
2502 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
2505 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2507 int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2508 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
2510 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
2512 || (clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0
2513 || (clu->nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
2514 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0))
2517 return s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
2521 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
2522 * with signature scheme |sig|.
2523 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
2524 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
2525 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
2527 static int has_usable_cert(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
2529 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2530 int mdnid, pknid, supported;
2533 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override lu->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
2536 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
2538 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2539 for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
2540 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
2542 || !X509_get_signature_info(s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509, &mdnid,
2545 * TODO this does not differentiate between the
2546 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
2547 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
2548 * signing certificate.
2550 || mdnid != lu->hash
2551 || pknid != lu->sig)
2555 supported = EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey,
2559 else if (supported < 0)
2561 /* If it didn't report a mandatory NID, for whatever reasons,
2562 * just clear the error and allow all hashes to be used. */
2569 supported = EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey,
2573 else if (supported < 0)
2580 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
2581 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
2583 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
2584 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
2586 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
2587 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
2588 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
2590 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
2592 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
2595 s->s3->tmp.cert = NULL;
2596 s->s3->tmp.sigalg = NULL;
2598 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2600 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2604 /* Look for a certificate matching shared sigalgs */
2605 for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2606 lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
2609 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
2610 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
2611 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
2612 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
2613 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2615 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
2616 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL) || !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
2618 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
2619 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2621 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
2623 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2625 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
2630 } else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2631 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2634 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
2635 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey), lu))
2640 if (i == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
2643 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2644 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2648 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
2649 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
2651 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
2654 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2656 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2657 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2660 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
2661 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
2662 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
2663 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2670 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
2673 for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2674 lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
2677 if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
2680 int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
2682 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2683 if (cc_idx != sig_idx)
2686 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
2687 if (!has_usable_cert(s, lu, sig_idx))
2689 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2690 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2691 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
2693 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey), lu))
2696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2697 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
2701 if (i == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
2704 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2705 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2706 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2711 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
2713 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
2714 size_t sent_sigslen;
2716 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2719 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2720 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2724 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
2725 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
2726 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
2727 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs
2728 && has_usable_cert(s, lu, lu->sig_idx))
2731 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
2734 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2735 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2736 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2741 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2744 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2745 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2751 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2752 s->s3->tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
2753 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
2754 s->s3->tmp.sigalg = lu;
2758 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t mode)
2760 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
2761 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
2762 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
2763 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
2767 ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
2771 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL *ssl, uint8_t mode)
2773 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
2774 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
2775 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
2776 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
2780 ssl->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
2784 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION *session)
2786 return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;