2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 # include <openssl/dh.h>
120 # include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
195 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
196 * http, the cache would over fill
198 return (60 * 60 * 2);
205 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
209 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
212 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
213 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
217 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
220 s->version = s->method->version;
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
226 int nid; /* Curve NID */
227 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
228 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
231 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
232 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
234 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
235 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
236 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
237 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
238 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
239 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
240 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
241 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
242 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
243 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
244 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
245 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
246 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
247 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
248 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
249 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
250 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
251 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
252 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
253 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
254 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
255 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
256 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
257 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
258 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
259 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
260 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
261 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
265 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
266 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
267 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
268 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
271 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
272 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
273 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
274 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
275 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
276 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
277 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
278 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
279 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
280 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
281 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
282 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
283 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
284 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
285 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
286 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
287 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
288 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
289 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
290 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
291 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
292 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
293 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
294 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
295 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
296 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
297 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
298 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
299 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
302 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
303 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
304 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
307 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
309 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
310 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
312 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
315 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
317 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
319 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
321 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
323 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
325 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
327 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
329 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
331 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
333 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
335 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
337 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
339 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
341 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
343 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
345 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
347 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
349 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
351 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
353 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
355 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
357 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
359 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
361 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
363 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
365 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
367 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
369 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
371 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
373 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
381 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
383 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
384 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
385 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
386 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
387 * lists in the first place.
388 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
389 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
390 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
392 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
393 const unsigned char **pcurves,
396 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
398 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
399 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
401 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
402 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
403 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
404 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
405 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
408 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
409 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
413 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
414 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
418 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
419 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
422 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
423 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
427 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
428 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
429 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
433 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
438 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
439 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
441 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
444 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
446 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
447 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
448 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
451 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
454 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
455 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
457 const unsigned char *curves;
458 size_t num_curves, i;
459 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
460 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
462 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
464 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
467 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
468 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
470 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
471 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
473 } else /* Should never happen */
476 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
478 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
479 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
480 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
486 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
487 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
488 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
489 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
491 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
493 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
494 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
496 /* Can't do anything on client side */
500 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
502 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
503 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
505 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
506 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
507 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
508 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
509 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
510 /* Should never happen */
513 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
517 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
518 * but s->options is a long...
520 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
521 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
523 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
524 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
525 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
526 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
528 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
530 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
531 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
532 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
533 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
534 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
537 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
538 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
546 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
550 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
551 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
553 unsigned char *clist, *p;
556 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
559 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
560 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
563 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
564 unsigned long idmask;
566 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
568 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
577 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
581 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
585 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
588 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
590 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
596 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
598 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
600 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
602 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
603 if (nid == NID_undef)
604 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
605 if (nid == NID_undef)
606 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
607 if (nid == NID_undef)
609 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
610 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
612 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
616 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
617 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
622 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
626 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
629 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
630 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
635 const EC_METHOD *meth;
638 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
639 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
642 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
645 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
649 /* Determine curve ID */
650 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
651 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
652 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
655 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
664 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
666 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
668 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
670 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
672 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
677 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
678 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
679 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
681 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
682 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
685 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
686 * supported (see RFC4492).
688 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
689 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
690 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
691 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
692 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
695 if (i == num_formats)
700 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
701 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
702 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
704 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
706 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
707 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
708 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
709 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
710 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
714 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
715 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
720 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
727 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
731 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
733 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
734 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
735 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
737 *pformats = ecformats_default;
738 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
740 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
742 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
747 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
748 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
750 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
752 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
755 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
758 /* If not EC nothing to do */
759 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
763 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
768 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
771 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
775 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
776 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
778 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
784 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
785 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
786 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
787 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
788 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
790 return 0; /* Should never happen */
791 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
792 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
794 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
796 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
797 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
798 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
800 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
806 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
807 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
808 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
810 unsigned char curve_id[2];
811 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
812 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
813 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
814 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
818 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
821 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
822 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
823 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
824 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
825 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
826 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
830 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
831 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
833 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
834 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
836 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
838 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
841 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
843 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
849 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
850 /* Need a shared curve */
851 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
857 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
862 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
864 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
868 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
871 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
875 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
880 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
882 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
885 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
886 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
889 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
890 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
892 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
895 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
896 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
898 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
901 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
902 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
904 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
907 # define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
908 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
909 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
910 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
912 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
913 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
914 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
915 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
916 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
917 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
920 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
921 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
922 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
923 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
926 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
929 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
932 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
933 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
934 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
935 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
936 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
938 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
939 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
942 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
943 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
947 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
948 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
949 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
950 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
951 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
952 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
953 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
955 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
956 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
961 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
962 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
964 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
965 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
967 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
968 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
969 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
970 /* Should never happen */
973 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
974 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
975 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
978 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
979 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
980 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
981 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
982 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
984 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
985 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
988 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
989 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
992 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
993 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
994 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
995 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
998 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
999 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
1000 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1001 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1007 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1011 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1012 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1013 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1014 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1017 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1018 if (i == sent_sigslen
1019 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1020 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1021 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1024 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1026 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1029 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1030 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1031 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1033 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1037 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1039 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1040 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1045 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1046 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1047 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1050 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1055 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1056 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1057 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1060 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1062 * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
1065 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1066 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1067 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1068 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1069 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1070 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1071 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1072 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1073 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1074 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1075 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1077 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1078 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1079 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1080 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1081 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1087 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1090 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k
1091 || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1093 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1096 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1098 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1100 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1103 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1104 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1107 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1108 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1109 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1110 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1112 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1114 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1115 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1117 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1118 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1120 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1121 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1122 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
1123 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1134 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1136 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1137 if (s->renegotiate) {
1140 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1141 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1145 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1148 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1151 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1158 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1159 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1162 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1163 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1164 unsigned long size_str;
1168 * check for enough space.
1169 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1170 * 2 for servernamelist length
1171 * 1 for the hostname type
1172 * 2 for hostname length
1176 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1178 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1181 /* extension type and length */
1182 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1183 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1185 /* length of servername list */
1186 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1188 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1189 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1191 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1194 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1195 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1196 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1197 * Client Hello message */
1199 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1200 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1206 * check for enough space.
1207 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1208 * 1 for the srp user identity
1209 * + srp user identity length
1211 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1214 /* fill in the extension */
1215 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1216 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1217 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1218 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1223 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1226 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1229 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1230 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1232 unsigned char *etmp;
1234 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1236 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1238 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1240 if (num_formats > 255) {
1241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1245 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1246 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1247 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1248 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1249 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1253 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1255 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1256 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1259 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1261 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1263 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1268 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1270 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1271 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1272 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1273 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1274 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1278 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1280 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1281 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1282 ret += curves_list_len;
1284 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1286 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1288 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1289 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1290 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1291 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1292 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1293 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1294 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1296 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1297 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1298 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1301 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1302 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1305 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1308 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1310 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1313 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1319 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1321 const unsigned char *salg;
1322 unsigned char *etmp;
1323 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1324 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1326 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1328 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1330 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1331 /* Fill in lengths */
1332 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1337 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1339 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1343 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1344 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1345 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1351 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1352 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1358 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1360 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1361 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1363 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1364 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1366 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1367 /* save position of id len */
1368 unsigned char *q = ret;
1369 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1370 /* skip over id len */
1372 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1378 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1380 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1381 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1382 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1384 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1388 * 1: peer may send requests
1389 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1391 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1392 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1394 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1397 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1398 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1400 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1401 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1403 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1405 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1410 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1411 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1413 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1414 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1415 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1416 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1417 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1419 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1420 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1423 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1424 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1425 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1429 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1432 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1435 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1442 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1443 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1444 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1446 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1447 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1450 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1454 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1455 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1456 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1459 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1460 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1462 * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1463 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c
1466 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1468 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1469 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1475 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1477 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1484 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1487 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1491 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1492 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1495 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1496 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1497 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1498 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1500 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1501 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1502 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1503 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1504 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1505 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1510 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1512 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1515 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1520 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1523 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1526 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1534 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1535 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1538 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1539 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1540 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1543 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1546 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1548 const unsigned char *plist;
1551 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1555 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1557 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1559 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1561 if (plistlen > 255) {
1562 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1566 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1567 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1568 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1569 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1574 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1577 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1579 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1580 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1582 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1586 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1587 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1589 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1593 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1594 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1597 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1598 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1599 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1602 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1605 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1608 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1616 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1617 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1618 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1619 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1620 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1621 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1622 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1623 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1624 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1625 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1627 if (limit - ret < 36)
1629 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1633 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1634 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1635 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1636 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1638 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1642 * 1: peer may send requests
1643 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1645 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1646 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1648 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1653 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1654 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1655 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1656 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1657 const unsigned char *npa;
1658 unsigned int npalen;
1661 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1663 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1664 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1665 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1667 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1669 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1671 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1675 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1677 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1678 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1680 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1681 * for other cases too.
1683 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1684 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
1685 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1687 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1692 if (!s->hit && s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
1693 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1697 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1698 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1699 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1701 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1703 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1707 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1713 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1716 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1721 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1722 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1723 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1724 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1727 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1728 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1732 const unsigned char *selected;
1733 unsigned char selected_len;
1736 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1743 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1744 * length-prefixed strings.
1746 i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]);
1755 for (i = 0; i < data_len;) {
1756 proto_len = data[i];
1762 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1768 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1769 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1770 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1771 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1772 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1773 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1774 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1777 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1778 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1783 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1787 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1789 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1790 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1791 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1796 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1797 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1798 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1799 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1801 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1802 const unsigned char *d, int n)
1804 unsigned short type, size;
1805 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1806 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1807 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1808 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1809 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1810 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1811 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1813 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1814 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1815 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1816 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1819 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1820 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1821 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1822 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1823 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1824 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1825 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1826 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1827 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1828 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1831 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1835 if (data > (d + n - 4))
1840 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1843 if (data + size > d + n)
1847 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1848 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1849 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1851 if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n)
1853 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1855 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1858 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1860 if (data + len != d + n)
1862 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1866 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1868 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1870 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
1871 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1873 unsigned short type;
1874 unsigned short size;
1876 unsigned char *data = *p;
1877 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1879 s->servername_done = 0;
1880 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1881 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1882 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1885 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1886 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1887 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1888 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1889 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1892 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1893 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1894 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1895 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1897 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1898 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1899 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1900 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1901 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1904 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1905 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1906 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1909 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1911 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1915 if (data > (d + n - len))
1918 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
1922 if (data + size > (d + n))
1924 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1925 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1926 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1927 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1929 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1930 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1933 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1935 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1936 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1937 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1938 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1939 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1940 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1941 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1942 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1943 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1944 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1945 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1946 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1947 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1948 * the value of the Host: field.
1949 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1950 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1951 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1953 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1957 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1958 unsigned char *sdata;
1963 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1969 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1975 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1980 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1983 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1984 switch (servname_type) {
1985 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1987 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
1988 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1991 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1992 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1995 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
1996 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
1997 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2000 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2001 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
2002 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2003 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2004 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2005 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2008 s->servername_done = 1;
2011 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2012 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2013 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2014 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2025 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2030 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2031 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2032 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) {
2033 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2036 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
2037 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2040 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2042 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2043 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2045 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) {
2046 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2052 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2053 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2054 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2055 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2057 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2058 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) {
2059 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2063 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2064 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2065 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2066 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2067 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2068 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2071 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2072 ecpointformatlist_length;
2073 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2074 ecpointformatlist_length);
2076 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2077 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2078 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2079 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2081 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2082 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2083 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2084 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) {
2085 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2089 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
2090 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2093 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2094 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2095 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2096 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2099 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2100 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2101 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
2102 ellipticcurvelist_length);
2105 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2106 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2107 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2108 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2109 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2111 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2114 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2116 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2) {
2117 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2122 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) {
2123 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2126 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2127 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2130 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2133 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2137 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2139 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2140 const unsigned char *sdata;
2142 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2146 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2153 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2157 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2160 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2165 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2167 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2170 if (data != sdata) {
2171 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2172 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2175 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2176 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2177 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2178 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2179 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2182 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2183 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2184 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2189 /* Read in request_extensions */
2191 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2196 if (dsize != size) {
2197 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2202 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2203 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2204 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2205 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2206 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) {
2207 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2213 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2216 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2218 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2219 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2221 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2222 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2224 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2225 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2226 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2229 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2234 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2235 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2236 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2237 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2239 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2242 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2243 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2244 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2245 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2246 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2247 * anything like that, but this might change).
2249 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2250 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2251 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2252 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2253 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2255 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2259 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2260 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2261 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2263 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2264 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2265 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2269 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2270 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2271 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2272 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2273 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2277 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2278 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2279 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2281 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2283 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2286 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2287 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2288 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2289 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2290 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2293 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2304 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2306 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2307 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2308 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2310 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2317 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2321 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2322 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2323 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2327 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2334 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2336 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2337 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2338 * fill the length of the block.
2340 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2342 unsigned int off = 0;
2355 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2356 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2358 unsigned short length;
2359 unsigned short type;
2360 unsigned short size;
2361 unsigned char *data = *p;
2362 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2363 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2365 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2366 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2368 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2370 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2371 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2372 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2373 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2374 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2377 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2378 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2381 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
2385 if (data + length != d + n) {
2386 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2390 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
2394 if (data + size > (d + n))
2397 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2398 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2400 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2401 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2403 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2404 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2405 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2406 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2407 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2410 tlsext_servername = 1;
2412 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2413 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2414 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2415 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2417 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2418 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2422 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2423 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2424 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2425 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2426 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2429 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2430 ecpointformatlist_length;
2431 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2432 ecpointformatlist_length);
2435 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2437 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2438 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2439 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2440 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2442 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2445 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2446 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2449 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2451 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2453 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2456 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2457 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2460 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2461 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2463 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2464 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2465 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2466 unsigned char *selected;
2467 unsigned char selected_len;
2469 /* We must have requested it. */
2470 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2471 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2474 /* The data must be valid */
2475 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
2476 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2480 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2482 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2483 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2484 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2487 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2488 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
2489 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2492 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2493 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2494 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2498 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2501 /* We must have requested it. */
2502 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2503 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2507 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2511 * The extension data consists of:
2512 * uint16 list_length
2513 * uint8 proto_length;
2514 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2519 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
2520 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2524 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
2525 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2528 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2529 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2530 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2531 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2534 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2535 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2537 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2538 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2540 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2541 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2543 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2544 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2545 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2548 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2553 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2554 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2555 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2559 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2560 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2561 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2562 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2563 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2564 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2567 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2569 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2572 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2573 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2575 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2581 if (data != d + n) {
2582 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2586 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2587 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2588 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2589 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2590 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2591 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2595 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2606 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2607 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2608 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2609 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2610 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2611 * initial connect only.
2613 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2614 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2615 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2617 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2624 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2630 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2635 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2637 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2638 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2640 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2642 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2643 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2646 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2647 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2651 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2653 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2654 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2655 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2656 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2658 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2660 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2663 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2664 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2667 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2668 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2671 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2672 s->servername_done = 0;
2678 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2682 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2683 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2684 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2685 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2686 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2687 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2688 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2689 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2692 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2693 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
2694 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2695 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2696 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2699 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2700 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2701 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2702 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2703 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2707 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2710 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2714 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2716 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2717 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2720 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2721 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2722 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2723 * influence which certificate is sent
2725 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2727 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2728 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2729 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2730 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2731 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2735 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2736 * et al can pick it up.
2738 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2739 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2741 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2742 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2743 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2745 /* status request response should be sent */
2746 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2747 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2748 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2750 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2752 /* something bad happened */
2753 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2754 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2755 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2759 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2763 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2764 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2767 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2768 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2776 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2778 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2779 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2781 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2783 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2784 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2785 * must contain uncompressed.
2787 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2788 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2789 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2790 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2791 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2792 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2793 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
2794 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2795 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2797 unsigned char *list;
2798 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2799 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2800 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2801 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2802 found_uncompressed = 1;
2806 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2807 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2808 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2812 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2813 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2815 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2817 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2818 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2819 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2820 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2822 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2824 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2827 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
2830 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2831 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2834 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
2837 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2838 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2839 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2840 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2842 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2843 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2846 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2847 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2852 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2853 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2856 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2857 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2860 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2861 s->servername_done = 0;
2867 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2871 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2873 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2874 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2878 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2879 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2886 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2887 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2888 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2890 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2891 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2892 * extension, if any.
2893 * len: the length of the session ID.
2894 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2895 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2896 * point to the resulting session.
2898 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2899 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2900 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2903 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2904 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2905 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2906 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2907 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2908 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2909 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2912 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2913 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2914 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2915 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2916 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2917 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2919 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2920 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2922 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2923 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2927 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2930 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2933 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
2935 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2939 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2940 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2946 /* Skip past cipher list */
2951 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2956 /* Now at start of extensions */
2957 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2960 while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
2961 unsigned short type, size;
2964 if (p + size > limit)
2966 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2970 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2973 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2976 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2978 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2979 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2980 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2981 * calculate the master secret later.
2985 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
2987 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2988 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2990 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2992 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2993 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2995 default: /* fatal error */
3005 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3007 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3008 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3009 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3010 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3011 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3012 * point to the resulting session.
3015 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3016 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3017 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3018 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3020 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3021 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3022 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3025 unsigned char *sdec;
3026 const unsigned char *p;
3027 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3028 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3031 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3032 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3035 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3036 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3037 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3038 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3039 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3040 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3049 /* Check key name matches */
3050 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3052 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3053 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
3054 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3055 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3058 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3061 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3063 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3067 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3068 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3069 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3070 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3071 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3072 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3075 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3076 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3077 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3078 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3079 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3081 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3084 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3085 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3086 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3091 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3094 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3098 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3099 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3100 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3104 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3105 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3114 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3119 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3126 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3127 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3128 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3129 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3130 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3131 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3132 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3135 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3136 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3137 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3138 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3141 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3144 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3145 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3151 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3154 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3155 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3156 return table[i].nid;
3161 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3167 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3170 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3173 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3174 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3178 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3180 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3186 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc) (void);
3189 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3190 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3193 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3195 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3196 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3197 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3198 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3199 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3202 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3206 if (hash_alg > OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info))
3208 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3211 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3213 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3214 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3216 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3217 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3219 return inf->mfunc();
3222 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3225 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3226 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3227 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3229 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3230 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3231 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3233 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3234 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3235 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3241 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3242 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3243 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3245 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3246 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3248 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3249 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3251 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3253 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3254 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3256 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3258 if (psignhash_nid) {
3259 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3260 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
3262 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3266 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3267 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3269 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3270 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3271 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3273 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3274 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3276 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3277 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3281 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3282 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3286 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3288 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3289 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3290 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3292 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3293 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3294 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3296 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3297 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3298 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3299 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3300 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3301 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3305 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3306 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3307 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3311 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3312 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3313 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3320 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3322 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3324 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3327 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3328 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3330 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3332 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3333 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3334 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3335 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3338 return tmpout - out;
3341 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3342 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3343 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3344 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3346 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3347 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3348 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3349 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3350 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3352 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3353 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3356 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3357 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3358 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3360 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3370 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3371 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3373 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3374 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3376 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3378 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3380 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3381 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3382 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3383 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3384 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3385 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3386 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3387 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3388 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3389 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3391 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3392 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3395 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3396 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3400 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3401 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3403 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3405 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3408 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3412 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3413 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3417 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3419 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3422 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3423 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3425 /* Should never happen */
3429 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3430 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3431 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3433 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3434 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3438 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3444 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3445 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3448 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3449 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3451 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3452 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3454 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3456 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3458 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3460 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3461 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3462 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3463 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3464 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3465 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3466 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3467 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3473 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3474 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3475 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3476 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) {
3477 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3478 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3479 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3480 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3481 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3482 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3483 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3489 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3490 * the certificate for signing.
3492 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3494 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3495 * supported it stays as NULL.
3497 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3498 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3499 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3501 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3502 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) {
3503 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3504 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3507 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3508 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3509 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3515 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3516 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3517 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3519 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3524 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3531 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3533 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3536 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3537 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3538 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3540 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3541 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3545 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3547 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3549 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3551 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3553 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3554 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3557 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3558 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length)
3561 unsigned short hbtype;
3562 unsigned int payload;
3563 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3565 if (s->msg_callback)
3566 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3568 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3570 /* Read type and payload length first */
3571 if (1 + 2 + 16 > length)
3572 return 0; /* silently discard */
3575 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > length)
3576 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3579 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3580 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3584 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3585 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3587 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3588 if (buffer == NULL) {
3589 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3594 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3595 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3597 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3599 /* Random padding */
3600 if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
3601 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3605 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3606 3 + payload + padding);
3608 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3609 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3610 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3611 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3613 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3617 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3621 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3622 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3626 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3628 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3635 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3637 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3639 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3640 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3642 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3643 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3644 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3645 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3649 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3650 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3651 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3655 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3656 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
3657 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3662 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
3663 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3665 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3668 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3669 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3670 * some random stuff.
3671 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3672 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3673 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3674 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3677 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3679 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3684 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3685 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3687 /* Sequence number */
3688 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3689 /* 16 random bytes */
3690 if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) {
3691 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3695 /* Random padding */
3696 if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) {
3697 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3701 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3703 if (s->msg_callback)
3704 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3705 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3706 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3708 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3717 # define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3721 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3724 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3726 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3729 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3732 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3734 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3736 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3738 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3746 if (strcmp(etmp, "RSA") == 0)
3747 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3748 else if (strcmp(etmp, "DSA") == 0)
3749 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3750 else if (strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA") == 0)
3751 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3755 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3756 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3757 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3758 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3761 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3762 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3765 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3766 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3771 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3772 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3774 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3778 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3782 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3785 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3788 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3793 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3794 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3796 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3797 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3798 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3800 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3807 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3808 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3809 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3811 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3812 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3813 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3819 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3823 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3827 if (default_nid == -1)
3829 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3831 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3832 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3833 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3838 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3839 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3843 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3844 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3845 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3852 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3853 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3854 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3855 * attempting to use them.
3858 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3860 # define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3861 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3862 /* Strict mode flags */
3863 # define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3864 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3865 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3867 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3872 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3873 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3875 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3876 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3878 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3881 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3883 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3885 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3887 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3888 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3891 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3892 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3893 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3894 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
3895 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3896 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
3903 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3906 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3907 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3908 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3910 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3917 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3918 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3919 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3920 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3921 else if (!check_flags)
3926 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3927 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3929 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3931 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3932 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3934 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3937 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3938 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3939 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3940 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3941 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3944 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3945 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3946 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3947 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3951 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3952 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3961 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3962 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3964 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3966 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3967 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3968 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3971 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3978 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3979 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3983 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3984 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3985 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3986 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3988 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3995 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3996 else if (check_flags)
3997 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3999 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4000 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4001 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4002 else if (!check_flags)
4005 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4006 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4007 else if (strict_mode) {
4008 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4009 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4010 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4011 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4013 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4020 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4021 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4025 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4028 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4031 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4036 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4037 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4038 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4039 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4040 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4044 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4048 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4050 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4051 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4053 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4054 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4055 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4059 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4062 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4064 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4066 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4067 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4069 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4070 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4071 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4073 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4074 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4075 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4076 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4077 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4082 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4085 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4087 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4088 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4092 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4093 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4094 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4095 else if (cpk->digest)
4096 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4098 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4101 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4105 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4106 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4108 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4109 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4116 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4117 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4119 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4120 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4121 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4122 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4123 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4124 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4127 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4128 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4130 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4135 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4136 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4138 int dh_secbits = 80;
4139 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4140 return DH_get_1024_160();
4141 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
4142 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4147 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4148 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4151 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4157 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4158 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4159 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4161 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4162 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g) {
4168 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4169 return DH_get_2048_224();
4170 return DH_get_1024_160();
4174 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4177 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4179 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4180 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4184 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4186 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4189 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4191 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4192 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4193 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4194 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4196 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4197 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4200 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4202 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4205 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4208 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4210 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4211 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4213 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4214 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4216 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4217 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4222 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4223 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4224 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4227 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4229 int rv, start_idx, i;
4231 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4236 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4240 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4241 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4242 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);