1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 /* ====================================================================
58 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
61 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
64 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
65 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
68 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
69 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
72 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
73 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
74 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
75 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
78 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
79 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
80 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
83 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
84 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
89 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
92 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
93 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
94 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
95 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
96 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
97 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
98 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
99 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
100 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
101 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
102 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
103 * ====================================================================
105 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
106 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
107 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
112 #include <openssl/objects.h>
113 #include <openssl/evp.h>
114 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
115 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
116 #include <openssl/rand.h>
117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
118 # include <openssl/dh.h>
119 # include <openssl/bn.h>
121 #include "ssl_locl.h"
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
129 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
132 tls1_setup_key_block,
133 tls1_generate_master_secret,
134 tls1_change_cipher_state,
135 tls1_final_finish_mac,
136 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 tls1_export_keying_material,
142 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
143 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
147 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
150 tls1_setup_key_block,
151 tls1_generate_master_secret,
152 tls1_change_cipher_state,
153 tls1_final_finish_mac,
154 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
155 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
156 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
158 tls1_export_keying_material,
159 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
160 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
161 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
165 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
168 tls1_setup_key_block,
169 tls1_generate_master_secret,
170 tls1_change_cipher_state,
171 tls1_final_finish_mac,
172 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
173 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
174 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
176 tls1_export_keying_material,
177 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
178 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
179 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
180 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
184 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
187 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
188 * http, the cache would over fill
190 return (60 * 60 * 2);
197 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
201 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
203 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
207 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
210 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
211 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
213 s->version = s->method->version;
216 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
219 int nid; /* Curve NID */
220 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
221 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
224 # define TLS_CURVE_TYPE 0x1
225 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
226 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
229 * Table of curve information.
230 * NB: do not delete entries or reorder this array. It is used as a lookup
231 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
234 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
235 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
236 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
237 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
238 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
239 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
240 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
241 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
242 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
243 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
244 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
245 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
246 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
247 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
248 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
249 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
250 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
251 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
252 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
253 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
254 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
255 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
256 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
257 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
258 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
259 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
260 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
261 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
265 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
266 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
267 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
268 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
271 /* The default curves */
272 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
273 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
274 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
275 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
276 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
277 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
278 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
279 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
280 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
281 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
282 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
283 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
284 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
285 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
286 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
287 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
288 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
291 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
292 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
293 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
294 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
295 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
296 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
297 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
298 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
299 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
300 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
301 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
302 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
303 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
304 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
305 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
306 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
307 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
309 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
310 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
312 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
313 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
314 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
315 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
316 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
317 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
318 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
319 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
320 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
321 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
322 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
323 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
324 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
325 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
326 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
330 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
331 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
332 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
335 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
337 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
338 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
340 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
343 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
346 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
347 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
354 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
356 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
357 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
358 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
359 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
360 * lists in the first place.
361 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
362 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
363 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
365 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
366 const unsigned char **pcurves,
369 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
371 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
372 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
374 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
375 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
376 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
377 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
378 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
381 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
382 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
386 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
387 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
391 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
392 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
395 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
396 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
400 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
401 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
402 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
406 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
411 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
412 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
414 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
417 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
419 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
420 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
421 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
424 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
427 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
428 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
430 const unsigned char *curves;
431 size_t num_curves, i;
432 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
433 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
435 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
437 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
440 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
441 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
443 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
444 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
446 } else /* Should never happen */
449 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
451 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
452 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
453 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
459 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
460 * if there is no match.
461 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
462 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
463 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
465 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
467 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
468 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
470 /* Can't do anything on client side */
474 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
476 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
477 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
479 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
480 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
481 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
482 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
483 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
484 /* Should never happen */
487 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
491 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
492 * but s->options is a long...
494 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
495 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
497 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
498 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
499 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
500 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
502 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
505 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
508 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
510 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
511 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
512 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
514 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
518 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
519 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
520 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
521 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
522 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
525 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
526 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
534 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
538 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
539 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
541 unsigned char *clist, *p;
544 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
547 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
548 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
551 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
552 unsigned long idmask;
554 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
556 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
565 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
569 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
573 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
576 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
578 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
584 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
586 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
588 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
590 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
591 if (nid == NID_undef)
592 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
593 if (nid == NID_undef)
594 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
595 if (nid == NID_undef)
597 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
598 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
600 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
604 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
605 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
610 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
614 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
617 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
618 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
625 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
626 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
629 /* Determine curve ID */
630 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
631 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
632 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
636 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
638 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
640 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
641 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
643 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
644 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
646 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
652 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
653 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
654 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
656 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
657 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
660 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
661 * supported (see RFC4492).
663 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
664 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
665 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
666 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
667 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
670 if (i == num_formats)
675 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
676 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
677 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
679 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
681 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
682 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
683 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
684 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
685 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
689 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
690 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
695 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
702 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
706 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
708 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
709 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
710 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
712 *pformats = ecformats_default;
713 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
715 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
717 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
722 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
723 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
725 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
727 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
730 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
733 /* If not EC nothing to do */
734 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
736 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
740 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
743 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
747 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
748 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
750 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
756 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
757 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
758 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
759 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
760 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
762 return 0; /* Should never happen */
763 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
764 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
766 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
768 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
769 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
770 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
772 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
778 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
780 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatiblity
782 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
784 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
785 * is compatible with the client extensions.
787 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
789 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
792 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
795 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
796 unsigned char curve_id[2];
797 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
798 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
799 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
800 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
801 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
805 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
806 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
810 /* Need a shared curve */
811 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
815 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
819 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
824 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
827 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
828 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
831 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
832 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
834 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
837 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
838 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
840 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
844 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
846 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
849 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
850 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
851 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
852 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
854 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
855 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
856 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
857 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
858 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
859 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
860 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
861 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
862 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
863 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
867 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
868 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
869 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
870 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
873 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
876 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
879 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
880 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
881 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
882 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
883 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
885 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
886 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
889 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
890 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
894 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
895 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
896 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
897 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
898 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
899 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
900 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
902 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
903 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
908 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
909 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
911 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
912 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
914 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
915 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
916 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
917 /* Should never happen */
920 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
921 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
922 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
925 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
926 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
927 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
928 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
929 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
931 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
932 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
935 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
936 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
939 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
940 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
941 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
942 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
945 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
946 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
947 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
948 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
954 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
958 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
959 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
960 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
961 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
964 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
965 if (i == sent_sigslen
966 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
967 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
968 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
971 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
973 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
976 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
977 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
978 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
980 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
984 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
986 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
991 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
992 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
993 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
996 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
998 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
999 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1000 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1001 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1002 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1004 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
1005 /* Disable TLS 1.0 ciphers if using SSL v3 */
1006 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1007 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl |= SSL_TLSV1;
1008 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1009 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1010 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1011 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1012 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1013 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1015 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1016 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1017 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1018 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1019 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1024 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1026 if (c->algorithm_ssl & s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl
1027 || c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1028 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1030 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1033 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1035 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1037 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1040 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1041 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1044 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1045 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1046 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1047 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1049 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1051 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1052 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1054 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1055 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1057 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1058 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1059 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1060 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1071 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1073 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1074 if (s->renegotiate) {
1077 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1078 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1082 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1085 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1088 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1095 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1096 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1099 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1100 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1101 unsigned long size_str;
1105 * check for enough space.
1106 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1107 * 2 for servernamelist length
1108 * 1 for the hostname type
1109 * 2 for hostname length
1113 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1115 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1118 /* extension type and length */
1119 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1120 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1122 /* length of servername list */
1123 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1125 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1126 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1128 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1132 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1133 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1134 * Client Hello message */
1136 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1137 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1143 * check for enough space.
1144 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1145 * 1 for the srp user identity
1146 * + srp user identity length
1148 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1151 /* fill in the extension */
1152 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1153 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1154 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1155 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1163 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1166 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1167 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1169 unsigned char *etmp;
1171 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1173 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1175 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1177 if (num_formats > 255) {
1178 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1182 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1183 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1184 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1185 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1186 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1190 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1192 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1193 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1196 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1198 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1200 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1205 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1207 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1208 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1209 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1210 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1211 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1215 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1217 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1218 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1219 ret += curves_list_len;
1221 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1223 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1225 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1226 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1227 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1228 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1229 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1230 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1231 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
1233 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1234 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1235 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1238 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1239 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1242 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1245 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1247 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1250 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1256 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1258 const unsigned char *salg;
1259 unsigned char *etmp;
1260 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1261 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1263 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1265 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1267 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1268 /* Fill in lengths */
1269 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1274 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1276 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1280 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1281 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1282 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1288 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1289 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1295 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1297 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1298 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1300 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1301 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1303 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1304 /* save position of id len */
1305 unsigned char *q = ret;
1306 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1307 /* skip over id len */
1309 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1315 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1317 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1318 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1319 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1320 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1322 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1326 * 1: peer may send requests
1327 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1329 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1330 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1332 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1336 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1337 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1339 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1340 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1342 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1344 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1349 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1350 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1352 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1353 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1354 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1355 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1356 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1359 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1362 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1363 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1368 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1371 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1374 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1381 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1382 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1383 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1385 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1386 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1389 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1393 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1394 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1395 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1398 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1399 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1401 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1402 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1408 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1410 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1417 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1420 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1424 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1425 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1428 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1429 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1430 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1431 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1434 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1435 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1436 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1437 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1442 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1444 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1447 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1452 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1455 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1458 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1466 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1467 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1470 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1471 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1472 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1475 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1478 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1480 const unsigned char *plist;
1483 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1487 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1489 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1491 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1493 if (plistlen > 255) {
1494 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1498 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1499 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1500 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1501 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1506 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1509 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1511 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1512 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1514 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1518 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1519 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1521 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1525 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1526 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1529 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1530 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1534 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1537 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1540 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1541 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1548 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1549 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1550 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1551 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1552 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1553 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1554 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1555 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1556 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1557 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1559 if (limit - ret < 36)
1561 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1565 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1566 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1567 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1568 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1570 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1574 * 1: peer may send requests
1575 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1577 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1578 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1580 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1585 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1586 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1587 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1588 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1589 const unsigned char *npa;
1590 unsigned int npalen;
1593 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1595 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1596 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1597 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1599 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1601 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1603 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1607 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1609 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1610 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1612 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1613 * for other cases too.
1615 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1616 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1617 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1618 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1619 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1621 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1626 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1627 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1631 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1632 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1633 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1635 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1637 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1641 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1647 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1650 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1655 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1656 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1657 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1658 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1661 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1663 unsigned int data_len;
1664 unsigned int proto_len;
1665 const unsigned char *selected;
1666 const unsigned char *data;
1667 unsigned char selected_len;
1670 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1674 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1675 * length-prefixed strings.
1677 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &data_len)
1678 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != data_len
1679 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, data_len))
1683 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &proto_len)
1685 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, proto_len))
1687 } while (PACKET_remaining(pkt));
1689 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1690 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1691 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1692 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1693 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1694 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1695 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1698 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1699 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1704 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1708 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1710 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1711 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1712 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1717 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1718 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1719 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1720 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1722 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1724 unsigned int type, size;
1725 const unsigned char *eblock1, *eblock2;
1728 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1729 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1730 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1731 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1732 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1733 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1734 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1736 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1737 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1738 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1739 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1742 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1743 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1744 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1745 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1746 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1747 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1748 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1749 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1750 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1751 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1756 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1757 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1758 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &size)
1759 || !PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, size))
1762 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1765 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1766 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1767 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1769 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len1)
1770 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock2, len2)
1771 || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
1773 if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1775 if (memcmp(eblock2, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1778 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1780 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len)
1781 || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
1783 if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1787 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1789 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1791 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1796 const unsigned char *data;
1797 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1799 s->servername_done = 0;
1800 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1801 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1802 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1805 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1806 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1807 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1808 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1809 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1812 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1813 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1814 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1815 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1817 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1818 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1819 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1820 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1821 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1824 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1825 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1826 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1829 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1831 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1834 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len))
1837 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len)
1840 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
1843 if (!PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, size))
1846 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1847 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1849 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, size))
1852 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1853 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
1855 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1856 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1859 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1861 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1862 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1863 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1864 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1865 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1866 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1867 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1868 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1869 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1870 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1871 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1872 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1873 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1874 * the value of the Host: field.
1875 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1876 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1877 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1879 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1883 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1884 const unsigned char *sdata;
1885 unsigned int servname_type;
1889 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
1890 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
1893 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) > 3) {
1894 if (!PACKET_get_1(&ssubpkt, &servname_type)
1895 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &len)
1896 || PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < len)
1899 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1900 switch (servname_type) {
1901 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1903 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1906 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1907 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1910 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
1911 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
1912 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1915 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ssubpkt,
1916 (unsigned char *)s->session
1919 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1922 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
1923 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1924 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1925 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1926 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1929 s->servername_done = 1;
1932 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &sdata, len)) {
1933 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1936 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1937 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1938 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
1939 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1948 /* We shouldn't have any bytes left */
1949 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) != 0)
1953 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1954 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
1955 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &len)
1956 || s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1959 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
1961 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt, (unsigned char *)s->srp_ctx.login,
1964 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
1966 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len
1967 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt))
1972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1973 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
1974 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
1976 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
1977 || ecpointformatlist_length == 0)
1981 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1982 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1983 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1984 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
1985 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
1986 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1989 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
1990 ecpointformatlist_length;
1991 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
1992 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
1993 ecpointformatlist_length))
1995 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ecpointformatlist_length)) {
1998 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
1999 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2000 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2003 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2004 unsigned int ellipticcurvelist_length;
2006 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1 */
2007 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &ellipticcurvelist_length)
2008 || ellipticcurvelist_length == 0
2009 || (ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) != 0)
2013 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2016 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2017 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2018 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2019 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2022 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2023 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2024 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
2025 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
2026 ellipticcurvelist_length))
2028 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
2031 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2032 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2036 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2037 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2038 if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, size)
2039 || (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2040 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2041 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))) {
2042 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2045 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2048 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs
2049 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2052 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
2053 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt) != 0
2054 || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2057 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2060 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt,
2061 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type))
2064 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2065 const unsigned char *sdata;
2067 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2068 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2069 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
2072 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt)) {
2074 unsigned int idsize;
2076 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < 4
2077 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &idsize)
2078 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &data, idsize)) {
2083 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2086 if (data != sdata) {
2087 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2090 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2091 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2092 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2093 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2094 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2097 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2098 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2099 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2104 /* Read in request_extensions */
2105 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2106 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
2107 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2112 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2113 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2114 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2115 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2116 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata))
2121 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2124 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2127 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2128 unsigned int hbtype;
2130 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &hbtype)
2131 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2132 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2136 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2137 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2139 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2140 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2141 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2144 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2149 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2150 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2151 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2152 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2154 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2157 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2158 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2159 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2160 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2161 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2162 * anything like that, but this might change).
2164 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2165 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2166 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2167 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2168 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2170 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2174 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2175 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2176 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &subpkt, al) != 0)
2178 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2179 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2180 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2184 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2185 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2186 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2187 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2188 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
2192 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2193 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2194 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2197 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2198 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2202 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2203 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2204 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2205 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2206 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2209 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2214 /* Spurious data on the end */
2215 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0)
2220 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2222 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2223 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2224 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2225 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2226 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2232 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2236 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2239 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2240 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2241 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2245 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2254 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2255 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2256 * fill the length of the block.
2258 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2262 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2263 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &len)
2264 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, len))
2272 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2274 unsigned int length, type, size;
2275 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2276 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2278 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2279 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2281 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2283 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2284 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2285 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2286 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2287 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2290 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2291 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2294 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2296 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2299 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2300 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2304 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2305 const unsigned char *data;
2308 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2309 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2312 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2313 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2315 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2316 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2318 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2319 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2320 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2321 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2322 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2325 tlsext_servername = 1;
2327 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2328 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2329 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2330 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2331 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2332 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2336 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2337 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2338 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2339 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2340 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2343 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2344 ecpointformatlist_length;
2345 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2346 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2347 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2348 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2354 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2356 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2357 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2358 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2359 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2361 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2364 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2365 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2368 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2370 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2372 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2375 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2376 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2379 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2380 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2382 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2383 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2384 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2385 unsigned char *selected;
2386 unsigned char selected_len;
2387 /* We must have requested it. */
2388 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2389 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2392 /* The data must be valid */
2393 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2394 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2398 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2400 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2401 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2402 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2405 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2406 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2407 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2410 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2411 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2412 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2416 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2418 /* We must have requested it. */
2419 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2420 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2424 * The extension data consists of:
2425 * uint16 list_length
2426 * uint8 proto_length;
2427 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2429 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2430 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len
2431 || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2432 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2433 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2436 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2437 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2438 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2439 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2442 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2443 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2446 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2449 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2450 unsigned int hbtype;
2451 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2452 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2456 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2457 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2459 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2460 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2461 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2464 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2469 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2470 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2471 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2475 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2476 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2477 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2478 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2479 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2480 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2483 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2484 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2486 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2489 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2490 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2492 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2496 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2497 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2501 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2502 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2503 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2504 s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2505 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2506 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2510 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2519 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2520 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2521 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2522 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2523 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2524 * initial connect only.
2526 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2527 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2528 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2530 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2536 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2539 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2540 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2541 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2542 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2550 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2556 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2561 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2563 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2564 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2568 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2569 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2572 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2573 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2577 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2579 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2580 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2581 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2582 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2584 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2586 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2589 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2590 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2593 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2594 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2597 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2598 s->servername_done = 0;
2603 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2604 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2606 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2607 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2608 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2610 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2611 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2612 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2614 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2615 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2617 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2618 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2620 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2621 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2622 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2623 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2627 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2631 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2632 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2633 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2634 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2635 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2636 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2637 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2638 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2641 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2642 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2643 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2644 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2645 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2648 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2649 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2650 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2651 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2652 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2656 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2660 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2664 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2666 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2667 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2670 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2671 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2672 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2673 * influence which certificate is sent
2675 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2677 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2678 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2679 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2680 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2681 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2685 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2686 * et al can pick it up.
2688 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2689 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2691 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2692 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2693 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2695 /* status request response should be sent */
2696 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2697 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2698 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2700 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2702 /* something bad happened */
2703 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2704 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2705 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2709 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2713 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2714 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2717 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2718 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2726 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2728 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2729 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2731 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2733 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2734 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2735 * must contain uncompressed.
2737 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2738 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2739 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2740 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2741 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2742 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2743 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2744 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2746 unsigned char *list;
2747 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2748 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2749 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2750 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2751 found_uncompressed = 1;
2755 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2756 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2757 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2761 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2762 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2764 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2766 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2767 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2768 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2769 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2771 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2773 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2776 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2777 * that we don't receive a status message
2779 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2780 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2781 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2784 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2785 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2788 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2789 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2792 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2793 s->servername_done = 0;
2799 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2802 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2804 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2805 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2809 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2817 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2818 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2819 * need to be handled at the same time.
2821 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2824 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2825 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2826 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2827 * point to the resulting session.
2829 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2830 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2831 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2834 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2835 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2836 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2837 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2838 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2839 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2840 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2843 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2844 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2845 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2846 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2847 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2848 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2850 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2853 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2854 const PACKET *session_id,
2858 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2861 int have_ticket = 0;
2862 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2865 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2866 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2869 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2872 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2875 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2879 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2880 unsigned int type, size;
2882 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2883 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2884 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2888 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
2892 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
2894 const unsigned char *etick;
2896 /* Duplicate extension */
2897 if (have_ticket != 0) {
2905 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2908 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2912 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2914 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2915 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2916 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2917 * calculate the master secret later.
2922 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
2923 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2927 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
2928 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
2930 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2931 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2934 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2937 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2938 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2941 default: /* fatal error */
2947 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
2948 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2949 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
2955 if (have_ticket == 0)
2962 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2964 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2965 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
2966 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2967 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2968 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2969 * point to the resulting session.
2972 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
2973 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2974 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2975 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2976 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2978 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
2979 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
2980 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
2983 unsigned char *sdec;
2984 const unsigned char *p;
2985 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
2986 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2987 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2988 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
2989 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2990 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
2993 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2994 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
2997 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3002 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3003 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3004 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3015 /* Check key name matches */
3016 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) {
3020 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3021 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3022 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3023 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3029 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3032 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3037 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3038 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3039 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3042 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3043 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3044 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3047 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3048 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3049 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3050 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3051 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3053 || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3054 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3057 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3058 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3063 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3067 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3071 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3072 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3073 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3077 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3078 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3087 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3091 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3092 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3096 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3103 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3104 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3105 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3106 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3107 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3108 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3109 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3110 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3111 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3112 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3115 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3116 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3117 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3118 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3119 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3120 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3121 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3124 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3127 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3128 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3134 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3137 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3138 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3139 return table[i].nid;
3144 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3150 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3153 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3156 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3157 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3161 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3163 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3170 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3173 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3174 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3175 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3176 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3177 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3178 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3179 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3180 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3181 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3182 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3185 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3191 for (i=0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++)
3193 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3194 return tls12_md_info + i;
3200 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3202 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3203 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3205 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3208 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3211 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3214 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3215 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3216 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3218 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3219 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3220 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3222 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3223 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3224 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3226 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3227 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3228 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3230 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3231 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3233 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3234 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3240 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3241 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3242 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3244 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3245 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3247 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3248 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3250 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3252 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3253 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3255 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3257 if (psignhash_nid) {
3258 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3259 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid,
3261 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3265 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3266 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3268 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3269 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3270 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3272 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3273 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3275 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3276 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3280 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3281 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3285 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3287 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3288 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3289 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3291 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3292 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3293 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3295 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3296 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3297 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3298 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3299 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3300 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3305 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3306 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3310 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3311 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3312 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3319 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3321 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3323 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3326 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3327 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3329 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3331 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3332 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3333 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3334 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3337 return tmpout - out;
3340 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3341 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3342 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3343 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3345 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3346 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3347 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3348 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3349 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3351 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3352 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3355 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3356 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3357 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3359 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3369 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3370 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3372 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3373 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3375 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3377 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3379 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3380 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3381 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3382 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3383 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3384 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3385 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3386 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3387 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3388 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3390 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3391 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3394 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3395 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3399 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3400 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3402 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3404 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3407 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3411 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3412 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3416 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3418 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3421 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3422 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3424 /* Should never happen */
3428 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3429 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3430 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3432 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3433 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3437 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3442 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3443 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3445 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3446 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3449 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3450 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3451 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3452 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3453 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3455 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3456 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3457 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3458 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3464 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3465 * the certificate for signing.
3467 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3469 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3470 * supported it stays as NULL.
3472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3473 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3474 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3477 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3478 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3479 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3482 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3483 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3484 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3486 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3487 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3488 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3489 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3490 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3491 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3492 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3498 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3499 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3500 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3502 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3507 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3514 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3516 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3519 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3520 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3521 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3523 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3524 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3528 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3530 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3532 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3534 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3536 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3537 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3540 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3544 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3547 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3549 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3550 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3551 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3552 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3553 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3554 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3556 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3557 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3558 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3562 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3564 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3567 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3570 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3572 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3574 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3576 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3584 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3585 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3587 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3590 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3591 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3594 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3595 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3600 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3601 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3603 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3607 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3611 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3614 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3617 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3622 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3623 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3625 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3626 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3627 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3629 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3636 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3637 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3638 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3640 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3641 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3642 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3648 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3652 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3656 if (default_nid == -1)
3658 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3660 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3661 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3662 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3667 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3668 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3672 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3673 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3674 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3681 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3682 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3683 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3684 * attempting to use them.
3687 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3689 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3690 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3691 /* Strict mode flags */
3692 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3693 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3694 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3696 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3701 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3702 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3705 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3706 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3708 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3711 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3713 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3714 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3716 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3718 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3719 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3725 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3728 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3730 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3731 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3733 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3740 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3741 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3742 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3743 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3744 else if (!check_flags)
3749 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3750 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3752 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3754 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3755 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3757 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3760 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3761 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3762 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3763 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3766 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3767 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3768 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3772 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3773 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3776 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3777 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3778 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3781 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3782 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3783 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3786 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3787 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3788 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3797 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3798 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3800 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3802 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3803 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3804 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3807 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3814 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3815 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3819 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3820 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3821 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3822 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3824 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3831 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3832 else if (check_flags)
3833 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3835 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3836 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3837 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3838 else if (!check_flags)
3841 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3842 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3843 else if (strict_mode) {
3844 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3845 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3846 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3847 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3849 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3856 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3857 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3859 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3861 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3864 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3867 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3871 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3875 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
3877 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
3878 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
3880 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
3881 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
3882 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3886 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
3889 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3891 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
3893 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
3894 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3896 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3897 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
3898 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3900 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3901 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3902 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3903 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
3904 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3909 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
3912 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3914 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
3915 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
3919 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3920 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
3921 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3922 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
3923 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3925 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3928 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
3932 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
3935 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
3936 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3943 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
3944 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
3946 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
3947 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
3948 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
3949 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
3950 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
3951 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
3952 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
3955 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
3956 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
3958 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
3962 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3963 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
3965 int dh_secbits = 80;
3966 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
3967 return DH_get_1024_160();
3968 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
3969 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
3974 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3975 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
3978 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
3984 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
3985 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
3986 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
3988 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
3989 if (dhp->p == NULL || dhp->g == NULL) {
3995 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
3996 return DH_get_2048_224();
3997 return DH_get_1024_160();
4001 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4004 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4007 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4008 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4009 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4010 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4012 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4015 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4017 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4020 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4022 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4023 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4024 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4025 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4027 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4028 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4030 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4031 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4034 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4036 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4039 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4042 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4044 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4045 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4047 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4048 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4050 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4051 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4056 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4057 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4058 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4061 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4063 int rv, start_idx, i;
4065 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4070 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4074 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4075 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4076 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);