2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, size_t ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, size_t sesslen,
26 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
27 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
29 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
33 tls1_generate_master_secret,
34 tls1_change_cipher_state,
35 tls1_final_finish_mac,
36 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
37 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
39 tls1_export_keying_material,
41 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
42 tls_close_construct_packet,
46 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
50 tls1_generate_master_secret,
51 tls1_change_cipher_state,
52 tls1_final_finish_mac,
53 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
54 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
56 tls1_export_keying_material,
57 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
58 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
59 tls_close_construct_packet,
63 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
67 tls1_generate_master_secret,
68 tls1_change_cipher_state,
69 tls1_final_finish_mac,
70 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
71 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
73 tls1_export_keying_material,
74 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
75 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
76 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
77 tls_close_construct_packet,
81 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
85 tls1_generate_master_secret,
86 tls1_change_cipher_state,
87 tls1_final_finish_mac,
88 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
89 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
91 tls1_export_keying_material,
92 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
93 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
94 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
95 tls_close_construct_packet,
99 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
102 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
103 * http, the cache would over fill
105 return (60 * 60 * 2);
112 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
116 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
118 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
122 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
125 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
126 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
128 s->version = s->method->version;
131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
134 int nid; /* Curve NID */
135 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
136 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
140 * Table of curve information.
141 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
142 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
144 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
145 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
146 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
147 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
148 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
149 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
150 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
151 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
152 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
153 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
154 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
155 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
156 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
157 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
158 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
159 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
160 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
161 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
162 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
163 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
164 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
165 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
166 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
167 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
168 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
169 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
170 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
171 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
172 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
173 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
176 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
177 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
178 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
179 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
182 /* The default curves */
183 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
184 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
185 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
186 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
187 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
190 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
191 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
192 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
193 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
194 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
195 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
196 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
197 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
200 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
201 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
203 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
204 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
205 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
206 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
207 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
208 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
209 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
210 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
211 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
212 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
213 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
214 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
215 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
216 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
217 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
218 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
219 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
220 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
221 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
222 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
223 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
224 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
227 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
228 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
229 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
232 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
234 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
235 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
236 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
238 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
240 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
244 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
247 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
248 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
255 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
257 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
258 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
259 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
260 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
261 * lists in the first place.
262 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
263 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
264 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
266 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
267 const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
269 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
271 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
272 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
274 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
275 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
276 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
277 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
278 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
281 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
282 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
286 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
287 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
291 *pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
292 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
295 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
296 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
300 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
301 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
302 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
306 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
311 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
312 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
314 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
317 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
319 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
320 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
321 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
324 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
327 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
328 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
330 const unsigned char *curves;
331 size_t num_curves, i;
332 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
333 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
335 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
337 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
340 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
341 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
343 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
344 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
346 } else /* Should never happen */
349 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
351 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
352 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
353 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
359 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
360 * if there is no match.
361 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
362 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
363 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
365 int tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
367 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
368 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
370 /* Can't do anything on client side */
374 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
376 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
377 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
379 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
380 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
381 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
382 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
383 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
384 /* Should never happen */
387 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
391 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
392 * but s->options is a long...
394 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
395 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
397 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
398 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
399 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
400 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
401 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
404 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
407 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
409 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
410 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
411 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
413 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
417 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
418 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
419 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
420 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
421 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
424 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
425 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
433 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
437 int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
438 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
440 unsigned char *glist, *p;
443 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
446 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
447 glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * 2);
450 for (i = 0, p = glist; i < ngroups; i++) {
451 unsigned long idmask;
453 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
454 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]);
456 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
465 *pextlen = ngroups * 2;
469 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
473 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
476 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
478 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
484 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
486 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
488 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
490 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
491 if (nid == NID_undef)
492 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
493 if (nid == NID_undef)
494 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
495 if (nid == NID_undef)
497 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
498 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
500 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
504 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
505 int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
509 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
513 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
516 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
517 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
524 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
525 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
528 /* Determine curve ID */
529 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
530 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
531 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
535 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
537 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
539 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
540 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
542 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
543 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
545 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
551 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
552 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
553 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
555 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
556 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
559 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
560 * supported (see RFC4492).
562 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
563 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
564 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
565 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
566 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
569 if (i == num_formats)
574 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
575 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
576 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
578 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
580 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
581 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
582 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
583 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
584 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
588 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
589 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
594 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
601 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
605 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
607 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
608 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
609 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
611 *pformats = ecformats_default;
612 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
614 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
616 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
621 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
622 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
624 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
626 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
629 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
632 /* If not EC nothing to do */
633 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
635 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
639 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
642 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
646 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
647 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
649 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
655 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
656 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
657 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
658 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
659 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
661 return 0; /* Should never happen */
662 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
663 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
665 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
667 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
668 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
669 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
671 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
677 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
679 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
681 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
683 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
684 * is compatible with the client extensions.
686 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
688 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
691 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
694 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
695 unsigned char curve_id[2];
696 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
697 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
698 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
699 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
700 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
704 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
705 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
709 /* Need a shared curve */
710 if (tls1_shared_group(s, 0))
714 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
718 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
723 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
726 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
727 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
730 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
731 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
733 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
736 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
737 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
739 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
743 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
745 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
748 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
749 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
750 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
751 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
753 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
754 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
755 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
756 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
757 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
758 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
759 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
760 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
761 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
762 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
766 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
767 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
768 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
769 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
772 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
775 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
779 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
780 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
781 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
782 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
784 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
785 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
788 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
789 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
793 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
794 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
795 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
796 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
797 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
798 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
799 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
801 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
802 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
807 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
808 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
810 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
811 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
813 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
814 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
815 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
816 /* Should never happen */
819 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
820 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
824 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
825 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
826 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
827 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
828 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
830 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
831 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
834 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
835 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
838 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
839 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
840 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
841 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
844 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
845 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
846 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
847 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
853 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
857 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
858 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
859 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
860 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
863 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
864 if (i == sent_sigslen
865 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
866 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
867 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
870 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
872 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
875 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
876 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
877 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
882 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
884 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
889 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
890 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
891 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
893 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
896 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
898 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
900 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
901 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
902 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
903 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
905 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
906 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
907 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
908 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
910 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
912 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
913 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
914 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
920 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
921 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
922 * @c: cipher to check
923 * @op: Security check that you want to do
925 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
927 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
929 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
930 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
932 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
934 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
935 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
937 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
938 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
941 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
944 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
946 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
948 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
951 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
953 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
954 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
964 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
965 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
966 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
967 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
968 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
971 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
973 PACKET extensions = *packet;
974 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
975 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
978 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
979 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
982 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
983 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
989 if (num_extensions <= 1)
992 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
993 if (extension_types == NULL) {
994 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
998 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
999 extensions = *packet;
1000 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1002 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
1003 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
1004 /* This should not happen. */
1005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1010 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1014 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1015 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1016 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1017 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1022 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1026 int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1028 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1029 const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL;
1030 size_t num_curves = 0;
1033 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1034 if ((s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1035 || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1037 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1038 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1040 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1041 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1043 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1044 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1045 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1046 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1051 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1053 * TODO(TLS1.3): We always use ECC for TLSv1.3 at the moment. This will
1054 * change if we implement DH key shares
1059 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1060 /* Shouldn't happen! */
1061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1066 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1067 if (s->renegotiate) {
1068 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1069 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1070 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1071 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1072 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1077 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1078 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1081 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1082 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1083 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1084 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
1085 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1086 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
1087 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1088 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
1089 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname,
1090 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname))
1091 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1092 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1097 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1098 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1099 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1100 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1101 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
1102 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1103 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1104 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
1105 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
1106 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
1107 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
1108 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1109 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1119 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1121 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurvestmp;
1125 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1127 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1128 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
1129 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1130 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
1131 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1137 * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
1139 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */
1140 pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
1141 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1145 pcurvestmp = pcurves;
1147 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
1148 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
1149 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1150 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1151 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1154 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1155 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurvestmp += 2) {
1156 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1157 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[0])
1158 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[1])) {
1159 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1160 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1165 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1170 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1172 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1174 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1175 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1176 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1177 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1178 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1179 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1180 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1184 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1185 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1186 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1189 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1190 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1193 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1194 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick,
1196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1202 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1204 const unsigned char *salg;
1206 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1208 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1209 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
1210 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1211 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
1212 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1213 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
1214 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1215 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1221 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1224 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1225 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
1226 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1227 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1228 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
1229 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1234 unsigned char *idbytes;
1238 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1239 idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1241 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
1242 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
1243 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
1244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1248 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1249 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1253 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1254 unsigned char *extbytes;
1255 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1261 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
1262 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes)
1264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1268 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1275 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1276 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1278 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1279 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1281 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1282 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1290 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1291 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1292 * (see longer comment below)
1294 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1295 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1296 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1297 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
1298 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1299 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1300 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1301 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1305 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1307 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1308 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1309 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
1310 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1313 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1314 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
1315 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1316 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
1317 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1321 ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
1322 for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) {
1323 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1324 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
1325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1329 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1330 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
1331 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1332 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1338 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1339 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1340 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, pkt, al)) {
1341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1345 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
1346 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1347 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1354 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1355 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
1356 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1363 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1364 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1369 /* TLS1.3 specific extensions */
1370 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1371 int min_version, max_version, reason, currv;
1372 size_t i, sharessent = 0;
1374 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Should we add this extension for versions < TLS1.3? */
1375 /* supported_versions extension */
1376 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
1377 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1378 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1382 reason = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version);
1384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, reason);
1388 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to wheter
1389 * we should include versions <TLS1.2. For the moment we do. To be
1392 for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
1393 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this first if clause prior to release!! */
1394 if (currv == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1395 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)) {
1396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1397 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1400 } else if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
1401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1405 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1406 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1411 /* key_share extension */
1412 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1413 /* Extension data sub-packet */
1414 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1415 /* KeyShare list sub-packet */
1416 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1422 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
1423 * now, just send one
1425 for (i = 0; i < num_curves && sharessent < 1; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1426 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1427 unsigned int curve_id = 0;
1428 EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
1431 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
1434 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1435 /* Shouldn't happen! */
1436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1437 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1441 /* Generate a key for this key_share */
1442 curve_id = (pcurves[0] << 8) | pcurves[1];
1443 key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
1444 if (key_share_key == NULL) {
1445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1449 /* Encode the public key. */
1450 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key,
1452 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1454 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
1458 /* Create KeyShareEntry */
1459 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
1460 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
1461 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1462 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1463 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
1464 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1469 * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're
1470 * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now
1471 * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
1473 s->s3->group_id = curve_id;
1474 s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
1476 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1478 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1485 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1486 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1487 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1490 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1491 unsigned char *padbytes;
1494 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
1495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1499 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1500 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1506 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
1507 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
1508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1511 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
1520 * Add the key_share extension.
1522 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
1524 static int add_client_key_share_ext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1526 unsigned char *encodedPoint;
1527 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
1528 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp, *skey = NULL;
1531 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1535 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1536 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1537 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) {
1538 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1542 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
1544 /* Generate encoding of server key */
1545 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
1546 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
1547 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1548 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1552 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
1553 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1554 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1555 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1556 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1559 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1561 /* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */
1562 s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey;
1563 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
1564 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1565 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1572 int ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1574 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1575 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1578 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1579 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1580 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1581 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1584 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1585 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH)) {
1586 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1590 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1591 !ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, pkt)) {
1592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1596 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1597 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1600 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1601 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1602 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1603 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1608 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1610 const unsigned char *plist;
1613 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1615 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1617 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1618 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1619 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
1620 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1626 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1629 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1631 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1632 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1633 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1634 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1639 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1642 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1645 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1646 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1647 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1652 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1653 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1654 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1655 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1656 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1657 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1658 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1659 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1660 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1666 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1667 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1668 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1669 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1670 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1671 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1672 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1673 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1674 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1675 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1677 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1683 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1684 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1685 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1686 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1687 const unsigned char *npa;
1688 unsigned int npalen;
1691 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1693 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1694 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1695 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1696 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1700 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1705 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->hit && !add_client_key_share_ext(s, pkt, al))
1708 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, pkt, al)) {
1709 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1713 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1715 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1716 * for other cases too.
1718 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1719 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1720 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1721 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1722 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1724 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1725 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1726 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1731 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1732 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1733 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1734 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1739 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1740 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1741 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1742 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1743 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1744 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
1745 s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
1746 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1747 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1754 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1762 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1763 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1764 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1765 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1767 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1769 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1771 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1773 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1774 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1778 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1780 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1781 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1782 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1785 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1787 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1788 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1789 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1797 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1798 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1799 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1801 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
1803 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1804 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1806 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1807 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1808 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1809 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1810 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1812 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1813 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1814 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1815 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1816 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1819 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1820 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1821 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1822 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1825 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1835 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1836 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1837 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1842 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1843 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1844 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1845 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1847 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1853 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1854 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1855 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1856 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1857 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1858 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1859 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1861 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1862 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1863 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1864 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1865 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1866 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1867 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1868 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1869 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1870 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1871 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1872 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1873 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1876 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1877 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1879 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1881 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1882 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1883 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1887 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1890 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1891 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1893 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1896 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1900 * Process the supported_groups extension if present. Returns success if the
1901 * extension is absent, or if it has been successfully processed.
1903 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
1905 static int tls_process_supported_groups(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1907 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1908 PACKET supported_groups_list;
1909 RAW_EXTENSION *suppgroups = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
1910 hello->num_extensions,
1911 TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups);
1913 if (suppgroups == NULL)
1916 /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
1917 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&suppgroups->data,
1918 &supported_groups_list)
1919 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
1920 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
1925 && !PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list,
1926 &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist,
1927 &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length)) {
1935 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
1936 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
1937 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
1938 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
1940 static int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id,
1941 const unsigned char *groups, size_t num_groups,
1946 if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
1949 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++, groups += 2) {
1950 unsigned int share_id = (groups[0] << 8) | (groups[1]);
1952 if (group_id == share_id
1953 && (!checkallow || tls_curve_allowed(s, groups,
1954 SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
1959 /* If i == num_groups then not in the list */
1960 return i < num_groups;
1964 * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
1965 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
1966 * If a failure occurs then |*al| is set to an appropriate alert value.
1968 static int process_key_share_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1970 unsigned int group_id;
1971 PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
1972 const unsigned char *clntcurves, *srvrcurves;
1973 size_t clnt_num_curves, srvr_num_curves;
1974 int group_nid, found = 0;
1975 unsigned int curve_flags;
1978 if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
1979 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1980 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1984 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) {
1985 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1986 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
1987 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1991 /* Get our list of supported curves */
1992 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &srvrcurves, &srvr_num_curves)) {
1993 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1994 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
1995 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1999 /* Get the clients list of supported curves */
2000 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &clntcurves, &clnt_num_curves)) {
2001 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2002 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
2003 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2007 while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
2008 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
2009 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt)
2010 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
2011 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2012 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
2013 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2018 * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the
2019 * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them.
2024 /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */
2025 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntcurves, clnt_num_curves, 0)) {
2026 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2027 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
2028 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
2032 /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */
2033 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrcurves, srvr_num_curves, 1)) {
2034 /* Share not suitable */
2038 group_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(group_id, &curve_flags);
2040 if (group_nid == 0) {
2041 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2042 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
2043 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2047 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
2048 /* Can happen for some curves, e.g. X25519 */
2049 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
2051 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, group_nid)) {
2052 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2053 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2057 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
2059 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
2060 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
2062 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
2063 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx,
2065 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
2066 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2067 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2068 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2071 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2074 s->s3->group_id = group_id;
2076 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2077 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2078 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2079 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2080 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2091 * Loop through all remaining ClientHello extensions that we collected earlier
2092 * and haven't already processed. For each one parse it and update the SSL
2093 * object as required.
2095 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
2096 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
2099 * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
2100 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
2102 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, int *al)
2105 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2107 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2108 s->servername_done = 0;
2109 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2110 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2111 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2114 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2115 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2116 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
2117 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
2118 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
2119 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
2121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2122 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
2123 ssl_check_for_safari(s, hello);
2124 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2126 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
2127 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
2128 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
2129 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2132 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
2133 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
2136 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
2139 * We process the supported_groups extension first so that is done before
2140 * we get to key_share which needs to use the information in it.
2142 if (!tls_process_supported_groups(s, hello)) {
2143 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2148 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
2149 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
2152 for (loop = 0; loop < hello->num_extensions; loop++) {
2153 RAW_EXTENSION *currext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[loop];
2155 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2156 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, currext->type,
2157 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2158 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
2159 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2161 if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2162 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s,
2163 &currext->data, al))
2165 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2166 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2169 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
2171 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2172 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2173 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2174 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2175 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2176 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2177 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2178 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2179 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2180 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2181 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2182 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2183 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2184 * the value of the Host: field.
2185 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2186 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
2187 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
2189 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2193 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2194 unsigned int servname_type;
2195 PACKET sni, hostname;
2197 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data, &sni)
2198 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
2199 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
2204 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
2205 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
2206 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
2208 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
2209 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
2210 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
2212 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
2213 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
2215 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
2216 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
2217 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
2222 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2223 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2227 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
2228 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2232 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
2233 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2237 s->servername_done = 1;
2240 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
2241 * fall back to a full handshake.
2243 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2244 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2245 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
2248 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2249 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2252 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data, &srp_I))
2255 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
2259 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
2260 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
2262 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
2263 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2269 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2270 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2271 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
2273 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data,
2274 &ec_point_format_list)
2275 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
2280 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
2281 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2283 session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2284 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2289 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2290 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2291 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2292 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s,
2293 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2294 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
2295 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
2296 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2299 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2300 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
2302 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data,
2303 &supported_sig_algs)
2304 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
2305 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
2310 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
2311 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2315 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2316 if (!PACKET_get_1(&currext->data,
2317 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2320 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
2321 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2322 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2323 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2324 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
2325 (&currext->data, &responder_id_list))
2329 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
2330 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
2332 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
2334 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2335 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
2336 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
2337 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2341 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
2344 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2346 PACKET responder_id;
2347 const unsigned char *id_data;
2349 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2351 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2355 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2356 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
2357 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2358 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2362 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2363 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2367 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2368 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2369 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2374 /* Read in request_extensions */
2375 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(
2376 &currext->data, &exts))
2379 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2380 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2381 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2382 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2383 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2384 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2385 (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2386 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2387 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2395 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2397 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2401 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
2402 && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2404 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2407 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2408 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2409 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2410 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2411 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2412 * anything like that, but this might change).
2414 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2415 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2416 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2417 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2418 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2420 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2424 else if (currext->type
2425 == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
2426 && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2427 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s,
2428 &currext->data, al))
2432 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2434 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2435 && currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2436 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s,
2437 &currext->data, al))
2441 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2442 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
2443 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2444 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
2445 && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->hit
2446 && !process_key_share_ext(s, &currext->data, al)) {
2450 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2451 * tls_check_client_ems_support()
2455 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2456 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2457 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2458 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2459 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2462 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, currext->type,
2463 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2464 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data), al) <= 0)
2469 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2471 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2472 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2473 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2475 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2480 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2481 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2482 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2483 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2488 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
2491 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2492 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, hello, &al) <= 0) {
2493 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2496 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2503 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2505 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2506 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2507 * fill the length of the block.
2509 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2511 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2513 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2514 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2515 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2523 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2525 unsigned int length, type, size;
2526 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2527 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2529 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2530 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2532 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2534 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2535 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2537 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2539 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2541 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2544 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2545 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2549 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2550 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2554 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2555 const unsigned char *data;
2558 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2559 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2562 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2563 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2565 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2566 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2568 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2569 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2570 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2571 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2572 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2575 tlsext_servername = 1;
2577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2578 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2579 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2580 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2581 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2582 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2586 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2587 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2588 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2589 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2590 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2593 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2594 ecpointformatlist_length;
2595 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2596 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2597 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2598 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2604 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2606 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2607 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2608 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2609 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2611 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2614 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2615 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2618 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2619 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2621 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2624 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2625 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2628 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2629 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2631 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2633 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2634 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2635 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2637 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2638 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2639 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2640 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2641 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2642 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2644 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2646 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2647 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2648 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2651 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2655 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2656 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2657 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2658 unsigned char *selected;
2659 unsigned char selected_len;
2660 /* We must have requested it. */
2661 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2662 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2665 /* The data must be valid */
2666 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2667 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2670 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2673 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2674 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2675 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2679 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
2680 * a single Serverhello
2682 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
2683 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2684 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2685 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2688 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2689 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2690 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2694 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2696 /* We must have requested it. */
2697 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2698 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2702 * The extension data consists of:
2703 * uint16 list_length
2704 * uint8 proto_length;
2705 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2707 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2708 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2709 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2710 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2713 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2714 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2715 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2716 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2719 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2720 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2723 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2725 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2726 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2727 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2731 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2732 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2733 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) &&
2734 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2735 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2736 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2737 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret &&
2738 (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
2739 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2741 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2742 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
2743 && SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2744 unsigned int group_id;
2746 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
2750 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2751 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2755 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &group_id)) {
2756 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2757 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2758 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2762 if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) {
2764 * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
2767 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2768 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2769 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
2773 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &encoded_pt)
2774 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
2775 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2777 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2781 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
2782 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2783 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2784 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2789 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) {
2790 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2791 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2792 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
2795 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
2797 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2798 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2800 } else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2804 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2805 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2809 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2810 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2811 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2812 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2813 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2814 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2815 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2819 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2828 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2829 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2830 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2831 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2832 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2834 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2835 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2836 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2837 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2838 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2844 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2847 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2848 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2849 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2850 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2858 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2860 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2864 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2869 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2871 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2872 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2874 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2876 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2877 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2880 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2881 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2885 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2887 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2888 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2889 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2890 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2892 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2894 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2897 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2898 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2901 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2902 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2905 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2906 s->servername_done = 0;
2912 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2913 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2915 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2916 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2917 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2919 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2920 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2921 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2923 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2924 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2926 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2927 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2929 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2930 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2931 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2932 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2936 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2941 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2942 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2943 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2944 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2945 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2946 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2947 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2948 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2951 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2952 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2953 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2954 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2955 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2958 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2959 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2960 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2961 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2962 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2966 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2970 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2975 * Upon success, returns 1.
2976 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2978 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2980 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2983 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2984 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2985 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2986 * influence which certificate is sent
2988 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2990 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2991 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2992 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2993 if (certpkey != NULL) {
2995 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2996 * et al can pick it up.
2998 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2999 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3001 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3002 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3003 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3005 /* status request response should be sent */
3006 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3007 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3008 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3010 /* something bad happened */
3011 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3013 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3019 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
3026 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3028 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3029 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3031 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3033 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3034 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
3035 * must contain uncompressed.
3037 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3038 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3039 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3040 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3041 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3042 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3043 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
3044 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3046 unsigned char *list;
3047 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3048 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3049 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
3050 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
3051 found_uncompressed = 1;
3055 if (!found_uncompressed) {
3056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
3057 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3061 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3062 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3064 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3066 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3067 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3068 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
3069 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3071 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3073 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3076 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
3077 * that we don't receive a status message
3079 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3080 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3081 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = 0;
3084 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3085 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3088 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3089 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3092 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3093 s->servername_done = 0;
3099 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3102 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3104 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
3105 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3109 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
3110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3117 * Given a list of extensions that we collected earlier, find one of a given
3118 * type and return it.
3120 * |exts| is the set of extensions previously collected.
3121 * |numexts| is the number of extensions that we have.
3122 * |type| the type of the extension that we are looking for.
3124 * Returns a pointer to the found RAW_EXTENSION data, or NULL if not found.
3126 RAW_EXTENSION *tls_get_extension_by_type(RAW_EXTENSION *exts, size_t numexts,
3131 for (loop = 0; loop < numexts; loop++) {
3132 if (exts[loop].type == type)
3140 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
3142 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
3143 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3144 * point to the resulting session.
3146 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3147 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3148 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3151 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3152 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3153 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3154 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3155 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3156 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3157 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3160 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3161 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3162 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3163 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3164 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3165 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3167 int tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
3171 const unsigned char *etick;
3173 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
3176 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3179 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
3182 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
3185 ticketext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
3186 hello->num_extensions,
3187 TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket);
3188 if (ticketext == NULL)
3191 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
3194 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3197 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3200 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3202 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3203 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3204 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3205 * calculate the master secret later.
3209 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ticketext->data, &etick, size)) {
3210 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3213 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, hello->session_id,
3214 hello->session_id_len, ret);
3216 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3217 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3220 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3223 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3224 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3227 default: /* fatal error */
3233 * Sets the extended master secret flag if the extension is present in the
3234 * ClientHello and we can support it
3239 int tls_check_client_ems_support(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
3241 RAW_EXTENSION *emsext;
3243 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3245 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION
3246 || s->version > TLS1_2_VERSION))
3249 emsext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
3250 hello->num_extensions,
3251 TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret);
3254 * No extensions is a success - we have successfully discovered that the
3255 * client doesn't support EMS.
3260 /* The extensions must always be empty */
3261 if (PACKET_remaining(&emsext->data) != 0)
3264 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3270 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3272 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3273 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
3274 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3275 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3276 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3277 * point to the resulting session.
3280 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
3281 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3282 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3283 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3284 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3286 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3287 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3288 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3291 unsigned char *sdec;
3292 const unsigned char *p;
3293 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1, declen;
3295 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3296 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3297 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
3298 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3300 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3301 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3304 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3309 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3310 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3311 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3322 /* Check key name matches */
3323 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3324 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
3328 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3329 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3330 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3331 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
3332 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3333 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
3339 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3342 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3346 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3348 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
3353 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3354 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3355 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3358 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3359 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3360 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3363 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3364 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3365 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3366 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3367 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3368 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
3369 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
3370 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3374 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
3375 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3380 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3384 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3388 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3389 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3390 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3394 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3395 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3404 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3408 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3409 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3413 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3420 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3421 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3422 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3423 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3424 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3425 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3426 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3427 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3428 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3429 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3432 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3433 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3434 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3435 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3436 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3437 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3438 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3441 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3444 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3445 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3451 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3454 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3455 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3456 return table[i].nid;
3461 int tls12_get_sigandhash(WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3467 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3470 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3473 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, md_id) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sig_id))
3479 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3481 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3488 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3491 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3492 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3493 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3494 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3495 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3496 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3497 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3498 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3499 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
3500 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3501 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
3502 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3505 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3511 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
3512 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3513 return tls12_md_info + i;
3519 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3521 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3522 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3524 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3527 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3530 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3533 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3534 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3535 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3537 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3538 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3539 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3542 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3543 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3545 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3546 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3547 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3549 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3550 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3552 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3553 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3559 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3560 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3561 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3563 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3564 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3566 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3567 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3569 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3571 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3572 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3574 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3576 if (psignhash_nid) {
3577 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3578 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
3579 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3583 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3584 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3586 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3587 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3588 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3590 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3591 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3593 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3594 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3598 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3599 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3603 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3605 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3606 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3607 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3609 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3610 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3611 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3613 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3614 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3615 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3616 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3617 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3618 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3622 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3623 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3624 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3628 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3629 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3630 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3637 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3639 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3641 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3644 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
3645 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3649 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3650 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3651 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[0])
3652 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[1]))
3659 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3660 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3661 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3662 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3664 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3665 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3666 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3667 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3668 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3670 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3671 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3674 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3675 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3676 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3678 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3688 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3689 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3691 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3692 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3694 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3696 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3698 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3699 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3700 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3701 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3702 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3703 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3704 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3705 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3706 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3707 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3709 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3710 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3713 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3714 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3718 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3719 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3721 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3723 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3726 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3730 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3731 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3735 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3737 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, size_t dsize)
3740 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3741 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3743 /* Should never happen */
3747 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3748 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3749 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3751 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3752 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3756 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3761 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3762 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3764 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3765 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3768 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3769 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3770 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3771 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3772 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3774 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3775 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3776 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3777 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3783 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3784 * the certificate for signing.
3786 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3788 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3789 * supported it stays as NULL.
3791 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3792 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3793 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3795 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3796 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3797 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3798 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3801 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3802 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3803 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3805 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3806 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3807 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3808 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3809 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
3810 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3811 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3812 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
3813 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3819 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3820 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3821 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3823 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3824 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3825 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
3829 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3836 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3838 return (int)numsigalgs;
3841 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3842 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3843 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3845 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3846 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
3847 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
3851 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3853 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3855 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3857 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3859 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3860 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3863 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3867 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3870 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3872 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3873 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3874 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3875 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3876 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3877 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3879 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3880 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3881 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3885 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3887 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3890 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3893 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3895 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3897 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3899 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3907 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3908 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3910 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3913 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3914 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3917 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3918 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3923 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3924 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3926 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3930 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3934 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3937 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3939 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3944 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3945 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3947 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3948 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3949 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3951 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3958 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3959 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3960 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3962 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3963 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3964 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3970 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3974 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3978 if (default_nid == -1)
3980 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3982 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3983 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3984 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3989 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3990 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3994 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3995 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3996 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4003 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
4004 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
4005 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
4006 * attempting to use them.
4009 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4011 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4012 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4013 /* Strict mode flags */
4014 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4015 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4016 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4018 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4023 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4024 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4027 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4028 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4030 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4033 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
4035 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4036 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
4038 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4040 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4041 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4047 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4050 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
4052 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4053 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4055 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4062 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4063 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4064 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4065 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4066 else if (!check_flags)
4071 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
4072 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
4074 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
4076 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4077 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
4079 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4082 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4083 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4084 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4085 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4088 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4089 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4090 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4094 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4095 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4098 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
4099 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
4100 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
4103 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
4104 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
4105 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
4108 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
4109 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
4110 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
4119 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4120 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4122 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4124 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4125 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4126 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4129 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4136 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4137 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4141 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4142 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4143 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4144 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4146 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4153 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4154 else if (check_flags)
4155 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4157 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4158 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4159 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4160 else if (!check_flags)
4163 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4164 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4165 else if (strict_mode) {
4166 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4167 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4168 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4169 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4171 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4178 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4179 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4181 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
4183 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4186 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4189 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4193 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4197 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4199 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4200 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4202 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4203 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4204 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4208 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4211 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4213 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4215 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4216 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4218 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4219 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4220 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4222 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4223 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4224 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4225 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4226 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4231 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4234 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4236 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4237 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4241 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4242 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4243 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4244 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4245 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4247 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4250 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4254 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4257 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4258 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4265 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4266 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4268 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4269 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4270 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4271 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4272 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
4273 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
4274 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
4277 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4278 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4280 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4283 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4284 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4286 int dh_secbits = 80;
4287 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4288 return DH_get_1024_160();
4289 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
4290 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4295 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4296 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4299 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4307 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4308 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4310 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4311 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
4319 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4320 return DH_get_2048_224();
4321 return DH_get_1024_160();
4325 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4328 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4331 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4332 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4333 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4334 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4336 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4339 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4341 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4344 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4346 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4347 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4348 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4349 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4351 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4352 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4354 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4355 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4358 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4360 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4363 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4366 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4368 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4369 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4371 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4372 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4374 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4375 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4380 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4381 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4382 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4385 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4387 int rv, start_idx, i;
4389 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4394 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4398 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4399 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4400 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);