2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
26 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
27 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
29 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
33 tls1_generate_master_secret,
34 tls1_change_cipher_state,
35 tls1_final_finish_mac,
36 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
37 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
38 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
40 tls1_export_keying_material,
42 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
43 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
44 ssl3_set_handshake_header2,
45 tls_close_construct_packet,
49 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
53 tls1_generate_master_secret,
54 tls1_change_cipher_state,
55 tls1_final_finish_mac,
56 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
57 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
58 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
60 tls1_export_keying_material,
61 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
62 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
63 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
64 ssl3_set_handshake_header2,
65 tls_close_construct_packet,
69 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
73 tls1_generate_master_secret,
74 tls1_change_cipher_state,
75 tls1_final_finish_mac,
76 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
77 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
78 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
80 tls1_export_keying_material,
81 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
82 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
83 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
84 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
85 ssl3_set_handshake_header2,
86 tls_close_construct_packet,
90 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
93 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
94 * http, the cache would over fill
103 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
107 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
109 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
113 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
116 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
117 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
119 s->version = s->method->version;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
125 int nid; /* Curve NID */
126 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
127 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
131 * Table of curve information.
132 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
133 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
135 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
136 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
137 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
138 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
139 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
140 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
141 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
142 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
143 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
144 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
145 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
146 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
147 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
148 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
149 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
150 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
151 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
152 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
153 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
154 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
155 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
156 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
157 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
158 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
159 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
160 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
161 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
162 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
163 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
164 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
167 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
168 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
169 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
170 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
173 /* The default curves */
174 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
175 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
176 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
177 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
178 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
181 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
182 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
183 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
184 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
185 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
186 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
187 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
188 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
191 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
192 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
194 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
195 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
196 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
197 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
198 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
199 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
200 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
201 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
202 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
203 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
204 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
205 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
206 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
207 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
208 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
209 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
210 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
211 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
212 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
213 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
214 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
215 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
218 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
219 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
220 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
223 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
225 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
226 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
227 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
229 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
231 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
235 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
238 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
239 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
246 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
248 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
249 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
250 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
251 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
252 * lists in the first place.
253 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
254 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
255 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
257 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
258 const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
260 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
262 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
263 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
265 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
266 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
267 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
268 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
269 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
272 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
273 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
277 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
278 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
282 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
283 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
286 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
287 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
291 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
292 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
293 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
297 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
302 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
303 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
305 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
308 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
310 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
311 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
312 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
315 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
318 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
319 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
321 const unsigned char *curves;
322 size_t num_curves, i;
323 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
324 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
326 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
328 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
331 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
332 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
334 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
335 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
337 } else /* Should never happen */
340 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
342 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
343 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
344 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
350 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
351 * if there is no match.
352 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
353 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
354 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
356 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
358 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
359 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
361 /* Can't do anything on client side */
365 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
367 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
368 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
370 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
371 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
372 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
373 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
374 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
375 /* Should never happen */
378 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
382 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
383 * but s->options is a long...
385 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
386 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
388 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
389 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
390 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
391 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
392 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
395 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
398 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
400 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
401 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
402 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
404 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
408 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
409 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
410 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
411 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
412 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
415 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
416 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
424 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
428 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
429 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
431 unsigned char *clist, *p;
434 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
437 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
438 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
441 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
442 unsigned long idmask;
444 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
446 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
455 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
459 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
463 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
466 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
468 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
474 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
476 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
478 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
480 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
481 if (nid == NID_undef)
482 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
483 if (nid == NID_undef)
484 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
485 if (nid == NID_undef)
487 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
488 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
490 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
494 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
495 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
499 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
503 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
506 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
507 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
514 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
515 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
518 /* Determine curve ID */
519 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
520 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
521 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
525 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
527 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
529 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
530 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
532 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
533 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
535 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
541 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
542 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
543 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
545 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
546 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
549 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
550 * supported (see RFC4492).
552 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
553 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
554 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
555 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
556 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
559 if (i == num_formats)
564 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
565 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
566 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
568 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
570 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
571 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
572 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
573 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
574 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
578 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
579 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
584 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
591 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
595 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
597 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
598 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
599 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
601 *pformats = ecformats_default;
602 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
604 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
606 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
611 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
612 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
614 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
616 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
619 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
622 /* If not EC nothing to do */
623 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
625 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
629 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
632 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
636 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
637 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
639 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
645 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
646 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
647 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
648 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
649 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
651 return 0; /* Should never happen */
652 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
653 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
655 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
657 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
658 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
659 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
661 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
667 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
669 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
671 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
673 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
674 * is compatible with the client extensions.
676 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
678 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
681 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
684 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
685 unsigned char curve_id[2];
686 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
687 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
688 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
689 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
690 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
694 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
695 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
699 /* Need a shared curve */
700 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
704 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
708 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
713 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
716 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
717 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
720 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
721 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
723 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
726 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
727 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
729 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
733 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
735 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
738 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
739 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
740 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
741 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
743 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
744 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
745 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
746 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
747 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
748 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
749 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
750 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
751 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
752 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
756 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
757 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
758 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
759 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
762 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
765 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
768 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
769 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
770 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
771 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
772 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
774 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
775 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
778 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
779 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
783 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
784 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
785 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
786 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
787 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
788 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
789 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
791 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
792 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
797 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
798 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
800 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
801 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
803 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
804 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
805 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
806 /* Should never happen */
809 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
810 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
811 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
814 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
815 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
816 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
817 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
818 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
820 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
824 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
825 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
828 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
829 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
830 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
831 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
834 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
835 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
836 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
837 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
843 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
847 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
848 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
849 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
850 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
853 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
854 if (i == sent_sigslen
855 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
856 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
857 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
860 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
862 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
865 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
866 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
867 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
868 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
872 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
874 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
879 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
880 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
881 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
883 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
886 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
888 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
890 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
891 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
892 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
893 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
895 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
896 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
897 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
898 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
900 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
902 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
903 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
904 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
910 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
911 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
912 * @c: cipher to check
913 * @op: Security check that you want to do
915 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
917 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
919 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
920 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
922 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
924 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
925 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
927 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
928 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
931 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
934 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
936 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
938 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
941 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
943 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
944 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
954 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
955 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
956 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
957 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
958 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
961 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
963 PACKET extensions = *packet;
964 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
965 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
968 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
969 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
972 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
973 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
979 if (num_extensions <= 1)
982 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
983 if (extension_types == NULL) {
984 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
988 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
989 extensions = *packet;
990 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
992 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
993 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
994 /* This should not happen. */
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1000 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1004 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1005 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1006 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1007 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1012 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1016 int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1018 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1019 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1021 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1023 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1024 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1026 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1027 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1029 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1030 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1031 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1032 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1040 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1041 if (s->renegotiate) {
1042 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1043 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1044 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1045 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1046 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1051 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1052 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1055 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1056 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1057 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1058 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
1059 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1060 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
1061 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1062 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
1063 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname,
1064 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname))
1065 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1066 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1071 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1072 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1073 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1074 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1075 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
1076 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1077 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1078 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
1079 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
1080 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
1081 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
1082 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1083 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1093 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1095 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1096 size_t num_curves, num_formats;
1099 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1101 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1102 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
1103 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1104 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
1105 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1111 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1113 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1114 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
1115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1119 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
1120 /* Sub-packet for curves extension */
1121 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1122 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1123 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1126 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1127 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1128 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1129 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurves[0])
1130 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurves[1])) {
1131 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1132 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1137 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1142 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1144 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1146 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1147 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1148 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1149 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1150 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1151 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1152 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1156 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1157 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1158 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1161 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1162 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1165 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1166 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick,
1168 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1174 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1176 const unsigned char *salg;
1178 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1180 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1181 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
1182 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1183 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
1184 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1185 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
1186 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1187 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1192 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1193 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1196 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1197 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
1198 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1199 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1200 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
1201 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1205 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1206 unsigned char *idbytes;
1210 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1211 idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1213 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
1214 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
1215 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1220 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1221 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1225 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1226 unsigned char *extbytes;
1227 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
1234 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes)
1236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1240 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1247 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1252 * 1: peer may send requests
1253 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1255 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1256 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1258 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1260 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1261 /* Sub-packet for Hearbeat extension */
1262 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1263 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, mode)
1264 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1271 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1272 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1274 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1275 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1277 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1278 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1286 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1287 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1288 * (see longer comment below)
1290 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1291 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1292 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1293 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
1294 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1295 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1296 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1297 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1301 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1303 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1304 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1305 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
1306 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1309 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1310 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
1311 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1312 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
1313 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1317 ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
1318 for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) {
1319 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1320 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
1321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1325 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1326 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
1327 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1328 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1329 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1334 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1335 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1336 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, pkt, al)) {
1337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1341 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1342 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1347 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1348 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1349 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
1350 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1357 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1358 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1364 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1365 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1366 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1369 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1370 unsigned char *padbytes;
1373 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
1374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1378 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1379 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1385 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
1386 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
1387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1390 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
1398 int ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1401 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1403 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1404 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1405 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1406 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1407 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1410 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1411 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH)) {
1412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1416 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1417 !ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, pkt)) {
1418 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1422 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1423 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1426 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1427 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1428 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1429 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1430 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1434 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1436 const unsigned char *plist;
1439 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1441 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1443 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1444 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1445 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
1446 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1447 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1452 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1455 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1457 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1458 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1459 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1465 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1468 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1471 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1472 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1473 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1478 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1479 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1480 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1481 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1482 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1483 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1484 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1485 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1486 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1492 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1493 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1494 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1495 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1496 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1497 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1498 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1499 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1500 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1501 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1503 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1508 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1509 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1510 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1514 * 1: peer may send requests
1515 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1517 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1518 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1520 mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1522 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1523 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1524 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, mode)
1525 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1526 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1533 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1534 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1535 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1536 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1537 const unsigned char *npa;
1538 unsigned int npalen;
1541 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1543 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1544 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1545 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1546 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1547 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1550 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1554 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, pkt, al)) {
1555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1559 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1561 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1562 * for other cases too.
1564 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1565 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1566 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1567 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1568 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1570 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1571 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1572 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1577 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1578 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1579 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1580 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1585 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1586 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1587 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1588 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1589 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1590 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
1591 s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
1592 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1593 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1594 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1600 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1601 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1608 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1609 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1610 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1611 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1613 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1615 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1617 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1619 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1620 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1624 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1626 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1627 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1628 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1631 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1633 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1634 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1635 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1643 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1644 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1645 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1647 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
1649 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1650 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1652 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1653 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1654 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1655 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1656 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1658 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1659 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1660 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1661 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1662 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1665 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1666 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1667 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1668 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1671 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1679 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1681 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1682 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|.
1683 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1688 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1689 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1690 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1691 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1693 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1699 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1700 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1701 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1702 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1703 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1704 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1705 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1707 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1708 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1709 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1710 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1711 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1712 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1713 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1714 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1715 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1716 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1717 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1718 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1719 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1722 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1723 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1727 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1728 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1729 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1733 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1736 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1737 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1739 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1742 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1745 * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of
1746 * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions.
1748 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1749 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1752 * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1753 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1755 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1758 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1761 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1762 s->servername_done = 0;
1763 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1764 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1765 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1768 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1769 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1770 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1771 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
1772 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
1773 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1774 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1775 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1776 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1779 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1780 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1781 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1782 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1784 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1785 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1786 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1787 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1789 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1790 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1791 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1794 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1796 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1799 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
1802 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
1806 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
1807 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
1810 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
1812 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
1815 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1816 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
1817 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1818 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1820 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1821 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
1823 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1824 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1827 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1829 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1830 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1831 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1832 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1833 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1834 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1835 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1836 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1837 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1838 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1839 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1840 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1841 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1842 * the value of the Host: field.
1843 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1844 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1845 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1847 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1851 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1852 unsigned int servname_type;
1853 PACKET sni, hostname;
1855 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
1856 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
1857 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
1862 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
1863 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
1864 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
1866 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
1867 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
1868 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
1870 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
1871 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
1873 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
1874 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
1875 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
1880 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1881 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1885 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
1886 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1890 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
1891 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1895 s->servername_done = 1;
1898 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
1899 * fall back to a full handshake.
1901 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1902 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
1903 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
1906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1907 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
1910 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
1913 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
1917 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
1918 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
1920 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
1921 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1927 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1928 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
1929 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
1931 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &ec_point_format_list)
1932 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
1937 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
1938 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
1940 session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
1941 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1945 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
1946 PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
1948 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
1949 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list)
1950 || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
1951 || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
1956 if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
1957 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
1959 session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
1960 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1965 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1966 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
1967 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1968 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
1969 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1970 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1972 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1975 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
1976 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
1978 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
1979 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
1980 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
1985 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
1986 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
1990 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
1991 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
1992 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
1995 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1996 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1997 const unsigned char *ext_data;
1998 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
1999 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
2000 (&extension, &responder_id_list))
2004 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
2005 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
2007 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
2009 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2010 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
2011 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
2012 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2016 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
2019 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2021 PACKET responder_id;
2022 const unsigned char *id_data;
2024 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2026 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2030 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2031 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2032 PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2036 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2037 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2041 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2042 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2043 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2048 /* Read in request_extensions */
2049 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
2052 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2053 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2054 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2055 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2056 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2057 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2058 PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2059 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2060 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2068 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2070 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2073 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2074 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2075 unsigned int hbtype;
2077 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
2078 || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
2079 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2083 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2084 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2086 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2087 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2088 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2091 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2096 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2097 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2098 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2100 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2103 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2104 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2105 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2106 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2107 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2108 * anything like that, but this might change).
2110 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2111 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2112 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2113 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2114 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2116 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2120 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2121 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2122 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
2126 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2127 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2128 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2129 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2130 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
2134 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2135 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2137 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2138 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2142 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2143 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2144 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2145 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2146 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2149 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
2150 PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
2155 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2157 * tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens.
2159 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2165 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2167 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2168 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2169 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2170 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2171 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2176 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2177 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2178 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2179 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2184 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2187 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2188 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2189 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2192 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2199 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2201 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2202 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2203 * fill the length of the block.
2205 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2207 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2209 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2210 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2211 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2219 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2221 unsigned int length, type, size;
2222 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2223 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2226 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2228 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2230 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2231 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2232 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2233 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2234 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2237 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2239 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2241 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2244 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2245 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2249 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2250 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2254 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2255 const unsigned char *data;
2258 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2259 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2262 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2263 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2265 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2266 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2268 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2269 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2270 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2271 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2272 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2275 tlsext_servername = 1;
2277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2278 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2279 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2280 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2281 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2282 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2286 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2287 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2288 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2289 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2290 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2293 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2294 ecpointformatlist_length;
2295 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2296 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2297 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2298 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2304 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2306 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2307 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2308 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2309 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2311 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2314 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2315 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2318 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2319 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2321 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2324 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2325 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2328 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2329 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2331 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2333 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2334 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2335 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2337 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2338 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2339 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2340 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2341 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2342 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2344 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2346 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2347 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2348 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2351 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2355 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2356 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2357 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2358 unsigned char *selected;
2359 unsigned char selected_len;
2360 /* We must have requested it. */
2361 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2362 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2365 /* The data must be valid */
2366 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2367 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2370 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2373 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2374 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2375 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2379 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
2380 * a single Serverhello
2382 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
2383 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2384 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2385 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2388 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2389 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2390 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2394 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2396 /* We must have requested it. */
2397 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2398 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2402 * The extension data consists of:
2403 * uint16 list_length
2404 * uint8 proto_length;
2405 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2407 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2408 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2409 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2410 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2413 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2414 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2415 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2416 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2419 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2420 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2423 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2426 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2427 unsigned int hbtype;
2428 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2429 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2433 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2434 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2436 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2437 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2438 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2441 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2446 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2447 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2448 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2452 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2453 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2454 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2455 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2456 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2457 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2458 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2460 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2463 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2464 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2466 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2470 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2471 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2475 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2476 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2477 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2478 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2479 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2480 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2481 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2485 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2494 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2495 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2496 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2497 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2498 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2500 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2501 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2502 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2503 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2504 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2510 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2513 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2514 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2515 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2524 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2526 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2530 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2535 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2537 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2538 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2540 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2542 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2543 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2546 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2547 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2551 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2553 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2554 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2555 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2556 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2558 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2560 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2563 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2564 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2567 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2568 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2571 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2572 s->servername_done = 0;
2578 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2579 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2581 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2582 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2583 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2585 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2586 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2587 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2589 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2590 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2593 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2595 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2596 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2597 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2598 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2602 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2607 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2608 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2609 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2610 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2611 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2612 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2613 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2614 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2617 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2618 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2619 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2620 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2621 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2624 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2625 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2626 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2627 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2628 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2632 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2636 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2641 * Upon success, returns 1.
2642 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2644 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2646 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2649 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2650 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2651 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2652 * influence which certificate is sent
2654 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2656 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2657 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2658 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2659 if (certpkey != NULL) {
2661 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2662 * et al can pick it up.
2664 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2665 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2667 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2668 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2669 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2671 /* status request response should be sent */
2672 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2673 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2674 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2676 /* something bad happened */
2677 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2679 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2685 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
2692 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2694 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2695 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2697 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2699 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2700 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2701 * must contain uncompressed.
2703 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2704 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2705 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2706 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2707 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2708 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2709 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2710 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2712 unsigned char *list;
2713 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2714 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2715 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2716 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2717 found_uncompressed = 1;
2721 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2722 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2723 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2727 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2728 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2730 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2732 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2733 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2734 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2735 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2737 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2739 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2742 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2743 * that we don't receive a status message
2745 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2746 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2747 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2750 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2751 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2754 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2755 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2758 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2759 s->servername_done = 0;
2765 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2768 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2770 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2771 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2775 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2783 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2784 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2785 * need to be handled at the same time.
2787 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2790 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2791 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2792 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2793 * point to the resulting session.
2795 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2796 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2797 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2800 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2801 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2802 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2803 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2804 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2805 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2806 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2809 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2810 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2811 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2812 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2813 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2814 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2816 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2819 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2820 const PACKET *session_id,
2824 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2827 int have_ticket = 0;
2828 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2831 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2832 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2835 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2838 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2841 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2845 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2846 unsigned int type, size;
2848 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2849 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2850 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2854 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
2858 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
2860 const unsigned char *etick;
2862 /* Duplicate extension */
2863 if (have_ticket != 0) {
2871 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2874 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2878 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2880 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2881 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2882 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2883 * calculate the master secret later.
2888 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
2889 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2893 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
2894 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
2896 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2897 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2900 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2903 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2904 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2907 default: /* fatal error */
2913 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
2914 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2915 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
2921 if (have_ticket == 0)
2928 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2930 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2931 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
2932 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2933 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2934 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2935 * point to the resulting session.
2938 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
2939 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2940 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2941 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2942 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2944 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
2945 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
2946 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
2949 unsigned char *sdec;
2950 const unsigned char *p;
2951 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
2952 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2953 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2954 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
2955 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2957 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2958 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
2961 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2966 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
2967 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2968 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2979 /* Check key name matches */
2980 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
2981 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
2985 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
2986 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
2987 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
2988 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
2989 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
2990 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
2996 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
2999 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3003 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3005 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
3010 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3011 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3012 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3015 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3016 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3017 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3020 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3021 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3022 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3023 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3024 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3025 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3026 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3030 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3031 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3036 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3040 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3044 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3045 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3046 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3050 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3051 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3060 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3064 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3065 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3069 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3076 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3077 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3078 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3079 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3080 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3081 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3082 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3083 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3084 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3085 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3088 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3089 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3090 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3091 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3092 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3093 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3094 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3097 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3100 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3101 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3107 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3110 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3111 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3112 return table[i].nid;
3117 int tls12_get_sigandhash(WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3123 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3126 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3129 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, md_id) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sig_id))
3135 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3137 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3144 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3147 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3148 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3149 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3150 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3151 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3152 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3153 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3154 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3155 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
3156 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3157 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
3158 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3161 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3167 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
3168 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3169 return tls12_md_info + i;
3175 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3177 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3178 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3180 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3183 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3186 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3189 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3190 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3191 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3193 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3194 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3195 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3197 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3198 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3199 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3201 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3202 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3203 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3205 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3206 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3208 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3209 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3215 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3216 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3217 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3219 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3220 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3222 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3223 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3225 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3227 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3228 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3230 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3232 if (psignhash_nid) {
3233 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3234 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
3235 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3239 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3240 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3242 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3243 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3244 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3246 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3247 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3249 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3250 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3254 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3255 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3259 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3261 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3262 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3263 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3265 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3266 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3267 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3269 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3270 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3271 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3273 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3274 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3278 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3279 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3280 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3284 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3285 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3286 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3293 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3295 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3297 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3300 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
3301 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3305 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3306 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3307 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[0])
3308 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[1]))
3315 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3316 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3317 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3318 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3320 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3321 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3322 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3323 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3324 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3326 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3327 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3330 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3331 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3332 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3334 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3344 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3345 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3347 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3348 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3350 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3352 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3354 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3355 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3356 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3357 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3358 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3359 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3360 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3361 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3362 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3363 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3365 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3366 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3369 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3370 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3374 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3375 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3377 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3379 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3382 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3386 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3387 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3391 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3393 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3396 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3397 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3399 /* Should never happen */
3403 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3404 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3405 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3407 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3408 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3412 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3417 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3418 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3420 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3421 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3424 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3425 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3426 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3427 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3428 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3430 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3431 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3432 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3433 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3439 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3440 * the certificate for signing.
3442 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3444 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3445 * supported it stays as NULL.
3447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3448 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3449 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3451 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3452 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3453 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3454 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3457 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3458 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3459 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3462 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3463 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3464 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3465 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
3466 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3467 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3468 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
3469 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3475 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3476 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3477 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3479 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3484 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3491 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3493 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3496 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3497 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3498 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3500 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3501 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3505 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3507 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3509 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3511 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3513 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3514 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3517 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3521 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3524 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3526 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3527 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3528 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3529 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3530 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3531 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3533 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3534 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3535 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3539 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3541 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3544 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3547 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3549 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3551 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3553 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3561 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3562 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3564 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3567 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3568 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3571 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3572 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3577 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3578 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3580 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3584 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3588 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3591 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3593 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3598 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3599 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3601 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3602 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3603 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3605 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3612 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3613 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3614 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3616 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3617 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3618 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3624 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3628 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3632 if (default_nid == -1)
3634 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3636 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3637 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3638 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3643 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3644 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3648 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3649 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3650 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3657 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3658 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3659 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3660 * attempting to use them.
3663 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3665 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3666 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3667 /* Strict mode flags */
3668 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3669 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3670 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3672 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3677 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3678 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3681 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3682 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3684 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3687 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3689 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3690 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3692 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3694 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3695 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3701 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3704 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3706 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3707 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3709 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3716 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3717 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3718 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3719 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3720 else if (!check_flags)
3725 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3726 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3728 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3730 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3731 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3733 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3736 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3737 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3738 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3739 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3742 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3743 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3744 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3748 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3749 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3752 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3753 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3754 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3757 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3758 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3759 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3762 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3763 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3764 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3773 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3774 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3776 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3778 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3779 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3780 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3783 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3790 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3791 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3795 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3796 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3797 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3798 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3800 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3807 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3808 else if (check_flags)
3809 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3811 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3812 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3813 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3814 else if (!check_flags)
3817 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3818 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3819 else if (strict_mode) {
3820 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3821 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3822 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3823 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3825 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3832 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3833 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3835 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3837 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3840 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3843 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3847 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3851 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
3853 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
3854 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
3856 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
3857 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
3858 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3862 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
3865 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3867 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
3869 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
3870 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3872 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3873 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
3874 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3876 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3877 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3878 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3879 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
3880 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3885 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
3888 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3890 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
3891 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
3895 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3896 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
3897 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3898 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
3899 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3901 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3904 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
3908 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
3911 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
3912 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3919 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
3920 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
3922 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
3923 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
3924 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
3925 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
3926 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
3927 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
3928 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
3931 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
3932 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
3934 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
3937 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3938 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
3940 int dh_secbits = 80;
3941 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
3942 return DH_get_1024_160();
3943 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
3944 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
3949 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3950 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
3953 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
3961 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
3962 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
3964 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
3965 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
3973 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
3974 return DH_get_2048_224();
3975 return DH_get_1024_160();
3979 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
3982 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
3985 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
3986 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
3987 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
3988 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
3990 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
3993 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
3995 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
3998 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4000 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4001 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4002 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4003 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4005 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4006 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4008 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4009 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4012 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4014 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4017 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4020 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4022 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4023 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4025 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4026 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4028 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4029 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4034 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4035 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4036 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4039 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4041 int rv, start_idx, i;
4043 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4048 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4052 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4053 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4054 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);