1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 /* ====================================================================
58 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
61 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
64 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
65 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
68 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
69 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
72 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
73 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
74 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
75 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
78 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
79 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
80 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
83 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
84 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
89 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
92 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
93 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
94 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
95 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
96 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
97 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
98 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
99 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
100 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
101 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
102 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
103 * ====================================================================
105 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
106 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
107 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
112 #include <openssl/objects.h>
113 #include <openssl/evp.h>
114 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
115 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
116 #include <openssl/rand.h>
117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
118 # include <openssl/dh.h>
119 # include <openssl/bn.h>
121 #include "ssl_locl.h"
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
129 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
132 tls1_setup_key_block,
133 tls1_generate_master_secret,
134 tls1_change_cipher_state,
135 tls1_final_finish_mac,
136 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 tls1_export_keying_material,
142 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
143 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
147 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
150 tls1_setup_key_block,
151 tls1_generate_master_secret,
152 tls1_change_cipher_state,
153 tls1_final_finish_mac,
154 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
155 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
156 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
158 tls1_export_keying_material,
159 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
160 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
161 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
165 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
168 tls1_setup_key_block,
169 tls1_generate_master_secret,
170 tls1_change_cipher_state,
171 tls1_final_finish_mac,
172 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
173 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
174 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
176 tls1_export_keying_material,
177 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
178 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
179 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
180 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
184 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
187 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
188 * http, the cache would over fill
190 return (60 * 60 * 2);
197 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
201 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
203 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
207 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
210 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
211 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
213 s->version = s->method->version;
216 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
219 int nid; /* Curve NID */
220 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
221 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
224 # define TLS_CURVE_TYPE 0x1
225 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
226 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
229 * Table of curve information.
230 * NB: do not delete entries or reorder this array. It is used as a lookup
231 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
234 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
235 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
236 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
237 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
238 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
239 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
240 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
241 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
242 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
243 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
244 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
245 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
246 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
247 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
248 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
249 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
250 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
251 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
252 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
253 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
254 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
255 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
256 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
257 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
258 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
259 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
260 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
261 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
265 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
266 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
267 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
268 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
271 /* The default curves */
272 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
273 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
274 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
275 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
276 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
277 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
278 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
279 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
280 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
281 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
282 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
283 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
284 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
285 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
286 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
287 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
288 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
291 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
292 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
293 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
294 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
295 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
296 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
297 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
298 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
299 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
300 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
301 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
302 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
303 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
304 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
305 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
306 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
307 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
309 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
310 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
312 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
313 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
314 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
315 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
316 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
317 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
318 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
319 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
320 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
321 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
322 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
323 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
324 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
325 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
326 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
330 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
331 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
332 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
335 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
337 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
338 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
340 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
343 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
346 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
347 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
354 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
356 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
357 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
358 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
359 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
360 * lists in the first place.
361 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
362 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
363 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
365 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
366 const unsigned char **pcurves,
369 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
371 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
372 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
374 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
375 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
376 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
377 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
378 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
381 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
382 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
386 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
387 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
391 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
392 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
395 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
396 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
400 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
401 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
402 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
406 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
411 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
412 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
414 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
417 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
419 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
420 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
421 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
424 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
427 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
428 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
430 const unsigned char *curves;
431 size_t num_curves, i;
432 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
433 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
435 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
437 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
440 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
441 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
443 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
444 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
446 } else /* Should never happen */
449 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
451 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
452 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
453 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
459 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
460 * if there is no match.
461 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
462 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
463 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
465 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
467 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
468 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
470 /* Can't do anything on client side */
474 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
476 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
477 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
479 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
480 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
481 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
482 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
483 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
484 /* Should never happen */
487 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
491 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
492 * but s->options is a long...
494 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
495 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
497 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
498 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
499 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
500 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
502 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
505 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
508 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
510 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
511 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
512 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
514 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
518 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
519 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
520 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
521 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
522 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
525 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
526 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
534 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
538 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
539 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
541 unsigned char *clist, *p;
544 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
547 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
548 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
551 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
552 unsigned long idmask;
554 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
556 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
565 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
569 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
573 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
576 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
578 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
584 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
586 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
588 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
590 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
591 if (nid == NID_undef)
592 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
593 if (nid == NID_undef)
594 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
595 if (nid == NID_undef)
597 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
598 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
600 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
604 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
605 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
610 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
614 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
617 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
618 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
625 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
626 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
629 /* Determine curve ID */
630 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
631 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
632 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
636 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
638 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
640 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
641 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
643 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
644 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
646 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
652 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
653 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
654 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
656 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
657 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
660 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
661 * supported (see RFC4492).
663 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
664 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
665 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
666 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
667 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
670 if (i == num_formats)
675 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
676 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
677 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
679 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
681 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
682 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
683 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
684 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
685 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
689 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
690 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
695 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
702 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
706 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
708 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
709 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
710 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
712 *pformats = ecformats_default;
713 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
715 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
717 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
722 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
723 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
725 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
727 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
730 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
733 /* If not EC nothing to do */
734 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
736 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
740 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
743 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
747 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
748 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
750 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
756 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
757 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
758 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
759 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
760 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
762 return 0; /* Should never happen */
763 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
764 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
766 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
768 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
769 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
770 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
772 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
778 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
780 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatiblity
782 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
784 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
785 * is compatible with the client extensions.
787 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
789 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
791 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
792 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
793 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
797 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
800 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
801 unsigned char curve_id[2];
802 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
803 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
804 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
805 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
806 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
810 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
811 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
815 /* Need a shared curve */
816 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
820 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
824 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
829 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
832 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
833 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
836 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
837 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
839 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
842 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
843 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
845 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
849 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
851 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
854 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
855 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
856 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
857 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
859 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
860 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
861 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
862 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
863 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
864 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
865 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
866 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
867 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
868 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
872 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
873 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
874 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
875 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
878 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
881 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
884 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
885 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
886 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
887 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
888 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
890 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
891 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
894 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
895 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
899 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
900 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
901 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
902 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
903 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
904 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
905 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
907 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
908 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
913 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
914 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
916 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
917 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
919 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
920 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
921 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
922 /* Should never happen */
925 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
926 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
927 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
930 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
931 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
932 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
933 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
934 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
936 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
937 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
940 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
941 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
944 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
945 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
946 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
947 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
950 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
951 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
952 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
953 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
959 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
963 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
964 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
965 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
966 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
969 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
970 if (i == sent_sigslen
971 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
972 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
973 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
976 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
978 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
981 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
982 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
983 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
985 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
989 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
991 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
996 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
997 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
998 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1001 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1003 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1004 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1005 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1006 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1007 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1009 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
1010 /* Disable TLS 1.0 ciphers if using SSL v3 */
1011 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1012 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl |= SSL_TLSV1;
1013 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1014 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1015 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1016 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1017 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1018 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1020 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1021 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1022 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1023 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1024 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1029 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1031 if (c->algorithm_ssl & s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl
1032 || c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1033 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1035 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1038 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1040 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1042 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1045 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1046 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1049 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1050 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1051 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1052 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1054 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1056 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1057 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1059 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1060 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1062 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1063 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1064 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1065 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1076 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1078 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1079 if (s->renegotiate) {
1082 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1083 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1087 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1090 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1093 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1100 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1101 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1104 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1105 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1106 unsigned long size_str;
1110 * check for enough space.
1111 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1112 * 2 for servernamelist length
1113 * 1 for the hostname type
1114 * 2 for hostname length
1118 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1120 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1123 /* extension type and length */
1124 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1125 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1127 /* length of servername list */
1128 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1130 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1131 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1133 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1136 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1137 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1138 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1139 * Client Hello message */
1141 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1142 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1143 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1148 * check for enough space.
1149 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1150 * 1 for the srp user identity
1151 * + srp user identity length
1153 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1156 /* fill in the extension */
1157 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1158 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1159 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1160 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1165 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1168 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1171 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1172 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1174 unsigned char *etmp;
1176 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1178 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1180 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1182 if (num_formats > 255) {
1183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1187 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1188 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1189 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1190 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1191 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1195 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1197 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1198 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1201 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1203 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1205 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1210 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1212 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1213 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1214 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1215 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1216 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1220 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1222 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1223 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1224 ret += curves_list_len;
1226 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1228 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1230 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1231 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1232 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1233 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1234 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1235 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1236 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
1238 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1239 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1240 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1243 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1244 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1247 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1250 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1252 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1255 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1261 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1263 const unsigned char *salg;
1264 unsigned char *etmp;
1265 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1266 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1268 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1270 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1272 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1273 /* Fill in lengths */
1274 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1279 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1281 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1285 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1286 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1287 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1293 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1294 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1300 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1302 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1303 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1305 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1306 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1308 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1309 /* save position of id len */
1310 unsigned char *q = ret;
1311 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1312 /* skip over id len */
1314 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1320 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1322 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1323 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1324 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1325 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1327 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1331 * 1: peer may send requests
1332 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1334 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1335 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1337 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1341 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1342 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1344 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1345 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1347 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1349 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1354 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1355 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1357 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1358 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1359 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1360 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1361 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1363 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1364 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1367 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1368 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1373 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1376 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1379 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1386 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1387 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1388 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1390 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1391 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1394 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1398 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1399 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1400 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1403 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1404 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1406 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1407 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1413 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1415 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1422 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1425 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1429 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1430 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1433 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1434 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1435 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1436 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1438 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1439 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1440 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1441 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1442 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1447 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1449 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1452 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1457 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1460 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1463 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1471 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1472 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1475 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1476 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1477 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1480 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1483 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1485 const unsigned char *plist;
1488 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1492 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1494 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1496 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1498 if (plistlen > 255) {
1499 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1503 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1504 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1505 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1506 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1511 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1514 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1516 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1517 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1519 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1523 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1524 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1526 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1531 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1534 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1535 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1539 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1542 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1545 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1553 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1554 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1555 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1556 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1557 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1558 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1559 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1560 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1561 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1562 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1564 if (limit - ret < 36)
1566 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1571 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1572 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1573 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1575 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1579 * 1: peer may send requests
1580 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1582 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1583 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1585 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1590 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1591 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1592 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1593 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1594 const unsigned char *npa;
1595 unsigned int npalen;
1598 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1600 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1601 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1602 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1604 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1606 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1608 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1612 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1614 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1615 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1617 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1618 * for other cases too.
1620 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1621 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1622 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1623 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1624 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1626 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1631 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1632 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1636 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1637 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1638 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1640 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1642 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1646 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1652 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1655 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1660 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1661 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1662 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1663 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1666 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1668 unsigned int data_len;
1669 unsigned int proto_len;
1670 const unsigned char *selected;
1671 const unsigned char *data;
1672 unsigned char selected_len;
1675 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1679 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1680 * length-prefixed strings.
1682 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &data_len)
1683 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != data_len
1684 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, data_len))
1688 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &proto_len)
1690 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, proto_len))
1692 } while (PACKET_remaining(pkt));
1694 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1695 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1696 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1697 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1698 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1699 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1700 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1703 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1704 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1709 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1713 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1715 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1716 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1717 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1722 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1723 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1724 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1725 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1727 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1729 unsigned int type, size;
1730 const unsigned char *eblock1, *eblock2;
1733 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1734 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1735 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1736 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1737 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1738 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1739 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1741 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1742 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1743 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1744 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1747 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1748 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1749 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1750 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1751 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1752 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1753 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1754 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1755 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1756 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1761 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1762 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1763 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &size)
1764 || !PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, size))
1767 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1770 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1771 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1772 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1774 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len1)
1775 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock2, len2)
1776 || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
1778 if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1780 if (memcmp(eblock2, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1783 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1785 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len)
1786 || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
1788 if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1792 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1794 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1796 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1801 const unsigned char *data;
1802 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1804 s->servername_done = 0;
1805 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1806 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1807 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1810 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1811 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1812 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1813 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1814 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1818 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1819 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1820 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1822 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1823 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1824 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1825 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1826 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1830 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1831 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1834 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1836 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1839 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len))
1842 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len)
1845 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
1848 if (!PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, size))
1851 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1852 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1854 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, size))
1857 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1858 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
1860 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1861 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1864 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1866 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1867 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1868 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1869 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1870 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1871 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1872 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1873 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1874 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1875 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1876 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1877 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1878 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1879 * the value of the Host: field.
1880 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1881 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1882 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1884 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1888 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1889 const unsigned char *sdata;
1890 unsigned int servname_type;
1894 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
1895 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
1898 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) > 3) {
1899 if (!PACKET_get_1(&ssubpkt, &servname_type)
1900 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &len)
1901 || PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < len)
1904 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1905 switch (servname_type) {
1906 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1908 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1911 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1912 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1915 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
1916 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
1917 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1920 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ssubpkt,
1921 (unsigned char *)s->session
1924 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1927 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
1928 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1929 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1930 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1931 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1934 s->servername_done = 1;
1937 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &sdata, len)) {
1938 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1941 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1942 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1943 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
1944 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1953 /* We shouldn't have any bytes left */
1954 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) != 0)
1958 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1959 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
1960 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &len)
1961 || s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1964 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
1966 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt, (unsigned char *)s->srp_ctx.login,
1969 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
1971 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len
1972 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt))
1977 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1978 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
1979 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
1981 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
1982 || ecpointformatlist_length == 0)
1986 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1987 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1988 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1989 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
1990 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
1991 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1994 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
1995 ecpointformatlist_length;
1996 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
1997 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
1998 ecpointformatlist_length))
2000 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2003 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2004 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2005 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2008 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2009 unsigned int ellipticcurvelist_length;
2011 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1 */
2012 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &ellipticcurvelist_length)
2013 || ellipticcurvelist_length == 0
2014 || (ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) != 0)
2018 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2021 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2022 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2023 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2024 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2027 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2028 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2029 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
2030 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
2031 ellipticcurvelist_length))
2033 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
2036 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2037 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2041 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2042 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2043 if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, size)
2044 || (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2045 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2046 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))) {
2047 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2050 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2053 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs
2054 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2057 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
2058 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt) != 0
2059 || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2062 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2065 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt,
2066 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type))
2069 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2070 const unsigned char *sdata;
2072 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2073 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2074 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
2077 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt)) {
2079 unsigned int idsize;
2081 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < 4
2082 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &idsize)
2083 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &data, idsize)) {
2088 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2091 if (data != sdata) {
2092 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2095 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2096 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2097 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2098 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2099 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2102 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2103 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2104 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2109 /* Read in request_extensions */
2110 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2111 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
2112 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2117 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2118 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2119 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2120 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2121 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata))
2126 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2129 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2132 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2133 unsigned int hbtype;
2135 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &hbtype)
2136 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2137 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2141 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2142 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2144 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2145 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2146 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2149 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2154 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2155 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2156 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2157 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2159 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2162 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2163 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2164 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2165 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2166 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2167 * anything like that, but this might change).
2169 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2170 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2171 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2172 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2173 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2175 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2179 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2180 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2181 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &subpkt, al) != 0)
2183 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2184 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2185 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2189 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2191 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2192 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2193 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
2197 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2198 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2199 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2202 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2203 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2207 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2208 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2209 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2210 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2211 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2214 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2219 /* Spurious data on the end */
2220 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0)
2225 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2227 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2228 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2229 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2231 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2237 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2241 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2244 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2245 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2246 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2250 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2257 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2259 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2260 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2261 * fill the length of the block.
2263 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2267 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2268 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &len)
2269 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, len))
2277 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2279 unsigned int length, type, size;
2280 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2281 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2283 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2284 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2286 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2288 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2289 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2290 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2291 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2292 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2295 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2296 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2299 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2301 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2304 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2305 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2309 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2310 const unsigned char *data;
2313 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2314 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2317 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2318 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2320 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2321 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2323 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2324 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2325 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2326 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2327 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2330 tlsext_servername = 1;
2332 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2333 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2334 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2335 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2336 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2337 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2341 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2342 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2343 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2344 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2345 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2348 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2349 ecpointformatlist_length;
2350 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2351 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2352 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2353 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2359 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2361 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2362 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2363 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2364 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2366 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2369 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2370 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2373 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2375 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2377 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2380 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2381 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2384 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2385 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2387 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2388 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2389 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2390 unsigned char *selected;
2391 unsigned char selected_len;
2392 /* We must have requested it. */
2393 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2394 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2397 /* The data must be valid */
2398 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2399 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2403 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2405 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2406 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2407 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2410 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2411 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2412 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2415 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2416 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2417 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2421 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2423 /* We must have requested it. */
2424 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2425 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2429 * The extension data consists of:
2430 * uint16 list_length
2431 * uint8 proto_length;
2432 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2434 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2435 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len
2436 || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2437 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2438 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2441 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2442 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2443 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2444 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2447 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2448 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2451 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2453 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2454 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2455 unsigned int hbtype;
2456 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2457 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2461 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2462 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2464 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2465 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2466 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2469 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2474 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2475 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2476 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2480 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2481 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2482 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2483 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2484 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2485 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2488 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2489 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2491 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2494 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2495 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2497 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2501 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2502 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2506 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2507 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2508 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2509 s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2510 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2511 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2515 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2524 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2525 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2526 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2527 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2528 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2529 * initial connect only.
2531 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2532 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2533 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2535 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2541 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2544 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2545 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2546 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2547 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2555 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2561 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2566 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2568 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2569 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2571 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2573 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2574 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2577 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2578 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2582 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2584 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2585 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2586 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2587 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2589 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2591 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2594 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2595 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2598 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2599 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2602 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2603 s->servername_done = 0;
2608 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2609 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2611 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2612 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2613 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2615 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2616 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2617 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2619 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2620 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2622 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2623 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2625 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2626 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2627 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2628 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2632 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2636 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2637 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2638 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2639 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2640 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2641 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2642 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2643 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2646 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2647 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2648 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2649 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2650 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2653 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2654 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2655 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2656 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2657 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2661 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2665 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2669 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2671 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2672 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2675 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2676 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2677 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2678 * influence which certificate is sent
2680 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2682 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2683 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2684 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2685 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2686 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2690 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2691 * et al can pick it up.
2693 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2694 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2696 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2697 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2698 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2700 /* status request response should be sent */
2701 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2702 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2703 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2705 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2707 /* something bad happened */
2708 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2709 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2710 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2714 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2718 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2719 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2722 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2723 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2731 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2733 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2734 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2736 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2738 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2739 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2740 * must contain uncompressed.
2742 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2743 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2744 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2745 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2746 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2747 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2748 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2749 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2751 unsigned char *list;
2752 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2753 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2754 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2755 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2756 found_uncompressed = 1;
2760 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2762 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2766 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2767 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2769 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2771 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2772 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2773 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2774 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2776 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2778 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2781 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2782 * that we don't receive a status message
2784 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2785 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2786 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2789 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2790 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2793 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2794 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2797 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2798 s->servername_done = 0;
2804 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2807 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2809 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2810 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2814 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2815 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2822 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2823 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2824 * need to be handled at the same time.
2826 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2829 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2830 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2831 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2832 * point to the resulting session.
2834 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2835 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2836 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2839 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2840 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2841 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2842 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2843 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2844 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2845 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2848 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2849 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2850 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2851 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2852 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2853 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2855 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2858 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2859 const PACKET *session_id,
2863 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2866 int have_ticket = 0;
2867 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2870 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2871 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2874 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2877 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2880 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2884 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2885 unsigned int type, size;
2887 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2888 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2889 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2893 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
2897 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
2899 const unsigned char *etick;
2901 /* Duplicate extension */
2902 if (have_ticket != 0) {
2910 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2913 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2917 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2919 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2920 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2921 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2922 * calculate the master secret later.
2927 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
2928 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2932 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
2933 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
2935 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2936 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2939 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2942 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2943 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2946 default: /* fatal error */
2952 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
2953 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2954 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
2960 if (have_ticket == 0)
2967 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2969 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2970 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
2971 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2972 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2973 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2974 * point to the resulting session.
2977 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
2978 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2979 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2980 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2981 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2983 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
2984 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
2985 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
2988 unsigned char *sdec;
2989 const unsigned char *p;
2990 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
2991 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2992 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2993 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
2994 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2995 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
2998 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2999 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3002 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3007 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3008 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3009 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3020 /* Check key name matches */
3021 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) {
3025 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3026 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3027 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3028 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3034 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3037 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3042 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3043 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3044 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3047 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3048 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3049 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3052 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3053 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3054 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3055 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3056 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3058 || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3059 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3062 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3063 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3068 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3072 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3076 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3077 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3078 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3082 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3083 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3092 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3096 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3097 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3101 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3108 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3109 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3110 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3111 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3112 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3113 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3114 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3115 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3116 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3117 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3120 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3121 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3122 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3123 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3124 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3125 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3126 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3129 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3132 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3133 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3139 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3142 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3143 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3144 return table[i].nid;
3149 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3155 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3158 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3161 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3162 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3166 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3168 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3175 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3178 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3179 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3180 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3181 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3182 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3183 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3184 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3185 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3186 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3187 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3190 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3196 for (i=0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++)
3198 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3199 return tls12_md_info + i;
3205 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3207 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3208 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3210 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3213 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3216 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3220 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3221 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3224 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3225 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3227 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3228 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3229 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3231 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3232 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3233 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3235 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3236 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3238 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3239 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3245 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3246 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3247 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3249 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3250 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3252 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3253 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3255 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3257 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3258 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3260 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3262 if (psignhash_nid) {
3263 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3264 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid,
3266 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3270 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3271 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3273 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3274 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3275 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3277 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3278 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3280 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3281 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3285 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3286 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3290 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3292 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3293 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3294 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3296 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3297 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3298 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3300 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3301 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3302 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3303 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3304 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3305 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3309 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3310 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3311 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3315 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3316 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3317 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3324 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3326 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3328 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3331 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3332 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3334 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3336 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3337 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3338 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3339 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3342 return tmpout - out;
3345 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3346 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3347 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3348 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3350 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3351 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3352 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3353 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3354 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3356 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3357 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3360 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3361 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3362 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3364 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3374 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3375 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3377 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3378 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3380 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3382 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3384 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3385 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3386 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3387 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3388 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3389 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3390 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3391 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3392 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3393 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3395 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3396 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3399 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3400 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3404 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3405 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3407 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3409 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3412 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3416 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3417 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3421 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3423 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3426 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3427 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3429 /* Should never happen */
3433 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3434 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3435 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3437 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3438 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3442 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3447 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3448 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3450 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3451 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3454 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3455 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3457 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3458 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3460 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3462 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3464 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3466 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3467 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3469 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3470 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3471 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3472 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3478 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3479 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3480 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3481 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3482 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3484 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3485 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3486 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3487 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3493 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3494 * the certificate for signing.
3496 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3498 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3499 * supported it stays as NULL.
3501 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3502 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3503 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3505 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3506 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3507 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3508 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3511 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3512 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3513 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3515 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3516 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3517 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3518 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3519 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3520 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3521 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3527 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3528 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3529 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3531 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3536 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3543 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3545 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3548 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3549 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3550 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3552 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3553 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3557 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3559 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3561 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3563 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3565 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3566 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3569 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3573 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3576 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3578 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3579 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3580 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3581 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3582 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3583 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3585 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3586 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3587 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3591 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3593 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3596 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3599 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3601 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3603 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3605 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3613 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3614 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3616 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3619 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3620 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3623 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3624 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3629 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3630 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3632 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3636 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3640 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3643 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3646 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3651 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3652 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3654 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3655 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3656 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3658 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3665 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3666 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3667 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3669 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3670 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3671 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3677 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3681 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3685 if (default_nid == -1)
3687 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3689 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3690 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3691 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)