2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 # include <openssl/dh.h>
120 # include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
195 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
196 * http, the cache would over fill
198 return (60 * 60 * 2);
205 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
209 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
212 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
213 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
217 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
220 s->version = s->method->version;
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
226 int nid; /* Curve NID */
227 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
228 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
231 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
232 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
234 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
235 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
236 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
237 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
238 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
239 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
240 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
241 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
242 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
243 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
244 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
245 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
246 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
247 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
248 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
249 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
250 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
251 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
252 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
253 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
254 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
255 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
256 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
257 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
258 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
259 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
260 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
261 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
265 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
266 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
267 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
268 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
271 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
272 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
273 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
274 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
275 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
276 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
277 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
278 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
279 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
280 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
281 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
282 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
283 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
284 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
285 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
286 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
287 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
288 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
289 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
290 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
291 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
292 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
293 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
294 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
295 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
296 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
297 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
298 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
299 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
302 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
303 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
304 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
307 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
309 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
310 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
311 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
313 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
316 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
318 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
320 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
322 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
324 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
326 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
328 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
330 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
332 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
334 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
336 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
338 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
340 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
342 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
344 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
346 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
348 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
350 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
352 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
354 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
356 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
358 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
360 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
362 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
364 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
366 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
368 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
370 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
372 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
374 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
382 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
384 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
385 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
386 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
387 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
388 * lists in the first place.
389 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
390 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
391 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
393 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
394 const unsigned char **pcurves,
397 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
399 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
400 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
402 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
403 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
404 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
405 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
406 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
409 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
410 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
414 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
415 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
419 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
420 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
423 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
424 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
428 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
429 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
430 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
434 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
439 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
440 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
442 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
445 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
446 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
448 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
449 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
450 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
453 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
456 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
457 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
459 const unsigned char *curves;
460 size_t num_curves, i;
461 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
462 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
464 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
466 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
469 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
470 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
472 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
473 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
475 } else /* Should never happen */
478 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
480 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
481 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
482 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
488 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
489 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
490 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
491 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
493 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
495 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
496 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
498 /* Can't do anything on client side */
502 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
504 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
505 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
507 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
508 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
509 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
510 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
511 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
512 /* Should never happen */
515 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
519 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
520 * but s->options is a long...
522 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
523 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
525 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
526 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
527 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
528 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
530 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
532 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
533 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
534 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
535 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
536 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
539 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
540 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
548 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
552 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
553 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
555 unsigned char *clist, *p;
558 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
561 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
562 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
565 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
566 unsigned long idmask;
568 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
570 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
579 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
583 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
587 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
590 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
592 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
598 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
600 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
602 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
604 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
605 if (nid == NID_undef)
606 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
607 if (nid == NID_undef)
608 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
609 if (nid == NID_undef)
611 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
612 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
614 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
618 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
619 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
624 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
628 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
631 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
632 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
637 const EC_METHOD *meth;
640 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
641 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
644 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
647 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
651 /* Determine curve ID */
652 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
653 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
654 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
657 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
666 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
668 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
670 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
672 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
674 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
679 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
680 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
681 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
683 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
684 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
687 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
688 * supported (see RFC4492).
690 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
691 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
692 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
693 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
694 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
697 if (i == num_formats)
702 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
703 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
704 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
706 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
708 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
709 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
710 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
711 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
712 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
716 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
717 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
722 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
729 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
733 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
735 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
736 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
737 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
739 *pformats = ecformats_default;
740 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
742 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
744 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
749 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
750 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
752 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
754 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
757 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
760 /* If not EC nothing to do */
761 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
765 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
770 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
773 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
777 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
778 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
780 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
786 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
787 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
788 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
789 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
790 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
792 return 0; /* Should never happen */
793 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
794 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
796 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
798 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
799 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
800 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
802 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
808 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
809 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
810 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
812 unsigned char curve_id[2];
813 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
814 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
815 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
816 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
820 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
823 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
824 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
825 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
826 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
827 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
828 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
832 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
833 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
835 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
836 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
838 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
840 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
843 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
845 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
851 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
852 /* Need a shared curve */
853 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
859 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
864 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
866 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
870 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
873 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
877 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
882 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
884 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
887 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
888 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
891 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
892 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
894 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
897 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
898 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
900 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
903 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
904 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
906 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
909 # define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
910 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
911 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
912 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
914 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
915 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
916 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
917 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
918 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
919 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
922 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
923 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
924 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
925 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
928 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
931 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
934 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
935 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
936 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
937 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
938 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
940 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
941 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
944 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
945 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
949 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
950 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
951 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
952 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
953 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
954 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
955 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
957 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
958 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
963 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
964 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
966 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
967 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
969 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
970 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
971 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
972 /* Should never happen */
975 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
976 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
977 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
980 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
981 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
982 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
983 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
984 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
986 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
987 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
990 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
991 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
994 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
995 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
996 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
997 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1000 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
1001 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1003 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1009 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1013 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1014 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1015 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1016 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1019 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1020 if (i == sent_sigslen
1021 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1022 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1023 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1026 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1028 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1031 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1032 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1033 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1035 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1039 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1041 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1042 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1047 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1048 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1049 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1052 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1057 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1058 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1059 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1062 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1064 * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
1067 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1068 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1069 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1070 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1071 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1072 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1073 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1074 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx)) {
1075 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1076 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1079 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1080 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1081 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1082 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1083 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1085 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1086 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1087 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1088 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1089 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1095 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1098 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k
1099 || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1101 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1104 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1106 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1108 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1111 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1112 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1115 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1116 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1117 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1118 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1120 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1122 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1123 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1125 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1126 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1128 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1129 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1130 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
1131 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1142 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1144 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1145 if (s->renegotiate) {
1148 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1149 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1153 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1156 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1159 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1166 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1167 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1170 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1171 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1172 unsigned long size_str;
1176 * check for enough space.
1177 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1178 * 2 for servernamelist length
1179 * 1 for the hostname type
1180 * 2 for hostname length
1184 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1186 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1189 /* extension type and length */
1190 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1191 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1193 /* length of servername list */
1194 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1196 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1197 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1199 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1202 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1203 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1204 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1205 * Client Hello message */
1207 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1208 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1214 * check for enough space.
1215 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1216 * 1 for the srp user identity
1217 * + srp user identity length
1219 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1222 /* fill in the extension */
1223 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1224 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1225 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1226 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1231 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1234 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1237 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1238 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1240 unsigned char *etmp;
1242 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1244 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1246 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1248 if (num_formats > 255) {
1249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1253 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1254 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1255 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1256 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1257 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1261 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1263 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1264 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1267 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1269 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1271 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1276 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1278 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1279 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1280 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1281 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1282 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1286 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1288 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1289 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1290 ret += curves_list_len;
1292 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1294 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1296 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1297 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1298 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1299 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1300 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1301 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1302 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1304 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1305 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1306 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1309 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1310 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1313 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1316 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1318 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1321 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1327 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1329 const unsigned char *salg;
1330 unsigned char *etmp;
1331 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1332 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1334 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1336 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1338 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1339 /* Fill in lengths */
1340 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1345 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1347 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1351 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1352 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1353 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1359 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1360 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1366 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1368 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1369 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1371 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1372 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1374 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1375 /* save position of id len */
1376 unsigned char *q = ret;
1377 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1378 /* skip over id len */
1380 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1386 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1388 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1389 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1390 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1392 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1396 * 1: peer may send requests
1397 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1399 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1400 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1402 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1405 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1406 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1408 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1409 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1411 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1413 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1418 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1419 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1421 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1422 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1423 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1424 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1425 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1427 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1428 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1431 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1432 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1437 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1440 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1443 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1444 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1450 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1451 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1452 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1454 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1455 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1458 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1462 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1463 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1464 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1467 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1468 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1470 * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1471 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c
1474 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1476 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1477 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1483 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1485 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1492 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1495 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1499 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1500 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1503 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1504 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1505 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1506 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1508 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1509 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1510 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1511 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1512 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1513 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1518 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1520 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1523 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1528 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1531 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1534 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1542 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1543 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1546 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1547 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1548 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1551 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1554 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1556 const unsigned char *plist;
1559 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1563 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1565 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1567 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1569 if (plistlen > 255) {
1570 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1574 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1575 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1576 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1577 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1582 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1585 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1587 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1588 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1590 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1594 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1595 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1597 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1601 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1602 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1605 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1606 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1610 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1613 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1616 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1617 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1624 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1625 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1626 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1627 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1628 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1629 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1630 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1631 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1632 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1633 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1635 if (limit - ret < 36)
1637 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1641 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1642 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1643 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1644 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1646 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1650 * 1: peer may send requests
1651 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1653 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1654 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1656 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1661 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1662 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1663 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1664 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1665 const unsigned char *npa;
1666 unsigned int npalen;
1669 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1671 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1672 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1673 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1675 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1677 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1679 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1683 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1685 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1686 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1688 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1689 * for other cases too.
1691 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1692 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
1693 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1695 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1700 if (!s->hit && s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
1701 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1705 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1706 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1707 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1709 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1711 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1715 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1721 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1724 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1729 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1730 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1731 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1732 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1735 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1736 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1740 const unsigned char *selected;
1741 unsigned char selected_len;
1744 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1751 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1752 * length-prefixed strings.
1754 i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]);
1763 for (i = 0; i < data_len;) {
1764 proto_len = data[i];
1770 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1776 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1777 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1778 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1779 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1780 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1781 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1782 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1785 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1786 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1791 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1795 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1797 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1798 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1799 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1804 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1805 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1806 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1807 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1809 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1810 const unsigned char *d, int n)
1812 unsigned short type, size;
1813 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1814 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1815 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1816 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1817 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1818 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1819 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1821 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1822 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1823 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1824 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1827 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1828 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1829 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1830 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1831 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1832 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1833 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1834 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1835 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1836 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1839 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1843 if (data > (d + n - 4))
1848 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1851 if (data + size > d + n)
1855 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1856 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1857 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1859 if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n)
1861 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1863 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1866 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1868 if (data + len != d + n)
1870 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1874 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1876 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1878 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
1879 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1881 unsigned short type;
1882 unsigned short size;
1884 unsigned char *data = *p;
1885 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1887 s->servername_done = 0;
1888 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1889 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1890 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1893 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1894 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1895 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1896 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1897 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1900 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1901 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1902 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1903 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1905 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1906 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1907 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1908 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1909 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1912 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1913 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1914 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1917 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1919 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1923 if (data > (d + n - len))
1926 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
1930 if (data + size > (d + n))
1932 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1933 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1934 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1935 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1937 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1938 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1941 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1943 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1944 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1945 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1946 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1947 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1948 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1949 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1950 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1951 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1952 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1953 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1954 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1955 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1956 * the value of the Host: field.
1957 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1958 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1959 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1961 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1965 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1966 unsigned char *sdata;
1971 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1977 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1983 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1988 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1991 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1992 switch (servname_type) {
1993 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1995 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
1996 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1999 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2000 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2003 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2004 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
2005 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2008 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2009 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
2010 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2011 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2012 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2013 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2016 s->servername_done = 1;
2019 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2020 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2021 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2022 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2033 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2038 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2039 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2040 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) {
2041 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2044 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
2045 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2048 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2050 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2051 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2053 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) {
2054 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2060 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2061 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2062 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2063 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2065 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2066 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) {
2067 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2071 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2072 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2073 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2074 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2075 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2076 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2079 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2080 ecpointformatlist_length;
2081 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2082 ecpointformatlist_length);
2084 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2085 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2086 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2087 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2089 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2090 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2091 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2092 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) {
2093 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2097 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
2098 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2101 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2102 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2103 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2104 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2107 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2108 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2109 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
2110 ellipticcurvelist_length);
2113 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2114 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2115 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2116 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2117 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2119 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2122 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2124 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2) {
2125 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2130 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) {
2131 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2134 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2135 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2138 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2141 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2145 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2147 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2148 const unsigned char *sdata;
2150 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2154 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2161 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2165 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2168 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2173 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2175 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2178 if (data != sdata) {
2179 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2180 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2183 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2184 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2185 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2186 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2187 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2190 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2191 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2192 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2197 /* Read in request_extensions */
2199 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2204 if (dsize != size) {
2205 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2210 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2211 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2212 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2213 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2214 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) {
2215 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2221 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2224 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2226 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2227 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2229 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2230 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2232 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2233 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2234 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2237 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2242 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2243 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2244 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2245 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2247 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2250 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2251 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2252 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2253 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2254 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2255 * anything like that, but this might change).
2257 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2258 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2259 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2260 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2261 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2263 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2267 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2268 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2269 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2271 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2272 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2273 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2277 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2278 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2279 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2280 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2281 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2285 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2286 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2287 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2289 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2291 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2294 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2295 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2296 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2297 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2298 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2301 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2312 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2314 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2315 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2316 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2317 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2318 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2325 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2329 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2330 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2331 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2335 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2342 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2344 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2345 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2346 * fill the length of the block.
2348 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2350 unsigned int off = 0;
2363 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2364 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2366 unsigned short length;
2367 unsigned short type;
2368 unsigned short size;
2369 unsigned char *data = *p;
2370 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2371 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2373 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2374 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2376 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2378 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2379 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2380 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2381 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2382 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2385 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2386 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2389 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
2393 if (data + length != d + n) {
2394 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2398 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
2402 if (data + size > (d + n))
2405 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2406 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2408 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2409 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2411 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2412 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2413 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2414 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2415 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2418 tlsext_servername = 1;
2420 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2421 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2422 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2423 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2425 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2426 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2430 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2431 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2432 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2433 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2434 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2437 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2438 ecpointformatlist_length;
2439 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2440 ecpointformatlist_length);
2443 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2445 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2446 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2447 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2448 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2450 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2453 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2454 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2457 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2459 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2461 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2464 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2465 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2468 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2469 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2471 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2472 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2473 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2474 unsigned char *selected;
2475 unsigned char selected_len;
2477 /* We must have requested it. */
2478 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2479 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2482 /* The data must be valid */
2483 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
2484 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2488 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2490 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2491 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2492 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2495 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2496 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
2497 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2500 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2501 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2502 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2506 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2509 /* We must have requested it. */
2510 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2511 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2515 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2519 * The extension data consists of:
2520 * uint16 list_length
2521 * uint8 proto_length;
2522 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2527 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
2528 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2532 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
2533 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2536 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2537 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2538 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2539 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2542 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2543 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2545 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2546 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2548 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2549 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2551 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2552 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2553 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2556 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2561 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2562 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2563 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2567 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2568 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2569 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2570 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2571 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2572 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2575 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2577 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2580 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2581 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2583 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2589 if (data != d + n) {
2590 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2594 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2595 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2596 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2597 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2598 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2599 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2603 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2614 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2615 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2616 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2617 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2618 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2619 * initial connect only.
2621 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2622 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2623 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2624 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2625 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2632 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2638 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2643 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2645 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2646 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2648 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2650 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2651 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2654 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2655 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2659 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2661 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2662 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2663 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2664 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2666 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2668 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2671 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2672 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2675 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2676 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2679 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2680 s->servername_done = 0;
2686 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2690 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2691 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2692 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2693 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2694 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2695 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2696 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2697 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2700 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2701 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
2702 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2703 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2704 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2707 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2708 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2709 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2710 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2711 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2715 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2718 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2722 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2724 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2728 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2729 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2730 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2731 * influence which certificate is sent
2733 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2735 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2736 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2737 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2738 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2739 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2743 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2744 * et al can pick it up.
2746 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2747 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2749 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2750 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2751 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2753 /* status request response should be sent */
2754 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2755 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2756 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2758 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2760 /* something bad happened */
2761 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2762 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2763 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2767 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2771 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2772 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2775 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2776 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2784 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2786 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2787 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2789 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2791 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2792 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2793 * must contain uncompressed.
2795 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2796 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2797 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2798 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2799 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2800 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2801 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
2802 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2803 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2805 unsigned char *list;
2806 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2807 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2808 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2809 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2810 found_uncompressed = 1;
2814 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2815 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2816 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2820 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2821 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2823 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2825 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2826 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2827 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2828 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2830 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2832 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2835 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
2838 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2839 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2842 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
2845 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2846 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2847 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2848 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2850 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2851 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2854 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2855 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2860 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2861 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2864 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2865 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2868 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2869 s->servername_done = 0;
2875 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2879 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2881 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2882 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2886 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2887 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2894 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2895 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2896 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2898 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2899 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2900 * extension, if any.
2901 * len: the length of the session ID.
2902 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2903 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2904 * point to the resulting session.
2906 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2907 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2908 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2911 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2912 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2913 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2914 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2915 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2916 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2917 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2920 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2921 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2922 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2923 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2924 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2925 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2927 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2928 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2930 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2931 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2935 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2938 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2941 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
2943 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2947 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2948 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2954 /* Skip past cipher list */
2959 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2964 /* Now at start of extensions */
2965 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2968 while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
2969 unsigned short type, size;
2972 if (p + size > limit)
2974 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2978 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2981 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2984 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2986 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2987 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2988 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2989 * calculate the master secret later.
2993 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
2995 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2996 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2998 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3000 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3001 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3003 default: /* fatal error */
3013 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3015 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3016 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3017 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3018 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3019 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3020 * point to the resulting session.
3023 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3024 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3025 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3026 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3028 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3029 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3030 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3033 unsigned char *sdec;
3034 const unsigned char *p;
3035 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3036 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3039 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3040 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3043 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3044 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3045 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3046 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3047 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3048 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3057 /* Check key name matches */
3058 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3060 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3061 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
3062 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3063 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3066 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3069 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3071 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3075 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3076 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3077 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3078 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3079 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3080 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3083 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3084 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3085 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3086 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3087 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3089 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3092 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3093 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3094 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3099 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3102 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3106 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3107 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3108 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3112 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3113 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3122 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3127 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3134 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3135 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3136 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3137 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3138 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3139 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3140 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3143 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3144 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3145 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3146 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3149 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3152 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3153 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3159 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3162 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3163 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3164 return table[i].nid;
3169 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3175 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3176 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3179 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3182 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3183 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3187 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3189 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3190 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3196 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc) (void);
3199 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3200 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3203 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3205 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3206 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3207 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3208 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3209 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3212 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3216 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info) / sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
3218 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3221 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3223 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3224 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3226 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3227 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3229 return inf->mfunc();
3232 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3235 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3236 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3237 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3239 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3240 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3241 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3243 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3244 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3245 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3251 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3252 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3253 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3255 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3256 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3258 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3259 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3260 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3262 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3264 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3265 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3266 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3268 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3270 if (psignhash_nid) {
3271 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3272 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
3274 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3278 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3279 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3281 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3282 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3283 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3285 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3286 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3288 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3289 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3293 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3294 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3298 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3300 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3301 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3302 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3304 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3305 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3306 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3308 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3309 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3310 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3311 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3312 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3313 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3317 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3318 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3319 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3323 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3324 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3325 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3332 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3334 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3336 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3339 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3340 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3342 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3344 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3345 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3346 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3347 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3350 return tmpout - out;
3353 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3354 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3355 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3356 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3358 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3359 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3360 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3361 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3362 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3364 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3365 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3368 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3369 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3370 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3372 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3382 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3383 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3385 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3386 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3388 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3390 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3392 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3393 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3394 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3395 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3396 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3397 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3398 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3399 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3400 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3401 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3403 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3404 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3407 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3408 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3412 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3413 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3415 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3417 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3420 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3424 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3425 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3429 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3431 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3434 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3435 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3437 /* Should never happen */
3441 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3442 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3443 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3445 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3446 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3450 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3456 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3457 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3460 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3461 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3463 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3464 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3466 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3468 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3470 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3472 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3473 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3474 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3475 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3476 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3477 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3478 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3479 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3485 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3486 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3487 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3488 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) {
3489 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3490 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3491 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3492 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3493 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3494 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3495 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3501 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3502 * the certificate for signing.
3504 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3506 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3507 * supported it stays as NULL.
3509 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3510 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3511 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3513 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3514 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) {
3515 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3516 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3519 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3520 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3521 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3527 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3528 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3529 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3531 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3536 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3543 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3545 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3548 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3549 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3550 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3552 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3553 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3557 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3559 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3561 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3563 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3565 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3566 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3569 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3570 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length)
3573 unsigned short hbtype;
3574 unsigned int payload;
3575 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3577 if (s->msg_callback)
3578 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3580 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3582 /* Read type and payload length first */
3583 if (1 + 2 + 16 > length)
3584 return 0; /* silently discard */
3587 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > length)
3588 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3591 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3592 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3596 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3597 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3599 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3600 if (buffer == NULL) {
3601 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3606 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3607 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3609 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3611 /* Random padding */
3612 if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
3613 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3617 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3618 3 + payload + padding);
3620 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3621 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3622 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3623 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3625 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3629 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3633 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3634 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3638 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3640 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3647 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3649 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3651 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3652 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3654 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3655 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3656 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3657 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3661 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3662 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3663 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3667 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3668 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
3669 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3674 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
3675 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3677 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3680 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3681 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3682 * some random stuff.
3683 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3684 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3685 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3686 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3689 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3691 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3696 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3697 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3699 /* Sequence number */
3700 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3701 /* 16 random bytes */
3702 if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) {
3703 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3707 /* Random padding */
3708 if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) {
3709 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3713 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3715 if (s->msg_callback)
3716 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3717 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3718 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3720 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3729 # define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3733 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3736 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3738 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3741 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3744 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3746 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3748 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3750 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3758 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3759 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3760 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3761 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3762 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3763 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3767 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3768 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3769 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3770 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3773 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3774 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3777 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3778 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3783 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3784 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3786 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3790 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3794 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3797 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3800 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3805 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3806 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3808 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3809 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3810 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3811 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3812 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3814 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3821 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3822 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3823 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3825 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3826 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3827 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3833 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3837 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3841 if (default_nid == -1)
3843 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3845 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3846 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3847 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3852 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3853 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3857 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3858 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3859 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3866 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3867 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3868 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3869 * attempting to use them.
3872 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3874 # define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3875 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3876 /* Strict mode flags */
3877 # define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3878 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3879 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3881 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3886 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3887 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3889 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3890 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3892 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3895 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3897 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3899 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3901 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3902 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3905 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3906 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3907 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3908 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
3909 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3910 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
3917 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3920 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3921 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3922 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3924 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3931 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3932 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3933 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3934 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3935 else if (!check_flags)
3940 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3941 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3943 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3945 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3946 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3948 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3951 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3952 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3953 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3954 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3955 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3958 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3959 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3960 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3961 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3965 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3966 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3975 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3976 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3978 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3980 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3981 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3982 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3985 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3992 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3993 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3997 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3998 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3999 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4000 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4002 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4009 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4010 else if (check_flags)
4011 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4013 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4014 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4015 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4016 else if (!check_flags)
4019 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4020 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4021 else if (strict_mode) {
4022 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4023 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4024 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4025 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4027 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4034 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4035 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4039 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4042 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4045 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4050 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4051 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4052 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4053 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4054 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4058 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4062 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4064 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4065 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4067 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4068 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4069 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4073 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4076 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4078 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4080 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4081 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4083 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4084 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4085 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4087 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4088 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4089 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4090 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4091 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4096 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4099 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4101 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4102 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4106 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4107 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4108 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4109 else if (cpk->digest)
4110 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4112 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4115 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4119 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4120 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4122 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4123 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4130 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4131 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4133 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4134 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4135 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4136 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4137 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4138 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4141 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4142 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4144 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4149 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4150 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4152 int dh_secbits = 80;
4153 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4154 return DH_get_1024_160();
4155 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
4156 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4161 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4162 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4165 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4171 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4172 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4173 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4175 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4176 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g) {
4182 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4183 return DH_get_2048_224();
4184 return DH_get_1024_160();
4188 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4191 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4193 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4194 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4198 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4200 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4203 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4205 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4206 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4207 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4208 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4210 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4211 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4214 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4216 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4219 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4222 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4224 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4225 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4227 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4228 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4230 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4231 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4236 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4237 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4238 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4241 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4243 int rv, start_idx, i;
4245 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4250 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4254 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4255 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4256 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);