2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
128 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = {
131 tls1_setup_key_block,
132 tls1_generate_master_secret,
133 tls1_change_cipher_state,
134 tls1_final_finish_mac,
135 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
136 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 tls1_export_keying_material,
143 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
146 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
147 * http, the cache would over fill
149 return (60 * 60 * 2);
156 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
160 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
163 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
164 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
166 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
170 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
173 s->version = s->method->version;
176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
178 static int nid_list[] = {
179 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
180 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
181 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
182 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
183 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
184 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
185 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
186 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
187 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
188 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
189 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
190 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
191 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
192 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
193 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
194 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
195 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
196 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
197 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
198 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
199 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
200 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
201 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
202 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
203 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
206 static int pref_list[] = {
207 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
208 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
209 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
211 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
212 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
213 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
214 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
216 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
217 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
218 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
219 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
221 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
222 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
223 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
224 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
225 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
226 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
228 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
229 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
230 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
231 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
232 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
235 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
236 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
237 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
238 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
239 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
241 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
242 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
243 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
246 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
248 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */
249 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
250 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
252 return nid_list[curve_id - 1];
255 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
257 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */
259 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
261 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
263 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
265 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
267 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
269 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
271 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
273 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
275 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
277 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
279 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
281 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
283 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
285 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
287 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
289 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
291 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
293 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
295 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
297 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
299 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
301 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
303 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
305 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
307 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
313 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
315 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
318 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
319 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
322 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
323 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
325 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
328 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
329 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
331 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
334 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
335 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
338 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
341 # define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
342 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
343 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
344 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
346 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
347 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
348 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
349 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
351 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
352 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
353 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
355 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
356 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
360 int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
362 size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
364 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
368 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
369 unsigned char *limit)
372 unsigned char *orig = buf;
373 unsigned char *ret = buf;
375 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
376 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
382 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
384 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
385 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
386 unsigned long size_str;
390 * check for enough space.
391 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
392 * 2 for servernamelist length
393 * 1 for the hostname type
394 * 2 for hostname length
398 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
400 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
403 /* extension type and length */
404 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
405 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
407 /* length of servername list */
408 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
410 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
411 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
413 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
417 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
418 if (s->renegotiate) {
421 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
422 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
426 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
429 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
432 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
439 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
440 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
441 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
442 * Client Hello message */
444 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
445 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
451 * check for enough space.
452 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
453 * 1 for the srp user identity
454 * + srp user identity length
456 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
459 /* fill in the extension */
460 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
461 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
462 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
463 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
468 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
469 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) {
471 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
475 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
477 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax)
479 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) {
480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
484 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
485 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1, ret);
486 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
487 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
488 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
489 ret += s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
491 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) {
493 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
497 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
499 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax)
501 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532) {
502 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
506 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
507 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
509 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
510 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
511 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
512 ret += s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
514 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
516 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
518 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
519 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
520 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
521 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
522 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
523 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
524 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
526 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
527 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
528 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
531 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
532 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
535 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
538 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
540 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
543 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
549 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
550 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
552 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
553 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
554 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
555 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
556 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
558 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
559 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
560 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
562 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
564 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
567 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
570 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
575 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
576 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
578 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
582 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
583 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
584 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
590 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
591 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
597 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
599 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
600 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
602 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
603 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
605 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
606 /* save position of id len */
607 unsigned char *q = ret;
608 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
609 /* skip over id len */
611 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
617 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
619 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
620 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
621 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
623 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
627 * 1: peer may send requests
628 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
630 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
631 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
633 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
636 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
637 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
639 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
640 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
642 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
644 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
649 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
650 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
653 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
655 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
658 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
661 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
662 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
669 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
670 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
671 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
674 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
675 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
677 * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
678 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c
681 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
683 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
690 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
692 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
697 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
700 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
704 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
705 unsigned char *limit)
708 unsigned char *orig = buf;
709 unsigned char *ret = buf;
710 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
711 int next_proto_neg_seen;
715 * don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation
717 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
722 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
724 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
725 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
726 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
729 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
733 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
736 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
741 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
744 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
747 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
754 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
755 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) {
757 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
761 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
763 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax)
765 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) {
766 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
770 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
771 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1, ret);
772 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
773 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
774 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
775 ret += s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
779 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
782 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
784 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
785 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
787 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
791 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
792 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
794 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
797 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
798 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
799 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
801 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
803 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
806 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
809 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
814 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
815 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
818 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
820 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
823 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
826 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
827 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
834 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
835 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
836 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
837 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
838 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
839 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
840 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
841 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
842 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
843 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
845 if (limit - ret < 36)
847 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
851 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
852 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
853 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
854 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
856 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
860 * 1: peer may send requests
861 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
863 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
864 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
866 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
871 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
872 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
873 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
874 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
875 const unsigned char *npa;
879 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
881 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
882 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
883 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
885 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
887 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
889 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
894 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
897 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
901 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
903 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
904 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
905 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
910 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
911 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
912 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
913 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
915 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
916 const unsigned char *d, int n)
918 unsigned short type, size;
919 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
920 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
921 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
922 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
923 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
924 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
925 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
927 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
928 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
929 0x01, /* 1 point format */
930 0x00, /* uncompressed */
933 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
934 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
935 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
936 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
937 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
938 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
939 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
940 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
941 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
942 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
945 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
949 if (data > (d + n - 4))
954 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
957 if (data + size > d + n)
961 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
962 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
963 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
965 if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n)
967 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
969 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
972 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
974 if (data + len != d + n)
976 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
980 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
982 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
984 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
990 unsigned char *data = *p;
991 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
994 s->servername_done = 0;
995 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
996 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
997 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1000 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1001 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1002 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1005 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1006 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1007 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1008 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1010 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1011 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1012 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1013 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1017 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1019 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1023 if (data > (d + n - len))
1026 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
1030 if (data + size > (d + n))
1033 fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
1035 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1036 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1038 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1040 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1041 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1042 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1043 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1044 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1045 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1046 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1047 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1048 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1049 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1050 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1051 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1052 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1053 * the value of the Host: field.
1054 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1055 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1056 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1058 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1062 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1063 unsigned char *sdata;
1068 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1074 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1080 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1085 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1088 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1089 switch (servname_type) {
1090 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1092 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
1093 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1096 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1097 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1100 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
1101 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
1102 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1105 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1106 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
1107 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1108 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1109 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1110 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1113 s->servername_done = 1;
1116 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1117 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1118 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
1119 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1130 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1135 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1136 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
1137 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) {
1138 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1141 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1142 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1145 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
1147 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1148 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
1150 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) {
1151 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1157 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1158 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
1159 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1160 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1162 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
1163 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1167 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
1168 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1169 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1171 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1172 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
1173 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
1174 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1177 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
1178 ecpointformatlist_length;
1179 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
1180 ecpointformatlist_length);
1184 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ",
1185 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1186 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1187 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1188 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
1189 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
1191 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
1192 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1193 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1194 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1196 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
1197 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
1198 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
1199 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) {
1200 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1204 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
1205 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1208 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1209 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
1210 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
1211 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1214 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
1215 ellipticcurvelist_length;
1216 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
1217 ellipticcurvelist_length);
1221 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ",
1222 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1223 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1224 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1225 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
1226 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
1229 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1230 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1231 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1232 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
1233 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1236 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1239 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1240 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
1241 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1245 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1246 /* shouldn't really happen */
1247 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1250 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1251 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1252 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
1254 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
1255 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1256 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
1257 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1262 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
1263 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1264 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
1265 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1267 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1270 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1271 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1273 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1274 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
1276 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2) {
1277 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1283 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1) {
1284 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1287 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
1288 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1291 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1292 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
1295 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1299 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
1301 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1302 const unsigned char *sdata;
1304 /* Read in responder_id_list */
1308 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1315 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1319 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
1322 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1327 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
1329 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1332 if (data != sdata) {
1333 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1334 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1337 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
1338 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
1339 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
1340 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1341 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1344 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
1345 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1346 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1351 /* Read in request_extensions */
1353 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1358 if (dsize != size) {
1359 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1364 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1365 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
1366 X509_EXTENSION_free);
1369 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
1370 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
1371 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) {
1372 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1378 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
1381 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1383 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1384 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
1386 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
1387 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1389 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
1390 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1391 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1394 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1399 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1400 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1401 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
1403 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
1406 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
1407 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
1408 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
1409 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
1410 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
1411 * anything like that, but this might change).
1413 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
1414 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
1415 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
1416 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1417 * Finished message could have been computed.)
1419 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1423 /* session ticket processed earlier */
1424 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1425 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
1426 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
1427 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
1439 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1441 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
1442 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1443 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1444 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1445 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1452 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1454 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1455 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
1456 * fill the length of the block.
1458 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
1460 unsigned int off = 0;
1473 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
1476 unsigned short length;
1477 unsigned short type;
1478 unsigned short size;
1479 unsigned char *data = *p;
1480 int tlsext_servername = 0;
1481 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1483 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1484 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1486 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1488 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1489 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1490 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1493 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1497 if (data + length != d + n) {
1498 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1502 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
1506 if (data + size > (d + n))
1509 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1510 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1512 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1513 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
1514 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1517 tlsext_servername = 1;
1519 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1520 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
1521 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1522 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1524 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
1525 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) {
1526 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1530 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1531 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
1532 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1533 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
1534 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
1535 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1538 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
1539 ecpointformatlist_length;
1540 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
1541 ecpointformatlist_length);
1545 "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
1546 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1547 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1548 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
1549 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
1552 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1554 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
1555 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1556 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
1557 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1559 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1562 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1564 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1567 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1569 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1570 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1571 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
1572 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1575 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1578 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1579 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) {
1580 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1584 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1585 /* shouldn't really happen */
1586 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1588 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
1589 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1590 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
1592 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
1593 BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1596 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
1597 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1602 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1603 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
1605 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
1608 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
1609 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1612 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1613 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1615 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1616 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1617 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
1618 unsigned char *selected;
1619 unsigned char selected_len;
1621 /* We must have requested it. */
1622 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
1623 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1626 /* The data must be valid */
1627 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
1628 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1632 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
1634 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
1635 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1636 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1639 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1640 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
1641 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1644 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
1645 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
1646 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1649 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1650 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1652 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1654 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1655 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
1657 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
1658 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1660 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
1661 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1662 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1665 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1670 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1671 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
1672 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
1680 if (data != d + n) {
1681 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1685 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
1686 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
1687 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
1688 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
1689 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
1690 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1694 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1705 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
1706 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
1707 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
1708 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
1709 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
1710 * initial connect only.
1712 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
1713 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1714 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1716 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1723 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1725 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1727 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
1728 * suite, send the point formats and elliptic curves we support.
1733 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1734 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1736 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1737 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1739 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1740 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1741 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
1742 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1747 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
1749 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
1750 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1751 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) {
1752 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1753 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1756 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1757 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1758 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] =
1759 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1760 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] =
1761 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1763 /* we support all named elliptic curves in RFC 4492 */
1764 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL)
1765 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
1766 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
1767 sizeof(pref_list) / sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2;
1768 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
1769 OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
1770 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1772 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1775 for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <
1776 sizeof(pref_list) / sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++) {
1777 int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]);
1781 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1783 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1787 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
1788 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
1790 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1795 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1796 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1797 /* shouldn't really happen */
1798 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1801 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
1802 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1803 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
1805 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input =
1806 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
1807 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1809 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
1810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1811 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1814 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len =
1815 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1820 * at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate
1821 * server opaque PRF input
1823 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
1824 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1831 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1833 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1835 * If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats
1836 * we support if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note
1837 * that the server is not supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
1840 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1841 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1842 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1843 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1844 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1847 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
1848 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1849 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) {
1850 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1851 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1854 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1855 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1856 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] =
1857 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1858 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] =
1859 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1861 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1866 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
1868 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1869 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1871 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1873 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
1874 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1877 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
1878 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1882 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1884 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
1885 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1886 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
1887 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1889 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
1891 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1893 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1896 * This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), but we
1897 * might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, so this
1898 * has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early().
1903 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) {
1904 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0,
1906 ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1908 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1909 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1914 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1915 /* shouldn't really happen */
1916 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1918 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
1920 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) {
1921 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1922 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len ==
1923 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) {
1925 * can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF
1926 * input of the same length as the client opaque PRF input!
1929 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) {
1930 /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1931 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
1933 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input =
1934 BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input,
1935 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1937 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
1938 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1939 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1942 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len =
1943 s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1947 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
1949 * The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, but we
1950 * can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; abort the
1953 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1954 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1961 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1962 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1965 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1966 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
1969 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1970 s->servername_done = 0;
1976 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
1978 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1982 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
1983 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has
1984 * changed, and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because
1985 * this may influence which certificate is sent
1987 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
1989 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
1990 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
1991 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1992 if (certpkey == NULL) {
1993 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1997 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
1998 * et al can pick it up.
2000 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2001 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2003 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2004 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2005 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2007 /* status request response should be sent */
2008 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2009 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2010 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2012 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2014 /* something bad happened */
2015 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2016 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2017 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2021 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2025 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2026 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2029 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2030 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2038 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2040 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2041 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2043 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2045 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2046 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2047 * must contain uncompressed.
2049 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2050 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2051 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2052 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2053 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2054 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2055 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
2056 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2057 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2059 unsigned char *list;
2060 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2061 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2062 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2063 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2064 found_uncompressed = 1;
2068 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2070 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2074 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2075 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2077 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2079 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2080 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2081 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2082 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2084 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2086 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2088 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2089 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) {
2091 * This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on
2092 * using opaque PRF inputs. So first verify that we really have a
2093 * value from the server too.
2096 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) {
2097 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2098 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2102 * Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to
2103 * check that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size.
2105 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
2106 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len !=
2107 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) {
2108 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2109 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2115 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
2118 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2119 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2122 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
2125 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
2126 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2127 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2129 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2130 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2132 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2133 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2136 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2137 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2142 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2143 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2146 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2147 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2150 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2151 s->servername_done = 0;
2158 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2159 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2160 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2162 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2163 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2164 * extension, if any.
2165 * len: the length of the session ID.
2166 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2167 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2168 * point to the resulting session.
2170 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2171 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2172 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2175 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2176 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2177 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2178 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2179 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2180 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2181 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2184 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2185 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2186 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2187 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2188 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2189 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2191 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2192 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2194 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2195 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2199 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2202 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2205 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2207 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2211 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2212 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2218 /* Skip past cipher list */
2223 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2228 /* Now at start of extensions */
2229 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2232 while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
2233 unsigned short type, size;
2236 if (p + size > limit)
2238 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2242 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2245 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2248 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2250 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2251 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2252 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2253 * calculate the master secret later.
2257 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
2259 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2260 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2262 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2264 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2265 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2267 default: /* fatal error */
2277 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2279 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2280 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
2281 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2282 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2283 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2284 * point to the resulting session.
2287 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2288 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2289 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2290 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2292 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
2293 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
2294 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
2297 unsigned char *sdec;
2298 const unsigned char *p;
2299 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
2300 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2303 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2304 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
2307 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2308 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2309 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2310 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
2311 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2312 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2321 /* Check key name matches */
2322 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
2324 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2325 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2326 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2327 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
2330 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
2333 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
2335 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2339 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
2340 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
2341 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
2342 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2343 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
2344 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2347 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
2348 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2349 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2350 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2351 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
2353 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2356 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
2357 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
2358 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2363 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2366 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
2370 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
2371 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
2372 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
2376 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
2377 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
2386 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
2391 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
2398 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
2399 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2400 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
2402 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2403 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
2405 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2406 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
2407 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
2409 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2410 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
2411 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
2415 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
2416 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2417 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
2419 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2420 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
2422 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2423 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
2427 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2430 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
2431 if (table[i].nid == nid)
2438 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2441 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
2442 if (table[i].id == id)
2443 return table[i].nid;
2449 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
2455 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
2456 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2459 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
2462 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
2463 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
2467 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
2469 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
2470 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2473 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
2476 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2477 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
2480 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2481 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
2482 return EVP_sha224();
2484 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
2485 return EVP_sha256();
2487 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2488 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
2489 return EVP_sha384();
2491 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
2492 return EVP_sha512();
2500 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2502 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
2507 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
2508 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
2510 /* Should never happen */
2514 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2515 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2516 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
2517 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
2519 for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2) {
2520 unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i + 1];
2523 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2524 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
2525 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
2528 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2529 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
2530 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
2533 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2534 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
2542 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) {
2543 md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
2545 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
2546 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
2547 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
2554 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
2555 * supported it stays as NULL.
2557 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2558 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
2559 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2561 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2562 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) {
2563 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2564 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2567 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2568 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
2569 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2576 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2577 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2579 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
2580 unsigned short hbtype;
2581 unsigned int payload;
2582 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2584 if (s->msg_callback)
2585 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2586 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
2587 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2589 /* Read type and payload length first */
2590 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
2591 return 0; /* silently discard */
2594 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
2595 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
2598 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
2599 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
2603 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
2604 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
2606 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2609 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
2610 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
2612 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
2614 /* Random padding */
2615 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
2617 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
2618 3 + payload + padding);
2620 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
2621 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2622 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
2623 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2625 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
2629 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
2633 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
2634 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
2638 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
2640 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
2647 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2649 unsigned char *buf, *p;
2651 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
2652 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2654 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
2655 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
2656 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
2657 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
2661 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
2662 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
2663 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
2667 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
2668 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
2669 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2674 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
2675 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
2677 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
2680 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
2681 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
2682 * some random stuff.
2683 * - Message Type, 1 byte
2684 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
2685 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
2686 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
2689 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2692 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
2693 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
2695 /* Sequence number */
2696 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
2697 /* 16 random bytes */
2698 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
2700 /* Random padding */
2701 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
2703 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
2705 if (s->msg_callback)
2706 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2707 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
2708 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2710 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;