2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 # include <openssl/dh.h>
120 # include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
195 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
196 * http, the cache would over fill
198 return (60 * 60 * 2);
205 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
209 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
212 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
213 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
215 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
219 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
222 s->version = s->method->version;
225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
228 int nid; /* Curve NID */
229 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
230 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
233 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
234 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
236 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
267 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
268 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
269 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
273 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
274 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
275 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
276 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
277 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
278 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
279 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
280 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
281 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
282 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
283 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
284 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
285 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
286 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
287 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
288 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
289 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
290 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
291 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
292 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
293 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
294 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
295 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
296 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
297 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
298 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
299 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
300 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
301 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
304 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
305 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
306 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
309 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
311 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
312 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
313 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
315 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
318 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
320 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
322 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
324 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
326 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
328 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
330 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
332 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
334 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
336 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
338 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
340 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
342 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
344 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
346 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
348 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
350 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
352 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
354 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
356 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
358 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
360 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
362 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
364 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
366 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
368 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
370 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
372 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
374 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
376 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
384 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
386 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
387 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
388 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
389 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
390 * lists in the first place.
391 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
392 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
393 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
395 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
396 const unsigned char **pcurves,
399 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
401 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
402 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
404 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
405 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
406 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
407 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
408 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
411 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
412 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
416 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
417 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
421 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
422 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
425 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
426 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
430 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
431 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
432 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
436 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
441 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
442 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
444 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
447 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
448 sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
450 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
451 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
452 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
455 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
458 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
459 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
461 const unsigned char *curves;
462 size_t num_curves, i;
463 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
464 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
466 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
468 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
471 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
472 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
474 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
475 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
477 } else /* Should never happen */
480 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
482 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
483 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
484 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
490 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
491 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
492 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
493 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
495 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
497 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
498 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
500 /* Can't do anything on client side */
504 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
506 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
507 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
509 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
510 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
511 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
512 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
513 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
514 /* Should never happen */
517 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
521 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
522 * but s->options is a long...
524 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
525 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
527 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
528 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
529 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
530 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
532 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
534 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
535 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
536 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
537 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
538 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
541 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
542 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
550 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
554 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
555 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
557 unsigned char *clist, *p;
560 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
563 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
564 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
567 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
568 unsigned long idmask;
570 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
572 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
582 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
586 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
590 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
593 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
595 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
601 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
603 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
605 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
607 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
608 if (nid == NID_undef)
609 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
610 if (nid == NID_undef)
611 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
612 if (nid == NID_undef)
614 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
615 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
617 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
621 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
622 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
627 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
631 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
634 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
635 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
640 const EC_METHOD *meth;
643 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
644 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
647 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
650 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
654 /* Determine curve ID */
655 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
656 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
657 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
660 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
669 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
671 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
673 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
675 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
677 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
682 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
683 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
684 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
686 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
687 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
690 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
691 * supported (see RFC4492).
693 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
694 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
695 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
696 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
697 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
700 if (i == num_formats)
705 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
706 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
707 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
709 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
710 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
715 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
722 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
726 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
728 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
729 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
730 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
732 *pformats = ecformats_default;
733 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
735 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
737 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
742 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
743 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
745 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
747 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
750 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
753 /* If not EC nothing to do */
754 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
758 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
763 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
766 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
770 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
771 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
773 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
779 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
780 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
781 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
782 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
783 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
785 return 0; /* Should never happen */
786 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
787 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
789 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
791 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
792 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
793 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
795 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
801 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
802 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
803 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
805 unsigned char curve_id[2];
806 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
807 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
808 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
809 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
813 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
816 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
817 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
818 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
819 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
820 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
821 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
825 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
826 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
828 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
829 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
831 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
833 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
836 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
838 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
844 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
845 /* Need a shared curve */
846 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
852 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
857 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
859 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
863 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
866 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
870 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
875 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
877 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
880 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
881 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
884 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
885 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
887 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
890 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
891 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
893 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
896 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
897 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
900 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
903 # define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
904 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
905 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
906 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
908 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
909 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
910 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
911 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
912 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
913 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
916 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
917 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
918 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
919 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
922 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
925 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
928 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
929 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
930 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
931 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
932 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
934 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
935 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
938 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
939 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
943 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
944 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
945 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
946 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
947 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
948 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
949 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
951 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
952 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
957 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
958 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
960 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
961 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
963 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
964 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
965 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
966 /* Should never happen */
969 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
970 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
971 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
974 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
975 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
976 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
977 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
978 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
980 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
984 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
985 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
988 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
989 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
990 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
991 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
994 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
995 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
996 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
997 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1003 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1007 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1008 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1009 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1010 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1013 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1014 if (i == sent_sigslen
1015 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1016 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1017 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1020 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1022 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1025 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1026 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1027 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1029 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1033 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1035 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1036 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1041 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1042 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1043 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1046 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1051 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1052 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1053 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1056 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1058 * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
1061 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1062 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1063 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1064 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1065 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1066 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1067 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1068 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx)) {
1069 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1070 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1073 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1074 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1075 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1076 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1077 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1079 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1080 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1081 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1082 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1083 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1089 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1092 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k
1093 || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1095 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1098 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1100 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1102 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1105 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1106 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1109 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1110 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1111 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1112 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1114 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1116 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1117 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1119 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1120 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1122 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1123 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1124 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)
1125 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1136 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1138 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1139 if (s->renegotiate) {
1142 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1143 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1147 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1150 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1153 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1160 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1161 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1164 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1165 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1166 unsigned long size_str;
1170 * check for enough space.
1171 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1172 * 2 for servernamelist length
1173 * 1 for the hostname type
1174 * 2 for hostname length
1178 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1180 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1183 /* extension type and length */
1184 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1185 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1187 /* length of servername list */
1188 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1190 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1191 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1193 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1196 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1197 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1198 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1199 * Client Hello message */
1201 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1202 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1208 * check for enough space.
1209 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1210 * 1 for the srp user identity
1211 * + srp user identity length
1213 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1216 /* fill in the extension */
1217 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1218 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1219 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1220 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1225 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1228 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1231 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1232 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1234 unsigned char *etmp;
1236 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1238 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1240 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1242 if (num_formats > 255) {
1243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1247 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1248 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1249 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1250 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1251 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1255 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1257 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1258 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1261 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1263 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1265 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1270 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1272 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1273 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1274 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1275 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1276 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1280 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1282 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1283 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1284 ret += curves_list_len;
1286 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1288 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1290 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1291 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1292 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1293 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1294 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1295 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1296 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1298 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1299 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1300 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1303 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1304 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1307 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1310 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1312 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1315 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1321 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1323 const unsigned char *salg;
1324 unsigned char *etmp;
1325 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1326 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1328 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1330 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1332 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1333 /* Fill in lengths */
1334 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1339 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1341 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1345 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1346 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1347 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1353 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1354 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1360 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1362 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1363 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1365 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1366 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1368 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1369 /* save position of id len */
1370 unsigned char *q = ret;
1371 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1372 /* skip over id len */
1374 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1380 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1382 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1383 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1384 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1386 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1390 * 1: peer may send requests
1391 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1393 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1394 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1396 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1399 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1400 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1402 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1403 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1405 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1407 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1412 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1413 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1415 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1416 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1417 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1418 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1419 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1421 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1422 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1425 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1427 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1430 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1433 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1440 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1441 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1442 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1444 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1445 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1448 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1452 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1453 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1454 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1457 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1458 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1460 * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1461 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c
1464 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1466 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1467 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1473 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1475 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1482 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1485 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1489 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1490 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1493 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1494 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1495 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1496 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1498 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1499 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1500 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1501 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1502 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1503 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1508 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1510 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1513 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1518 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1521 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1524 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1525 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1532 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1533 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1536 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1537 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1538 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1541 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1544 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1546 const unsigned char *plist;
1549 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1553 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1555 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1557 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1559 if (plistlen > 255) {
1560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1564 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1565 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1566 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1567 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1572 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1575 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1577 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1578 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1580 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1584 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1585 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1587 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1591 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1592 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1595 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1597 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1600 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1603 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1611 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1612 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1613 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1614 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1615 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1616 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1617 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1618 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1619 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1620 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1622 if (limit - ret < 36)
1624 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1628 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1629 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1630 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1631 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1633 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1637 * 1: peer may send requests
1638 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1640 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1641 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1643 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1648 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1649 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1650 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1651 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1652 const unsigned char *npa;
1653 unsigned int npalen;
1656 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1658 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1659 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1660 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1662 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1664 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1666 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1670 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1672 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1673 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1675 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1676 * for other cases too.
1678 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1679 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
1680 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1682 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1687 if (!s->hit && s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
1688 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1692 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1693 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1694 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1696 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1698 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1702 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1708 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1711 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1716 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1717 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1718 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1719 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1722 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1723 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1727 const unsigned char *selected;
1728 unsigned char selected_len;
1731 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1738 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1739 * length-prefixed strings.
1741 i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]);
1750 for (i = 0; i < data_len;) {
1751 proto_len = data[i];
1757 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1763 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1764 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1765 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1766 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1767 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1768 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1769 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1770 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1773 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1774 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1779 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1783 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1785 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1786 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1787 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1792 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1793 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1794 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1795 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1797 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1798 const unsigned char *d, int n)
1800 unsigned short type, size;
1801 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1802 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1803 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1804 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1805 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1806 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1807 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1809 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1810 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1811 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1812 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1815 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1816 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1817 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1818 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1819 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1820 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1821 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1822 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1823 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1824 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1827 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1831 if (data > (d + n - 4))
1836 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1839 if (data + size > d + n)
1843 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1844 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1845 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1847 if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n)
1849 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1851 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1854 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1856 if (data + len != d + n)
1858 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1862 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1864 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1866 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
1867 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1869 unsigned short type;
1870 unsigned short size;
1872 unsigned char *data = *p;
1873 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1875 s->servername_done = 0;
1876 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1877 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1878 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1881 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1882 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1883 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1885 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1886 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1887 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1890 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1891 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1892 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1893 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1895 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1896 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
1897 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1898 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1900 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1901 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1904 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1905 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1906 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1907 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1911 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1913 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1917 if (data > (d + n - len))
1920 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
1924 if (data + size > (d + n))
1927 fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
1929 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1930 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1931 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1932 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1934 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1935 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1938 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1940 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1941 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1942 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1943 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1944 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1945 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1946 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1947 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1948 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1949 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1950 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1951 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1952 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1953 * the value of the Host: field.
1954 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1955 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1956 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1958 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1962 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1963 unsigned char *sdata;
1968 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1974 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1980 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1985 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1988 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1989 switch (servname_type) {
1990 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1992 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
1993 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1996 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1997 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2000 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2001 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
2002 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2005 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2006 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
2007 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2008 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2009 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2010 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2013 s->servername_done = 1;
2016 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2017 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2018 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2019 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2030 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2035 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2036 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2037 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) {
2038 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2041 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
2042 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2045 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2047 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2048 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2050 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) {
2051 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2057 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2058 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2059 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2060 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2062 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2063 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) {
2064 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2068 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
2069 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2070 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2072 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2073 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2074 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2075 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2078 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2079 ecpointformatlist_length;
2080 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2081 ecpointformatlist_length);
2085 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ",
2086 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2087 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2088 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2089 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2090 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2092 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2093 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2094 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2095 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2097 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2098 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2099 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2100 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) {
2101 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2105 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
2106 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2109 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2110 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2111 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2112 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2115 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2116 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2117 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata,
2118 ellipticcurvelist_length);
2122 "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ",
2123 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2124 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2125 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2126 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2127 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2130 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2131 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2132 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2133 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2134 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2136 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2139 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2141 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2) {
2142 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2147 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) {
2148 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2151 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2152 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2155 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2158 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2162 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2164 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2165 const unsigned char *sdata;
2167 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2171 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2178 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2182 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2185 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2190 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2192 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2195 if (data != sdata) {
2196 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2197 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2200 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2201 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2202 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2203 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2204 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2207 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2208 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2209 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2214 /* Read in request_extensions */
2216 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2221 if (dsize != size) {
2222 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2227 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
2228 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2229 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2232 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2233 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2234 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) {
2235 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2241 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2244 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2246 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2247 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2249 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2250 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2252 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2253 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2254 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2257 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2262 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2263 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2264 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2265 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2267 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2270 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2271 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2272 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2273 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2274 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2275 * anything like that, but this might change).
2277 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2278 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2279 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2280 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2281 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2283 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2287 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2288 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2289 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2291 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2292 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2293 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2297 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2298 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2299 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2300 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2301 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2305 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2306 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2307 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2309 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2311 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2314 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2315 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2316 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2317 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2318 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2321 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2332 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2334 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2335 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2336 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2338 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2345 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2349 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2350 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2351 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2355 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2362 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2364 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2365 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2366 * fill the length of the block.
2368 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2370 unsigned int off = 0;
2383 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
2384 unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2386 unsigned short length;
2387 unsigned short type;
2388 unsigned short size;
2389 unsigned char *data = *p;
2390 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2391 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2393 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2394 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2396 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2398 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2399 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2400 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2402 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2403 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2404 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2407 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2408 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2411 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
2415 if (data + length != d + n) {
2416 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2420 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
2424 if (data + size > (d + n))
2427 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2428 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2430 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2431 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2433 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2434 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2435 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2436 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2437 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2440 tlsext_servername = 1;
2442 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2443 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2444 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2445 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2447 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2448 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2452 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2453 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2454 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2455 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2456 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2457 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2460 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2461 ecpointformatlist_length;
2462 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata,
2463 ecpointformatlist_length);
2467 "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2468 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2469 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2470 fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++));
2471 fprintf(stderr, "\n");
2474 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2476 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2477 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2478 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2479 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2481 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2484 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2485 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2488 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2490 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2492 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2495 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2496 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2499 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2500 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2502 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2503 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2504 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2505 unsigned char *selected;
2506 unsigned char selected_len;
2508 /* We must have requested it. */
2509 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2510 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2513 /* The data must be valid */
2514 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
2515 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2519 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2521 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2522 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2523 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2526 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2527 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
2528 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2531 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2532 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2533 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2537 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2540 /* We must have requested it. */
2541 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2542 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2546 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2550 * The extension data consists of:
2551 * uint16 list_length
2552 * uint8 proto_length;
2553 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2558 if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) {
2559 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2563 if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) {
2564 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2567 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2568 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2569 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2570 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
2571 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2574 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2575 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2577 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2578 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2580 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2581 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2583 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2584 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2585 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2588 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2593 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2594 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2595 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
2599 # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2600 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2601 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2602 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2603 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2604 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2607 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2609 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2612 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2613 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2615 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2621 if (data != d + n) {
2622 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2626 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2627 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2628 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2629 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2630 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2631 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2635 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2646 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2647 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2648 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2649 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2650 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2651 * initial connect only.
2653 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2654 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2655 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2656 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2657 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2664 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2670 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2675 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2677 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2678 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2680 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2682 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2683 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2686 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2687 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2691 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2693 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2694 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2695 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2696 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2698 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2700 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2703 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2704 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2707 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2708 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2711 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2712 s->servername_done = 0;
2718 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2722 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2723 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2724 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2725 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2727 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2728 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2729 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2730 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2733 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2734 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
2735 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2736 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2737 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2740 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2741 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2742 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2743 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2744 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2748 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2751 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2755 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2757 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2761 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2762 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2763 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2764 * influence which certificate is sent
2766 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2768 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2769 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2770 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2771 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2772 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2776 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2777 * et al can pick it up.
2779 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2780 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2782 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2783 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2784 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2786 /* status request response should be sent */
2787 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2788 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2789 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2791 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2793 /* something bad happened */
2794 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2795 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2796 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2800 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2804 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2805 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2808 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2809 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2817 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2819 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2820 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2822 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2824 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2825 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2826 * must contain uncompressed.
2828 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2829 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2830 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2831 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2832 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2833 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2834 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
2835 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2836 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2838 unsigned char *list;
2839 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2840 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2841 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2842 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2843 found_uncompressed = 1;
2847 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2848 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2849 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2853 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2854 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2856 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2858 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2859 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2860 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2861 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2863 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2865 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2868 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
2871 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2872 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2875 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
2878 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
2879 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2880 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2882 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2883 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2885 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2886 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2889 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2890 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2895 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2896 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2899 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2900 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2903 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2904 s->servername_done = 0;
2910 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
2914 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2916 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) {
2917 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2921 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2922 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2929 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2930 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2931 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2933 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2934 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2935 * extension, if any.
2936 * len: the length of the session ID.
2937 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2938 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2939 * point to the resulting session.
2941 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2942 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2943 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2946 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2947 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2948 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2949 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2950 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2951 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2952 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2955 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2956 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2957 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2958 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2959 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2960 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2962 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2963 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2965 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2966 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2970 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2973 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2976 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
2978 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2982 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2983 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2989 /* Skip past cipher list */
2994 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2999 /* Now at start of extensions */
3000 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3003 while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
3004 unsigned short type, size;
3007 if (p + size > limit)
3009 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
3013 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3016 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3019 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3021 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3022 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3023 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3024 * calculate the master secret later.
3028 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3030 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3031 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3033 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3035 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3036 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3038 default: /* fatal error */
3048 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3050 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3051 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3052 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3053 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3054 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3055 * point to the resulting session.
3058 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3059 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3060 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3061 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3063 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3064 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3065 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3068 unsigned char *sdec;
3069 const unsigned char *p;
3070 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3071 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3074 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3075 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3078 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3079 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3080 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3081 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3082 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3083 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3092 /* Check key name matches */
3093 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3095 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3096 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
3097 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3098 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3101 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3104 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3106 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3110 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3111 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3112 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3113 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3114 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3115 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3118 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3119 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3120 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3121 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3122 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3124 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3127 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3128 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3129 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3134 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3137 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3141 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3142 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3143 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3147 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3148 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3157 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3162 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3169 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3170 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3171 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3172 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3173 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3174 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3175 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3178 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3179 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3180 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3181 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3184 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3187 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3188 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3194 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3197 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3198 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3199 return table[i].nid;
3204 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3210 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3211 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3214 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3217 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3218 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3222 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3224 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3225 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3231 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc) (void);
3234 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3235 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3238 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3240 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3241 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3242 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3243 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3244 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3247 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3251 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info) / sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
3253 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3256 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3258 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3259 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3261 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3262 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3264 return inf->mfunc();
3267 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3270 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3271 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3272 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3274 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3275 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3276 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3278 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3279 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3280 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3286 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3287 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3288 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3290 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3291 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3293 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3294 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3295 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3297 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3299 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3300 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3301 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3303 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3305 if (psignhash_nid) {
3306 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3307 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
3309 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3313 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3314 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3316 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3317 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3318 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3320 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3321 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3323 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3324 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3328 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3329 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3333 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3335 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3336 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3337 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3339 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3340 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3341 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3343 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3344 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3345 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3346 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3347 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3348 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3352 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3353 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3354 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3358 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3359 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3360 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3367 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3369 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3371 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3374 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3375 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3377 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3379 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3380 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3381 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3382 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3385 return tmpout - out;
3388 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3389 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3390 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3391 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3393 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3394 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3395 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3396 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3397 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3399 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3400 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3403 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3404 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3405 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3407 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3417 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3418 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3420 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3421 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3423 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3425 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3426 if (c->shared_sigalgs) {
3427 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3428 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3430 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3431 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3432 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3433 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3434 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3435 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3436 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3438 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3439 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3442 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3443 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3447 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3448 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3450 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3453 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3456 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3457 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3458 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3462 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3464 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3467 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3468 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3470 /* Should never happen */
3474 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3475 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3476 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3477 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3479 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3480 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3484 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3490 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3491 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3494 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3495 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3497 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3498 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3500 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3502 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3504 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3506 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3507 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3508 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3509 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3510 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3511 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3512 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3513 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3519 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3520 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3521 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3522 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) {
3523 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3524 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3525 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3526 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3527 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags =
3528 CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3529 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3535 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3536 * the certificate for signing.
3538 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3540 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3541 * supported it stays as NULL.
3543 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3544 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3545 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3547 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3548 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) {
3549 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3550 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3553 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3554 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3555 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3561 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3562 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3563 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3565 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3570 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3577 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3579 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3582 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3583 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3584 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3586 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3587 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3591 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3593 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3595 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3597 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3599 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3600 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3603 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3604 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3606 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3607 unsigned short hbtype;
3608 unsigned int payload;
3609 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3611 if (s->msg_callback)
3612 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3613 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3614 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3616 /* Read type and payload length first */
3617 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3618 return 0; /* silently discard */
3621 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3622 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3625 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3626 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3630 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3631 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3633 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3634 if (buffer == NULL) {
3635 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3640 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3641 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3643 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3645 /* Random padding */
3646 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3648 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3649 3 + payload + padding);
3651 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3652 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3653 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3654 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3656 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3660 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3664 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3665 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3669 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3671 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3678 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3680 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3682 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3683 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3685 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3686 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3687 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3688 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3692 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3693 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3694 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3698 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3699 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
3700 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3705 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
3706 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3708 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3711 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3712 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3713 * some random stuff.
3714 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3715 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3716 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3717 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3720 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3722 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3727 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3728 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3730 /* Sequence number */
3731 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3732 /* 16 random bytes */
3733 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3735 /* Random padding */
3736 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3738 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3740 if (s->msg_callback)
3741 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3742 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3743 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3745 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3754 # define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3758 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3761 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3763 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3766 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3769 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3771 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3773 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3775 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3783 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3784 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3785 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3786 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3787 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3788 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3792 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3793 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3794 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3795 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3798 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3799 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3802 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3803 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3808 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3809 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3811 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3815 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3819 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3822 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3825 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3830 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3831 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3833 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3834 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3835 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3836 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3837 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3839 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3846 if (c->client_sigalgs)
3847 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3848 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3849 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3851 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3852 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3853 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3854 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3860 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3864 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3868 if (default_nid == -1)
3870 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3872 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3873 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3874 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3879 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3880 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3884 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3885 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3886 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3893 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3894 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3895 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3896 * attempting to use them.
3899 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3901 # define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3902 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3903 /* Strict mode flags */
3904 # define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3905 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3906 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3908 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3913 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3914 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3916 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3917 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3919 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3922 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3924 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3926 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3928 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3929 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3932 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3933 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3934 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3935 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
3936 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3937 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
3944 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3947 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3948 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3949 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3951 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3958 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3959 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3960 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3961 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3962 else if (!check_flags)
3967 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3968 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3970 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3972 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3973 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3975 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3978 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3979 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3980 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3981 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3982 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3985 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3986 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3987 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3988 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3992 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3993 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4002 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4003 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4005 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4007 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4008 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4009 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4012 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4019 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4020 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4024 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4025 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4026 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4027 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4029 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4036 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4037 else if (check_flags)
4038 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4040 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4041 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4042 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4043 else if (!check_flags)
4046 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4047 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4048 else if (strict_mode) {
4049 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4050 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4051 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4052 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4054 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4061 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4062 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4066 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4069 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4072 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4077 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4078 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4079 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4080 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4081 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4085 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4089 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4091 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4092 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4094 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4095 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4096 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4100 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4103 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4105 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4107 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4108 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4110 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4111 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4112 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4114 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4115 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4116 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4117 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4118 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4123 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4126 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4128 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4129 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4133 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4134 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4135 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4136 else if (cpk->digest)
4137 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4139 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4142 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4146 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4147 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4149 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4150 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4157 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4158 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4160 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4161 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4162 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4163 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4164 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4165 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4168 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4169 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4171 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4177 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4179 int dh_secbits = 80;
4180 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4181 return DH_get_1024_160();
4182 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
4183 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4188 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4189 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4192 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4198 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4199 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4200 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4202 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4203 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g) {
4209 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4210 return DH_get_2048_224();
4211 return DH_get_1024_160();
4215 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4218 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4220 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4221 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4225 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4227 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4230 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4232 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4233 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4234 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4235 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4237 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4238 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4241 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4243 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4246 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4249 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4251 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4252 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4254 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4255 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4257 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4258 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4263 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4264 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4265 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4268 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4270 int rv, start_idx, i;
4272 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4277 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4281 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4282 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4283 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);