2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 # include <openssl/dh.h>
120 # include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
125 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
126 SSL_SESSION **psess);
127 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
128 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
139 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
141 tls1_export_keying_material,
143 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
144 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
148 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
151 tls1_setup_key_block,
152 tls1_generate_master_secret,
153 tls1_change_cipher_state,
154 tls1_final_finish_mac,
155 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
156 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
157 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 tls1_export_keying_material,
160 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
161 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
162 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
166 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
169 tls1_setup_key_block,
170 tls1_generate_master_secret,
171 tls1_change_cipher_state,
172 tls1_final_finish_mac,
173 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
174 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
175 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
177 tls1_export_keying_material,
178 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
179 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
180 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
181 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
185 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
188 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
189 * http, the cache would over fill
191 return (60 * 60 * 2);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
204 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
208 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
211 s->version = s->method->version;
214 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
217 int nid; /* Curve NID */
218 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
219 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
222 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
223 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
225 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
226 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
227 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
228 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
229 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
230 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
231 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
232 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
233 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
234 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
235 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
236 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
237 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
238 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
239 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
240 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
241 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
242 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
243 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
244 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
245 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
246 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
247 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
248 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
249 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
250 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
251 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
252 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
253 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
256 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
257 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
258 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
259 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
262 /* The client's default curves / the server's 'auto' curves. */
263 static const unsigned char eccurves_auto[] = {
264 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
265 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
266 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
267 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
268 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
269 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
270 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
271 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
272 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
273 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
274 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
275 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
276 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
277 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
278 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
279 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
282 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
283 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
284 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
285 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
286 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
287 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
288 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
289 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
290 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
291 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
292 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
293 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
294 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
295 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
296 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
297 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
298 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
300 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
301 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
303 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
304 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
305 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
306 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
307 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
308 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
309 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
310 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
311 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
312 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
313 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
314 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
315 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
316 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
317 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
321 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
322 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
323 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
326 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
328 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
329 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
331 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
334 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
336 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
338 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
340 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
342 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
344 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
346 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
348 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
350 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
352 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
354 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
356 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
358 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
360 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
362 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
364 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
366 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
368 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
370 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
372 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
374 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
376 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
378 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
380 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
382 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
384 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
386 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
388 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
390 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
392 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
400 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
402 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
403 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
404 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
405 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
406 * lists in the first place.
407 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
408 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
409 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
411 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
412 const unsigned char **pcurves,
415 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
417 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
418 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
420 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
421 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
422 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
423 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
424 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
427 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
428 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
432 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
433 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
437 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
438 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
441 if (!s->server || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
442 *pcurves = eccurves_auto;
443 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_auto);
445 *pcurves = eccurves_all;
446 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_all);
451 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
452 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
453 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
457 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
462 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
463 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
465 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
468 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
470 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
471 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
472 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
475 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
478 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
479 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
481 const unsigned char *curves;
482 size_t num_curves, i;
483 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
484 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
486 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
488 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
491 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
492 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
494 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
495 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
497 } else /* Should never happen */
500 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
502 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
503 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
504 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
510 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
511 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
512 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
513 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
515 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
517 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
518 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
520 /* Can't do anything on client side */
524 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
526 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
527 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
529 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
530 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
531 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
532 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
533 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
534 /* Should never happen */
537 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
541 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
542 * but s->options is a long...
544 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
545 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
547 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
548 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
549 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
550 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
552 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
555 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
558 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
560 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
561 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
562 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
564 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
568 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
569 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
570 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
571 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
572 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
575 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
576 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
584 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
588 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
589 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
591 unsigned char *clist, *p;
594 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
597 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
598 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
601 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
602 unsigned long idmask;
604 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
606 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
615 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
619 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
623 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
626 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
628 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
634 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
636 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
638 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
640 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
641 if (nid == NID_undef)
642 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
643 if (nid == NID_undef)
644 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
645 if (nid == NID_undef)
647 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
648 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
650 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
654 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
655 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
660 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
664 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
667 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
668 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
673 const EC_METHOD *meth;
676 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
677 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
680 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
683 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
687 /* Determine curve ID */
688 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
689 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
690 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
693 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
702 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
704 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
706 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
708 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
710 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
715 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
716 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
717 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
719 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
720 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
723 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
724 * supported (see RFC4492).
726 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
727 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
728 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
729 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
730 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
733 if (i == num_formats)
738 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
739 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
740 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
742 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
744 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
745 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
746 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
747 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
748 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
752 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
753 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
758 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
765 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
769 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
771 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
772 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
773 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
775 *pformats = ecformats_default;
776 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
778 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
780 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
785 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
786 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
788 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
790 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
793 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
796 /* If not EC nothing to do */
797 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
801 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
806 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
809 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
813 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
814 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
816 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
822 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
823 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
824 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
825 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
826 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
828 return 0; /* Should never happen */
829 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
830 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
832 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
834 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
835 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
836 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
838 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
844 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
845 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
846 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
848 unsigned char curve_id[2];
849 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
850 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
851 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
852 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
856 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
859 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
860 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
861 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
862 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
863 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
864 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
868 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
869 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
871 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
872 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
874 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
876 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
879 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
881 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
887 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
888 /* Need a shared curve */
889 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
895 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
900 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
902 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
906 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
909 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
913 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
918 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
921 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
922 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
925 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
926 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
928 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
931 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
932 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
934 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
938 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
940 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
943 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
944 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
945 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
946 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
948 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
949 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
950 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
951 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
952 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
953 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
954 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
955 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
956 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
957 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
961 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
962 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
963 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
964 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
967 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
970 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
973 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
974 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
975 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
976 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
977 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
979 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
980 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
983 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
984 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
988 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
989 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
990 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
991 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
992 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
993 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
994 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
996 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
997 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
999 * We expect that GOST 2001 signature and GOST 34.11-94 hash are present in all engines
1000 * and GOST 2012 algorithms are not always present.
1001 * It may change when the old algorithms are deprecated.
1003 if ((EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94) != NULL)
1004 && (EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256) == NULL)) {
1005 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 4;
1006 } else if (EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94) == NULL) {
1007 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 6;
1009 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
1011 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
1017 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1018 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
1020 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
1021 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1023 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
1024 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
1025 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
1026 /* Should never happen */
1029 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1030 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
1031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1034 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1035 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1036 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
1037 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
1038 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
1040 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
1041 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1044 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1045 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1048 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
1049 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
1050 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1051 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1054 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
1055 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
1056 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1057 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1063 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1067 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1068 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1069 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1070 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1073 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1074 if (i == sent_sigslen
1075 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1076 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1077 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1080 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1082 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1085 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1086 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1087 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1089 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1093 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1095 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
1100 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1101 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1102 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1105 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1107 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1108 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1109 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1110 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1111 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1113 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
1114 /* Disable TLS 1.0 ciphers if using SSL v3 */
1115 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1116 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl |= SSL_TLSV1;
1117 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1119 * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
1122 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1123 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1124 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1125 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1126 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1127 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1128 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1129 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1130 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1131 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1132 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1134 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1135 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1136 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1137 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1138 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1143 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1145 if (c->algorithm_ssl & s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl
1146 || c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1147 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1149 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1152 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1154 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1156 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1159 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1160 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1163 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1164 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1165 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1166 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1168 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1170 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1171 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1173 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1174 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1176 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1177 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1178 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)
1179 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1190 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1192 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1193 if (s->renegotiate) {
1196 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1201 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1204 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1207 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1214 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1215 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1218 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1219 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1220 unsigned long size_str;
1224 * check for enough space.
1225 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1226 * 2 for servernamelist length
1227 * 1 for the hostname type
1228 * 2 for hostname length
1232 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1234 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1237 /* extension type and length */
1238 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1239 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1241 /* length of servername list */
1242 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1244 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1245 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1247 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1250 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1251 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1252 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1253 * Client Hello message */
1255 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1256 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1262 * check for enough space.
1263 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1264 * 1 for the srp user identity
1265 * + srp user identity length
1267 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1270 /* fill in the extension */
1271 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1272 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1273 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1274 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1279 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1282 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1285 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1286 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1288 unsigned char *etmp;
1290 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1292 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1294 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1296 if (num_formats > 255) {
1297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1301 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1302 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1303 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1304 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1305 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1309 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1311 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1312 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1315 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1317 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1319 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1324 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1326 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1327 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1328 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1329 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1330 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1334 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1336 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1337 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1338 ret += curves_list_len;
1340 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1342 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1344 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1345 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1346 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1347 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1348 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1349 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1350 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
1352 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1353 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1354 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1357 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1358 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1361 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1364 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1366 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1369 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1375 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1377 const unsigned char *salg;
1378 unsigned char *etmp;
1379 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1380 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1382 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1384 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1386 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1387 /* Fill in lengths */
1388 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1393 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1395 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1399 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1400 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1401 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1407 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1408 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1414 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1416 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1417 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1419 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1420 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1422 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1423 /* save position of id len */
1424 unsigned char *q = ret;
1425 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1426 /* skip over id len */
1428 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1434 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1436 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1437 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1438 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1440 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1444 * 1: peer may send requests
1445 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1447 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1448 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1450 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1453 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1454 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1456 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1457 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1459 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1461 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1466 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1467 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1469 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1470 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1471 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1472 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1473 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1476 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1479 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1480 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1481 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1485 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1488 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1491 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1492 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1498 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1499 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1500 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1502 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1503 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1506 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1510 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1511 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1512 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1515 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1516 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1518 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1519 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1525 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1527 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1534 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1537 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1541 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1542 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1545 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1546 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1547 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1548 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1550 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1551 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1552 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1553 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1554 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1555 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1560 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1562 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1565 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1570 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1573 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1576 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1584 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1585 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1588 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1589 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1590 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1593 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1596 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1598 const unsigned char *plist;
1601 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1605 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1607 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1609 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1611 if (plistlen > 255) {
1612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1616 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1617 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1618 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1619 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1624 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1627 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1629 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1630 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1632 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1636 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1637 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1639 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1643 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1644 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1647 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1648 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1649 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1652 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1655 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1658 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1666 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1667 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1668 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1669 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1670 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1671 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1672 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1673 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1674 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1675 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1677 if (limit - ret < 36)
1679 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1683 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1684 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1685 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1686 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1688 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1692 * 1: peer may send requests
1693 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1695 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1696 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1698 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1703 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1704 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1705 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1706 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1707 const unsigned char *npa;
1708 unsigned int npalen;
1711 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1713 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1714 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1715 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1717 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1719 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1721 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1725 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1727 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1728 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1730 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1731 * for other cases too.
1733 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1734 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1735 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1736 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1737 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1739 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1744 if (!s->hit && s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
1745 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1749 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1750 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1751 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1753 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1755 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1759 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1765 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1768 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1773 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1774 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1775 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1776 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1779 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1781 unsigned int data_len;
1782 unsigned int proto_len;
1783 const unsigned char *selected;
1784 unsigned char *data;
1785 unsigned char selected_len;
1788 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1792 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1793 * length-prefixed strings.
1795 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &data_len)
1796 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != data_len
1797 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, data_len))
1801 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &proto_len)
1803 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, proto_len))
1805 } while (PACKET_remaining(pkt));
1807 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1808 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1809 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1810 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1811 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1812 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1813 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1816 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1817 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1822 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1826 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1828 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1829 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1830 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1835 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1836 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1837 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1838 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1840 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1842 unsigned int type, size;
1843 unsigned char *eblock1, *eblock2;
1846 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1847 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1848 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1849 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1850 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1851 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1852 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1854 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1855 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1856 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1857 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1860 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1861 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1862 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1863 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1864 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1865 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1866 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1867 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1868 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1869 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1874 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1875 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1876 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &size)
1877 || !PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, size))
1880 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1883 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1884 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1885 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1887 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len1)
1888 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock2, len2)
1889 || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
1891 if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1893 if (memcmp(eblock2, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1896 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1898 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len)
1899 || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
1901 if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1905 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1907 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1909 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1914 unsigned char *data;
1915 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1917 s->servername_done = 0;
1918 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1919 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1920 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1923 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1924 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1925 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1926 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1927 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1930 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1931 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1932 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1933 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1935 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1936 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1937 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1938 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1939 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1943 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1944 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1947 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1949 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1952 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len))
1955 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len)
1958 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
1961 if (!PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, size))
1964 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1965 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1967 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, size))
1970 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1971 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
1973 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1974 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1977 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1979 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1980 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1981 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1982 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1983 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1984 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1985 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1986 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1987 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1988 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1989 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1990 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1991 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1992 * the value of the Host: field.
1993 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1994 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1995 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1997 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2001 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2002 unsigned char *sdata;
2003 unsigned int servname_type;
2007 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2008 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
2011 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) > 3) {
2012 if (!PACKET_get_1(&ssubpkt, &servname_type)
2013 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &len)
2014 || PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < len)
2017 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2018 switch (servname_type) {
2019 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2021 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2024 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2025 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2028 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2029 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
2030 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2033 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ssubpkt,
2034 (unsigned char *)s->session
2037 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2040 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
2041 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2042 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2043 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2044 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2047 s->servername_done = 1;
2050 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &sdata, len)) {
2051 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2054 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2055 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2056 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2057 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2066 /* We shouldn't have any bytes left */
2067 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) != 0)
2071 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2072 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2073 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &len)
2074 || s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2077 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2079 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt, (unsigned char *)s->srp_ctx.login,
2082 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2084 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len
2085 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt))
2090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2091 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2092 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2094 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2095 || ecpointformatlist_length == 0)
2099 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2100 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2101 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2102 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2103 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2104 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2107 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2108 ecpointformatlist_length;
2109 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
2110 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2111 ecpointformatlist_length))
2113 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2116 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2117 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2118 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2121 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2122 unsigned int ellipticcurvelist_length;
2124 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1 */
2125 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &ellipticcurvelist_length)
2126 || ellipticcurvelist_length == 0
2127 || (ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) != 0)
2131 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2134 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2135 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2136 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2137 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2140 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2141 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2142 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
2143 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
2144 ellipticcurvelist_length))
2146 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
2149 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2150 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2154 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2155 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2156 if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, size)
2157 || (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2158 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2159 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))) {
2160 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2163 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2166 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs
2167 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2170 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
2171 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt) != 0
2172 || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2175 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2178 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt,
2179 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type))
2182 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2183 const unsigned char *sdata;
2185 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2186 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2187 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
2190 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt)) {
2192 unsigned int idsize;
2194 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < 4
2195 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &idsize)
2196 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &data, idsize)) {
2201 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2204 if (data != sdata) {
2205 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2208 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2209 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2210 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2211 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2212 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2215 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2216 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2217 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2222 /* Read in request_extensions */
2223 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2224 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
2225 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2230 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2231 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2232 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2233 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2234 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata))
2239 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2242 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2244 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2245 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2246 unsigned int hbtype;
2248 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &hbtype)
2249 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2250 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2254 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2255 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2257 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2258 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2259 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2262 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2267 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2268 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2269 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2270 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2272 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2275 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2276 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2277 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2278 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2279 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2280 * anything like that, but this might change).
2282 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2283 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2284 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2285 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2286 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2288 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2292 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2293 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2294 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &subpkt, al) != 0)
2296 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2297 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2298 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2302 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2303 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2304 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2305 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2306 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
2310 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2311 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2312 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2314 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2316 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2319 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2320 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2321 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2322 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2323 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2326 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2331 /* Spurious data on the end */
2332 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0)
2337 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2339 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2340 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2341 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2343 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2349 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2353 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2356 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2357 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2358 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2362 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2369 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2371 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2372 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2373 * fill the length of the block.
2375 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2379 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2380 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &len)
2381 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, len))
2389 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2391 unsigned int length, type, size;
2392 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2393 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2396 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2398 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2400 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2401 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2402 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2403 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2404 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2407 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2408 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2411 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2414 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2415 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2419 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2420 unsigned char *data;
2423 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2424 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2427 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2428 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2430 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2431 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2433 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2434 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2435 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2436 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2437 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2440 tlsext_servername = 1;
2442 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2443 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2444 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2445 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2446 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2447 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2451 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2452 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2453 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2454 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2455 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2458 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2459 ecpointformatlist_length;
2460 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2461 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2462 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2463 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2469 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2471 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2472 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2473 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2474 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2476 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2479 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2480 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2483 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2485 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2487 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2490 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2491 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2494 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2495 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2497 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2498 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2499 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2500 unsigned char *selected;
2501 unsigned char selected_len;
2502 /* We must have requested it. */
2503 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2504 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2507 /* The data must be valid */
2508 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2509 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2513 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2515 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2516 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2517 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2520 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2521 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2522 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2525 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2526 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2527 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2531 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2533 /* We must have requested it. */
2534 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2535 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2539 * The extension data consists of:
2540 * uint16 list_length
2541 * uint8 proto_length;
2542 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2544 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2545 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len
2546 || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2547 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2548 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2551 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2552 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2553 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2554 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2557 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2558 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2561 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2563 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2564 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2565 unsigned int hbtype;
2566 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2567 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2571 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2572 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2574 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2575 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2576 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2579 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2584 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2585 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2586 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2590 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2591 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2592 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2593 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2594 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2595 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2598 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2600 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2603 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2604 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2606 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2610 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2611 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2615 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2616 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2617 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2618 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2619 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2620 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2624 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2633 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2634 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2635 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2636 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2637 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2638 * initial connect only.
2640 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2641 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2642 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2643 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2644 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2651 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2657 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2662 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2664 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2665 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2667 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2669 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2670 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2673 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2674 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2678 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2680 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2681 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2682 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2683 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2685 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2687 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2690 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2691 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2694 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2695 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2698 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2699 s->servername_done = 0;
2704 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2705 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2707 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2708 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2709 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2711 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2712 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2713 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2715 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2716 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2718 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2719 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2721 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2722 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2723 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2724 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2728 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2732 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2733 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2734 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2735 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2736 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2737 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2738 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2739 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2742 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2743 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2744 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2745 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2746 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2749 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2750 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2751 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2752 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2753 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2757 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2761 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2765 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2767 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2768 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2771 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2772 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2773 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2774 * influence which certificate is sent
2776 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2778 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2779 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2780 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2781 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2782 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2786 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2787 * et al can pick it up.
2789 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2790 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2792 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2793 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2794 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2796 /* status request response should be sent */
2797 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2798 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2799 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2801 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2803 /* something bad happened */
2804 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2805 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2806 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2810 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2814 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2815 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2818 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2819 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2827 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2829 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2830 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2832 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2834 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2835 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2836 * must contain uncompressed.
2838 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2839 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2840 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2841 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2842 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2843 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2844 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
2845 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2846 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2848 unsigned char *list;
2849 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2850 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2851 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2852 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2853 found_uncompressed = 1;
2857 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2858 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2859 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2863 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2864 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2866 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2868 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2869 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2870 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2871 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2873 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2875 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2878 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
2881 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2882 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2885 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
2888 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2889 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2890 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2891 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2893 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2894 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2897 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2898 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2903 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2904 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2907 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2908 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2911 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2912 s->servername_done = 0;
2918 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2921 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2923 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2924 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2928 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2929 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2936 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2937 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2938 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2940 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2941 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2942 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2943 * point to the resulting session.
2945 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2946 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2947 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2950 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2951 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2952 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2953 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2954 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2955 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2956 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2959 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2960 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2961 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2962 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2963 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2964 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2966 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext, const PACKET *session_id,
2970 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2974 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2977 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2980 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
2982 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2985 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2989 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2990 unsigned int type, size;
2992 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2993 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2994 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2998 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
3002 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
3004 unsigned char *etick;
3008 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3011 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3015 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3017 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3018 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3019 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3020 * calculate the master secret later.
3025 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
3026 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3030 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
3031 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
3033 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3034 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3037 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3040 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3041 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3044 default: /* fatal error */
3050 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
3062 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3064 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3065 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3066 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3067 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3068 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3069 * point to the resulting session.
3072 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3073 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3074 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3075 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3077 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3078 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3079 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3082 unsigned char *sdec;
3083 const unsigned char *p;
3084 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3085 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3088 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3089 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3092 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3093 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3094 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3095 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3096 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3097 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3106 /* Check key name matches */
3107 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3109 if (HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3110 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3111 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3112 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3118 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3121 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3126 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3127 if (HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3128 || HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3131 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3132 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3133 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3136 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3137 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3138 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3139 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3140 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3142 || EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3143 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3146 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3147 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3152 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3155 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3159 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3160 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3161 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3165 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3166 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3175 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3179 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3180 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3184 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3191 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3192 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3193 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3194 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3195 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3196 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3197 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3198 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3199 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3200 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3203 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3204 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3205 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3206 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3207 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3208 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3209 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3212 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3215 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3216 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3222 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3225 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3226 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3227 return table[i].nid;
3232 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3238 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3241 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3244 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3245 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3249 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3251 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3258 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3261 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3262 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3263 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3264 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3265 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3266 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3267 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3268 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3269 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3270 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3273 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3279 for (i=0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++)
3281 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3282 return tls12_md_info + i;
3288 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3290 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3291 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3293 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3296 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3299 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3302 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3303 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3304 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3306 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3307 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3308 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3310 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3311 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3312 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3314 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3315 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3316 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3318 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3319 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3321 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3322 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3328 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3329 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3330 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3332 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3333 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3335 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3336 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3338 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3340 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3341 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3343 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3345 if (psignhash_nid) {
3346 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3347 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
3349 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3353 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3354 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3356 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3357 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3358 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3360 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3361 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3363 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3364 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3368 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3369 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3373 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3375 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3376 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3377 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3379 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3380 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3381 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3383 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3384 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3385 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3387 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3388 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3393 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3394 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3398 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3399 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3400 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3407 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3409 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3411 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3414 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3415 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3417 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3419 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3420 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3421 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3422 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3425 return tmpout - out;
3428 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3429 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3430 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3431 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3433 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3434 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3435 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3436 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3437 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3439 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3440 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3443 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3444 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3445 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3447 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3457 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3458 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3460 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3461 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3463 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3465 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3467 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3468 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3469 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3470 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3471 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3472 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3473 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3474 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3475 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3476 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3478 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3479 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3482 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3483 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3487 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3488 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3490 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3492 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3495 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3499 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3500 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3504 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3506 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3509 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3510 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3512 /* Should never happen */
3516 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3517 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3518 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3520 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3521 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3525 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3530 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3531 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3533 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3534 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3537 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3538 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3540 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3541 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3543 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3545 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3547 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3549 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3550 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3552 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3553 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3554 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3555 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3561 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3562 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3563 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3564 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3565 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3567 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3568 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3569 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3570 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3576 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3577 * the certificate for signing.
3579 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3581 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3582 * supported it stays as NULL.
3584 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3585 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3586 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3588 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3589 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3590 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3591 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3594 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3595 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3596 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3598 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3599 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3600 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3601 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3602 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3603 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3604 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3610 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3611 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3612 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3614 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3619 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3626 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3628 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3631 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3632 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3633 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3635 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3636 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3640 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3642 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3644 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3646 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3648 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3649 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3652 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3653 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length)
3656 unsigned short hbtype;
3657 unsigned int payload;
3658 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3660 if (s->msg_callback)
3661 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3663 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3665 /* Read type and payload length first */
3666 if (1 + 2 + 16 > length)
3667 return 0; /* silently discard */
3670 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > length)
3671 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3674 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3675 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3679 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,