2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_local.h"
14 #include "statem_local.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/md5.h>
25 #include <openssl/trace.h>
26 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
27 #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
29 #define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8
33 ASN1_TYPE *opaqueBlob;
36 DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
38 ASN1_SEQUENCE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) = {
39 ASN1_SIMPLE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, kxBlob, ASN1_ANY),
40 ASN1_OPT(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, opaqueBlob, ASN1_ANY),
41 } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
43 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
45 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
48 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
49 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
50 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
51 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
53 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
54 * (transition not allowed)
56 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
58 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
61 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
62 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
63 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
65 switch (st->hand_state) {
69 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
70 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
71 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
72 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
76 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
77 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
78 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
85 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
86 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
87 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
88 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
89 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
93 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
94 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
101 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
102 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
103 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
107 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
108 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
114 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
115 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
116 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
123 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
124 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
126 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
129 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
130 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
131 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
135 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
136 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
142 /* No valid transition found */
147 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
148 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
149 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
150 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
152 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
153 * (transition not allowed)
155 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
157 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
159 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
160 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
165 switch (st->hand_state) {
171 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
172 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
173 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
178 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
180 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
181 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
183 * 2) If we did request one then
184 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
186 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
187 * list if we requested a certificate)
189 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
190 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
191 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
192 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
193 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
195 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
196 * not going to accept it because we require a client
199 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
200 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
201 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
204 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
208 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
211 } else if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
212 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
213 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
220 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
221 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
226 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
228 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
229 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
230 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
231 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
232 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
235 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
236 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
238 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
239 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
240 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
241 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
243 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
247 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
248 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
254 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
255 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
256 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
261 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
262 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
263 if (s->s3.npn_seen) {
264 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
265 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
270 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
271 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
274 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
279 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
280 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
281 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
282 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
288 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
289 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
290 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
297 /* No valid transition found */
298 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
302 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
303 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
306 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
307 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
308 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
309 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
312 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
313 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
314 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
319 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
321 * Valid return values are:
325 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
327 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
330 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
331 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
332 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
333 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
334 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
337 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
339 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
343 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
344 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
345 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
346 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
347 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
349 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
350 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
351 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
361 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
363 * Valid return values are:
367 int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
370 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
371 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
373 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
374 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
376 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE)
377 || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING)
379 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
382 && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 ||
383 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
385 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
386 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
389 && (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
391 * ... except when the application insists on
392 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
395 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
396 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
397 && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
399 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
402 && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
410 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
411 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
414 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
416 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
419 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
420 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
423 switch (st->hand_state) {
425 /* Shouldn't happen */
426 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
427 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
428 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
429 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
432 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
433 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
434 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
436 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
437 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
438 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
440 /* Try to read from the client instead */
441 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
443 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
444 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
445 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
447 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
448 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
449 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)
450 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
451 else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
452 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
454 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
455 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
457 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
458 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
459 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
461 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
462 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
464 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
466 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
467 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
468 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
470 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
472 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
474 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
475 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
476 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
477 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
479 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
481 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
484 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
485 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
487 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
488 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
489 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
491 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
492 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
493 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
495 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
496 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
498 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
500 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
501 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets
504 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
505 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
506 } else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) {
508 * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the
509 * handshake at this point.
511 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
512 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
514 if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets)
515 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
517 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
518 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
520 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
521 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
522 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
523 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
525 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
526 /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket.
527 * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
528 * been configured for.
530 if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) {
531 /* We've written enough tickets out. */
532 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
534 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
539 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
540 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
542 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
544 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
547 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
548 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
552 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
554 switch (st->hand_state) {
556 /* Shouldn't happen */
557 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
558 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION,
559 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
560 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
563 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
564 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
565 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
566 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
567 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
569 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
570 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
571 /* SSLfatal() already called */
572 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
577 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
578 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
580 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
581 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
582 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
584 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
585 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
586 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) {
587 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
588 } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
589 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
590 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
591 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
593 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
595 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
597 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
598 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
600 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
602 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
603 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
605 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
607 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
608 /* normal PSK or SRP */
609 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
610 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
611 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
612 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
613 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
614 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
615 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
617 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
620 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
623 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
624 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
625 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
629 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
630 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
631 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
632 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
636 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
637 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
638 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
639 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
643 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
644 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
645 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
647 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
648 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
650 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
652 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
653 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
654 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
655 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
657 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
659 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
661 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
662 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
663 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
665 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
666 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
667 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
669 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
671 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
673 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
674 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
679 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
680 * the server to the client.
682 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
684 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
686 switch (st->hand_state) {
688 /* No pre work to be done */
691 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
694 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
697 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
699 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
700 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
701 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
706 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
707 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
709 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
710 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
716 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
717 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
718 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
719 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
720 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
723 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
725 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
726 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0) {
728 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
729 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
730 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
732 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
734 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0);
735 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
737 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
738 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
744 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
747 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
748 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
749 /* SSLfatal() already called */
752 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
754 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
755 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
756 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
757 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
761 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
763 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
764 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
765 && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
766 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
770 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
771 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
774 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
777 static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void)
779 switch (get_last_sys_error()) {
784 #if defined(ECONNRESET)
788 #if defined(WSAECONNRESET)
798 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
799 * server to the client.
801 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
803 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
807 switch (st->hand_state) {
809 /* No post work to be done */
812 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
813 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
815 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
816 /* SSLfatal() already called */
821 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
822 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
824 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
825 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
826 /* SSLfatal() already called */
830 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
831 * treat like it was the first packet
836 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
837 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
838 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0
839 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
843 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
844 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
845 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
846 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
850 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
853 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
854 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
856 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
857 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
858 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
861 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
862 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
865 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
866 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK,
867 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
871 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
872 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
876 || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
877 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE))
881 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
882 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
883 if (!statem_flush(s))
888 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
889 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
890 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
891 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
892 /* SSLfatal() already called */
896 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
897 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
898 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
899 /* SSLfatal() already called */
903 * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive
904 * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted
905 * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts.
907 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS;
911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
912 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
914 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
917 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
921 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
922 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
924 /* SSLfatal() already called */
929 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
932 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
933 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
937 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
938 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
940 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
941 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
943 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
946 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
950 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
951 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
952 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
953 &s->session->master_key_length)
954 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
955 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
956 /* SSLfatal() already called */
961 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
962 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
963 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
968 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
969 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
971 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
972 /* SSLfatal() already called */
977 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
979 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) {
980 if (SSL_get_error(s, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
981 && conn_is_closed()) {
983 * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a
984 * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is
985 * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client
986 * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without
987 * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets.
989 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
998 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1002 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
1005 * Valid return values are:
1009 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1010 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
1012 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1014 switch (st->hand_state) {
1016 /* Shouldn't happen */
1017 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1018 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
1019 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
1022 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
1024 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1026 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1027 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1030 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1031 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
1032 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
1035 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
1036 /* No construction function needed */
1038 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
1041 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
1042 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
1043 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1046 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
1047 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
1048 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
1051 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
1052 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
1053 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
1057 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
1058 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
1059 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1062 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
1063 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
1064 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1067 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
1068 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
1069 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1072 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
1073 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
1074 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
1077 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
1078 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
1079 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
1082 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
1083 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
1084 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
1087 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
1089 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
1092 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1093 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
1094 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
1097 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
1098 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
1099 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
1107 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
1108 * calculated as follows:
1110 * 2 + # client_version
1111 * 32 + # only valid length for random
1112 * 1 + # length of session_id
1113 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
1114 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
1115 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
1116 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
1117 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
1118 * 2 + # length of extensions
1119 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
1121 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1123 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1124 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1127 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1128 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1130 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
1132 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1134 switch (st->hand_state) {
1136 /* Shouldn't happen */
1139 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1140 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1142 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1143 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
1145 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1146 return s->max_cert_list;
1148 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1149 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1151 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1152 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1154 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1155 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1156 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1159 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1160 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1162 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1163 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1165 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1166 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1171 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1173 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1175 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1177 switch (st->hand_state) {
1179 /* Shouldn't happen */
1180 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1181 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1182 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1183 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1185 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1186 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1188 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1189 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1191 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1192 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1194 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1195 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1197 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1198 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1201 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1202 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1205 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1206 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1208 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1209 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1211 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1212 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1218 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1221 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1223 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1225 switch (st->hand_state) {
1227 /* Shouldn't happen */
1228 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1229 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1230 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1234 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1236 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1237 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1241 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1242 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
1243 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s)
1246 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1248 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1249 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1250 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1252 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1255 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
1256 SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1257 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1260 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al);
1263 if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1264 SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO,
1265 al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1266 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1267 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1276 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1279 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1280 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1281 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1287 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1289 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1290 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1291 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1292 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1293 cookie_leni > 255) {
1294 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1295 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1298 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1300 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1301 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1302 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1303 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1310 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1312 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1313 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1314 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1318 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1320 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1321 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1322 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1323 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1325 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1327 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1328 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1329 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1330 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1331 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1332 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1333 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1335 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1336 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1337 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1338 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1339 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1340 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1341 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1342 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1343 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1344 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1345 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1346 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1347 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1349 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1350 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1355 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1357 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1358 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1359 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1363 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1366 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1367 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1369 s->s3.is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1372 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1374 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1376 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1377 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1378 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1379 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL;
1381 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1382 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1383 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1384 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1385 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1388 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0
1389 || (!s->s3.send_connection_binding
1391 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) {
1392 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1393 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1399 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1400 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1401 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1402 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1407 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1409 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1410 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1412 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1415 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
1416 || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1417 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1418 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1423 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1424 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1425 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1426 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1428 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1429 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1431 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1432 * 7-8 session_id_length
1433 * 9-10 challenge_length
1437 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1438 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1440 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1441 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1442 * in the first place
1444 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1445 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1450 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1451 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1452 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1456 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1457 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1459 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1460 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1461 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1463 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1466 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1467 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1468 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1469 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1470 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1474 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1475 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1476 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1480 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1482 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1483 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1484 /* No extensions. */
1485 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1486 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1487 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1490 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1492 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1493 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1494 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1495 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1497 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1498 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1499 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1500 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1501 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1502 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1503 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1504 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1505 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1506 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1510 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1512 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1513 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1514 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1515 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1516 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1517 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1518 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1519 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1523 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1524 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1525 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1526 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1529 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1530 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1531 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1532 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1533 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1537 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1538 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1539 * So check cookie length...
1541 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1542 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) {
1543 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1544 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1549 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1550 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1551 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1555 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1556 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1557 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1561 /* Could be empty. */
1562 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1563 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1565 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
1566 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1567 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1568 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1574 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1575 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1576 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1577 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1578 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1582 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1583 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1584 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1585 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
1586 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
1587 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1590 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1592 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1595 if (clienthello != NULL)
1596 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1597 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1599 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1602 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s)
1605 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1609 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1610 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1612 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1613 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1614 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1615 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1616 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1618 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1619 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1620 if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
1621 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1622 switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
1623 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
1625 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
1626 s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
1628 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
1631 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1632 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
1637 /* Set up the client_random */
1638 memcpy(s->s3.client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1640 /* Choose the version */
1642 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1643 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1644 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1645 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1647 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1650 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1651 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1652 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1656 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1659 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1660 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1662 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1663 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1664 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1665 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1666 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1672 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1673 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1674 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1676 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1677 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1681 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1682 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1683 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1684 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1685 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1689 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1690 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1691 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1692 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1693 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1694 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1695 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1696 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1697 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1699 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1701 /* default verification */
1702 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1703 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1704 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1705 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1706 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1707 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1710 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1712 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1713 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1714 if (protverr != 0) {
1715 s->version = s->client_version;
1716 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1717 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1725 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1726 clienthello->isv2) ||
1727 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
1728 clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
1729 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1733 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 0;
1734 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1735 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1736 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1737 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1738 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1739 if (s->renegotiate) {
1740 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1741 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1742 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1743 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1746 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1;
1747 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1748 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1750 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1751 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1752 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1753 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1754 * an insecure downgrade.
1756 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
1757 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1758 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1764 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1765 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1766 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
1767 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1769 if (cipher == NULL) {
1770 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1771 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1772 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1775 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
1776 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL
1777 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
1779 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1780 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1782 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1783 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1787 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1790 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1791 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1792 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1793 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) {
1794 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1799 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1800 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1802 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1803 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1804 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1805 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1806 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1807 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1808 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1809 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1810 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1811 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1814 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1816 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1817 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1818 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1822 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
1824 /* previous session */
1826 } else if (i == -1) {
1827 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1831 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1832 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1838 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1839 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id,
1840 s->clienthello->session_id_len);
1841 s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len;
1845 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1846 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1848 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
1850 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1852 OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS_CIPHER) {
1853 BIO_printf(trc_out, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1854 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1856 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1857 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1858 if (trc_out != NULL)
1859 BIO_printf(trc_out, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", i,
1860 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1868 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1871 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1872 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1873 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1874 OSSL_TRACE_CANCEL(TLS_CIPHER);
1877 OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS_CIPHER);
1880 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1881 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1885 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1887 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1888 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1889 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1893 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1894 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1895 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1896 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1898 /* TLS extensions */
1899 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1900 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1901 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1906 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1907 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1908 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1909 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1913 pos = s->s3.server_random;
1914 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
1915 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1916 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1917 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1923 && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1926 && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1927 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1929 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1930 * backwards compat reasons
1932 int master_key_length;
1934 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1935 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1936 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1938 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1939 && master_key_length > 0) {
1940 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1942 s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
1943 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1947 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1948 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1949 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers,
1950 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1951 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1952 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1953 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1954 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1958 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1959 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1960 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
1961 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1962 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
1967 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1968 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1969 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1971 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1972 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1974 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1975 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1976 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1978 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
1979 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1980 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1981 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1985 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1986 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1987 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1988 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1990 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1991 /* Can't disable compression */
1992 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1993 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1994 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1995 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1998 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1999 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
2000 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
2001 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
2002 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
2006 if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
2007 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2008 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2009 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
2012 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
2013 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
2014 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
2017 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
2018 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2019 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2020 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
2023 } else if (s->hit) {
2025 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
2026 /* See if we have a match */
2027 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
2030 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
2031 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
2032 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
2034 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
2035 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
2044 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
2050 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
2051 * using compression.
2053 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
2054 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2055 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2056 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
2062 * Given s->peer_ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
2065 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2066 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->peer_ciphers);
2067 s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
2068 if (ciphers == NULL) {
2069 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2070 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2071 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2078 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2079 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
2081 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
2083 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
2084 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2089 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2090 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2091 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2092 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2093 s->clienthello = NULL;
2096 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2097 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2098 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2099 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2100 s->clienthello = NULL;
2106 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2107 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2109 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s)
2111 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2114 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2115 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2116 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2117 * influence which certificate is sent
2119 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
2120 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2123 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2124 if (s->s3.tmp.cert != NULL) {
2126 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2127 * et al can pick it up.
2129 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
2130 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2132 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2133 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2134 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2136 /* status request response should be sent */
2137 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2138 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
2139 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
2141 /* something bad happened */
2142 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2144 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2145 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST,
2146 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2156 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2157 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2159 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s)
2161 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
2162 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
2164 if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3.alpn_proposed != NULL) {
2165 int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
2166 s->s3.alpn_proposed,
2167 (unsigned int)s->s3.alpn_proposed_len,
2168 s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
2170 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2171 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected);
2172 s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
2173 if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2174 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2175 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2178 s->s3.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2179 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2180 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2184 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2185 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
2186 || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
2187 || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
2188 selected_len) != 0) {
2189 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2190 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2194 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
2195 * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
2198 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
2199 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2200 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2201 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2204 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
2206 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2207 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2208 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2209 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2212 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2217 } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
2218 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2219 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
2223 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2228 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2229 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
2230 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2231 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2237 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2239 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
2241 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2242 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
2244 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2251 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2252 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2253 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2254 if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
2255 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2257 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2258 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2259 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
2263 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2266 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2269 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2270 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2272 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
2274 if (cipher == NULL) {
2275 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2276 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2277 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
2280 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
2283 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
2284 /* SSLfatal already called */
2287 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2288 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
2289 s->session->not_resumable =
2290 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
2291 ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
2292 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
2293 if (s->session->not_resumable)
2294 /* do not send a session ticket */
2295 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2298 /* Session-id reuse */
2299 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
2303 * we now have the following setup.
2305 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2306 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2307 * compression - basically ignored right now
2308 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2309 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2310 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2311 * s->s3.tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
2315 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2316 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2318 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
2319 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2323 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2324 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2325 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2326 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2328 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) {
2329 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2335 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2336 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2338 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) {
2340 * callback indicates further work to be done
2342 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2346 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2352 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2357 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2362 unsigned char *session_id;
2363 int usetls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING;
2365 version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
2366 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2368 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2369 * tls_process_client_hello()
2371 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
2372 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2373 ? hrrrandom : s->s3.server_random,
2374 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2375 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2376 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2381 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2382 * back in the server hello:
2383 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2384 * we send back the old session ID.
2385 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2386 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2387 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2388 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2390 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2391 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2392 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2394 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2395 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2398 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
2399 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2401 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2404 sl = s->tmp_session_id_len;
2405 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
2407 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2408 session_id = s->session->session_id;
2411 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2412 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2413 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2417 /* set up the compression method */
2418 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2421 if (usetls13 || s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2424 compm = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
2427 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
2428 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
2429 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) {
2430 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2431 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2435 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2436 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2437 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
2439 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2440 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
2442 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2446 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
2447 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
2448 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2453 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
2454 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
2456 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
2457 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2460 } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2461 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2462 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2469 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2471 if (!s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
2472 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2473 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2480 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2482 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2483 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2485 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2486 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2487 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2490 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg;
2494 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2495 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2496 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2498 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
2499 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2500 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2504 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2505 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2506 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2510 type = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2512 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2513 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2514 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2515 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2517 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2518 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2519 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2520 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2522 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2525 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2526 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2527 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2528 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2530 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2531 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2532 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2535 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2538 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2540 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2541 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2542 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2544 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2545 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2546 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2551 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2552 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2553 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2554 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2557 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2558 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2559 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2560 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2561 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2564 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2565 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2566 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2567 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2571 s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, pkdhp);
2572 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2573 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2577 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
2579 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2580 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2581 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2585 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2588 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2589 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2593 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2595 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2596 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2597 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2598 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2602 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2603 curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2604 if (curve_id == 0) {
2605 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2606 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2607 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2610 s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
2611 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2612 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2613 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2617 /* Encode the public key. */
2618 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3.tmp.pkey,
2620 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2621 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2622 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2627 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2628 * can set these to NULLs
2635 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2636 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2637 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2638 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2639 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2640 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2641 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2642 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2643 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2646 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2647 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2648 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2649 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2653 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2654 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2655 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2659 if (((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2660 || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2662 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2663 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2664 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2668 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2669 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2670 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2671 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2674 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2675 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2677 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2678 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2680 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2681 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2682 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2688 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2689 unsigned char *binval;
2692 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2693 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2694 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2697 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2700 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2701 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2702 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2706 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2708 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2709 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2712 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2713 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2716 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2717 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2718 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2719 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2722 memset(binval, 0, len);
2726 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2727 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2728 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2729 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2730 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2734 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2737 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2738 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2740 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2741 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2742 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2745 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2746 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2747 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2748 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2749 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2750 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2751 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2754 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2755 encodedPoint = NULL;
2761 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey;
2763 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
2764 size_t siglen = 0, tbslen;
2766 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) {
2767 /* Should never happen */
2768 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2769 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2770 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2773 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2774 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2775 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2776 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2777 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2780 /* send signature algorithm */
2781 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
2782 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2783 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2784 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2788 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2789 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2790 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2791 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2794 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2795 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2796 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2797 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2798 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2803 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
2804 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2807 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2811 if (EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, NULL, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <=0
2812 || !WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2813 || EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <= 0
2814 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2815 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2817 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2818 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2819 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2825 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2828 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2829 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2831 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2832 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2834 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2838 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2840 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2841 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
2842 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
2843 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2844 s->pha_context_len = 32;
2845 if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL
2846 || RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->pha_context,
2847 s->pha_context_len) <= 0
2848 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
2849 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2850 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2851 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2854 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
2855 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
2856 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2860 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2861 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2862 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2863 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2868 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2869 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
2871 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2877 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2878 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2879 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2880 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2881 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2885 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2886 const uint16_t *psigs;
2887 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2889 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2890 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2891 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2892 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2893 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2894 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2895 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2900 if (!construct_ca_names(s, get_ca_names(s), pkt)) {
2901 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2907 s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 1;
2911 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2913 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2914 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2916 PACKET psk_identity;
2918 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2919 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2920 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2923 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2924 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2925 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2928 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2929 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2930 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2934 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2935 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2936 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2940 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2943 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2944 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2945 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2947 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2949 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2951 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
2952 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2953 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2957 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
2958 s->s3.tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2959 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2961 if (s->s3.tmp.psk == NULL) {
2962 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2963 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2967 s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
2971 /* Should never happen */
2972 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2973 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2978 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2980 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2982 PACKET enc_premaster;
2983 EVP_PKEY *rsa = NULL;
2984 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2986 EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
2987 OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
2989 rsa = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey;
2991 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2992 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2996 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2997 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2998 enc_premaster = *pkt;
3000 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
3001 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3002 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3003 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3008 outlen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
3009 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
3010 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
3011 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3012 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3016 ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, rsa, s->ctx->propq);
3018 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3019 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3024 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
3025 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
3026 * section 7.4.7.1). We use the special padding type
3027 * RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING to do that. It will automaticaly decrypt the
3028 * RSA, check the padding and check that the client version is as expected
3029 * in the premaster secret. If any of that fails then the function appears
3030 * to return successfully but with a random result. The call below could
3031 * still fail if the input is publicly invalid.
3032 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
3034 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx) <= 0
3035 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING) <= 0) {
3036 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3037 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3041 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION,
3042 (unsigned int *)&s->client_version);
3043 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) != 0)
3044 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(
3045 OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION,
3046 (unsigned int *)&s->version);
3047 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3049 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params)
3050 || EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, rsa_decrypt, &outlen,
3051 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
3052 PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster)) <= 0) {
3053 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3054 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3059 * This test should never fail (otherwise we should have failed above) but
3060 * we double check anyway.
3062 if (outlen != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
3063 OPENSSL_cleanse(rsa_decrypt, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
3064 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3065 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3069 /* Also cleanses rsa_decrypt (on success or failure) */
3070 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt,
3071 SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH, 0)) {
3072 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3078 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
3079 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
3082 /* Should never happen */
3083 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
3084 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3089 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3091 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3092 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
3096 const unsigned char *data;
3097 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3100 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
3101 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3102 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
3105 skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
3107 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3108 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3112 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3113 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3114 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3117 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3118 /* We already checked we have enough data */
3119 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3120 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3123 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3124 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
3125 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3130 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3131 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
3132 if (pub_key == NULL || cdh == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
3133 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3134 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3139 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3140 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3145 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
3146 s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
3148 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3151 /* Should never happen */
3152 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
3153 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3158 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3161 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
3162 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3165 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3166 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3167 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3168 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3172 const unsigned char *data;
3175 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3176 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3179 /* Get encoded point length */
3180 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
3181 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3182 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3183 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3187 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3188 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3192 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3193 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
3194 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3198 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
3199 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3205 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3206 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3211 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
3212 s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
3214 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3218 /* Should never happen */
3219 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3220 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3225 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3227 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3229 const unsigned char *data;
3231 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
3232 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3233 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3234 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
3237 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
3238 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3242 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
3243 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3244 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
3247 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3248 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3249 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3250 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3251 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3255 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
3256 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3262 /* Should never happen */
3263 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3264 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3269 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3271 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3272 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
3273 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
3274 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3275 const unsigned char *start;
3276 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
3277 unsigned long alg_a;
3278 GOST_KX_MESSAGE *pKX = NULL;
3279 const unsigned char *ptr;
3282 /* Get our certificate private key */
3283 alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3284 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
3286 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3288 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
3290 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3293 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3295 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
3296 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3299 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, pk, s->ctx->propq);
3300 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3301 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3302 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3305 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3306 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3307 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3311 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3312 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3313 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3314 * client certificate for authorization only.
3316 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3317 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3318 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3322 ptr = PACKET_data(pkt);
3323 /* Some implementations provide extra data in the opaqueBlob
3324 * We have nothing to do with this blob so we just skip it */
3325 pKX = d2i_GOST_KX_MESSAGE(NULL, &ptr, PACKET_remaining(pkt));
3327 || pKX->kxBlob == NULL
3328 || ASN1_TYPE_get(pKX->kxBlob) != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
3329 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3330 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3334 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, ptr - PACKET_data(pkt))) {
3335 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3336 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3340 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3341 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3342 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3346 inlen = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->length;
3347 start = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->data;
3349 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
3351 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3352 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3355 /* Generate master secret */
3356 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3357 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3358 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3361 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3362 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
3364 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3368 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3369 GOST_KX_MESSAGE_free(pKX);
3372 /* Should never happen */
3373 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3374 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3379 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3381 unsigned long alg_k;
3383 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3385 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3386 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
3387 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3391 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3392 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3393 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3394 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3395 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3396 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3399 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3400 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3401 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3404 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3405 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) {
3406 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3409 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3410 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) {
3411 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3414 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3415 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) {
3416 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3419 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3420 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) {
3421 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3424 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3425 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) {
3426 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3430 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3431 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3432 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3436 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3438 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3439 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
3440 s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
3442 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3445 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3448 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3449 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3450 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3451 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3454 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3457 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3458 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3460 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3461 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
3462 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
3465 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3466 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3469 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3470 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3471 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3475 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3476 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3481 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3483 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3484 * the handshake_buffer
3486 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3487 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3490 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3492 if (!s->s3.handshake_buffer) {
3493 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3494 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3495 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3499 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3500 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3502 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3503 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3508 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3511 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3514 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3517 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3518 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3519 PACKET spkt, context;
3521 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
3524 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no
3525 * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less than
3528 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID;
3530 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3531 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3532 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3536 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)
3537 || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0)
3538 || (s->pha_context != NULL &&
3539 !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)))) {
3540 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3541 SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
3545 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt)
3546 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3547 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3548 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3552 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3553 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3554 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3555 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3556 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3557 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3561 certstart = certbytes;
3562 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3564 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3565 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3568 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3569 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3570 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3571 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3575 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3576 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3579 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3580 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3581 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3585 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3586 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
3587 NULL, chainidx == 0)
3588 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3589 rawexts, x, chainidx,
3590 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
3591 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3594 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3597 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3598 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3599 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3600 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3606 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3607 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3608 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3609 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3610 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3611 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3614 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3615 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3616 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3617 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
3618 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3619 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3622 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3623 if (s->s3.handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3624 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3629 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3631 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
3632 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3633 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3637 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3638 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3641 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3643 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3644 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3645 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3651 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3652 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3653 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3654 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
3655 * session may have already gone into the session cache.
3658 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3659 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
3660 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3661 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3662 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3666 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3667 s->session = new_sess;
3670 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3671 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3672 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3674 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3675 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3678 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3681 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3682 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3687 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3688 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3692 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3693 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3694 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3695 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3696 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3697 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3701 /* Resend session tickets */
3702 s->sent_tickets = 0;
3705 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3709 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3713 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3715 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3.tmp.cert;
3718 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3719 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3724 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3725 * for the server Certificate message
3727 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3728 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3729 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3732 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3733 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3740 static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3741 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3744 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3745 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3746 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3749 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
3750 (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
3751 ? 0 : s->session->timeout)) {
3752 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3753 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3757 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3758 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add)
3759 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) {
3760 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3761 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3766 /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */
3767 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
3768 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL,
3769 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3776 static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3777 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3779 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3780 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3781 SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
3782 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3783 const unsigned char *const_p;
3784 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3787 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3788 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3789 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3791 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3793 /* get session encoding length */
3794 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3796 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3799 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3800 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3801 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3804 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3806 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3807 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3811 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3812 hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
3813 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3814 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3815 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3820 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
3821 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3822 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3827 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3830 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3832 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3833 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3837 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3838 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
3839 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3840 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3841 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3842 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3846 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3847 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3848 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3849 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3852 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3855 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3856 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3858 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3859 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
3861 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
3866 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
3867 ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3868 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
3870 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3871 else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
3872 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3873 ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3874 ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 1);
3879 /* Put timeout and length */
3880 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3881 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3882 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3883 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3884 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3888 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3889 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
3893 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3894 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3897 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3899 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3901 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3902 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, iv, iv_len) <= 0
3903 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3904 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv)
3905 || !ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
3906 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
3908 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3909 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3912 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3913 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3916 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
3917 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3921 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3922 /* Output key name */
3923 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3925 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3926 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3928 /* Encrypt session data */
3929 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3930 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3931 || encdata1 != encdata2
3932 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3933 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3934 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3935 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3936 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3937 || !ssl_hmac_update(hctx,
3938 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3939 macendoffset - macoffset)
3940 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3941 || !ssl_hmac_final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)
3942 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3943 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3944 || macdata1 != macdata2) {
3945 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3946 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3950 /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */
3951 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3952 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET,
3953 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3960 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3961 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
3965 static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, uint32_t age_add,
3966 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3968 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
3969 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3973 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
3974 s->session->session_id_length)
3975 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3976 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATEFUL_TICKET,
3977 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3984 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3986 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3987 unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE];
3989 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3993 age_add_u.age_add = 0;
3995 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3998 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
3999 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
4000 int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
4002 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
4003 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
4004 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4005 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4006 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4009 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
4012 * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then
4013 * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it.
4014 * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that.
4016 if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) {
4017 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0);
4019 if (new_sess == NULL) {
4020 /* SSLfatal already called */
4024 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
4025 s->session = new_sess;
4028 if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) {
4029 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4032 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, age_add_u.age_add_c,
4033 sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) {
4034 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4035 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4036 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4039 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
4041 nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce;
4042 for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) {
4043 tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff);
4047 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
4049 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
4052 s->session->master_key,
4054 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4057 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
4059 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
4060 if (s->s3.alpn_selected != NULL) {
4061 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
4062 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
4063 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected_len);
4064 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
4065 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
4066 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4067 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
4070 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3.alpn_selected_len;
4072 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
4075 if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL &&
4076 tctx->generate_ticket_cb(s, tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0)
4080 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
4081 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
4082 * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
4085 && ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
4086 || (s->max_early_data > 0
4087 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) {
4088 if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) {
4089 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4092 } else if (!construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add,
4094 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4098 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4099 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
4100 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4102 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4106 * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets|
4107 * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake
4108 * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not.
4111 s->next_ticket_nonce++;
4112 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
4121 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
4122 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
4124 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4126 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
4127 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
4128 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
4129 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
4130 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4137 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4139 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
4140 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
4149 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
4150 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
4152 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4154 PACKET next_proto, padding;
4155 size_t next_proto_len;
4158 * The payload looks like:
4160 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
4161 * uint8 padding_len;
4162 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
4164 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
4165 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
4166 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
4167 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
4168 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4169 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4172 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
4174 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
4175 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4176 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4179 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
4181 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4185 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4187 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
4189 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4196 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
4198 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
4199 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4200 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4201 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4204 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
4205 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
4206 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4207 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4208 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4212 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
4213 * a record boundary.
4215 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
4216 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
4217 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
4218 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
4219 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4222 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
4223 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
4224 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
4225 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4226 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4229 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;