2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
14 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/md5.h>
26 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
27 static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
30 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
31 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
32 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
33 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
35 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
36 * (transition not allowed)
38 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
40 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
43 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
44 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
45 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
47 switch (st->hand_state) {
51 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
52 if (s->hello_retry_request) {
53 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
54 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
58 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
59 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
60 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
67 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
68 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
69 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
70 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
71 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
75 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
76 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
83 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
84 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
85 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
89 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
90 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
96 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
97 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
98 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
105 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
106 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
108 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
110 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
111 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
117 /* No valid transition found */
122 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
123 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
124 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
125 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
127 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
128 * (transition not allowed)
130 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
132 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
134 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
135 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
140 switch (st->hand_state) {
146 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
147 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
148 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
153 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
155 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
156 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
158 * 2) If we did request one then
159 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
161 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
162 * list if we requested a certificate)
164 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
165 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
166 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
167 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
168 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
170 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
171 * not going to accept it because we require a client
174 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
175 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
176 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
179 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
183 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
186 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
187 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
188 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
195 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
196 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
201 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
203 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
204 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
205 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
206 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
207 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
210 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
211 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
213 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
214 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
215 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
216 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
218 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
222 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
223 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
229 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
230 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
231 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
236 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
237 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
238 if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
239 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
240 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
245 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
246 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
249 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
254 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
255 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
256 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
257 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
263 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
264 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
265 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
272 /* No valid transition found */
273 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
274 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
275 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
280 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
282 * Valid return values are:
286 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
288 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
291 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
292 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
293 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
294 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
295 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
298 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
300 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
303 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
304 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
305 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
306 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
307 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
308 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
310 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
311 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
312 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
322 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
324 * Valid return values are:
328 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
331 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
332 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
334 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
335 * during re-negotiation:
337 && (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 ||
338 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
340 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
341 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
344 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
346 * ... except when the application insists on
347 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
350 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
351 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
352 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
354 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
357 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
365 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
366 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
369 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
371 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
374 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
375 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
378 switch (st->hand_state) {
380 /* Shouldn't happen */
381 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
382 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
383 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
384 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
387 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
388 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
389 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
391 /* Try to read from the client instead */
392 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
394 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
395 if (s->hello_retry_request)
396 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
398 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
399 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
401 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
402 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
403 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
405 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
406 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
407 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
409 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
411 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
412 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
413 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
415 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
417 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
419 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
420 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
421 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
424 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
425 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
427 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
428 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
429 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
431 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
432 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
433 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
435 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
436 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
438 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
440 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
441 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket
443 * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour
444 * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the
447 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
448 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
450 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
451 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
452 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
453 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
457 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
458 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
459 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
460 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
465 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
466 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
468 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
470 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
473 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
474 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
478 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
480 switch (st->hand_state) {
482 /* Shouldn't happen */
483 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
484 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION,
485 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
486 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
489 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
490 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
491 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
492 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
493 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
495 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
496 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
497 /* SSLfatal() already called */
498 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
503 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
504 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
506 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
507 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
508 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
510 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
511 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
512 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
513 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
515 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
516 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
518 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
519 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
521 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
523 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
524 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
526 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
528 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
529 /* normal PSK or SRP */
530 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
531 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
532 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
533 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
534 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
535 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
536 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
538 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
541 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
544 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
545 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
546 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
550 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
551 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
552 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
553 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
557 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
558 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
559 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
560 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
564 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
565 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
566 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
568 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
569 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
571 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
573 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
574 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
575 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
576 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
578 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
580 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
582 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
583 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
584 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
586 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
587 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
588 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
590 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
592 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
594 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
595 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
600 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
601 * the server to the client.
603 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
605 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
607 switch (st->hand_state) {
609 /* No pre work to be done */
612 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
615 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
618 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
620 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
621 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
622 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
627 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
628 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
630 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
631 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
637 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
638 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
639 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
640 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
641 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
644 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
646 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
647 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
649 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
650 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
651 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
653 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
655 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0);
656 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
658 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
659 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
665 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
666 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
667 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
668 /* SSLfatal() already called */
671 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
673 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
674 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
675 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
676 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
680 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
682 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
683 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING)
684 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
688 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
689 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
692 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
696 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
697 * server to the client.
699 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
701 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
705 switch (st->hand_state) {
707 /* No post work to be done */
710 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
711 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
715 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
716 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
718 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
719 /* SSLfatal() already called */
724 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
725 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
727 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
728 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
729 /* SSLfatal() already called */
733 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
734 * treat like it was the first packet
739 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
740 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
741 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
742 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
743 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
746 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
749 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
750 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
752 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
753 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
754 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
756 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
757 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK,
758 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
762 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
763 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
767 * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
768 * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
769 * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
770 * something clever in the record layer for this.
772 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
773 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
774 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
775 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
776 /* SSLfatal() already called */
780 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
781 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
782 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
783 /* SSLfatal() already called */
789 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
790 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
791 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
793 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
796 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
800 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
801 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
803 /* SSLfatal() already called */
808 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
811 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
812 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
816 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
817 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
819 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
820 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
822 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
825 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
829 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
830 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
831 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
832 &s->session->master_key_length)
833 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
834 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
835 /* SSLfatal() already called */
840 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
841 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
843 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
844 /* SSLfatal() already called */
849 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
850 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1)
855 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
859 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
862 * Valid return values are:
866 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
867 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
869 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
871 switch (st->hand_state) {
873 /* Shouldn't happen */
874 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
875 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
876 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
879 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
881 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
883 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
884 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
887 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
888 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
889 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
892 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
893 /* No construction function needed */
895 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
898 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
899 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
900 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
904 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
905 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
908 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
909 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
910 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
914 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
915 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
916 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
919 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
920 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
921 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
924 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
925 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
926 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
929 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
930 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
931 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
934 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
935 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
936 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
939 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
940 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
941 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
944 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
949 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
950 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
951 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
954 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
955 *confunc = tls_construct_hello_retry_request;
956 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
959 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
960 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
961 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
969 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
970 * calculated as follows:
972 * 2 + # client_version
973 * 32 + # only valid length for random
974 * 1 + # length of session_id
975 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
976 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
977 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
978 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
979 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
980 * 2 + # length of extensions
981 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
983 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
985 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
986 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
989 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
990 * reading. Excludes the message header.
992 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
994 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
996 switch (st->hand_state) {
998 /* Shouldn't happen */
1001 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1002 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1004 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1005 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
1007 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1008 return s->max_cert_list;
1010 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1011 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1013 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1014 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1016 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1017 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1018 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1021 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1022 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1024 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1025 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1027 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1028 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1033 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1035 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1037 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1039 switch (st->hand_state) {
1041 /* Shouldn't happen */
1042 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1043 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1044 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1045 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1047 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1048 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1050 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1051 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1053 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1054 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1056 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1057 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1059 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1060 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1062 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1063 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1064 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1067 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1068 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1070 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1071 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1073 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1074 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1080 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1083 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1085 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1087 switch (st->hand_state) {
1089 /* Shouldn't happen */
1090 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1091 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1092 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1095 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1096 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1098 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1099 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1101 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1104 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1105 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
1107 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
1109 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1111 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1112 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1113 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1115 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1118 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
1119 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
1121 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
1128 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1131 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1132 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1133 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1139 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1141 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1142 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1143 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1144 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1145 cookie_leni > 255) {
1146 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1147 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1150 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1152 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1153 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1154 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1155 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1164 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1165 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1166 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1170 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1172 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1173 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1174 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1175 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1177 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1179 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1180 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1181 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1182 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1183 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1184 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1185 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1187 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1188 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1189 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1190 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1191 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1192 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1193 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1194 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1195 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1196 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1197 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1198 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1199 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1201 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1202 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1207 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1209 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1210 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1211 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1215 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1218 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1219 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1221 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1224 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1226 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1228 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1229 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1230 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1231 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello;
1233 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1234 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1235 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1236 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1239 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1240 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1241 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1242 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1250 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1252 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1253 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1255 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1258 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) || s->hello_retry_request) {
1259 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1260 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1265 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1266 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1267 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1268 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1270 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1271 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1273 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1274 * 7-8 session_id_length
1275 * 9-10 challenge_length
1279 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1280 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1282 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1283 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1284 * in the first place
1286 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1287 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1292 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1293 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1294 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1298 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1299 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1301 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1302 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1303 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1305 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1308 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1309 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1310 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1311 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1312 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1316 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1317 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1318 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1322 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1324 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1325 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1326 /* No extensions. */
1327 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1328 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1329 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1332 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1334 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1335 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1336 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1337 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1339 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1340 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1341 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1342 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1343 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1344 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1345 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1346 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1347 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1348 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1352 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1354 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1355 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1356 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1357 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1358 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1359 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1360 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1361 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1365 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1366 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1367 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1368 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1371 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1372 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1373 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1374 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1375 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1379 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1380 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1381 * So check cookie length...
1383 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1384 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0)
1385 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1389 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1390 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1391 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1395 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1396 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1397 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1401 /* Could be empty. */
1402 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1403 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1405 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
1406 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1407 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1408 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1414 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1415 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1416 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1417 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1418 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1422 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1423 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1424 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1425 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
1426 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
1427 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1430 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1432 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1435 if (clienthello != NULL)
1436 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1437 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1439 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1442 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s)
1445 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1449 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1450 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1452 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1453 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1454 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1455 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1456 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1458 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1459 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1460 if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
1461 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1462 switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
1463 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
1465 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
1466 s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
1468 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
1471 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1472 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
1477 /* Set up the client_random */
1478 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1480 /* Choose the version */
1482 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1483 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1484 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1485 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1487 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1490 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1491 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1492 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1496 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1499 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1500 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1502 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1503 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1504 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1505 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1506 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1512 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1513 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1514 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1516 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1517 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1521 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1522 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1523 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1524 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1525 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1529 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1530 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1531 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1532 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1533 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1534 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1535 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1536 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1537 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1539 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1541 /* default verification */
1542 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1543 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1544 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1545 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1546 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1547 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1550 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1552 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1553 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1554 if (protverr != 0) {
1555 s->version = s->client_version;
1556 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1557 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1565 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1566 clienthello->isv2) ||
1567 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
1568 clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
1569 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1573 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
1574 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1575 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1576 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1577 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1578 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1579 if (s->renegotiate) {
1580 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1581 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1582 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1583 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1586 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
1587 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1588 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1590 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1591 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1592 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1593 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1594 * an insecure downgrade.
1596 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
1597 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1598 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1604 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1605 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1606 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
1607 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1609 if (cipher == NULL) {
1610 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1611 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1612 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1615 if (s->hello_retry_request
1616 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL
1617 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
1619 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1620 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1622 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1623 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1627 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1630 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1631 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1632 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1633 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) {
1634 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1639 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1640 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1642 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1643 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1644 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1645 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1646 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1647 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1648 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1649 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1650 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1651 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1654 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1656 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1657 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1658 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1662 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
1664 /* previous session */
1666 } else if (i == -1) {
1667 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1671 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1672 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1679 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1680 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1682 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
1684 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1687 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1689 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1690 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1692 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1693 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1702 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1705 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1706 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1707 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1712 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1713 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1717 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1719 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1720 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1721 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1725 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1726 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1727 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1728 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1730 /* TLS extensions */
1731 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1732 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1733 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1738 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1739 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1740 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1741 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1745 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1746 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
1747 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1748 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1749 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1755 && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1758 && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1759 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1761 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1762 * backwards compat reasons
1764 int master_key_length;
1766 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1767 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1768 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1770 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1771 && master_key_length > 0) {
1772 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1774 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1775 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1779 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1780 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1781 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
1782 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1783 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1784 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1785 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1786 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1790 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1791 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1792 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1793 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1794 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1799 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1800 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1801 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1803 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1804 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1806 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1807 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1808 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1810 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
1811 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1812 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1813 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1818 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1819 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1820 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1822 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1823 /* Can't disable compression */
1824 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1825 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1826 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1827 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1830 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1831 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1832 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1833 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1834 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1838 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1839 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1840 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1841 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1844 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1845 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
1846 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
1849 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1850 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1851 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1852 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1855 } else if (s->hit) {
1857 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1858 /* See if we have a match */
1859 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1862 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1863 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1864 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1866 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
1867 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
1876 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1882 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1883 * using compression.
1885 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1886 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1887 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1888 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1894 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1897 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1898 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1899 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1900 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1901 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1902 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1903 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1910 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1911 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1913 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1915 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1916 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1921 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1922 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
1923 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1924 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
1925 s->clienthello = NULL;
1928 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1929 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
1930 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1931 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
1932 s->clienthello = NULL;
1938 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
1939 * Upon failure, returns 0.
1941 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s)
1943 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
1946 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
1947 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
1948 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
1949 * influence which certificate is sent
1951 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
1952 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
1955 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1956 if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) {
1958 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
1959 * et al can pick it up.
1961 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
1962 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
1964 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1965 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1966 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
1968 /* status request response should be sent */
1969 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1970 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
1971 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
1973 /* something bad happened */
1974 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1976 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1977 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST,
1978 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1988 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
1989 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |*al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
1991 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s)
1993 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1994 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1996 if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1997 int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1998 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1999 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
2000 s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
2002 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2003 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2004 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
2005 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2006 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2007 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2010 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2011 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2012 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2013 s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
2016 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2017 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
2018 || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
2019 || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
2020 selected_len) != 0) {
2021 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2022 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2025 /* If a new session update it with the new ALPN value */
2026 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
2028 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2029 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2030 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2031 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2034 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2039 } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
2040 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN,
2041 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
2045 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2050 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2051 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
2052 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2053 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2059 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2061 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2062 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
2064 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2065 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
2067 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2074 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2075 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2076 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2077 if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
2078 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2080 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2081 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2082 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
2086 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2089 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2092 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2093 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2095 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
2097 if (cipher == NULL) {
2098 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2099 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2100 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
2103 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
2106 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
2107 /* SSLfatal already called */
2110 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2111 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
2112 s->session->not_resumable =
2113 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
2114 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
2115 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
2116 if (s->session->not_resumable)
2117 /* do not send a session ticket */
2118 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2121 /* Session-id reuse */
2122 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
2126 * we now have the following setup.
2128 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2129 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2130 * compression - basically ignored right now
2131 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2132 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2133 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2134 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
2138 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2139 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2141 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
2142 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2146 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2147 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2148 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2149 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2151 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) {
2152 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2158 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2159 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2161 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
2163 * callback indicates further work to be done
2165 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2168 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
2170 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
2171 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
2173 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
2174 SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2175 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2177 SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2178 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2184 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2189 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2195 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT conditional before release */
2196 version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT : s->version;
2197 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2199 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2200 * tls_process_client_hello()
2202 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2203 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2204 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2209 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2210 * back in the server hello:
2211 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2212 * we send back the old session ID.
2213 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2214 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2215 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2216 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2218 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2219 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2220 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2221 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2224 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
2225 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2227 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2229 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2230 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2231 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO,
2232 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2236 /* set up the compression method */
2237 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2240 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2243 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
2246 if ((!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2247 && !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->session_id, sl))
2248 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
2249 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2250 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm))
2251 || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2253 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2254 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO,
2256 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2260 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2261 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2262 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2269 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2271 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
2272 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2273 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2280 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2282 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2283 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2285 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2286 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2287 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2290 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
2294 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2295 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2296 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2298 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
2299 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2300 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2304 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2305 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2306 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2310 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2312 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2313 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2314 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2315 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2317 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2319 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2320 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2322 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2325 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2326 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2327 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2328 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2330 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2331 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2332 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2335 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2338 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2340 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2341 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2342 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2344 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2345 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2346 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2351 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2352 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2353 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2354 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2357 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2358 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2359 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2360 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2361 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2364 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2365 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2366 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2367 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2371 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
2372 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2373 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2377 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2379 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2382 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2383 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2387 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2389 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2390 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2391 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2392 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2396 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2397 curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2398 if (curve_id == 0) {
2399 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2400 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2401 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2404 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
2405 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2406 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2407 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2411 /* Encode the public key. */
2412 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
2414 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2415 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2416 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2421 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2422 * can set these to NULLs
2429 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2430 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2431 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2432 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2433 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2434 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2435 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2436 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2437 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2440 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2441 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2442 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2443 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2447 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2448 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2449 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2453 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2454 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2456 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2457 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2458 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2463 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2464 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2465 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2468 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2469 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2471 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2472 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2474 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2475 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2476 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2482 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2483 unsigned char *binval;
2486 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2487 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2488 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2491 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2494 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2495 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2496 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2500 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2502 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2503 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2506 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2507 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2510 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2511 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2512 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2513 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2516 memset(binval, 0, len);
2520 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2521 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2522 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2523 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2524 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2528 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2531 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2532 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2534 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2535 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2536 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2539 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2540 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2541 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2542 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2543 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2544 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2545 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2548 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2549 encodedPoint = NULL;
2555 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
2557 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
2558 size_t siglen, tbslen;
2561 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
2562 /* Should never happen */
2563 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2564 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2565 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2569 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
2570 * points to the space at the end.
2573 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2574 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2575 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2576 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2577 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2580 /* send signature algorithm */
2581 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
2582 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2583 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2584 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2588 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2589 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2590 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2593 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2594 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2595 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2596 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2597 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2598 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2601 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2602 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2603 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2604 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2605 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2610 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
2611 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2614 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2617 rv = EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen);
2619 if (rv <= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2620 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2621 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2622 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2623 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2628 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2631 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2632 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2634 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2635 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2637 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2641 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2643 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2644 /* TODO(TLS1.3) for now send empty request context */
2645 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2646 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2647 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2648 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2652 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2653 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
2655 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2661 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2662 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2663 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2664 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2665 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2669 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2670 const uint16_t *psigs;
2671 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2673 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2674 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2675 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2676 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2677 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2678 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2679 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2684 if (!construct_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2685 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2690 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2694 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2697 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2699 PACKET psk_identity;
2701 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2702 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2703 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2706 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2707 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2708 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2711 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2712 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2713 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2717 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2718 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2719 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2723 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2726 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2727 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2728 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2730 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2732 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2734 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
2735 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2736 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2740 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2741 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2742 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2744 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2745 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2746 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2750 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2754 /* Should never happen */
2755 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2756 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2761 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2764 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2766 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2767 size_t j, padding_len;
2768 PACKET enc_premaster;
2770 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2773 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
2775 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2776 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2780 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2781 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2782 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2784 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2785 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2786 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2787 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2793 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2794 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2795 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2796 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2798 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2799 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2800 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2804 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2805 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2806 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2807 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2812 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2813 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2814 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2815 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2816 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2819 if (ssl_randbytes(s, rand_premaster_secret,
2820 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
2821 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2822 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2827 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2828 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2830 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2831 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2832 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2833 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2834 if (decrypt_len < 0) {
2835 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2836 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2840 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2843 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2844 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2845 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2847 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2848 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2849 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2853 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2854 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2855 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2856 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2857 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2859 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
2862 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2863 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2864 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2865 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2866 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2867 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2870 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2871 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2873 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2874 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2877 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2878 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2879 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2880 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2881 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2882 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2885 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2886 unsigned char workaround_good;
2887 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2888 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2890 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2891 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2892 version_good |= workaround_good;
2896 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2897 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2899 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2902 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2903 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2904 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2905 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2907 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2908 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
2909 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
2910 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
2911 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2914 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
2915 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2916 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2922 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2925 /* Should never happen */
2926 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA,
2927 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2932 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2934 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2935 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2939 const unsigned char *data;
2940 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2943 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2944 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2945 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2948 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2950 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2951 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2955 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2956 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2957 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2960 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2961 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2962 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2963 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2966 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2967 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2968 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2972 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2973 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2975 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
2976 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2977 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2978 if (pub_key != NULL)
2983 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2984 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2989 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2990 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2992 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2995 /* Should never happen */
2996 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2997 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3002 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3004 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3005 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
3006 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3009 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3010 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3011 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3012 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3016 const unsigned char *data;
3019 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3020 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3023 /* Get encoded point length */
3024 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
3025 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3026 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3027 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3030 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3031 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
3032 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3036 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
3037 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3043 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3044 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3049 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
3050 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
3052 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3056 /* Should never happen */
3057 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
3058 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3063 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3065 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3067 const unsigned char *data;
3069 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
3070 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3071 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3072 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
3075 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
3076 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3080 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
3081 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3082 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
3085 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3086 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3087 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3088 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3089 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3093 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
3094 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3100 /* Should never happen */
3101 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP,
3102 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3107 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3109 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3110 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
3111 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
3112 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3113 const unsigned char *start;
3114 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
3115 unsigned long alg_a;
3118 size_t sess_key_len;
3119 const unsigned char *data;
3122 /* Get our certificate private key */
3123 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3124 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
3126 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3128 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
3130 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3133 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3135 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
3136 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3139 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
3140 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3141 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3142 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3145 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3146 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3147 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3151 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3152 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3153 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3154 * client certificate for authorization only.
3156 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3157 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3158 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3161 /* Decrypt session key */
3162 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
3163 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
3164 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3165 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3168 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
3169 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
3170 &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
3171 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
3172 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3173 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3178 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
3180 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3181 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3184 /* Generate master secret */
3185 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3186 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3187 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3190 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3191 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
3193 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3197 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3200 /* Should never happen */
3201 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST,
3202 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3207 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3209 unsigned long alg_k;
3211 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3213 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3214 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
3215 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3219 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3220 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3221 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3222 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3223 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3224 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3227 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3228 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3229 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3232 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3233 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) {
3234 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3237 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3238 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) {
3239 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3242 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3243 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) {
3244 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3247 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3248 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) {
3249 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3252 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3253 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) {
3254 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3258 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3259 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3260 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3264 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3266 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3267 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3268 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3270 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3273 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3275 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3276 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3277 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3278 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3279 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3281 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3284 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3285 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3287 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3288 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3289 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
3291 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3292 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3293 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3297 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3298 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3303 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3305 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3306 * the handshake_buffer
3308 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3309 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3312 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3314 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3315 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3316 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3317 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3321 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3322 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3324 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3325 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3330 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3333 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3336 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3338 unsigned long l, llen;
3339 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3340 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3341 PACKET spkt, context;
3344 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3345 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3346 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3350 /* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we ignore the context. We need to verify this */
3351 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context))
3352 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
3353 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
3354 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3355 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3356 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3360 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3361 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3362 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3363 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3364 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3365 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3369 certstart = certbytes;
3370 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3372 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3373 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3376 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3377 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3378 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3379 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3383 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3384 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3387 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3388 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
3389 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3393 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3394 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
3395 NULL, chainidx == 0)
3396 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3397 rawexts, x, chainidx,
3398 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
3399 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3402 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3405 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3406 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3407 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3408 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3414 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3415 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3416 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3417 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3418 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3419 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3422 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3423 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3424 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3425 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
3426 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3427 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3430 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3431 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3432 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3437 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3439 SSLfatal(s, ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result),
3440 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3441 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3445 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3446 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3449 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3451 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3452 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3453 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3458 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3459 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3460 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3462 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3463 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3466 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3469 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3470 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3475 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3476 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3480 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3482 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3483 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3484 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3485 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3489 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3493 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3497 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3499 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert;
3502 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3503 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3508 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3509 * for the server Certificate message
3511 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3512 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3513 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3516 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3517 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3524 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3526 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3527 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3528 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3529 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3530 const unsigned char *const_p;
3531 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3534 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3535 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3536 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3538 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3540 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3544 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3545 if (ssl_randbytes(s, age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) {
3546 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3547 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3548 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3551 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
3553 * ticket_nonce is set to a single 0 byte because we only ever send a
3554 * single ticket per connection. IMPORTANT: If we ever support multiple
3555 * tickets per connection then this will need to be changed.
3557 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick_nonce);
3558 s->session->ext.tick_nonce = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(char));
3559 if (s->session->ext.tick_nonce == NULL) {
3560 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3561 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3562 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3565 s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len = 1;
3566 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
3567 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
3568 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
3569 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
3570 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
3571 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
3572 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3573 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3574 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3577 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
3579 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
3582 /* get session encoding length */
3583 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3585 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3588 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3589 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3590 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3593 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3595 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3596 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3600 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3601 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3602 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3603 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3604 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3609 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
3610 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3611 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3616 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3619 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3621 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3622 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3625 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3627 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3628 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
3629 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3630 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3631 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3632 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3636 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3637 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3638 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3639 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3642 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3645 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3646 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3648 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
3649 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3650 int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3655 /* Put timeout and length */
3656 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3657 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3658 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3659 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3660 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3664 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3665 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3669 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3670 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3671 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3674 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3676 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3678 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3679 if (ssl_randbytes(s, iv, iv_len) <= 0
3680 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3681 tctx->ext.tick_aes_key, iv)
3682 || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
3683 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
3684 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
3685 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3686 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3687 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3690 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3691 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3695 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3696 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3697 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3700 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
3701 (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
3702 ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
3704 && (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add_u.age_add)
3705 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->ext.tick_nonce,
3706 s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len)))
3707 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3708 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
3709 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3710 /* Output key name */
3711 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3713 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3714 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3716 /* Encrypt session data */
3717 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3718 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3719 || encdata1 != encdata2
3720 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3721 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3722 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3723 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3724 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3725 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3726 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3727 macendoffset - macoffset)
3728 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3729 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3730 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3731 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3732 || macdata1 != macdata2
3733 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3734 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3735 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3739 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
3740 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3742 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3745 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3746 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3752 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3753 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3758 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
3759 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
3761 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3763 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
3764 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
3765 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
3766 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
3767 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3774 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3776 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
3777 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3784 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3786 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3787 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3789 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3791 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3792 size_t next_proto_len;
3795 * The payload looks like:
3797 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3798 * uint8 padding_len;
3799 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3801 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3802 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3803 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3804 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
3805 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3806 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3809 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
3811 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO,
3812 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3813 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3816 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3818 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3822 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3824 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3826 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3833 static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3838 * TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT version before release
3839 * (should be s->version)
3841 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
3842 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt,
3844 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3845 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3849 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
3851 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3855 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
3856 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3861 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
3862 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
3864 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s)) {
3865 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3872 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3874 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3875 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3876 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3877 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3880 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
3881 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
3882 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3883 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3884 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3888 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
3889 * a record boundary.
3891 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
3892 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
3893 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3894 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
3895 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3898 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
3899 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3900 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
3901 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3902 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3905 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;