2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
12 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
13 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
19 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
20 #include "statem_locl.h"
21 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
22 #include <openssl/objects.h>
23 #include <openssl/evp.h>
24 #include <openssl/x509.h>
27 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
28 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
30 int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
35 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
36 s->init_num, &written);
39 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
41 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
42 * ignore the result anyway
44 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
45 (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
49 if (written == s->init_num) {
51 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
52 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
56 s->init_off += written;
57 s->init_num -= written;
61 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype)
65 if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt))
66 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen)
69 s->init_num = (int)msglen;
75 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s)
77 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s))
81 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
82 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
83 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
85 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
87 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
88 * support secure renegotiation.
90 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
91 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
92 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
95 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
97 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
100 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
101 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
103 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
105 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
106 memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
109 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
112 s->statem.use_timer = 1;
119 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
120 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
122 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
123 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
125 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs,
126 void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen)
128 static const char *servercontext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
129 static const char *clientcontext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
131 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
134 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
135 memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE);
136 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
137 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
138 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY)
139 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext);
141 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext);
144 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
145 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
146 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
148 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
149 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) {
150 memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash,
151 s->cert_verify_hash_len);
152 hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len;
153 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE,
154 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
159 *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen;
163 retlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata);
172 int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
176 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
177 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
178 size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0;
180 unsigned char *sig = NULL;
181 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
182 int pktype, ispss = 0;
185 /* Only happens in TLSv1.3 */
187 * TODO(TLS1.3): This needs to change. We should not get this from the
188 * cipher. However, for now, we have not done the work to separate the
189 * certificate type from the ciphersuite
191 pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md);
195 md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
196 pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
198 pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
200 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
202 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
206 /* Get the data to be signed */
207 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
208 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
212 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !tls12_get_sigandhash(s, pkt, pkey, md, &ispss)) {
213 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
217 fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
219 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
220 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
222 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
226 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
227 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
228 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
233 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
234 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
235 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
239 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
240 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
241 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
242 s->session->master_key)) {
243 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
248 if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) {
249 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
253 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
255 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
256 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
257 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
258 BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen);
262 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) {
263 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
267 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
268 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
272 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
276 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
277 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
281 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
283 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
284 const unsigned char *data;
285 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
286 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
288 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
289 int type = 0, j, pktype;
292 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
295 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
296 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
297 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
300 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
304 peer = s->session->peer;
305 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
306 pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
307 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
309 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
310 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
311 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
312 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
316 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
318 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
319 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
321 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
322 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
323 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
328 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
332 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
333 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
336 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey);
339 } else if (rv == 0) {
340 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
343 md = ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->hash_idx);
345 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
348 /* Use default digest for this key type */
349 int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
351 md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
353 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
358 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
359 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
360 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
364 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
365 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
366 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
367 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
368 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
371 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
372 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
373 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
377 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
378 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
383 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
385 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
386 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
387 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
390 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
392 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
393 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
394 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
395 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
396 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
399 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
405 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
406 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
407 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
408 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
409 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
412 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
413 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
414 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
415 s->session->master_key)) {
416 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
420 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) {
421 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
422 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
427 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
429 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
432 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
433 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
435 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
436 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
437 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
438 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
439 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
444 int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
446 size_t finish_md_len;
451 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
452 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
454 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
455 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
458 finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
460 s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
461 if (finish_md_len == 0) {
462 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
466 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len;
468 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) {
469 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
474 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
475 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
477 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL,
478 s->session->master_key,
479 s->session->master_key_length))
483 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
486 OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
487 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
489 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len;
491 OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
492 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
494 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len;
499 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
503 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
505 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
508 static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
513 * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
514 * the appropriate error.
516 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
519 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
520 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
522 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
523 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
526 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
529 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
533 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
538 remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
540 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
541 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
542 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
544 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
545 if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
546 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
547 || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
548 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
549 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
550 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
551 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
556 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
557 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
558 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
563 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
564 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
565 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
566 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
570 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
571 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
572 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
573 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
577 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
578 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
580 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
581 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
585 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
586 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
589 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
593 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
595 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
596 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
597 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
600 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
602 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
605 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
606 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
607 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
608 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
611 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
613 md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
615 if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
616 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
617 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
621 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
623 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
624 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
629 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
632 OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
633 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
635 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
637 OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
638 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
640 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
644 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
645 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
647 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
649 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
650 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
651 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
655 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
656 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
657 &s->session->master_key_length)) {
658 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
661 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
662 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
663 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
666 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
671 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
673 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
674 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
675 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
678 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
680 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
681 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
682 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
689 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
690 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain,
694 unsigned char *outbytes;
696 len = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
698 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
699 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
702 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes)
703 || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) {
704 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
705 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
710 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x,
717 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
718 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int *al)
722 STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
723 STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
724 X509_STORE *chain_store;
725 int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
727 if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL)
733 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
735 if (cpk->chain != NULL)
736 extra_certs = cpk->chain;
738 extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs;
740 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
742 else if (s->cert->chain_store)
743 chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
745 chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
747 if (chain_store != NULL) {
748 X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
750 if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
751 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
754 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
755 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
756 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
760 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
761 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
762 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
763 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
765 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
766 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
768 chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx);
769 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0);
772 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
773 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
774 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
775 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
777 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
778 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
781 chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain);
782 for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) {
783 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
785 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i, &tmpal)) {
786 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
790 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
792 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
794 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
797 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0, &tmpal))
799 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
800 x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
801 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1, &tmpal))
812 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk,
815 int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
817 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)
818 || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &tmpal)
819 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
820 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
828 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
829 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
832 WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs)
834 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
836 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
837 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
839 ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
840 if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE)
846 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
848 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
849 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
851 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
854 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
858 if (s->statem.cleanuphand) {
859 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
862 s->statem.cleanuphand = 0;
864 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
867 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
869 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
870 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
872 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
874 s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
876 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
877 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
880 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
881 cb = s->info_callback;
882 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
883 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
886 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
888 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
889 /* done with handshaking */
890 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
891 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
892 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
893 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
898 * If we've not cleared the buffers its because we've got more work to do,
902 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
904 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
907 int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
909 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
910 int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al;
914 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
917 while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
918 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
920 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
923 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
926 if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
928 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
929 * in the middle of a handshake message.
931 if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
932 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
933 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
934 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
937 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
938 s->init_num = readbytes - 1;
939 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
940 s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes;
942 } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
943 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
944 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
947 s->init_num += readbytes;
952 if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK
953 && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
955 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
956 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
957 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
960 if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
965 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
966 p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
967 s->msg_callback_arg);
969 } while (skip_message);
970 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
973 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++);
975 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
977 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
980 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
981 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
983 l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer)
984 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
985 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
987 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
988 s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
991 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
992 if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
993 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
994 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
997 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
999 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1005 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1009 int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len)
1011 size_t n, readbytes;
1015 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1016 /* We've already read everything in */
1017 *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
1022 n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
1024 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
1025 &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes);
1027 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1031 s->init_num += readbytes;
1035 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1037 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1038 * Finished verification.
1040 if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
1044 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1045 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1046 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1048 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1049 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1053 if (s->msg_callback)
1054 s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
1055 (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1057 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1058 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1059 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1060 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1064 if (s->msg_callback)
1065 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
1066 (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1067 s->msg_callback_arg);
1074 int ssl_cert_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pk)
1076 if (pk == NULL && (pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x)) == NULL)
1079 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
1083 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
1085 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
1086 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1088 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
1090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1091 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001:
1092 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
1093 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256:
1094 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
1095 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512:
1096 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
1101 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type)
1106 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
1107 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
1108 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
1109 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
1111 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
1112 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
1113 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
1114 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
1115 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
1116 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
1117 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
1118 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
1119 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
1120 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
1121 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
1122 case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH:
1123 case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH:
1124 case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH:
1125 case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH:
1126 case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
1127 case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
1128 case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK:
1129 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1131 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
1132 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
1133 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1135 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
1136 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
1137 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
1139 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
1140 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
1142 case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED:
1143 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
1144 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL:
1145 case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP:
1146 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1148 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
1149 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
1150 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
1151 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
1152 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
1153 case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
1154 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
1155 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
1157 case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
1158 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1160 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
1161 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
1164 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
1170 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s)
1172 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1174 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL);
1177 static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b)
1179 int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s);
1184 return a < b ? -1 : 1;
1185 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1;
1190 const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void);
1191 const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void);
1194 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
1195 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1198 static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
1199 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1200 {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method},
1202 {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1205 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method},
1207 {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1209 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1210 {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method},
1212 {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1214 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1215 {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method},
1217 {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1220 {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method},
1222 {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1227 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1228 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1231 static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = {
1232 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1233 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method},
1235 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1237 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1238 {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method},
1239 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL},
1241 {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1242 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL},
1248 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1250 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1251 * @method: the intended method.
1253 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1255 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
1257 int version = method->version;
1259 if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 &&
1260 version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) ||
1261 ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0)
1262 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1264 if (s->max_proto_version != 0 &&
1265 version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0)
1266 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH;
1268 if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0)
1269 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1270 if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s))
1271 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE;
1272 else if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS) != 0 && FIPS_mode())
1273 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE;
1279 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1282 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1283 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1285 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1287 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version)
1289 const version_info *vent;
1290 const version_info *table;
1292 switch (s->method->version) {
1294 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1295 return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0;
1296 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1297 table = tls_version_table;
1299 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1300 table = dtls_version_table;
1305 vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0;
1307 if (vent->cmeth != NULL &&
1308 version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 &&
1309 ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) {
1317 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1318 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1319 * supported protocol version.
1321 * @s server SSL handle.
1323 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1325 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s)
1327 const version_info *vent;
1328 const version_info *table;
1331 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1332 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
1335 if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
1339 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1340 * highest protocol version).
1342 if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version)
1343 table = tls_version_table;
1344 else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version)
1345 table = dtls_version_table;
1347 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1351 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1352 if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0)
1353 return s->version == vent->version;
1359 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1360 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1361 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1362 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1364 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1365 * @version: the intended limit.
1366 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1368 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1370 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
1378 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1379 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1380 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1382 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1383 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1384 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1385 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1386 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1388 switch (method_version) {
1391 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
1392 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
1393 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
1394 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
1399 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1400 if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION)
1404 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1405 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) ||
1406 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER))
1416 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1417 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1418 * the version specific method.
1420 * @s: server SSL handle.
1422 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1424 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1427 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1429 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1430 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
1432 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1435 int server_version = s->method->version;
1436 int client_version = hello->legacy_version;
1437 const version_info *vent;
1438 const version_info *table;
1440 RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions;
1442 s->client_version = client_version;
1444 switch (server_version) {
1447 * TODO(TLS1.3): This check will fail if someone attempts to do
1448 * renegotiation in TLS1.3 at the moment. We need to ensure we disable
1449 * renegotiation for TLS1.3
1451 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
1452 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1454 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1455 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1456 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1457 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1458 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1461 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1462 table = tls_version_table;
1464 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1465 table = dtls_version_table;
1469 suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions];
1471 if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1472 unsigned int candidate_vers = 0;
1473 unsigned int best_vers = 0;
1474 const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL;
1475 PACKET versionslist;
1477 suppversions->parsed = 1;
1479 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) {
1480 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1481 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1484 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) {
1485 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1486 if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
1487 candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION;
1489 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about
1490 * wheter to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the
1491 * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later
1493 if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0)
1496 vent->version != 0 && vent->version != (int)candidate_vers;
1499 if (vent->version != 0 && vent->smeth != NULL) {
1500 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1502 method = vent->smeth();
1503 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1504 best_vers = candidate_vers;
1505 best_method = method;
1509 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) {
1510 /* Trailing data? */
1511 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1514 if (best_vers > 0) {
1515 s->version = best_vers;
1516 s->method = best_method;
1519 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1523 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1524 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1526 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0)
1527 client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1530 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1533 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1534 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1536 if (vent->smeth == NULL ||
1537 version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0)
1539 method = vent->smeth();
1540 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1541 s->version = vent->version;
1547 return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1551 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1552 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1553 * the version specific method.
1555 * @s: client SSL handle.
1556 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1558 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1560 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version)
1562 const version_info *vent;
1563 const version_info *table;
1565 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1566 if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
1567 version = TLS1_3_VERSION;
1569 switch (s->method->version) {
1571 if (version != s->version)
1572 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1574 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1575 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1576 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1577 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1578 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1581 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1582 table = tls_version_table;
1584 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1585 table = dtls_version_table;
1589 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1590 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1593 if (version != vent->version)
1595 if (vent->cmeth == NULL)
1597 method = vent->cmeth();
1598 err = ssl_method_error(s, method);
1602 s->version = version;
1606 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1610 * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version
1611 * @s: The SSL connection
1612 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1613 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1615 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1616 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1617 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1618 * or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1619 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1621 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1622 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1623 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1625 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1626 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1628 int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version,
1633 const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL;
1634 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1635 const version_info *table;
1636 const version_info *vent;
1638 switch (s->method->version) {
1641 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1642 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1643 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1644 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1645 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1647 *min_version = *max_version = s->version;
1649 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1650 table = tls_version_table;
1652 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1653 table = dtls_version_table;
1658 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
1659 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
1660 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
1661 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
1663 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
1664 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
1665 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
1667 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
1668 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
1669 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
1671 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
1672 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
1673 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
1674 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
1675 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
1676 * selected, as we start from scratch.
1678 *min_version = version = 0;
1680 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1682 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
1683 * "version capability" vector.
1685 if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
1689 method = vent->cmeth();
1690 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
1694 *min_version = method->version;
1696 version = (single = method)->version;
1697 *min_version = version;
1702 *max_version = version;
1704 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
1706 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE;
1712 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
1713 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
1715 * @s: client SSL handle.
1717 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1719 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s)
1721 int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
1723 ret = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max);
1728 s->version = ver_max;
1730 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
1731 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION)
1732 ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1734 s->client_version = ver_max;