2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/x509.h>
23 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
24 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
26 int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
31 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
32 s->init_num, &written);
35 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
37 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
38 * ignore the result anyway
40 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
41 (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
45 if (written == s->init_num) {
47 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
48 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
52 s->init_off += written;
53 s->init_num -= written;
57 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype)
61 if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt))
62 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen)
65 s->init_num = (int)msglen;
71 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s)
73 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s))
76 /* Reset any extension flags */
77 memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags));
80 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
81 int i, ver_min, ver_max, ok = 0;
84 * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers
85 * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the
88 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max) != 0) {
89 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
90 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
93 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
94 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
97 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) &&
98 DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls))
100 } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) {
107 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
108 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
109 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
113 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
114 /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */
115 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept, 1, &i,
116 s->session_ctx->lock);
117 } else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
118 /* Renegotiation is disabled */
119 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
121 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
123 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
125 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
126 * support secure renegotiation.
128 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
129 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
132 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
133 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate, 1, &i,
136 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
140 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
141 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect, 1, &discard,
142 s->session_ctx->lock);
144 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate,
145 1, &discard, s->session_ctx->lock);
147 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
148 memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
151 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
154 s->statem.use_timer = 1;
161 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
162 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
164 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
165 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
167 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs,
168 void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen)
170 static const char *servercontext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
171 static const char *clientcontext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
173 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
176 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
177 memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE);
178 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
179 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
180 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY)
181 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext);
183 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext);
186 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
187 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
188 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
190 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
191 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) {
192 memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash,
193 s->cert_verify_hash_len);
194 hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len;
195 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE,
196 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
201 *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen;
205 retlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata);
214 int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
216 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
217 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
218 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
219 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
220 size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0;
222 unsigned char *sig = NULL;
223 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
224 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
226 if (lu == NULL || s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL) {
227 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
230 pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
232 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
233 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
237 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
239 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
243 /* Get the data to be signed */
244 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
245 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
249 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
250 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
253 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
254 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
256 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
260 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
261 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
265 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
266 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
267 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
268 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
269 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
273 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
274 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
275 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
276 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
277 s->session->master_key)
278 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) {
280 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
283 } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
284 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
288 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
290 int pktype = lu->sig;
292 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
293 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
294 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
295 BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen);
299 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) {
300 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
304 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
305 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
309 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
313 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
314 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
318 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
320 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
321 const unsigned char *data;
322 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
323 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
325 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
326 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
330 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
333 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
334 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
335 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
338 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
342 peer = s->session->peer;
343 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
347 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) {
348 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
349 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
350 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
354 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
358 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
359 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
362 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey);
365 } else if (rv == 0) {
366 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
370 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
372 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
373 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
377 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
378 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
379 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
383 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
385 * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without
386 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2)
388 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
389 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)
390 && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
391 && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
392 || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256))
393 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128
394 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) {
395 len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
398 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
399 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
400 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
404 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
405 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
406 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
407 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
408 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
411 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
412 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
413 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
417 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
418 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
423 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
425 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
426 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
429 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
431 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
432 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
433 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
434 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
435 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
436 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
439 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
445 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
446 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
447 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
448 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
449 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
453 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
454 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
455 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
456 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
457 s->session->master_key)) {
458 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
461 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) {
462 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
463 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
467 j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen);
469 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
470 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
475 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
478 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
479 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
481 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
482 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
483 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
484 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
485 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
490 int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
492 size_t finish_md_len;
496 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
498 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
501 * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the
506 && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 0
507 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
508 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
509 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
511 * This is a fatal error, which leaves
512 * enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent state
513 * and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
519 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
520 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
522 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
523 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
526 finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
528 s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
529 if (finish_md_len == 0) {
530 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
534 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len;
536 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) {
537 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
542 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
543 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
545 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL,
546 s->session->master_key,
547 s->session->master_key_length)) {
548 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
553 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
555 if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
556 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
560 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
562 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len;
564 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
566 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len;
571 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
575 int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
577 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) {
578 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
582 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE;
586 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
590 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
593 unsigned int updatetype;
595 s->key_update_count++;
596 if (s->key_update_count > MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES) {
597 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
598 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES);
603 * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
604 * be on a record boundary.
606 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
607 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
608 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
612 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype)
613 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
614 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
615 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
620 * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we
623 if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
624 && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) {
625 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
626 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
631 * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
632 * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
633 * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop).
635 if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED)
636 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED;
638 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) {
639 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
640 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
644 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
646 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
647 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
648 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
651 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
653 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
656 static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
661 * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
662 * the appropriate error.
664 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
667 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
668 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
670 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
671 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
674 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
677 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
681 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
686 remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
688 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
689 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
690 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
692 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
693 if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
694 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
695 || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
696 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
697 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
698 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
699 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
704 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
705 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
706 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
711 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
712 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
713 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
714 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
718 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
719 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
720 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
721 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
725 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
726 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
728 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
729 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
731 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
733 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
734 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
737 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
741 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
743 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
744 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
745 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
748 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
750 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
754 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
756 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
759 * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
760 * message must be on a record boundary.
762 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
763 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
764 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
768 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
769 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
770 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
771 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
774 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
776 md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
778 if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
779 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
780 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
784 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
786 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
787 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
792 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
794 if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
795 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
796 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
800 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
802 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
804 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
806 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
810 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
811 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
813 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
815 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
816 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
817 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
821 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
822 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
823 &s->session->master_key_length)) {
824 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
827 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
828 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
829 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
832 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
837 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
839 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
840 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
841 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
844 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
846 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
847 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
848 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
855 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
856 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain,
860 unsigned char *outbytes;
862 len = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
864 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
865 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
868 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes)
869 || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) {
870 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
871 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
876 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x,
883 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
884 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int *al)
888 STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
889 STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
890 X509_STORE *chain_store;
891 int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
893 if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL)
899 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
901 if (cpk->chain != NULL)
902 extra_certs = cpk->chain;
904 extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs;
906 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
908 else if (s->cert->chain_store)
909 chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
911 chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
913 if (chain_store != NULL) {
914 X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
916 if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
917 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
920 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
921 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
922 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
926 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
927 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
928 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
929 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
931 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
932 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
934 chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx);
935 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0);
938 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
940 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
941 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
943 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
944 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
947 chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain);
948 for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) {
949 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
951 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i, &tmpal)) {
952 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
956 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
958 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
960 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
963 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0, &tmpal))
965 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
966 x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
967 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1, &tmpal))
978 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk,
981 int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
983 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)
984 || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &tmpal)
985 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
986 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
994 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
995 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
998 WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs)
1001 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1003 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1004 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
1006 ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
1007 if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE)
1013 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1015 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
1016 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
1018 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
1021 if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s))
1026 if (s->statem.cleanuphand) {
1027 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
1030 s->statem.cleanuphand = 0;
1032 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
1035 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
1037 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
1038 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good, 1, &discard,
1040 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
1043 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the
1046 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1047 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
1049 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit, 1, &discard,
1050 s->session_ctx->lock);
1052 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
1053 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good, 1,
1054 &discard, s->session_ctx->lock);
1057 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1058 cb = s->info_callback;
1059 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1060 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1063 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
1065 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1066 /* done with handshaking */
1067 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
1068 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
1069 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
1070 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
1075 * If we've not cleared the buffers its because we've got more work to do,
1079 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1081 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
1082 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1085 int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
1087 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1088 int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al;
1090 size_t l, readbytes;
1092 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1095 while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
1096 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
1098 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
1101 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1104 if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1106 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
1107 * in the middle of a handshake message.
1109 if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
1110 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1111 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
1112 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1115 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1116 s->init_num = readbytes - 1;
1117 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1118 s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes;
1120 } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1121 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1122 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1125 s->init_num += readbytes;
1130 if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK
1131 && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
1133 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
1134 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
1135 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
1138 if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
1142 if (s->msg_callback)
1143 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1144 p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1145 s->msg_callback_arg);
1147 } while (skip_message);
1148 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1151 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++);
1153 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1155 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
1158 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
1159 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
1161 l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer)
1162 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1163 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
1165 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1166 s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1169 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
1170 if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1171 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1172 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
1175 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
1177 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1183 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1187 int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len)
1189 size_t n, readbytes;
1193 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1194 /* We've already read everything in */
1195 *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
1200 n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
1202 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
1203 &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes);
1205 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1209 s->init_num += readbytes;
1213 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1215 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1216 * Finished verification.
1218 if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
1222 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1223 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1224 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1226 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1227 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1231 if (s->msg_callback)
1232 s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
1233 (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1236 * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
1237 * processing the message
1239 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
1240 && !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1241 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1242 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1243 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1247 if (s->msg_callback)
1248 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
1249 (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1250 s->msg_callback_arg);
1257 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type)
1262 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
1263 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
1264 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
1265 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
1267 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
1268 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
1269 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
1270 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
1271 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
1272 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
1273 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
1274 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
1275 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
1276 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
1277 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
1278 case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH:
1279 case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH:
1280 case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH:
1281 case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH:
1282 case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
1283 case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
1284 case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK:
1285 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1287 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
1288 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
1289 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1291 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
1292 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
1293 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
1295 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
1296 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
1298 case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED:
1299 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
1300 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL:
1301 case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP:
1302 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1304 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
1305 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
1306 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
1307 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
1308 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
1309 case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
1310 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
1311 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
1313 case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
1314 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1316 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
1317 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
1320 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
1326 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s)
1328 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1330 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL);
1333 static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b)
1335 int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s);
1340 return a < b ? -1 : 1;
1341 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1;
1346 const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void);
1347 const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void);
1350 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
1351 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1354 /* Must be in order high to low */
1355 static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
1356 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1357 {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method},
1359 {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1362 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method},
1364 {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1366 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1367 {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method},
1369 {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1371 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1372 {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method},
1374 {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1376 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1377 {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method},
1379 {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1384 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1385 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1388 /* Must be in order high to low */
1389 static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = {
1390 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1391 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method},
1393 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1396 {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method},
1397 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL},
1399 {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1400 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL},
1406 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1408 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1409 * @method: the intended method.
1411 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1413 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
1415 int version = method->version;
1417 if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 &&
1418 version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) ||
1419 ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0)
1420 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1422 if (s->max_proto_version != 0 &&
1423 version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0)
1424 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH;
1426 if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0)
1427 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1428 if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s))
1429 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE;
1435 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1438 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1439 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1441 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1443 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version)
1445 const version_info *vent;
1446 const version_info *table;
1448 switch (s->method->version) {
1450 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1451 return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0;
1452 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1453 table = tls_version_table;
1455 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1456 table = dtls_version_table;
1461 vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0;
1463 if (vent->cmeth != NULL &&
1464 version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 &&
1465 ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) {
1473 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1474 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1475 * supported protocol version.
1477 * @s server SSL handle.
1479 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1481 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s)
1483 const version_info *vent;
1484 const version_info *table;
1487 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1488 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
1491 if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
1495 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1496 * highest protocol version).
1498 if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version)
1499 table = tls_version_table;
1500 else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version)
1501 table = dtls_version_table;
1503 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1507 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1508 if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0)
1509 return s->version == vent->version;
1515 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1516 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1517 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1518 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1520 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1521 * @version: the intended limit.
1522 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1524 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1526 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
1534 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1535 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1536 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1538 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1539 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1540 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1541 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1542 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1544 switch (method_version) {
1547 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
1548 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
1549 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
1550 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
1555 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1556 if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION)
1560 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1561 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) ||
1562 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER))
1571 static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
1573 if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION
1574 && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1575 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2;
1576 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION
1577 && (ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION)
1578 || ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION))) {
1579 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1;
1581 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1586 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1587 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1588 * the version specific method.
1590 * @s: server SSL handle.
1592 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1594 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
1597 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1599 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1600 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
1602 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1605 int server_version = s->method->version;
1606 int client_version = hello->legacy_version;
1607 const version_info *vent;
1608 const version_info *table;
1610 RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions;
1612 s->client_version = client_version;
1614 switch (server_version) {
1616 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1617 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
1618 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1619 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1621 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1622 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1623 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1624 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1625 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1630 * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
1631 * a HelloRetryRequest
1634 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1635 table = tls_version_table;
1637 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1638 table = dtls_version_table;
1642 suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions];
1644 if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1645 unsigned int candidate_vers = 0;
1646 unsigned int best_vers = 0;
1647 const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL;
1648 PACKET versionslist;
1650 suppversions->parsed = 1;
1652 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) {
1653 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1654 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1657 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) {
1658 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1659 if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
1660 candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION;
1662 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about
1663 * whether to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the
1664 * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later
1666 if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0)
1669 vent->version != 0 && vent->version != (int)candidate_vers;
1672 if (vent->version != 0 && vent->smeth != NULL) {
1673 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1675 method = vent->smeth();
1676 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1677 best_vers = candidate_vers;
1678 best_method = method;
1682 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) {
1683 /* Trailing data? */
1684 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1687 if (best_vers > 0) {
1688 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1690 * We get here if this is after a HelloRetryRequest. In this
1691 * case we just check that we still negotiated TLSv1.3
1693 if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION)
1694 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1697 check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd);
1698 s->version = best_vers;
1699 s->method = best_method;
1702 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1706 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1707 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1709 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0)
1710 client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1713 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1716 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1717 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1719 if (vent->smeth == NULL ||
1720 version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0)
1722 method = vent->smeth();
1723 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1724 check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd);
1725 s->version = vent->version;
1731 return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1735 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1736 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1737 * the version specific method.
1739 * @s: client SSL handle.
1740 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1741 * @checkdgrd: Whether to check the downgrade sentinels in the server_random
1742 * @al: Where to store any alert value that may be generated
1744 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1746 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, int checkdgrd, int *al)
1748 const version_info *vent;
1749 const version_info *table;
1752 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1753 if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
1754 version = TLS1_3_VERSION;
1756 if (s->hello_retry_request && version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1757 *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1758 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1761 switch (s->method->version) {
1763 if (version != s->version) {
1764 *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1765 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1768 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1769 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1770 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1771 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1772 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1775 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1776 table = tls_version_table;
1778 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1779 table = dtls_version_table;
1783 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1784 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1787 if (vent->cmeth == NULL)
1790 if (highver != 0 && version != vent->version)
1793 method = vent->cmeth();
1794 err = ssl_method_error(s, method);
1796 if (version == vent->version) {
1797 *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1804 highver = vent->version;
1806 if (version != vent->version)
1809 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS13DOWNGRADE
1810 /* Check for downgrades */
1812 if (version == TLS1_2_VERSION && highver > version) {
1813 if (memcmp(tls12downgrade,
1814 s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1815 - sizeof(tls12downgrade),
1816 sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) {
1817 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1818 return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
1820 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
1821 && version < TLS1_2_VERSION
1822 && highver > version) {
1823 if (memcmp(tls11downgrade,
1824 s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1825 - sizeof(tls11downgrade),
1826 sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) {
1827 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1828 return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
1835 s->version = version;
1839 *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1840 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1844 * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version
1845 * @s: The SSL connection
1846 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1847 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1849 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1850 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1851 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1852 * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1853 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1855 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1856 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1857 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1859 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1860 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1862 int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version)
1866 const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL;
1867 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1868 const version_info *table;
1869 const version_info *vent;
1871 switch (s->method->version) {
1874 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1875 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1876 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1877 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1878 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1880 *min_version = *max_version = s->version;
1882 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1883 table = tls_version_table;
1885 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1886 table = dtls_version_table;
1891 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
1892 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
1893 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
1894 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
1896 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
1897 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
1898 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
1900 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
1901 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
1902 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
1904 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
1905 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
1906 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
1907 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
1908 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
1909 * selected, as we start from scratch.
1911 *min_version = version = 0;
1913 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1915 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
1916 * "version capability" vector.
1918 if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
1922 method = vent->cmeth();
1923 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
1927 *min_version = method->version;
1929 version = (single = method)->version;
1930 *min_version = version;
1935 *max_version = version;
1937 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
1939 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE;
1945 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
1946 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
1948 * @s: client SSL handle.
1950 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1952 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s)
1954 int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
1956 ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max);
1961 s->version = ver_max;
1963 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
1964 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION)
1965 ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1967 s->client_version = ver_max;
1972 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
1973 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
1974 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
1975 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
1977 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1978 int check_in_list(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups,
1979 size_t num_groups, int checkallow)
1983 if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
1986 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
1987 uint16_t group = groups[i];
1989 if (group_id == group
1991 || tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
2000 /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
2001 int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s)
2003 unsigned char hashval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2005 unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
2007 memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr));
2009 /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
2010 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
2011 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) {
2012 SSLerr(SSL_F_CREATE_SYNTHETIC_MESSAGE_HASH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2016 /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
2017 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s))
2020 /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
2021 msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH;
2022 msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen;
2023 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
2024 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) {
2025 SSLerr(SSL_F_CREATE_SYNTHETIC_MESSAGE_HASH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2032 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2034 return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b);
2037 int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2039 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp);
2040 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2043 if (ca_sk == NULL) {
2044 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2047 /* get the CA RDNs */
2048 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) {
2049 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2050 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2054 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) {
2055 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2056 unsigned int name_len;
2058 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len)
2059 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2060 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2064 namestart = namebytes;
2065 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) {
2066 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2069 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2070 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2074 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2075 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2076 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2082 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2083 s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk;
2088 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2090 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2095 int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2097 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s);
2099 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2100 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt))
2103 if (ca_sk != NULL) {
2106 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) {
2107 unsigned char *namebytes;
2108 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i);
2112 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
2113 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
2115 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
2121 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt))
2127 /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */
2128 size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(const SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs,
2129 const void *param, size_t paramlen)
2131 size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen;
2132 unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen);
2136 memcpy(tbs, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2137 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2139 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen);