2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */
23 const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = {
24 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02,
25 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e,
26 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c
30 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
31 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
33 int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
38 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
39 s->init_num, &written);
42 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
44 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
45 * ignore the result anyway
47 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
48 (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
52 if (written == s->init_num) {
54 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
55 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
59 s->init_off += written;
60 s->init_num -= written;
64 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype)
68 if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt))
69 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen)
72 s->init_num = (int)msglen;
78 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s)
80 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
81 /* SSLfatal() already called */
85 /* Reset any extension flags */
86 memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags));
89 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
90 int i, ver_min, ver_max, ok = 0;
93 * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers
94 * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the
97 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max) != 0) {
98 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
99 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
102 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
103 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
105 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
106 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) &&
107 DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls))
109 } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) {
116 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
117 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
118 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
122 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
123 /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */
124 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept, 1, &i,
125 s->session_ctx->lock);
126 } else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
127 /* Renegotiation is disabled */
128 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
130 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
132 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
134 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
135 * support secure renegotiation.
137 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
138 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
141 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
142 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate, 1, &i,
145 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
149 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
150 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect, 1, &discard,
151 s->session_ctx->lock);
153 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate,
154 1, &discard, s->session_ctx->lock);
156 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
157 memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
160 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
163 s->statem.use_timer = 1;
170 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
171 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
173 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
174 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
176 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs,
177 void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen)
179 static const char *servercontext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
180 static const char *clientcontext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
182 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
185 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
186 memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE);
187 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
188 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
189 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY)
190 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext);
192 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext);
195 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
196 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
197 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
199 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
200 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) {
201 memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash,
202 s->cert_verify_hash_len);
203 hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len;
204 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE,
205 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
206 /* SSLfatal() already called */
211 *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen;
215 retlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata);
217 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_GET_CERT_VERIFY_TBS_DATA,
218 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
227 int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
229 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
230 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
231 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
232 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
233 size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0;
235 unsigned char *sig = NULL;
236 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
237 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
239 if (lu == NULL || s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL) {
240 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
241 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
244 pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
246 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
247 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
248 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
252 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
254 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
255 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
259 /* Get the data to be signed */
260 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
261 /* SSLfatal() already called */
265 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
266 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
267 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
270 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
271 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
273 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
274 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
278 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
279 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
284 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
285 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
286 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
287 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
288 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
293 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
294 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
295 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
296 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
297 s->session->master_key)
298 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) {
300 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
304 } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
305 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
310 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
312 int pktype = lu->sig;
314 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
315 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
316 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
317 BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen);
321 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) {
322 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
323 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
327 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
328 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
329 /* SSLfatal() already called */
334 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
338 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
342 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
344 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
345 const unsigned char *data;
346 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
347 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
349 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
353 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
356 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
357 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
358 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
361 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
362 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
366 peer = s->session->peer;
367 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
369 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
370 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
374 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) {
375 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
376 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
380 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
383 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
384 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
388 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) {
389 /* SSLfatal() already called */
393 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
395 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
396 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
397 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
401 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
402 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
403 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
407 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
409 * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without
410 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2)
412 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
413 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)
414 && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
415 && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
416 || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256))
417 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128
418 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) {
419 len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
422 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
423 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
424 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
428 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
429 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
430 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
431 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
432 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
435 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
436 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
437 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
441 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
442 /* SSLfatal() already called */
447 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
449 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
450 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
454 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
456 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
457 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
458 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
459 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
460 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
461 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
462 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
465 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
471 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
472 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
473 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
474 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
475 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
480 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
481 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
482 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
483 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
484 s->session->master_key)) {
485 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
489 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) {
490 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
491 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
495 j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen);
497 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
498 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
503 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
505 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
506 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
507 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
508 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
509 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
514 int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
516 size_t finish_md_len;
520 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
522 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
525 * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the
530 && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 0
531 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
532 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {;
533 /* SSLfatal() already called */
538 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
539 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
541 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
542 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
545 finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
547 s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
548 if (finish_md_len == 0) {
549 /* SSLfatal() already called */
553 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len;
555 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) {
556 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED,
557 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
562 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
563 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
565 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL,
566 s->session->master_key,
567 s->session->master_key_length)) {
568 /* SSLfatal() already called */
573 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
575 if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
576 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED,
577 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
581 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
583 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len;
585 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
587 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len;
593 int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
595 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) {
596 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE,
597 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
601 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE;
605 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
607 unsigned int updatetype;
609 s->key_update_count++;
610 if (s->key_update_count > MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES) {
611 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
612 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES);
613 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
617 * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
618 * be on a record boundary.
620 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
621 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
622 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
623 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
626 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype)
627 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
628 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
629 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
630 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
634 * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we
637 if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
638 && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) {
639 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
640 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
641 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
645 * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
646 * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
647 * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop).
649 if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED)
650 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED;
652 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) {
653 /* SSLfatal() already called */
654 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
657 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
660 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
662 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
665 static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
670 * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
671 * the appropriate error.
673 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
676 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
677 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
679 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
680 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
683 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
686 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
690 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
694 remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
696 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
697 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
698 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
700 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
701 if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
702 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
703 || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
704 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
705 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
706 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
707 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
708 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
712 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
713 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
714 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
715 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
719 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
720 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
721 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
722 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
723 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
726 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
727 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
728 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
729 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
730 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
733 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
734 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
736 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
737 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
739 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
741 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
742 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
745 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
749 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
752 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
757 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
759 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
762 * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
763 * message must be on a record boundary.
765 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
766 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
767 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
768 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
771 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
772 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
773 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
774 SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
775 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
777 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
779 md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
781 if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
782 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
783 SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
784 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
787 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
789 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
790 SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
791 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
795 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
797 if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
798 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
799 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
800 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
803 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
805 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
807 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
809 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
813 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
814 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
816 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
818 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
819 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
820 /* SSLfatal() already called */
821 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
824 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
825 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
826 &s->session->master_key_length)) {
827 /* SSLfatal() already called */
828 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
830 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
831 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
832 /* SSLfatal() already called */
833 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
835 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
836 /* SSLfatal() already called */
837 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
842 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
845 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
847 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
848 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
849 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
856 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
857 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain)
860 unsigned char *outbytes;
862 len = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
864 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET,
868 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes)
869 || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) {
870 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET,
871 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
876 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x,
878 /* SSLfatal() already called */
885 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
886 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
890 STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
891 STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
892 X509_STORE *chain_store;
894 if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL)
900 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
902 if (cpk->chain != NULL)
903 extra_certs = cpk->chain;
905 extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs;
907 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
909 else if (s->cert->chain_store)
910 chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
912 chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
914 if (chain_store != NULL) {
915 X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
917 if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
918 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN,
919 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
922 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
923 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
924 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN,
929 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
930 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
931 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
932 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
934 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
935 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
937 chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx);
938 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0);
941 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
942 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
943 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
944 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
946 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
947 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
950 chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain);
951 for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) {
952 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
954 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i)) {
955 /* SSLfatal() already called */
956 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
960 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
962 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
964 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
967 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0)) {
968 /* SSLfatal() already called */
971 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
972 x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
973 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1)) {
974 /* SSLfatal() already called */
982 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
984 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) {
985 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,
986 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
990 if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk))
993 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
994 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,
995 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1003 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
1004 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
1007 WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs, int stop)
1010 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1012 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1013 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
1015 ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
1016 if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE)
1022 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1024 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
1025 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
1027 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
1030 if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) {
1031 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_FINISH_HANDSHAKE,
1032 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1038 if (s->statem.cleanuphand) {
1039 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
1042 s->statem.cleanuphand = 0;
1044 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
1047 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
1049 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
1050 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good, 1, &discard,
1052 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
1055 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the
1058 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1059 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
1061 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit, 1, &discard,
1062 s->session_ctx->lock);
1064 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
1065 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good, 1,
1066 &discard, s->session_ctx->lock);
1069 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1070 cb = s->info_callback;
1071 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1072 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1075 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
1077 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1078 /* done with handshaking */
1079 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
1080 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
1081 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
1082 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
1087 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1089 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
1090 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1093 int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
1095 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1096 int skip_message, i, recvd_type;
1098 size_t l, readbytes;
1100 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1103 while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
1104 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
1106 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
1109 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1112 if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1114 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
1115 * in the middle of a handshake message.
1117 if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
1118 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1119 SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
1120 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1123 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1124 s->init_num = readbytes - 1;
1125 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1126 s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes;
1128 } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1129 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1130 SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
1131 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1134 s->init_num += readbytes;
1139 if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK
1140 && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
1142 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
1143 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
1144 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
1147 if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
1151 if (s->msg_callback)
1152 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1153 p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1154 s->msg_callback_arg);
1156 } while (skip_message);
1157 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1160 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++);
1162 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1164 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
1167 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
1168 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
1170 l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer)
1171 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1172 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
1174 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1175 s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1178 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
1179 if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1180 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
1181 SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
1184 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
1186 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1193 int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len)
1195 size_t n, readbytes;
1199 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1200 /* We've already read everything in */
1201 *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
1206 n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
1208 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
1209 &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes);
1211 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1215 s->init_num += readbytes;
1219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1221 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1222 * Finished verification.
1224 if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
1228 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1229 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1230 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1232 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1236 if (s->msg_callback)
1237 s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
1238 (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1241 * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
1242 * processing the message
1244 #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2)
1245 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
1246 || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1247 || memcmp(hrrrandom,
1248 s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET,
1249 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) {
1250 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1251 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1252 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1257 if (s->msg_callback)
1258 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
1259 (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1260 s->msg_callback_arg);
1267 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type)
1272 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
1273 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
1274 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
1275 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
1277 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
1278 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
1279 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
1280 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
1281 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
1282 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
1283 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
1284 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
1285 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
1286 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
1287 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
1288 case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH:
1289 case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH:
1290 case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH:
1291 case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH:
1292 case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
1293 case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
1294 case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK:
1295 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1297 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
1298 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
1299 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1301 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
1302 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
1303 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
1305 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
1306 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
1308 case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED:
1309 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
1310 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL:
1311 case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP:
1312 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1314 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
1315 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
1316 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
1317 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
1318 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
1319 case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
1320 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
1321 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
1323 case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
1324 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1326 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
1327 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
1330 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
1336 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s)
1338 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1340 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL);
1343 static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b)
1345 int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s);
1350 return a < b ? -1 : 1;
1351 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1;
1356 const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void);
1357 const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void);
1360 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
1361 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1364 /* Must be in order high to low */
1365 static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
1366 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1367 {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method},
1369 {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1371 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1372 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method},
1374 {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1376 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1377 {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method},
1379 {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1382 {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method},
1384 {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1387 {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method},
1389 {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1394 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1395 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1398 /* Must be in order high to low */
1399 static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = {
1400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1401 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method},
1403 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1406 {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method},
1407 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL},
1409 {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1410 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL},
1416 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1418 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1419 * @method: the intended method.
1421 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1423 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
1425 int version = method->version;
1427 if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 &&
1428 version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) ||
1429 ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0)
1430 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1432 if (s->max_proto_version != 0 &&
1433 version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0)
1434 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH;
1436 if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0)
1437 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1438 if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s))
1439 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE;
1445 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1448 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1449 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1451 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1453 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version)
1455 const version_info *vent;
1456 const version_info *table;
1458 switch (s->method->version) {
1460 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1461 return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0;
1462 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1463 table = tls_version_table;
1465 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1466 table = dtls_version_table;
1471 vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0;
1473 if (vent->cmeth != NULL &&
1474 version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 &&
1475 ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) {
1483 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1484 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1485 * supported protocol version.
1487 * @s server SSL handle.
1489 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1491 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s)
1493 const version_info *vent;
1494 const version_info *table;
1497 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1498 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
1501 if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
1505 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1506 * highest protocol version).
1508 if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version)
1509 table = tls_version_table;
1510 else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version)
1511 table = dtls_version_table;
1513 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1517 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1518 if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0)
1519 return s->version == vent->version;
1525 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1526 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1527 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1528 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1530 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1531 * @version: the intended limit.
1532 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1534 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1536 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
1544 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1545 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1546 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1548 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1549 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1550 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1551 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1552 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1554 switch (method_version) {
1557 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
1558 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
1559 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
1560 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
1565 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1566 if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION)
1570 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1571 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) ||
1572 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER))
1581 static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
1583 if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION
1584 && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1585 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2;
1586 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION
1587 && (ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION)
1588 || ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION))) {
1589 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1;
1591 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1596 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1597 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1598 * the version specific method.
1600 * @s: server SSL handle.
1602 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1604 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
1607 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1609 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1610 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
1612 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1615 int server_version = s->method->version;
1616 int client_version = hello->legacy_version;
1617 const version_info *vent;
1618 const version_info *table;
1620 RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions;
1622 s->client_version = client_version;
1624 switch (server_version) {
1626 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1627 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
1628 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1629 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1631 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1632 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1633 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1634 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1635 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1640 * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
1641 * a HelloRetryRequest
1644 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1645 table = tls_version_table;
1647 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1648 table = dtls_version_table;
1652 suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions];
1654 /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */
1655 if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE)
1656 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1658 if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1659 unsigned int candidate_vers = 0;
1660 unsigned int best_vers = 0;
1661 const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL;
1662 PACKET versionslist;
1664 suppversions->parsed = 1;
1666 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) {
1667 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1668 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1671 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) {
1672 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1673 if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
1674 candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION;
1676 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about
1677 * whether to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the
1678 * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later
1680 if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0)
1683 vent->version != 0 && vent->version != (int)candidate_vers;
1686 if (vent->version != 0 && vent->smeth != NULL) {
1687 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1689 method = vent->smeth();
1690 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1691 best_vers = candidate_vers;
1692 best_method = method;
1696 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) {
1697 /* Trailing data? */
1698 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1701 if (best_vers > 0) {
1702 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1704 * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we
1705 * negotiated TLSv1.3
1707 if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION)
1708 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1711 check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd);
1712 s->version = best_vers;
1713 s->method = best_method;
1716 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1720 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1721 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1723 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0)
1724 client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1727 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1730 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1731 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1733 if (vent->smeth == NULL ||
1734 version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0)
1736 method = vent->smeth();
1737 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1738 check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd);
1739 s->version = vent->version;
1745 return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1749 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1750 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1751 * the version specific method.
1753 * @s: client SSL handle.
1754 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1755 * @extensions: The extensions received
1757 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
1759 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions)
1761 const version_info *vent;
1762 const version_info *table;
1767 s->version = version;
1769 /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */
1770 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions,
1771 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1772 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions,
1778 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE
1779 && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1781 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
1782 SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1786 switch (s->method->version) {
1788 if (s->version != s->method->version) {
1790 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1791 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
1792 SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1796 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1797 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1798 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1799 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1800 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1803 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1804 table = tls_version_table;
1806 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1807 table = dtls_version_table;
1811 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1812 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1815 if (vent->cmeth == NULL)
1818 if (highver != 0 && s->version != vent->version)
1821 method = vent->cmeth();
1822 err = ssl_method_error(s, method);
1824 if (s->version == vent->version) {
1826 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1827 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, err);
1834 highver = vent->version;
1836 if (s->version != vent->version)
1839 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS13DOWNGRADE
1840 /* Check for downgrades */
1841 if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && highver > s->version) {
1842 if (memcmp(tls12downgrade,
1843 s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1844 - sizeof(tls12downgrade),
1845 sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) {
1847 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1848 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
1849 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1852 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
1853 && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION
1854 && highver > s->version) {
1855 if (memcmp(tls11downgrade,
1856 s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1857 - sizeof(tls11downgrade),
1858 sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) {
1860 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1861 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
1862 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1873 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
1874 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
1879 * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version
1880 * @s: The SSL connection
1881 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1882 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1884 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1885 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1886 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1887 * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1888 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1890 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1891 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1892 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1894 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1895 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1897 int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version)
1901 const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL;
1902 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1903 const version_info *table;
1904 const version_info *vent;
1906 switch (s->method->version) {
1909 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1910 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1911 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1912 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1913 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1915 *min_version = *max_version = s->version;
1917 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1918 table = tls_version_table;
1920 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1921 table = dtls_version_table;
1926 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
1927 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
1928 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
1929 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
1931 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
1932 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
1933 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
1935 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
1936 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
1937 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
1939 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
1940 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
1941 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
1942 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
1943 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
1944 * selected, as we start from scratch.
1946 *min_version = version = 0;
1948 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1950 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
1951 * "version capability" vector.
1953 if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
1957 method = vent->cmeth();
1958 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
1962 *min_version = method->version;
1964 version = (single = method)->version;
1965 *min_version = version;
1970 *max_version = version;
1972 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
1974 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE;
1980 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
1981 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
1983 * @s: client SSL handle.
1985 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1987 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s)
1989 int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
1991 ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max);
1996 s->version = ver_max;
1998 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
1999 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION)
2000 ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION;
2002 s->client_version = ver_max;
2007 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
2008 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
2009 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
2010 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
2012 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2013 int check_in_list(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups,
2014 size_t num_groups, int checkallow)
2018 if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
2021 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
2022 uint16_t group = groups[i];
2024 if (group_id == group
2026 || tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
2035 /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
2036 int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s, const unsigned char *hashval,
2037 size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr,
2040 unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2041 unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
2043 memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr));
2045 if (hashval == NULL) {
2046 hashval = hashvaltmp;
2048 /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
2049 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
2050 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp),
2052 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2057 /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
2058 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
2059 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2063 /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
2064 msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH;
2065 msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen;
2066 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
2067 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) {
2068 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2073 * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted
2074 * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after
2075 * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie.
2078 && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen)
2079 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
2080 s->s3->tmp.message_size
2081 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) {
2082 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2089 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2091 return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b);
2094 int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2096 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp);
2097 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2100 if (ca_sk == NULL) {
2101 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2102 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2105 /* get the CA RDNs */
2106 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) {
2107 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2108 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2112 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) {
2113 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2114 unsigned int name_len;
2116 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len)
2117 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2118 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2119 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2123 namestart = namebytes;
2124 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) {
2125 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2129 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2130 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2131 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2135 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2136 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2137 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2143 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2144 s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk;
2149 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2154 int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2156 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s);
2158 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2159 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2160 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,
2161 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2165 if (ca_sk != NULL) {
2168 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) {
2169 unsigned char *namebytes;
2170 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i);
2174 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
2175 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
2177 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
2178 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,
2179 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2185 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2186 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,
2187 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2194 /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */
2195 size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs,
2196 const void *param, size_t paramlen)
2198 size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen;
2199 unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen);
2202 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_KEY_EXCHANGE_TBS,
2203 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2206 memcpy(tbs, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2207 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2209 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen);