2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
12 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
13 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
19 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
20 #include "statem_locl.h"
21 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
22 #include <openssl/objects.h>
23 #include <openssl/evp.h>
24 #include <openssl/x509.h>
27 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
28 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
30 int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
35 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
36 s->init_num, &written);
39 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
41 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
42 * ignore the result anyway
44 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
45 (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
49 if (written == s->init_num) {
51 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
52 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
56 s->init_off += written;
57 s->init_num -= written;
61 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype)
65 if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt))
66 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen)
69 s->init_num = (int)msglen;
75 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s)
77 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s))
81 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
82 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
83 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
85 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
87 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
88 * support secure renegotiation.
90 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
91 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
92 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
95 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
97 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
100 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
101 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
103 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
105 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
106 memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
109 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
112 s->statem.use_timer = 1;
119 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
120 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
122 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
123 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
125 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs,
126 void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen)
128 static const char *servercontext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
129 static const char *clientcontext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
131 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
134 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
135 memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE);
136 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
137 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
138 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY)
139 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext);
141 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext);
144 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
145 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
146 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
148 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
149 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) {
150 memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash,
151 s->cert_verify_hash_len);
152 hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len;
153 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE,
154 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
159 *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen;
163 retlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata);
172 int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
174 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
175 const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
176 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
177 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
178 size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0;
180 unsigned char *sig = NULL;
181 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
182 int pktype, ispss = 0;
184 pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
186 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
188 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
192 /* Get the data to be signed */
193 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
194 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
198 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !tls12_get_sigandhash(s, pkt, pkey, md, &ispss)) {
199 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
203 fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
205 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
206 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
208 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
212 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
213 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
214 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
219 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
220 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
221 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
222 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
225 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
226 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
227 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
228 s->session->master_key)) {
229 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
234 if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) {
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
239 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
241 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
242 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
243 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
244 BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen);
248 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) {
249 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
253 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
254 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
258 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
262 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
263 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
267 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
269 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
270 const unsigned char *data;
271 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
272 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
274 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
275 int type = 0, j, pktype;
278 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
281 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
282 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
283 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
286 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
290 peer = s->session->peer;
291 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
292 pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
293 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
295 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
296 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
297 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
298 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
302 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
304 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
305 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
307 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
308 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
309 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
314 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
318 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
319 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
322 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey);
325 } else if (rv == 0) {
326 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
329 md = ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->hash_idx);
331 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
334 /* Use default digest for this key type */
335 int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
337 md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
339 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
344 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
345 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
346 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
350 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
351 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
352 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
353 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
354 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
357 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
358 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
359 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
363 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
364 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
369 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
371 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
372 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
373 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
376 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
378 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
379 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
380 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
381 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
382 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
385 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
391 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
392 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
393 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
394 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
395 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
398 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
399 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
400 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
401 s->session->master_key)) {
402 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
406 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) {
407 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
408 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
413 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
415 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
418 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
419 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
421 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
422 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
423 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
425 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
430 int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
432 size_t finish_md_len;
437 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
438 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
440 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
441 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
444 finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
446 s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
447 if (finish_md_len == 0) {
448 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
452 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len;
454 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) {
455 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
460 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
461 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
463 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL,
464 s->session->master_key,
465 s->session->master_key_length))
469 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
472 OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
473 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
475 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len;
477 OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
478 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
480 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len;
485 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
491 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
494 static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
499 * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
500 * the appropriate error.
502 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
505 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
506 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
508 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
509 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
512 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
515 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
519 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
524 remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
526 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
527 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
528 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
530 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
531 if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
532 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
533 || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
534 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
535 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
536 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
537 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
542 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
543 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
544 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
549 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
550 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
551 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
552 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
556 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
557 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
558 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
559 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
563 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
564 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
566 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
567 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
569 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
571 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
572 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
575 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
579 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
581 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
582 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
583 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
586 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
588 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
591 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
592 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
593 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
594 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
597 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
599 md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
601 if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
602 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
603 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
607 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
609 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
610 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
615 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
618 OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
619 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
621 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
623 OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
624 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
626 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
630 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
631 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
633 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
635 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
636 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
637 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
641 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
642 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
643 &s->session->master_key_length)) {
644 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
647 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
648 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
649 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
652 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
657 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
659 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
660 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
661 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
664 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
666 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
667 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
668 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
675 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
676 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain,
680 unsigned char *outbytes;
682 len = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
684 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
685 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
688 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes)
689 || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) {
690 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
691 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
696 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x,
703 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
704 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int *al)
708 STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
709 STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
710 X509_STORE *chain_store;
711 int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
713 if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL)
719 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
721 if (cpk->chain != NULL)
722 extra_certs = cpk->chain;
724 extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs;
726 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
728 else if (s->cert->chain_store)
729 chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
731 chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
733 if (chain_store != NULL) {
734 X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
736 if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
740 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
741 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
742 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
746 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
747 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
748 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
749 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
751 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
752 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
754 chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx);
755 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0);
758 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
759 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
763 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
767 chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain);
768 for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) {
769 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
771 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i, &tmpal)) {
772 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
776 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
778 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
780 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
783 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0, &tmpal))
785 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
786 x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
787 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1, &tmpal))
798 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk,
801 int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
803 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)
804 || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &tmpal)
805 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
806 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
814 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
815 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
818 WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs)
820 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
822 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
823 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
825 ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
826 if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE)
832 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
834 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
835 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
837 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
840 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
844 if (s->statem.cleanuphand) {
845 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
848 s->statem.cleanuphand = 0;
850 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
853 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
855 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
856 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
858 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
860 s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
862 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
863 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
866 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
867 cb = s->info_callback;
868 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
869 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
872 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
874 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
875 /* done with handshaking */
876 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
877 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
878 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
879 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
884 * If we've not cleared the buffers its because we've got more work to do,
888 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
890 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
893 int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
895 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
896 int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al;
900 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
903 while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
904 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
906 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
909 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
912 if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
914 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
915 * in the middle of a handshake message.
917 if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
918 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
919 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
920 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
923 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
924 s->init_num = readbytes - 1;
925 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
926 s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes;
928 } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
929 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
930 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
933 s->init_num += readbytes;
938 if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK
939 && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
941 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
942 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
943 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
946 if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
951 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
952 p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
953 s->msg_callback_arg);
955 } while (skip_message);
956 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
959 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++);
961 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
963 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
966 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
967 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
969 l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer)
970 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
971 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
973 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
974 s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
977 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
978 if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
979 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
980 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
983 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
985 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
991 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
995 int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len)
1001 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1002 /* We've already read everything in */
1003 *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
1008 n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
1010 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
1011 &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes);
1013 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1017 s->init_num += readbytes;
1021 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1023 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1024 * Finished verification.
1026 if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
1030 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1031 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1032 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1035 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1039 if (s->msg_callback)
1040 s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
1041 (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1043 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1044 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1045 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1046 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1050 if (s->msg_callback)
1051 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
1052 (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1053 s->msg_callback_arg);
1060 int ssl_cert_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pk)
1062 if (pk == NULL && (pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x)) == NULL)
1065 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
1069 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
1071 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
1072 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1074 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
1076 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1077 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001:
1078 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
1079 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256:
1080 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
1081 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512:
1082 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
1087 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type)
1092 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
1093 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
1094 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
1095 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
1097 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
1098 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
1099 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
1100 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
1101 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
1102 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
1103 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
1104 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
1105 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
1106 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
1107 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
1108 case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH:
1109 case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH:
1110 case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH:
1111 case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH:
1112 case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
1113 case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
1114 case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK:
1115 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1117 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
1118 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
1119 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1121 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
1122 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
1123 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
1125 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
1126 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
1128 case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED:
1129 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
1130 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL:
1131 case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP:
1132 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1134 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
1135 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
1136 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
1137 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
1138 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
1139 case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
1140 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
1141 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
1143 case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
1144 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1146 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
1147 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
1150 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
1156 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s)
1158 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1160 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL);
1163 static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b)
1165 int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s);
1170 return a < b ? -1 : 1;
1171 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1;
1176 const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void);
1177 const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void);
1180 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
1181 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1184 static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
1185 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1186 {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method},
1188 {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1191 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method},
1193 {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1195 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1196 {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method},
1198 {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1201 {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method},
1203 {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1205 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1206 {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method},
1208 {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1213 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1214 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1217 static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = {
1218 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1219 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method},
1221 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1224 {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method},
1225 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL},
1227 {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1228 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL},
1234 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1236 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1237 * @method: the intended method.
1239 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1241 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
1243 int version = method->version;
1245 if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 &&
1246 version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) ||
1247 ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0)
1248 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1250 if (s->max_proto_version != 0 &&
1251 version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0)
1252 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH;
1254 if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0)
1255 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1256 if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s))
1257 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE;
1258 else if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS) != 0 && FIPS_mode())
1259 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE;
1265 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1268 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1269 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1271 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1273 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version)
1275 const version_info *vent;
1276 const version_info *table;
1278 switch (s->method->version) {
1280 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1281 return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0;
1282 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1283 table = tls_version_table;
1285 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1286 table = dtls_version_table;
1291 vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0;
1293 if (vent->cmeth != NULL &&
1294 version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 &&
1295 ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) {
1303 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1304 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1305 * supported protocol version.
1307 * @s server SSL handle.
1309 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1311 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s)
1313 const version_info *vent;
1314 const version_info *table;
1317 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1318 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
1321 if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
1325 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1326 * highest protocol version).
1328 if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version)
1329 table = tls_version_table;
1330 else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version)
1331 table = dtls_version_table;
1333 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1337 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1338 if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0)
1339 return s->version == vent->version;
1345 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1346 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1347 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1348 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1350 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1351 * @version: the intended limit.
1352 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1354 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1356 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
1364 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1365 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1366 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1368 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1369 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1370 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1371 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1372 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1374 switch (method_version) {
1377 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
1378 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
1379 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
1380 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
1385 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1386 if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION)
1390 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1391 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) ||
1392 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER))
1402 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1403 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1404 * the version specific method.
1406 * @s: server SSL handle.
1408 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1410 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1413 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1415 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1416 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
1418 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1421 int server_version = s->method->version;
1422 int client_version = hello->legacy_version;
1423 const version_info *vent;
1424 const version_info *table;
1426 RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions;
1428 s->client_version = client_version;
1430 switch (server_version) {
1433 * TODO(TLS1.3): This check will fail if someone attempts to do
1434 * renegotiation in TLS1.3 at the moment. We need to ensure we disable
1435 * renegotiation for TLS1.3
1437 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
1438 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1440 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1441 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1442 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1443 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1444 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1447 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1448 table = tls_version_table;
1450 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1451 table = dtls_version_table;
1455 suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions];
1457 if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1458 unsigned int candidate_vers = 0;
1459 unsigned int best_vers = 0;
1460 const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL;
1461 PACKET versionslist;
1463 suppversions->parsed = 1;
1465 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) {
1466 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1467 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1470 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) {
1471 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1472 if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
1473 candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION;
1475 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about
1476 * wheter to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the
1477 * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later
1479 if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0)
1482 vent->version != 0 && vent->version != (int)candidate_vers;
1485 if (vent->version != 0 && vent->smeth != NULL) {
1486 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1488 method = vent->smeth();
1489 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1490 best_vers = candidate_vers;
1491 best_method = method;
1495 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) {
1496 /* Trailing data? */
1497 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1500 if (best_vers > 0) {
1501 s->version = best_vers;
1502 s->method = best_method;
1505 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1509 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1510 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1512 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0)
1513 client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1516 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1519 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1520 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1522 if (vent->smeth == NULL ||
1523 version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0)
1525 method = vent->smeth();
1526 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1527 s->version = vent->version;
1533 return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1537 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1538 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1539 * the version specific method.
1541 * @s: client SSL handle.
1542 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1544 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1546 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version)
1548 const version_info *vent;
1549 const version_info *table;
1551 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1552 if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
1553 version = TLS1_3_VERSION;
1555 switch (s->method->version) {
1557 if (version != s->version)
1558 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1560 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1561 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1562 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1563 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1564 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1567 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1568 table = tls_version_table;
1570 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1571 table = dtls_version_table;
1575 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1576 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1579 if (version != vent->version)
1581 if (vent->cmeth == NULL)
1583 method = vent->cmeth();
1584 err = ssl_method_error(s, method);
1588 s->version = version;
1592 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1596 * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version
1597 * @s: The SSL connection
1598 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1599 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1601 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1602 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1603 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1604 * or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1605 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1607 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1608 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1609 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1611 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1612 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1614 int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version,
1619 const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL;
1620 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1621 const version_info *table;
1622 const version_info *vent;
1624 switch (s->method->version) {
1627 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1628 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1629 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1630 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1631 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1633 *min_version = *max_version = s->version;
1635 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1636 table = tls_version_table;
1638 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1639 table = dtls_version_table;
1644 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
1645 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
1646 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
1647 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
1649 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
1650 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
1651 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
1653 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
1654 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
1655 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
1657 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
1658 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
1659 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
1660 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
1661 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
1662 * selected, as we start from scratch.
1664 *min_version = version = 0;
1666 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1668 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
1669 * "version capability" vector.
1671 if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
1675 method = vent->cmeth();
1676 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
1680 *min_version = method->version;
1682 version = (single = method)->version;
1683 *min_version = version;
1688 *max_version = version;
1690 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
1692 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE;
1698 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
1699 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
1701 * @s: client SSL handle.
1703 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1705 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s)
1707 int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
1709 ret = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max);
1714 s->version = ver_max;
1716 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
1717 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION)
1718 ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1720 s->client_version = ver_max;