2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/objects.h>
18 #include <openssl/evp.h>
19 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
23 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
25 int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
30 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
31 s->init_num, &written);
34 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
36 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
37 * ignore the result anyway
39 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
40 (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
44 if (written == s->init_num) {
46 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
47 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
51 s->init_off += written;
52 s->init_num -= written;
56 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype)
60 if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt))
61 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen)
64 s->init_num = (int)msglen;
70 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s)
72 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s))
75 /* Reset any extension flags */
76 memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags));
79 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
80 int i, ver_min, ver_max, ok = 0;
83 * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers
84 * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the
87 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max) != 0) {
88 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
89 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
92 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
93 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
96 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) &&
97 DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls))
99 } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) {
106 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
107 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
109 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
112 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
113 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
114 } else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
115 /* Renegotiation is disabled */
116 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
118 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
120 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
122 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
123 * support secure renegotiation.
125 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
126 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
127 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
130 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
132 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
135 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
136 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
138 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
140 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
141 memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
144 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
147 s->statem.use_timer = 1;
154 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
155 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
157 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
158 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
160 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs,
161 void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen)
163 static const char *servercontext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
164 static const char *clientcontext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
166 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
169 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
170 memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE);
171 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
172 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
173 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY)
174 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext);
176 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext);
179 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
180 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
181 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
183 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
184 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) {
185 memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash,
186 s->cert_verify_hash_len);
187 hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len;
188 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE,
189 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
194 *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen;
198 retlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata);
207 int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
209 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
210 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
211 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
212 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
213 size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0;
215 unsigned char *sig = NULL;
216 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
217 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
219 if (lu == NULL || s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL) {
220 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
223 pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
225 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
226 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
230 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
232 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
236 /* Get the data to be signed */
237 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
238 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
242 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
243 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
246 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
247 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
249 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
253 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
254 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
258 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
259 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
260 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
261 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
262 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
266 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
267 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
268 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
269 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
270 s->session->master_key)
271 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) {
273 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
276 } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
277 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
283 int pktype = lu->sig;
285 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
286 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
287 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
288 BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen);
292 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) {
293 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
297 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
298 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
302 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
306 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
307 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
311 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
313 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
314 const unsigned char *data;
315 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
316 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
318 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
322 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
325 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
326 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
327 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
330 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
334 peer = s->session->peer;
335 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
339 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) {
340 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
341 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
342 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
346 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
350 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
351 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
354 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey);
357 } else if (rv == 0) {
358 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
362 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
364 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
365 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
369 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
370 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
371 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
375 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
377 * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without
378 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2)
380 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
381 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)
382 && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
383 && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
384 || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256))
385 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128
386 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) {
387 len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
390 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
391 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
392 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
396 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
397 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
398 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
399 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
400 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
403 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
404 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
405 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
409 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
410 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
415 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
417 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
418 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
421 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
423 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
424 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
425 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
426 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
427 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
428 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
431 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
437 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
438 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
439 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
440 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
441 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
445 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
446 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
447 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
448 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
449 s->session->master_key)) {
450 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
453 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) {
454 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
455 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
459 j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen);
461 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
462 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
467 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
470 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
471 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
473 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
474 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
475 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
477 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
482 int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
484 size_t finish_md_len;
488 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
490 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
493 * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the
498 && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 0
499 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
500 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
501 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
503 * This is a fatal error, which leaves
504 * enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent state
505 * and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
511 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
512 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
514 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
515 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
518 finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
520 s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
521 if (finish_md_len == 0) {
522 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
526 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len;
528 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) {
529 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
534 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
535 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
537 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL,
538 s->session->master_key,
539 s->session->master_key_length)) {
540 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
545 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
547 if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
548 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
552 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
554 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len;
556 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
558 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len;
563 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
567 int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
569 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) {
570 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
574 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE;
578 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
582 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
585 unsigned int updatetype;
587 s->key_update_count++;
588 if (s->key_update_count > MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES) {
589 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
590 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES);
595 * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
596 * be on a record boundary.
598 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
599 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
600 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
604 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype)
605 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
606 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
607 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
612 * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we
615 if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
616 && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) {
617 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
618 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
623 * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
624 * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
625 * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop).
627 if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED)
628 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED;
630 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) {
631 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
632 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
636 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
638 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
639 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
640 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
643 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
645 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
648 static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
653 * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
654 * the appropriate error.
656 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
659 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
660 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
662 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
663 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
666 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
669 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
673 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
678 remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
680 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
681 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
682 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
684 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
685 if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
686 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
687 || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
688 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
689 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
690 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
691 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
696 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
697 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
698 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
703 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
704 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
705 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
706 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
710 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
711 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
712 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
713 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
717 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
718 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
720 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
721 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
723 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
725 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
726 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
729 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
733 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
735 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
736 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
737 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
740 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
742 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
746 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
748 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
751 * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
752 * message must be on a record boundary.
754 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
755 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
756 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
760 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
761 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
762 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
763 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
766 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
768 md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
770 if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
771 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
772 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
776 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
778 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
779 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
784 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
786 if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
787 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
788 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
792 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
794 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
796 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
798 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
802 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
803 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
805 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
807 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
808 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
809 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
813 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
814 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
815 &s->session->master_key_length)) {
816 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
819 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
820 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
824 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
829 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
831 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
832 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
833 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
836 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
838 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
839 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
840 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
847 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
848 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain,
852 unsigned char *outbytes;
854 len = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
856 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
857 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
860 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes)
861 || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) {
862 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
863 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
868 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x,
875 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
876 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int *al)
880 STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
881 STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
882 X509_STORE *chain_store;
883 int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
885 if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL)
891 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
893 if (cpk->chain != NULL)
894 extra_certs = cpk->chain;
896 extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs;
898 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
900 else if (s->cert->chain_store)
901 chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
903 chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
905 if (chain_store != NULL) {
906 X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
908 if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
909 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
912 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
913 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
918 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
919 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
920 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
921 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
923 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
924 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
926 chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx);
927 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0);
930 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
931 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
932 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
933 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
935 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
936 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
939 chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain);
940 for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) {
941 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
943 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i, &tmpal)) {
944 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
948 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
950 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
952 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
955 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0, &tmpal))
957 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
958 x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
959 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1, &tmpal))
970 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk,
973 int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
975 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)
976 || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &tmpal)
977 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
978 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
986 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
987 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
990 WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs)
992 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
994 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
995 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
997 ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
998 if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE)
1004 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1006 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
1007 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
1009 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
1012 if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s))
1017 if (s->statem.cleanuphand) {
1018 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
1021 s->statem.cleanuphand = 0;
1023 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
1026 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
1028 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
1029 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
1032 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the
1035 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1036 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
1038 s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
1040 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
1041 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
1044 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1045 cb = s->info_callback;
1046 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1047 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1050 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
1052 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1053 /* done with handshaking */
1054 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
1055 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
1056 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
1057 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
1062 * If we've not cleared the buffers its because we've got more work to do,
1066 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1068 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
1069 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1072 int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
1074 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1075 int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al;
1077 size_t l, readbytes;
1079 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1082 while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
1083 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
1085 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
1088 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1091 if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1093 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
1094 * in the middle of a handshake message.
1096 if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
1097 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1098 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
1099 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1102 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1103 s->init_num = readbytes - 1;
1104 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1105 s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes;
1107 } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1108 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1109 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1112 s->init_num += readbytes;
1117 if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK
1118 && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
1120 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
1121 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
1122 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
1125 if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
1129 if (s->msg_callback)
1130 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1131 p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1132 s->msg_callback_arg);
1134 } while (skip_message);
1135 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1138 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++);
1140 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1142 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
1145 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
1146 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
1148 l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer)
1149 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1150 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
1152 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1153 s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1156 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
1157 if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1158 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1159 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
1162 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
1164 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1170 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1174 int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len)
1176 size_t n, readbytes;
1180 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1181 /* We've already read everything in */
1182 *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
1187 n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
1189 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
1190 &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes);
1192 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1196 s->init_num += readbytes;
1200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1202 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1203 * Finished verification.
1205 if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
1209 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1210 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1211 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1213 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1214 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1218 if (s->msg_callback)
1219 s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
1220 (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1223 * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
1224 * processing the message
1226 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
1227 && !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1228 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1229 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1230 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1234 if (s->msg_callback)
1235 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
1236 (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1237 s->msg_callback_arg);
1244 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type)
1249 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
1250 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
1251 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
1252 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
1254 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
1255 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
1256 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
1257 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
1258 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
1259 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
1260 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
1261 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
1262 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
1263 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
1264 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
1265 case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH:
1266 case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH:
1267 case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH:
1268 case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH:
1269 case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
1270 case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
1271 case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK:
1272 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1274 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
1275 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
1276 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1278 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
1279 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
1280 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
1282 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
1283 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
1285 case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED:
1286 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
1287 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL:
1288 case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP:
1289 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1291 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
1292 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
1293 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
1294 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
1295 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
1296 case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
1297 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
1298 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
1300 case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
1301 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1303 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
1304 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
1307 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
1313 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s)
1315 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1317 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL);
1320 static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b)
1322 int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s);
1327 return a < b ? -1 : 1;
1328 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1;
1333 const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void);
1334 const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void);
1337 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
1338 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1341 /* Must be in order high to low */
1342 static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
1343 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1344 {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method},
1346 {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1348 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1349 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method},
1351 {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1354 {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method},
1356 {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1359 {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method},
1361 {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1363 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1364 {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method},
1366 {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1371 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1372 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1375 /* Must be in order high to low */
1376 static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = {
1377 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1378 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method},
1380 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1382 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1383 {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method},
1384 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL},
1386 {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1387 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL},
1393 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1395 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1396 * @method: the intended method.
1398 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1400 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
1402 int version = method->version;
1404 if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 &&
1405 version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) ||
1406 ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0)
1407 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1409 if (s->max_proto_version != 0 &&
1410 version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0)
1411 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH;
1413 if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0)
1414 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1415 if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s))
1416 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE;
1422 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1425 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1426 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1428 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1430 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version)
1432 const version_info *vent;
1433 const version_info *table;
1435 switch (s->method->version) {
1437 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1438 return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0;
1439 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1440 table = tls_version_table;
1442 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1443 table = dtls_version_table;
1448 vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0;
1450 if (vent->cmeth != NULL &&
1451 version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 &&
1452 ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) {
1460 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1461 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1462 * supported protocol version.
1464 * @s server SSL handle.
1466 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1468 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s)
1470 const version_info *vent;
1471 const version_info *table;
1474 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1475 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
1478 if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
1482 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1483 * highest protocol version).
1485 if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version)
1486 table = tls_version_table;
1487 else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version)
1488 table = dtls_version_table;
1490 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1494 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1495 if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0)
1496 return s->version == vent->version;
1502 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1503 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1504 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1505 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1507 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1508 * @version: the intended limit.
1509 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1511 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1513 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
1521 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1522 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1523 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1525 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1526 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1527 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1528 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1529 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1531 switch (method_version) {
1534 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
1535 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
1536 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
1537 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
1542 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1543 if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION)
1547 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1548 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) ||
1549 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER))
1558 static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
1560 if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION
1561 && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1562 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2;
1563 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION
1564 && (ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION)
1565 || ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION))) {
1566 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1;
1568 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1573 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1574 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1575 * the version specific method.
1577 * @s: server SSL handle.
1579 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1581 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
1584 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1586 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1587 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
1589 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1592 int server_version = s->method->version;
1593 int client_version = hello->legacy_version;
1594 const version_info *vent;
1595 const version_info *table;
1597 RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions;
1599 s->client_version = client_version;
1601 switch (server_version) {
1603 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1604 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
1605 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1606 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1608 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1609 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1610 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1611 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1612 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1617 * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
1618 * a HelloRetryRequest
1621 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1622 table = tls_version_table;
1624 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1625 table = dtls_version_table;
1629 suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions];
1631 if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1632 unsigned int candidate_vers = 0;
1633 unsigned int best_vers = 0;
1634 const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL;
1635 PACKET versionslist;
1637 suppversions->parsed = 1;
1639 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) {
1640 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1641 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1644 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) {
1645 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1646 if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
1647 candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION;
1649 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about
1650 * whether to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the
1651 * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later
1653 if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0)
1656 vent->version != 0 && vent->version != (int)candidate_vers;
1659 if (vent->version != 0 && vent->smeth != NULL) {
1660 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1662 method = vent->smeth();
1663 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1664 best_vers = candidate_vers;
1665 best_method = method;
1669 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) {
1670 /* Trailing data? */
1671 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1674 if (best_vers > 0) {
1675 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1677 * We get here if this is after a HelloRetryRequest. In this
1678 * case we just check that we still negotiated TLSv1.3
1680 if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION)
1681 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1684 check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd);
1685 s->version = best_vers;
1686 s->method = best_method;
1689 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1693 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1694 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1696 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0)
1697 client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1700 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1703 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1704 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1706 if (vent->smeth == NULL ||
1707 version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0)
1709 method = vent->smeth();
1710 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1711 check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd);
1712 s->version = vent->version;
1718 return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1722 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1723 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1724 * the version specific method.
1726 * @s: client SSL handle.
1727 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1728 * @checkdgrd: Whether to check the downgrade sentinels in the server_random
1729 * @al: Where to store any alert value that may be generated
1731 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1733 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, int checkdgrd, int *al)
1735 const version_info *vent;
1736 const version_info *table;
1739 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1740 if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
1741 version = TLS1_3_VERSION;
1743 if (s->hello_retry_request && version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1744 *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1745 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1748 switch (s->method->version) {
1750 if (version != s->version) {
1751 *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1752 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1755 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1756 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1757 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1758 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1759 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1762 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1763 table = tls_version_table;
1765 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1766 table = dtls_version_table;
1770 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1771 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1774 if (vent->cmeth == NULL)
1777 if (highver != 0 && version != vent->version)
1780 method = vent->cmeth();
1781 err = ssl_method_error(s, method);
1783 if (version == vent->version) {
1784 *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1791 highver = vent->version;
1793 if (version != vent->version)
1796 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS13DOWNGRADE
1797 /* Check for downgrades */
1799 if (version == TLS1_2_VERSION && highver > version) {
1800 if (memcmp(tls12downgrade,
1801 s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1802 - sizeof(tls12downgrade),
1803 sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) {
1804 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1805 return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
1807 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
1808 && version < TLS1_2_VERSION
1809 && highver > version) {
1810 if (memcmp(tls11downgrade,
1811 s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1812 - sizeof(tls11downgrade),
1813 sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) {
1814 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1815 return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
1822 s->version = version;
1826 *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1827 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1831 * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version
1832 * @s: The SSL connection
1833 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1834 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1836 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1837 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1838 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1839 * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1840 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1842 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1843 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1844 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1846 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1847 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1849 int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version)
1853 const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL;
1854 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1855 const version_info *table;
1856 const version_info *vent;
1858 switch (s->method->version) {
1861 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1862 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1863 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1864 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1865 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1867 *min_version = *max_version = s->version;
1869 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1870 table = tls_version_table;
1872 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1873 table = dtls_version_table;
1878 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
1879 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
1880 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
1881 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
1883 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
1884 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
1885 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
1887 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
1888 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
1889 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
1891 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
1892 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
1893 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
1894 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
1895 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
1896 * selected, as we start from scratch.
1898 *min_version = version = 0;
1900 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1902 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
1903 * "version capability" vector.
1905 if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
1909 method = vent->cmeth();
1910 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
1914 *min_version = method->version;
1916 version = (single = method)->version;
1917 *min_version = version;
1922 *max_version = version;
1924 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
1926 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE;
1932 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
1933 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
1935 * @s: client SSL handle.
1937 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1939 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s)
1941 int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
1943 ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max);
1948 s->version = ver_max;
1950 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
1951 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION)
1952 ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1954 s->client_version = ver_max;
1959 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
1960 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
1961 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
1962 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
1964 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1965 int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id, const unsigned char *groups,
1966 size_t num_groups, int checkallow)
1970 if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
1973 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++, groups += 2) {
1974 if (group_id == GET_GROUP_ID(groups, 0)
1976 || tls_curve_allowed(s, groups, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
1985 /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
1986 int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s)
1988 unsigned char hashval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1990 unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
1992 memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr));
1994 /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
1995 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
1996 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) {
1997 SSLerr(SSL_F_CREATE_SYNTHETIC_MESSAGE_HASH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2001 /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
2002 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s))
2005 /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
2006 msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH;
2007 msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = hashlen;
2008 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
2009 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) {
2010 SSLerr(SSL_F_CREATE_SYNTHETIC_MESSAGE_HASH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2017 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2019 return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b);
2022 int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2024 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp);
2025 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2028 if (ca_sk == NULL) {
2029 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2032 /* get the CA RDNs */
2033 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) {
2034 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2035 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2039 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) {
2040 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2041 unsigned int name_len;
2043 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len)
2044 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2045 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2049 namestart = namebytes;
2050 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) {
2051 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2054 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2055 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2059 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2060 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2061 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2067 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2068 s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk;
2073 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2075 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2080 int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2082 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s);
2084 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2085 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt))
2088 if (ca_sk != NULL) {
2091 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) {
2092 unsigned char *namebytes;
2093 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i);
2097 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
2098 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
2100 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
2106 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt))
2112 /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */
2113 size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(const SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs,
2114 const void *param, size_t paramlen)
2116 size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen;
2117 unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen);
2121 memcpy(tbs, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2122 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2124 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen);