2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
52 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
53 #include "statem_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/md5.h>
59 #include <openssl/dh.h>
60 #include <openssl/bn.h>
61 #include <openssl/engine.h>
63 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
64 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
66 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
67 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
68 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
69 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
73 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
79 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
81 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
82 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
83 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
84 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
91 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
97 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
99 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
102 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
103 * ciphersuite or for SRP
105 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
114 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
115 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
116 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
117 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
119 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
120 * (transition not allowed)
122 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
124 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
127 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
128 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
132 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
133 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
134 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
137 switch (st->hand_state) {
141 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
143 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
144 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
146 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
147 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
152 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
153 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
154 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
159 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
161 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
162 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
166 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
167 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
170 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
171 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
177 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
178 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
179 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
185 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
186 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
191 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
192 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
193 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
199 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
200 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
203 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
204 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
210 /* No valid transition found */
215 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
216 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
217 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
218 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
220 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
221 * (transition not allowed)
223 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
225 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
229 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
230 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
232 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
233 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
238 switch (st->hand_state) {
242 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
243 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
244 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
248 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
249 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
250 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
254 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
255 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
261 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
263 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
264 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
265 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
268 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
269 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
273 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
274 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
276 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
277 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
278 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
279 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
281 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
282 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
283 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
284 * the server is resuming.
287 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
289 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
290 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
291 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
292 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
296 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
297 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
299 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
300 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
301 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
302 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
305 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
306 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
307 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
309 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
310 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
319 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
320 * |ext.status_expected| is set
322 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
323 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
328 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
329 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
330 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
331 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
332 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
333 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
334 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
341 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
342 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
343 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
344 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
351 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
352 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
353 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
358 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
359 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
360 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
361 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
364 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
365 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
370 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
371 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
372 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
377 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
378 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
379 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
385 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
386 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
393 /* No valid transition found */
394 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
395 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
400 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
401 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
404 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
406 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
409 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
410 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
414 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
415 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
416 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
418 switch (st->hand_state) {
420 /* Shouldn't happen */
421 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
423 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
424 /* We only hit this in the case of HelloRetryRequest */
425 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
427 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
428 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
429 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
431 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
432 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
433 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
434 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
437 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
438 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
439 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
440 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
442 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
443 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
444 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
446 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
447 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
448 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
449 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
450 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
451 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
454 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the server */
455 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
460 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
461 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
463 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
465 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
468 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
469 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
473 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
475 switch (st->hand_state) {
477 /* Shouldn't happen */
478 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
481 if (!s->renegotiate) {
483 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
484 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
486 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
488 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
490 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
491 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
493 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
495 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
498 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
500 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
501 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
502 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
504 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
505 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
506 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
508 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
509 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
512 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
513 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
515 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
517 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
518 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
521 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
522 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
523 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
524 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
526 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
527 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
529 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
531 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
532 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
534 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
536 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
537 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
538 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
540 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
541 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
542 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
544 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
545 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
547 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
549 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
551 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
552 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
553 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
554 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
557 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
559 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
560 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
561 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
563 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
566 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
568 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
569 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
571 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
572 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
573 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
576 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
578 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
581 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
582 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
583 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
584 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
586 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
587 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
589 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
590 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
591 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
596 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
597 * the client to the server.
599 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
601 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
603 switch (st->hand_state) {
605 /* No pre work to be done */
608 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
610 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
611 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
612 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
613 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
619 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
620 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
623 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
624 * messages unless we need to.
628 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
629 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
630 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
636 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
639 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
643 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
644 * client to the server.
645 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
646 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
648 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
650 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
654 switch (st->hand_state) {
656 /* No post work to be done */
659 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
660 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
663 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
664 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
669 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
670 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
674 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
675 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
676 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
677 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
679 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
680 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
682 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
684 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
687 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
688 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
691 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
692 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
695 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
698 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
703 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
707 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
708 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
709 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
711 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
714 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
718 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
721 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
722 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
723 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
729 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
733 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
736 * Valid return values are:
740 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
741 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
743 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
745 switch (st->hand_state) {
747 /* Shouldn't happen */
750 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
752 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
754 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
755 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
758 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
759 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
760 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
764 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
765 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
768 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
769 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
770 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
773 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
774 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
775 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
778 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
779 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
780 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
781 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
784 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
785 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
786 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
794 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
795 * reading. Excludes the message header.
797 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
799 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
801 switch (st->hand_state) {
803 /* Shouldn't happen */
806 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
807 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
809 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
810 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
812 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
813 return HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
816 return s->max_cert_list;
818 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
819 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
821 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
822 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
824 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
825 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
827 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
829 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
830 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
831 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
833 return s->max_cert_list;
835 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
836 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
838 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
839 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
841 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
843 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
844 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
846 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
847 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
849 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
850 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
852 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
853 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
858 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
860 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
862 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
864 switch (st->hand_state) {
866 /* Shouldn't happen */
867 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
869 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
870 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
872 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
873 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
875 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
876 return tls_process_hello_retry_request(s, pkt);
879 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
881 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
882 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
884 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
885 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
887 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
888 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
890 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
891 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
893 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
894 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
896 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
897 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
899 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
900 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
902 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
903 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
905 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
906 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
908 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
909 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
911 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
912 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
917 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
920 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
922 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
924 switch (st->hand_state) {
926 /* Shouldn't happen */
929 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
930 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
932 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
933 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
934 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
935 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
936 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
937 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
938 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
939 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
940 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
943 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
944 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
949 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
954 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
955 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
958 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
960 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
961 /* Should not happen */
962 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
966 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
967 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
973 if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||
975 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
976 * "ticket" without a session ID.
978 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->ext.tick) ||
979 (sess->not_resumable)) {
980 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
983 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
985 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
986 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
988 p = s->s3->client_random;
991 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
992 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
994 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
997 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1006 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
1010 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1011 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1012 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1013 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1014 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1015 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1016 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1017 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1020 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1021 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1022 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1023 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1024 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1025 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1026 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1027 * know that is maximum server supports.
1028 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1029 * containing version 1.0.
1031 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1032 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1033 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1034 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1035 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1036 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1037 * the negotiated version.
1039 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1040 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1042 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1043 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1044 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1049 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
1052 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1053 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1054 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1055 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
1057 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1058 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1062 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1063 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1064 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1065 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1066 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1067 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1072 /* Ciphers supported */
1073 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1074 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1077 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
1078 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt))
1080 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1081 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1086 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1087 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1091 if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1092 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1093 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1094 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1095 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1096 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1102 /* Add the NULL method */
1103 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1104 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1108 /* TLS extensions */
1109 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1110 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1111 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1118 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1124 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1125 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1126 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1127 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1131 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1132 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1133 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1134 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1138 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1139 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1140 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1143 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1145 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1147 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1148 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1149 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1152 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1154 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1155 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1156 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1157 size_t session_id_len;
1158 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1159 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1160 unsigned int compression;
1161 unsigned int sversion;
1162 unsigned int context;
1164 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1165 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1169 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1170 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1171 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1175 /* We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in */
1176 protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1177 if (protverr != 0) {
1178 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1179 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
1183 /* load the server hello data */
1184 /* load the server random */
1185 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1186 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1187 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1191 /* Get the session-id. */
1192 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1193 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1194 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1195 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1198 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1199 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1200 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1201 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1202 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1203 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1207 PACKET_null_init(&session_id);
1211 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1212 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1213 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1217 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1218 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1219 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1220 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1227 /* TLS extensions */
1228 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1229 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1230 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
1231 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1232 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1236 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1237 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1238 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al))
1243 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1244 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1245 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1246 EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1247 extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1251 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1252 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1253 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1254 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1255 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1256 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1257 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1258 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1259 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1260 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1262 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1263 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1264 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1266 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1267 * backwards compat reasons
1269 int master_key_length;
1270 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1271 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1274 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1275 && master_key_length > 0) {
1276 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1277 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1278 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1280 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1281 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1286 if (session_id_len != 0
1287 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1288 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1289 session_id_len) == 0)
1294 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1295 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1296 /* actually a client application bug */
1297 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1298 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1299 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1304 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1305 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1306 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1307 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1308 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1310 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1312 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1313 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1314 s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
1315 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1320 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1321 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1322 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1323 if (session_id_len > 0)
1324 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1328 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1329 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1330 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1332 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1333 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1337 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1339 /* unknown cipher */
1340 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1341 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1345 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1348 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1349 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1351 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1352 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1354 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1355 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1356 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1360 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1361 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1363 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1364 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1370 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1371 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1372 * set and use it for comparison.
1374 if (s->session->cipher)
1375 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1376 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1377 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1378 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1379 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1382 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1384 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1385 if (compression != 0) {
1386 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1387 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1388 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1392 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1393 * using compression.
1395 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1396 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1400 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1401 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1402 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1403 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1406 if (compression == 0)
1408 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1409 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1410 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1413 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1416 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1417 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1418 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1419 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1422 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1426 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1429 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1430 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1431 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1432 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1435 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1438 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1439 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1441 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1442 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1444 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
1447 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1448 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1449 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1454 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1455 * we're done with this message
1458 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1459 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1460 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)
1461 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1462 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1463 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1464 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
1468 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1469 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1471 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1472 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1473 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1474 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1477 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1479 unsigned int sversion;
1481 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1485 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1486 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1487 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1491 s->hello_retry_request = 1;
1493 /* This will fail if it doesn't choose TLSv1.3+ */
1494 errorcode = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1495 if (errorcode != 0) {
1496 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1497 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, errorcode);
1501 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
1502 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1503 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1507 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1509 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1510 extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1513 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1515 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1517 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1518 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1519 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1520 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1523 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1525 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1526 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1528 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1529 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1530 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1532 unsigned int context = 0;
1534 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1535 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1539 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1541 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1542 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
1543 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1544 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1547 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1548 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1549 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1550 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1551 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1552 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1556 certstart = certbytes;
1557 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1559 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1560 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1563 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1564 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1565 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1566 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1570 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1571 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1574 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1575 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1576 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1579 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1581 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1582 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) {
1583 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1586 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1589 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1590 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1596 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1598 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1599 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1600 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1601 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1602 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1603 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1604 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1605 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1606 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1607 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1608 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1609 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1611 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1612 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1613 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1614 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1617 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1619 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1620 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1624 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1626 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1627 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1629 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1632 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1635 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1637 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1640 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1641 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1645 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1649 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1650 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1654 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1655 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1658 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1659 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1660 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
1661 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
1662 (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1663 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
1665 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1666 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1667 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1671 s->session->peer_type = i;
1673 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1675 s->session->peer = x;
1676 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1679 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1681 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1682 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1683 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1684 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1685 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1689 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1693 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1695 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1698 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1702 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1704 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1705 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1707 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1709 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1710 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1711 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1716 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1717 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1718 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1721 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1722 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1723 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1727 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1728 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1729 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1730 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1731 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1732 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1738 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1739 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1744 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1746 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1747 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1749 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1750 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1751 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1752 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1753 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1754 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1758 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1760 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1761 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1763 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1764 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1766 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1767 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1769 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1770 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1771 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1772 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1776 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
1777 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1778 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1782 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1783 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1784 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1788 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1789 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1794 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1796 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1797 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1798 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
1801 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
1805 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1806 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1807 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1808 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1809 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1813 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1816 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1817 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1818 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1822 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1823 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
1824 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
1826 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1827 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
1828 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
1829 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1830 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1834 /* test non-zero pupkey */
1835 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
1836 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1837 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1841 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
1842 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1843 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1848 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
1849 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1850 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1854 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
1855 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1856 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1861 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1862 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1863 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1867 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
1868 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1869 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1873 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
1876 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1877 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1879 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1880 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1881 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1890 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
1894 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1895 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1900 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1904 const unsigned char *ecparams;
1906 unsigned int curve_flags;
1907 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
1910 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1911 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1912 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1914 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
1915 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1916 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1920 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1921 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1923 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
1924 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1925 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1929 curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags);
1931 if (curve_nid == 0) {
1932 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1933 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
1934 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1938 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
1939 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
1941 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) {
1942 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1943 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1947 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
1949 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
1950 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
1952 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
1953 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
1954 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
1955 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1956 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1957 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1960 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1964 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
1965 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1966 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1970 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
1971 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1972 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
1973 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1974 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1979 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1980 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1983 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
1984 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1985 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
1986 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1987 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1991 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1992 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1997 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2001 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2002 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2003 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2004 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2006 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2008 save_param_start = *pkt;
2010 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2011 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2012 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2015 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2016 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2020 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2021 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2022 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2023 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2025 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2026 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2028 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2029 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2032 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2033 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2037 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2041 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2044 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2045 * equals the length of the parameters.
2047 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2048 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2049 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2050 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2051 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2055 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2056 unsigned int sigalg;
2059 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2060 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2061 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2064 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey);
2066 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2068 } else if (rv == 0) {
2069 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2073 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2075 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2076 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2080 md = ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->hash_idx);
2082 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2083 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2084 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2085 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2088 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2090 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2091 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2096 * Check signature length
2098 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2099 /* wrong packet length */
2100 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2101 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2102 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2106 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2107 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2108 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2109 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2113 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2114 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2115 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2118 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2119 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2120 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2121 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2122 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2123 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2127 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2128 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2129 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2130 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2131 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2132 PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
2133 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2134 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2137 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2138 PACKET_remaining(&signature)) <= 0) {
2140 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2141 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2144 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2147 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2148 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2149 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2150 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2151 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2152 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
2153 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2154 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2156 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2160 /* still data left over */
2161 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2162 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2163 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2168 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2171 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2172 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2173 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2174 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2177 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2179 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2180 unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len;
2181 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2182 const unsigned char *data;
2183 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2184 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
2186 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
2187 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2191 /* get the certificate types */
2192 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num)
2193 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) {
2194 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2195 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2198 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
2199 s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
2200 if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
2201 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
2202 s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
2203 if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
2204 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2207 memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, data, ctype_num);
2208 s->cert->ctype_num = ctype_num;
2209 ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
2211 for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
2212 s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = data[i];
2214 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2217 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2218 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2219 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2220 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2224 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2225 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2226 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2227 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2229 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) {
2230 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2231 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2232 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2235 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2236 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2237 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2241 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2244 /* get the CA RDNs */
2245 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
2246 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) {
2247 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2248 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2252 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2253 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len)
2254 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2255 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2256 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2257 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2261 namestart = namebytes;
2263 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
2264 name_len)) == NULL) {
2265 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2266 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2270 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2271 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2272 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2273 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2276 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2277 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2283 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2284 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2285 s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
2286 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2287 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2290 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2293 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2296 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2300 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2302 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2305 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2307 int al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2308 unsigned int ticklen;
2309 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2310 unsigned int sess_len;
2311 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2313 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2314 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add))
2315 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2316 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
2318 && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
2319 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2324 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2325 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2326 * be 0 here in that instance
2329 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2331 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Is this a suitable test for TLS1.3? */
2332 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2333 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2334 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2336 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2339 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2341 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2343 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2346 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2347 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2348 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2352 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2353 s->session = new_sess;
2357 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2358 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2360 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2362 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2363 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2364 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2366 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2367 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2368 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2371 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2372 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2373 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2377 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2378 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2379 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2381 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2384 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2385 || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2386 EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2388 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2389 exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
2390 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2396 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2397 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2398 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2399 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2400 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2401 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2402 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2403 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2404 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2407 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2408 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2410 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2411 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2412 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2413 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2416 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2418 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2419 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2421 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2422 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2425 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2427 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2429 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2431 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2435 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2436 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On failure
2437 * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code.
2439 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2444 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2445 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2446 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2447 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2448 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2451 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2452 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2453 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2454 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2457 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2458 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2459 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2460 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2463 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2464 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2465 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2468 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2474 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2478 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt, &al)) {
2479 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2480 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2481 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2484 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2488 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2489 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2490 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2493 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s, int *al)
2496 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2499 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2500 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2505 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2506 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2507 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2509 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2510 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2511 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2514 *al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2515 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2516 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2520 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2521 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2522 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2526 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2527 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2528 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2529 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2530 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2539 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2541 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2543 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2544 /* should contain no data */
2545 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2546 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2549 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2550 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2551 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2552 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2559 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2561 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
2564 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2565 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2566 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2567 && s->renegotiate != 0)
2568 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2571 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2574 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2575 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2576 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2579 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2581 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2584 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2585 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2588 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2589 size_t identitylen = 0;
2590 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2591 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2592 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2595 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2596 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2597 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2601 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2603 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2604 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2607 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2608 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2609 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2611 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2612 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2613 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2614 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2618 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2619 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2620 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2621 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2625 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2626 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2627 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2628 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2629 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2633 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2634 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2635 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2637 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2638 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2641 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2642 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2643 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2650 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2651 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2652 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2653 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2657 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2658 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2663 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2665 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2666 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2667 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2668 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2670 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2673 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2675 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2677 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2681 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2682 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2683 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2687 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2688 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2690 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2691 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2695 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2696 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2697 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2698 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2702 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2703 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2704 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2707 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2708 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2709 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2710 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2713 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2714 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2715 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2718 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2721 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
2723 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
2727 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2728 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2729 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2733 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2734 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2736 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2737 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen))
2742 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2743 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2747 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2748 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2753 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2755 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2757 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2758 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2759 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2761 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2765 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2769 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2771 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0)
2774 /* send off the data */
2775 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2776 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), &keybytes))
2779 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2780 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2784 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2786 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2787 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2791 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2793 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2794 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2795 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2796 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2799 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2801 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2805 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2807 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2811 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2812 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2816 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2817 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2819 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2820 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2824 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
2825 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2831 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2832 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2835 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2836 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2841 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2843 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2844 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2845 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
2848 unsigned int md_len;
2849 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2850 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
2851 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2852 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2855 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2856 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2859 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2861 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2863 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2864 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
2865 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2869 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2870 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2871 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2872 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2876 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2877 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2878 * certificate key for key exchange
2881 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2883 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2885 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2886 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2890 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
2891 /* Generate session key
2892 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
2894 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
2895 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2896 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2900 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2903 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2904 if (ukm_hash == NULL
2905 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
2906 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2907 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2908 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2909 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2910 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
2911 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2912 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2915 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2917 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
2918 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
2919 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2920 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2923 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2925 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2928 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2929 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2930 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2934 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
2935 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
2936 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
2937 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2938 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2942 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2943 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2944 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2948 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2949 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2950 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2953 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2954 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2959 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2961 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2962 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
2964 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
2965 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
2967 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2970 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
2972 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2973 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2974 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2975 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2982 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2987 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2989 unsigned long alg_k;
2992 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2994 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
2995 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2998 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2999 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
3001 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3002 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
3004 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3005 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
3007 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3008 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
3010 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3011 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
3013 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3014 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3015 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3022 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3023 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3024 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3025 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3026 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3027 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3032 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3034 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3037 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3038 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3040 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3042 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3043 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3044 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3045 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3052 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3053 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3054 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3057 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3058 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3059 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3060 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3068 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3069 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3070 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3071 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3074 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3077 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3078 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3080 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3081 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3082 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
3085 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3086 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3092 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3093 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3098 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3099 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3100 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3102 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3104 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3105 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, NULL) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3108 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3109 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3111 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3112 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3117 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3120 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3123 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3124 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3125 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3126 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3128 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3132 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3133 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3136 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3138 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3139 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3141 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3145 /* We need to get a client cert */
3146 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3148 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3149 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3151 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3153 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3156 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3157 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3158 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3160 } else if (i == 1) {
3162 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3163 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3167 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3168 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3171 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3172 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3173 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3174 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3176 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3177 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3178 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3179 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3185 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3188 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3192 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3194 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3197 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3200 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3201 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3202 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3205 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3206 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3213 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3215 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3218 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3222 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3223 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3225 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3226 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3228 /* we don't have a certificate */
3229 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3232 /* This is the passed certificate */
3234 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3235 idx = s->session->peer_type;
3236 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3237 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
3239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3244 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3246 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3250 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3251 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
3253 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3254 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3256 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3259 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3260 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3262 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3266 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3267 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
3268 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3270 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3274 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3275 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3276 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3284 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3288 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3289 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3291 size_t len, padding_len;
3292 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3294 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3295 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3297 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3298 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3299 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3303 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3307 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3312 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3314 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3315 /* should contain no data */
3316 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3317 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
3318 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3319 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3323 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3324 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3325 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3326 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3327 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3332 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3334 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3337 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3339 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3341 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3343 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
3344 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3345 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3349 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3351 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3352 rawexts, NULL, 0, &al))
3355 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3356 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3359 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3360 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3361 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3362 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3365 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3368 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3369 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3370 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3371 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3372 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3377 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3378 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3382 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3385 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen;
3386 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3387 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3388 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3393 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3394 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3395 # error Max cipher length too short
3398 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3399 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3402 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3403 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3406 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3409 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3411 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3414 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3415 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3417 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3418 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3419 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
3422 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3423 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3431 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3436 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3437 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3438 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3440 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3441 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3445 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3446 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3447 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3449 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3450 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);