2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
54 #include <openssl/rand.h>
55 #include <openssl/objects.h>
56 #include <openssl/evp.h>
57 #include <openssl/md5.h>
58 #include <openssl/dh.h>
59 #include <openssl/bn.h>
60 #include <openssl/engine.h>
62 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
64 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
65 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
66 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
67 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
71 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
77 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
79 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
80 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
81 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
82 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
89 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
95 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
97 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
100 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
101 * ciphersuite or for SRP
103 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
112 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
113 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
114 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
115 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
117 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
118 * (transition not allowed)
120 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
122 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
125 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
126 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
130 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
131 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
132 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
135 switch (st->hand_state) {
139 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
140 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
141 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
146 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
148 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
149 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
153 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
154 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
157 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
158 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
164 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
165 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
166 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
172 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
173 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
178 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
179 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
180 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
186 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
187 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
193 /* No valid transition found */
198 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
199 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
200 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
201 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
203 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
204 * (transition not allowed)
206 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
208 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
212 * Note that after a ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
213 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
215 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
216 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
221 switch (st->hand_state) {
225 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
226 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
227 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
231 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
232 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
233 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
239 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
241 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
242 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
243 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
246 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
247 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
251 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
252 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
254 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
255 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
256 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
257 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
259 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
260 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
261 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
262 * the server is resuming.
265 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
267 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
268 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
269 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
270 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
274 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
275 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
277 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
278 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
279 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
280 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
283 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
284 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
285 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
287 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
288 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
297 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
298 * |ext.status_expected| is set
300 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
301 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
306 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
307 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
308 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
309 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
310 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
311 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
312 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
319 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
320 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
321 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
322 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
329 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
330 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
331 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
336 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
337 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
338 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
339 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
342 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
343 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
348 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
349 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
350 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
355 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
356 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
357 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
363 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
364 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
371 /* No valid transition found */
372 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
373 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
378 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
379 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
382 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
384 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
387 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
388 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
392 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE or TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO,
393 * because we haven't negotiated TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are
394 * handled by ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
396 switch (st->hand_state) {
398 /* Shouldn't happen */
399 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
401 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
402 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
403 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
404 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
407 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
408 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
409 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
410 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
412 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
413 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
414 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
416 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
417 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
418 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
419 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
420 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
423 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the server */
424 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
429 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
430 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
432 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
434 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
437 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
438 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
442 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
444 switch (st->hand_state) {
446 /* Shouldn't happen */
447 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
450 if (!s->renegotiate) {
452 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
453 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
455 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
457 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
459 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
460 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
462 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
464 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
467 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
469 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
470 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
471 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
473 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
474 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
475 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
477 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
478 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
481 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
482 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
484 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
486 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
487 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
490 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
491 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
492 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
493 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
495 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
496 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
498 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
500 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
501 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
503 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
505 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
506 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
507 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
509 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
510 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
511 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
513 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
514 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
516 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
518 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
520 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
521 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
522 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
523 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
526 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
528 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
529 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
530 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
532 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
535 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
537 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
538 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
540 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
541 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
542 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
545 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
547 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
550 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
551 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
552 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
553 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
555 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
556 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
558 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
559 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
560 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
565 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
566 * the client to the server.
568 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
570 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
572 switch (st->hand_state) {
574 /* No pre work to be done */
577 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
579 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
580 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
581 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
582 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
588 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
589 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
592 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
593 * messages unless we need to.
597 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
598 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
599 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
605 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
608 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
612 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
613 * client to the server.
614 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
615 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
617 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
619 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
623 switch (st->hand_state) {
625 /* No post work to be done */
628 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
629 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
632 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
633 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
638 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
639 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
643 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
644 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
645 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
646 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
648 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
649 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
651 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
653 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
656 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
657 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
660 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
661 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
664 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
667 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
672 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
676 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
677 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
678 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
680 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
683 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
687 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
690 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
691 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
692 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
698 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
702 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
705 * Valid return values are:
709 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
710 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
712 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
714 switch (st->hand_state) {
716 /* Shouldn't happen */
719 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
721 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
723 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
724 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
727 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
728 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
729 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
733 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
734 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
737 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
738 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
739 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
742 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
743 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
744 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
747 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
748 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
749 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
750 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
753 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
754 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
755 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
763 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
764 * reading. Excludes the message header.
766 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
768 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
770 switch (st->hand_state) {
772 /* Shouldn't happen */
775 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
776 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
778 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
779 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
782 return s->max_cert_list;
784 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
785 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
787 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
788 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
790 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
791 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
793 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
795 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
796 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
797 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
799 return s->max_cert_list;
801 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
802 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
804 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
805 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
807 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
809 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
810 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
812 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
813 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
815 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
816 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
821 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
823 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
825 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
827 switch (st->hand_state) {
829 /* Shouldn't happen */
830 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
832 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
833 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
835 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
836 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
839 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
841 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
842 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
844 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
845 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
847 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
848 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
850 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
851 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
853 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
854 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
856 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
857 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
859 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
860 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
862 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
863 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
865 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
866 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
868 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
869 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
874 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
877 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
879 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
881 switch (st->hand_state) {
883 /* Shouldn't happen */
886 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
887 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
889 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
890 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
891 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
892 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
893 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
894 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
895 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
896 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
897 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
900 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
901 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
906 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
911 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
912 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
915 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
917 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
918 /* Should not happen */
919 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
923 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
924 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
926 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
930 if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||
932 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
933 * "ticket" without a session ID.
935 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->ext.tick) ||
936 (sess->not_resumable)) {
937 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
940 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
942 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
943 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
945 p = s->s3->client_random;
948 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
949 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
951 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
954 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
963 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
967 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
968 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
969 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
970 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
971 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
972 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
973 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
974 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
977 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
978 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
979 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
980 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
981 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
982 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
983 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
984 * know that is maximum server supports.
985 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
986 * containing version 1.0.
988 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
989 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
990 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
991 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
992 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
993 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
994 * the negotiated version.
996 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
997 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
999 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1000 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1006 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
1009 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1010 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1011 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1012 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
1014 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1015 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1019 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1020 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1021 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1022 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1023 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1024 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1029 /* Ciphers supported */
1030 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1034 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
1035 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt))
1037 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1038 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1043 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1044 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1047 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1048 if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1049 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1050 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1051 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1052 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1053 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1059 /* Add the NULL method */
1060 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1061 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1065 /* TLS extensions */
1066 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1067 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1068 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1075 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1081 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1082 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1083 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1088 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1089 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1090 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1091 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1095 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1096 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1097 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1100 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1102 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1104 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1105 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1106 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1109 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1111 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1112 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1113 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1114 size_t session_id_len;
1115 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1116 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1117 unsigned int compression;
1118 unsigned int sversion;
1119 unsigned int context;
1121 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1126 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1127 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1128 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1132 protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1133 if (protverr != 0) {
1134 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
1139 /* load the server hello data */
1140 /* load the server random */
1141 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1142 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1143 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1149 /* Get the session-id. */
1150 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1151 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1152 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1156 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1157 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1158 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1159 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1160 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1161 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1165 PACKET_null_init(&session_id);
1169 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1170 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1171 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1176 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
1177 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1178 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1179 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1180 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1181 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
1182 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
1183 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
1184 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
1185 * server wants to resume.
1187 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1188 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1189 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1191 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1192 * backwards compat reasons
1194 int master_key_length;
1195 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1196 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1199 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1200 && master_key_length > 0) {
1201 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1202 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1203 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1206 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1211 if (session_id_len != 0 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1212 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1213 session_id_len) == 0) {
1214 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1215 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1216 /* actually a client application bug */
1217 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1218 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1219 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1225 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1226 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1227 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1228 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1229 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1231 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1232 s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
1233 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1238 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1239 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1240 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1241 if (session_id_len > 0)
1242 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1246 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1247 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1248 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1250 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1251 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1255 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1257 /* unknown cipher */
1258 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1259 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1263 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1266 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1267 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1269 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1270 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1272 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1273 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1274 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1278 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1279 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1281 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1282 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1283 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1288 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1289 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1290 * set and use it for comparison.
1292 if (s->session->cipher)
1293 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1294 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1295 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1296 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1297 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1300 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1301 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1303 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1304 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1305 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1306 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1313 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1314 if (compression != 0) {
1315 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1316 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1317 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1321 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1322 * using compression.
1324 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1325 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1329 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1330 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1331 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1332 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1335 if (compression == 0)
1337 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1338 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1339 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1342 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1345 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1346 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1347 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1348 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1351 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1355 /* TLS extensions */
1356 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1357 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1358 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
1359 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1360 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1364 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1365 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1366 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al)
1367 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1370 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1371 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1372 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1373 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1376 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1379 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1380 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1382 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1383 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1385 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
1388 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1389 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1390 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1395 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1396 * we're done with this message
1399 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1400 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1401 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)
1402 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1403 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1404 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1405 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
1409 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1410 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1412 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1413 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1414 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1415 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1418 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1420 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1421 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1423 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1424 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1425 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1427 unsigned int context = 0;
1429 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1430 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1434 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1436 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1437 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
1438 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1439 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1442 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1443 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1444 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1445 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1446 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1447 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1451 certstart = certbytes;
1452 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1454 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1455 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1458 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1459 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1460 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1461 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1465 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1466 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1469 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1470 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1471 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1474 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1476 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1477 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) {
1478 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1481 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1484 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1485 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1491 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1493 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1494 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1495 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1496 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1497 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1498 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1499 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1500 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1501 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1502 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1503 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1504 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1506 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1507 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1508 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1509 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1512 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1514 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1515 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1519 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1521 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1522 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1524 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1527 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1530 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1532 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1535 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1536 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1540 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1544 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1545 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1549 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1550 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
1551 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
1552 (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1553 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
1555 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1556 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1557 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1560 s->session->peer_type = i;
1562 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1564 s->session->peer = x;
1565 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1568 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1570 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1571 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1572 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1573 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1574 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1578 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1582 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1584 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1587 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1591 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1593 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1594 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1596 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1598 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1599 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1600 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1605 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1606 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1607 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1610 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1611 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1612 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1616 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1617 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1618 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1619 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1620 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1621 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1627 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1628 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1633 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1635 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1636 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1638 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1639 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1640 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1641 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1642 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1643 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1647 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1649 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1650 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1652 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1653 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1655 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1656 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1658 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1659 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1660 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1661 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1665 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
1666 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1667 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1671 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1672 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1673 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1677 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1678 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1683 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1685 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1686 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1687 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
1690 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
1694 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1695 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1696 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1697 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1698 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1702 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1705 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1706 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1707 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1711 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1712 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
1713 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
1715 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1716 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
1717 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
1718 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1719 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1723 /* test non-zero pupkey */
1724 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
1725 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1726 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1730 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
1731 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1732 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1737 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
1738 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1739 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1743 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
1744 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1745 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1750 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1751 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1752 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1756 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
1757 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1758 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1762 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
1765 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1766 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1768 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1769 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1770 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1779 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
1783 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1784 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1789 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1791 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1793 const unsigned char *ecparams;
1795 unsigned int curve_flags;
1796 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
1799 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1800 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1801 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1803 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
1804 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1805 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1809 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1810 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1812 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
1813 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1814 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1818 curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags);
1820 if (curve_nid == 0) {
1821 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1822 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
1823 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1827 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
1828 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
1830 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) {
1831 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1832 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1836 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
1838 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
1839 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
1841 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
1842 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
1843 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
1844 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1845 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1846 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1849 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1853 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
1854 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1855 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1859 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
1860 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1861 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
1862 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1863 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1868 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1869 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1872 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
1873 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1874 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
1875 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1876 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1880 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1881 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1886 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1888 int al = -1, ispss = 0;
1890 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1891 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
1892 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
1893 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
1895 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1897 save_param_start = *pkt;
1899 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1900 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
1901 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
1904 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
1905 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
1909 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
1910 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1911 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
1912 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1914 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1915 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1917 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1918 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1921 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1922 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1926 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1930 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1933 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
1934 * equals the length of the parameters.
1936 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
1937 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
1938 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
1939 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1940 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1944 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1945 unsigned int sigalg;
1948 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
1949 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1950 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1953 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalg, pkey);
1955 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1957 } else if (rv == 0) {
1958 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1961 ispss = SIGID_IS_PSS(sigalg);
1963 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1965 } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
1966 md = EVP_md5_sha1();
1971 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
1972 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1973 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1974 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1977 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1979 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1980 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1985 * Check signature length
1987 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
1988 /* wrong packet length */
1989 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1990 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1991 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
1995 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1996 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1997 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1998 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2002 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2003 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2004 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2008 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2009 /* -1 here means set saltlen to the digest len */
2010 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1) <= 0) {
2011 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2012 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2016 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2017 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2018 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2019 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2020 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2021 PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
2022 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2023 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2026 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2027 PACKET_remaining(&signature)) <= 0) {
2029 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2030 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2033 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2036 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2037 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2038 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2039 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2040 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2041 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
2042 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2043 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2045 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2049 /* still data left over */
2050 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2051 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2052 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2057 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2060 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2061 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2062 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2063 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2066 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2068 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2069 unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len;
2070 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2071 const unsigned char *data;
2072 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2073 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
2075 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
2076 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2080 /* get the certificate types */
2081 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num)
2082 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) {
2083 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2084 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2087 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
2088 s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
2089 if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
2090 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
2091 s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
2092 if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
2093 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2096 memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, data, ctype_num);
2097 s->cert->ctype_num = ctype_num;
2098 ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
2100 for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
2101 s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = data[i];
2103 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2106 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2107 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2108 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2109 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2113 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2114 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2115 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2116 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2118 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) {
2119 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2120 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2121 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2124 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2125 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2126 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2130 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2133 /* get the CA RDNs */
2134 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
2135 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) {
2136 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2137 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2141 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2142 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len)
2143 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2144 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2145 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2146 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2150 namestart = namebytes;
2152 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
2153 name_len)) == NULL) {
2154 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2155 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2159 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2160 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2161 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2162 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2165 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2166 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2172 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2173 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2174 s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
2175 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2176 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2179 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2182 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2185 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2189 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2191 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2194 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2197 unsigned int ticklen;
2198 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, add_age;
2199 unsigned int sess_len;
2200 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2202 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2203 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &add_age))
2204 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2205 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
2206 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (ticklen == 0
2207 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
2208 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2209 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2214 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2215 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2216 * be 0 here in that instance
2219 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2221 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Is this a suitable test for TLS1.3? */
2222 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2223 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2224 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2226 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2229 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2231 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2233 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2236 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2237 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2238 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2242 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2243 s->session = new_sess;
2246 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2247 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2248 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2250 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2251 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2252 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2255 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2256 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2257 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2261 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2262 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2264 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2267 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2268 || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2269 EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2271 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2272 exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
2273 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2279 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2280 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2281 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2282 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2283 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2284 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2285 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2286 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2287 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2290 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2291 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2293 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2294 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2295 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2296 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2299 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2301 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2302 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2303 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2304 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2307 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2309 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2311 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2312 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2316 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2317 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On failure
2318 * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code.
2320 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2325 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2326 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2327 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2328 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2329 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2332 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2333 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2334 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2335 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2338 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2339 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2340 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2341 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2344 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2345 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2346 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2349 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2355 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2359 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt, &al)) {
2360 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2361 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2362 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2365 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2369 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2370 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2371 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2374 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s, int *al)
2377 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2380 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2381 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2386 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2387 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2388 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2390 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2391 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2392 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2395 *al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2396 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2397 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2401 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2402 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2403 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2407 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2408 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2409 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2410 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2411 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2420 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2422 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2424 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2425 /* should contain no data */
2426 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2427 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2430 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2431 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2432 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2433 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2440 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2442 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
2445 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2446 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2447 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2448 && s->renegotiate != 0)
2449 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2452 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2455 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2456 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2457 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2460 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2465 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2466 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2469 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2470 size_t identitylen = 0;
2471 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2472 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2473 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2476 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2477 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2478 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2482 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2484 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2485 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2488 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2489 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2490 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2492 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2493 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2494 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2495 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2499 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2500 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2501 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2502 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2506 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2507 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2508 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2509 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2510 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2514 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2515 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2516 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2518 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2519 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2522 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2523 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2524 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2531 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2532 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2533 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2534 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2538 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2539 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2544 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2546 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2547 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2548 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2549 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2551 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2554 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2556 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2558 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2562 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2563 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2564 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2568 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2569 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2571 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2572 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2576 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2577 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2578 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2579 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2583 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2584 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2585 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2588 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2589 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2590 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2591 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2594 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2595 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2596 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2599 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2602 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
2604 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
2608 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2609 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2610 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2614 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2615 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2617 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2618 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen))
2623 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2624 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2628 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2629 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2634 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2636 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2638 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2639 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2640 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2642 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2646 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2650 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2652 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0)
2655 /* send off the data */
2656 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2657 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), &keybytes))
2660 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2661 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2665 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2667 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2668 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2672 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2675 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2676 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2677 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2680 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2682 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2686 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2688 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2692 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2693 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2697 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2698 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2700 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2701 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2705 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
2706 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2712 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2713 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2716 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2717 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2722 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2724 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2725 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2726 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
2729 unsigned int md_len;
2730 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2731 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
2732 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2733 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2736 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2737 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2740 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2742 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2744 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2745 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
2746 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2750 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2751 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2752 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2753 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2757 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2758 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2759 * certificate key for key exchange
2762 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2764 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2766 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2767 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2771 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
2772 /* Generate session key
2773 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
2775 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
2776 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2777 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2781 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2784 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2785 if (ukm_hash == NULL
2786 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
2787 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2788 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2789 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2790 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2791 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
2792 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2793 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2796 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2798 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
2799 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
2800 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2801 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2804 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2806 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2809 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2810 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2811 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2815 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
2816 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
2817 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
2818 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2819 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2823 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2824 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2825 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2829 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2830 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2831 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2834 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2835 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2840 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2842 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2843 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
2845 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
2846 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
2848 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2851 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
2853 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2854 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2855 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2856 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2862 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2863 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2868 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2870 unsigned long alg_k;
2873 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2875 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
2876 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2879 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2880 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
2882 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2883 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
2885 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2886 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
2888 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2889 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
2891 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2892 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
2894 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
2895 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2896 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2903 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2904 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
2905 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2907 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2908 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2913 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
2915 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2918 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
2919 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
2921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2923 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2924 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
2925 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
2926 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2933 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
2934 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2935 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2938 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
2939 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2940 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2941 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
2949 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2950 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2951 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2952 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2955 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2958 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2959 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2961 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2962 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2963 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
2966 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2967 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2973 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2974 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2979 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
2980 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
2981 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
2983 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2985 if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
2987 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
2988 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys])
2991 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
2992 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
2994 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
2995 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3000 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3003 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3006 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3007 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3008 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3009 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3011 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3015 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3016 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3019 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3021 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3022 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3024 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3028 /* We need to get a client cert */
3029 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3031 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3032 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3034 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3036 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3039 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3040 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3041 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3043 } else if (i == 1) {
3045 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3046 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3050 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3051 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3054 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3055 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3056 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3057 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3059 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3060 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3061 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3062 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3068 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3071 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3075 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3077 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3080 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3083 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3084 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3085 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3088 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3089 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3096 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3098 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3101 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3105 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3106 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3108 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3109 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3111 /* we don't have a certificate */
3112 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3115 /* This is the passed certificate */
3117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3118 idx = s->session->peer_type;
3119 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3120 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
3122 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3127 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3129 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3133 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3134 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
3136 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3137 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3139 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3142 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3143 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3145 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3149 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3150 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
3151 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3153 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3157 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3158 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3159 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3167 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3171 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3172 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3174 size_t len, padding_len;
3175 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3177 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3178 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3180 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3181 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3182 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3186 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3190 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3195 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3197 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3198 /* should contain no data */
3199 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3200 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
3201 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3202 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3206 * This is a historical discrepancy maintained for compatibility
3207 * reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will attempt
3208 * an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3209 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake.
3214 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3216 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3219 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3221 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3223 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3225 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
3226 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3227 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3231 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3233 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3234 rawexts, NULL, 0, &al))
3237 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3238 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3241 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3242 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3243 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3244 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3247 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3250 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3251 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3252 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3253 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3254 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3259 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3260 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3264 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3267 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen;
3268 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3269 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3270 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3275 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3276 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3277 # error Max cipher length too short
3280 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3281 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3284 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3285 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3288 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3291 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3293 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3296 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3297 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3299 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3300 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3301 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
3304 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3305 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3318 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3319 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3320 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3322 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3327 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3328 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3329 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3331 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);