2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/md5.h>
21 #include <openssl/dh.h>
22 #include <openssl/bn.h>
23 #include <openssl/engine.h>
25 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
26 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
28 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
29 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
30 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
34 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
40 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
42 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
43 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
44 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
45 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
52 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
58 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
60 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
63 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
64 * ciphersuite or for SRP
66 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
75 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
76 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
77 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
78 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
80 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
81 * (transition not allowed)
83 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
85 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
88 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
89 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
90 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
93 switch (st->hand_state) {
97 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
99 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
100 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
102 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
103 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
108 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
109 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
110 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
115 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
117 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
118 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
122 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
123 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
126 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
127 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
133 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
134 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
135 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
141 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
142 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
147 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
148 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
149 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
155 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
156 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
159 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
160 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
166 /* No valid transition found */
171 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
172 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
173 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
174 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
176 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
177 * (transition not allowed)
179 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
181 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
185 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
186 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
188 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
189 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
194 switch (st->hand_state) {
198 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
199 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
200 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
204 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
205 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
206 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
212 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
214 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
215 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
218 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
219 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
224 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
226 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
227 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
228 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
231 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
232 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
236 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
237 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
239 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
240 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
241 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
242 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
244 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
245 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
246 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
247 * the server is resuming.
250 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
252 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
253 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
254 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
255 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
259 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
260 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
262 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
263 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
264 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
265 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
268 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
269 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
270 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
272 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
273 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
282 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
283 * |ext.status_expected| is set
285 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
286 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
291 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
292 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
293 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
294 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
295 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
296 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
297 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
304 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
305 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
306 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
307 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
314 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
315 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
316 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
321 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
322 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
323 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
324 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
327 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
328 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
333 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
334 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
335 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
340 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
341 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
342 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
348 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
349 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
356 /* No valid transition found */
357 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
358 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION,
359 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
364 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
365 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
368 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
370 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
373 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
374 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
375 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
377 switch (st->hand_state) {
379 /* Shouldn't happen */
380 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
381 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
382 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
383 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
385 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
386 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
387 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
388 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
389 else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
390 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
391 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
393 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
394 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
395 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
397 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
398 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
399 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
400 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
404 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
405 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
406 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
407 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
408 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
411 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
412 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
413 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
414 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
416 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
417 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
418 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
420 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
421 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
422 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
423 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
427 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
428 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
429 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
430 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
431 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
434 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
435 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
436 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
439 /* Try to read from the server instead */
440 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
445 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
446 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
448 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
450 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
453 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
454 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
458 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
460 switch (st->hand_state) {
462 /* Shouldn't happen */
463 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
464 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION,
465 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
466 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
469 if (!s->renegotiate) {
471 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
472 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
474 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
479 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
480 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
482 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
483 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
485 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
486 * actually selected a version yet.
488 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
489 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
491 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
492 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
495 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
498 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
500 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
502 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
503 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
504 * because we did early data.
506 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
507 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
508 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
510 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
511 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
513 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
514 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
516 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
517 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
518 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
520 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
521 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
522 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
524 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
525 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
528 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
529 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
531 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
533 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
534 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
537 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
538 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
539 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
540 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
542 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
543 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
545 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
547 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
548 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
550 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
552 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
553 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
554 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
556 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
557 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
558 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
559 } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
560 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
562 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
563 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
565 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
566 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
568 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
571 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
573 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
574 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
575 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
576 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
579 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
581 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
582 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
584 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
587 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
589 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
590 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
592 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
593 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
596 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
598 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
601 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
602 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
603 /* SSLfatal() already called */
604 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
606 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
607 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
609 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
610 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
615 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
616 * the client to the server.
618 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
620 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
622 switch (st->hand_state) {
624 /* No pre work to be done */
627 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
629 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
630 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
631 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
632 /* SSLfatal() already called */
638 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
639 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
642 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
643 * messages unless we need to.
647 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
648 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
649 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
650 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
656 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
658 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
659 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
660 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
662 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
663 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
664 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
667 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
668 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1);
671 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
672 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
675 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
679 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
680 * client to the server.
682 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
684 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
688 switch (st->hand_state) {
690 /* No post work to be done */
693 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
694 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
695 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
697 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
698 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
699 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
701 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
702 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
703 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
704 /* SSLfatal() already called */
708 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
709 } else if (!statem_flush(s)) {
713 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
714 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
719 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
721 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
722 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
724 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
725 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
728 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
729 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
730 /* SSLfatal() already called */
735 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
736 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
738 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
739 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
741 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
742 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
743 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
745 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
746 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
750 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
751 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
752 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
754 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
755 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
757 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
759 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
760 /* SSLfatal() already called */
764 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
765 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
766 /* SSLfatal() already called */
770 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
771 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
774 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
777 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
782 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
786 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
787 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
788 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
790 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
793 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
797 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
800 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
801 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
802 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
803 /* SSLfatal() already called */
809 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
810 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
812 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
813 /* SSLfatal() already called */
819 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
823 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
826 * Valid return values are:
830 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
831 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
833 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
835 switch (st->hand_state) {
837 /* Shouldn't happen */
838 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
839 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
840 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
843 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
845 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
847 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
848 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
851 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
852 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
853 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
856 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
857 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
858 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
861 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
867 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
868 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
871 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
872 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
873 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
876 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
877 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
878 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
881 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
882 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
883 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
884 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
887 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
888 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
889 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
892 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
893 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
894 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
902 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
903 * reading. Excludes the message header.
905 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
907 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
909 switch (st->hand_state) {
911 /* Shouldn't happen */
914 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
915 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
917 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
918 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
921 return s->max_cert_list;
923 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
924 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
926 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
927 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
929 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
930 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
932 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
934 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
935 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
936 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
938 return s->max_cert_list;
940 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
941 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
943 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
944 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
946 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
948 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
949 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
951 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
952 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
954 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
955 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
957 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
958 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
963 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
965 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
967 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
969 switch (st->hand_state) {
971 /* Shouldn't happen */
972 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
973 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
974 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
975 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
977 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
978 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
980 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
981 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
984 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
986 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
987 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
989 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
990 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
992 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
993 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
995 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
996 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
998 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
999 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
1001 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1002 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1004 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1005 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
1007 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1008 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1010 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
1011 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1013 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1014 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1016 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1017 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1022 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1025 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1027 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1029 switch (st->hand_state) {
1031 /* Shouldn't happen */
1032 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1033 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1034 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1037 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1038 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1042 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1047 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1050 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1051 unsigned char *session_id;
1053 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
1054 /* Should not happen */
1055 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1056 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1060 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1061 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1062 if (protverr != 0) {
1063 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1069 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version)
1070 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1071 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1072 && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1073 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1077 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1079 p = s->s3->client_random;
1082 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1083 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1085 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1088 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1095 i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE);
1098 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random),
1099 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
1100 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1101 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1106 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1107 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1108 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1109 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1110 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1111 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1112 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1113 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1116 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1117 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1118 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1119 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1120 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1121 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1122 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1123 * know that is maximum server supports.
1124 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1125 * containing version 1.0.
1127 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1128 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1129 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1130 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1131 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1132 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1133 * the negotiated version.
1135 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1136 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1138 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1139 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1140 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1141 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1146 session_id = s->session->session_id;
1147 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1148 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1149 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) {
1150 sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id);
1151 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1152 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
1153 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1154 && ssl_randbytes(s, s->tmp_session_id,
1155 sess_id_len) <= 0) {
1156 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1157 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1158 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1165 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1166 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1167 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1168 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len);
1171 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1172 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1173 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id,
1175 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1176 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1177 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1181 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1182 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1183 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1184 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1185 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1186 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1187 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1192 /* Ciphers supported */
1193 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1194 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1195 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1199 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) {
1200 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1203 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1204 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1205 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1210 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1211 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1212 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1215 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1216 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1217 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1218 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1219 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1220 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1221 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1222 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1223 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1224 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1225 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1231 /* Add the NULL method */
1232 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1233 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1234 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1238 /* TLS extensions */
1239 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
1240 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1247 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1252 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1253 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1254 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1255 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1256 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1259 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1260 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1261 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1262 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1263 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1266 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1267 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1268 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1269 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1271 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1273 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1276 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1278 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1279 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1282 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1284 /* unknown cipher */
1285 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1286 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1290 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1291 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1293 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1294 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1295 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1299 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1300 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1302 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1303 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1304 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1308 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1309 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1310 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1311 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1312 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1317 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1318 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1319 * set and use it for comparison.
1321 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1322 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1323 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1324 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1326 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1327 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1329 if (ssl_md(c->algorithm2)
1330 != ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1331 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1332 SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1333 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1338 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1341 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1342 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1346 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1351 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1353 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1354 size_t session_id_len;
1355 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1357 unsigned int compression;
1358 unsigned int sversion;
1359 unsigned int context;
1361 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1362 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1366 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1367 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1368 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1372 /* load the server random */
1373 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1374 && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION
1375 && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1376 && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
1377 s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
1379 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1380 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1381 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1385 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1386 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1387 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1392 /* Get the session-id. */
1393 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1394 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1395 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1398 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1399 if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1400 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1401 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1402 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1406 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1407 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1408 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1412 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1413 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1414 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1418 /* TLS extensions */
1419 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) {
1420 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1421 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1422 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1423 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1429 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
1430 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1431 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1432 &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
1433 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1437 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
1438 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1443 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
1444 if (compression != 0) {
1445 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1446 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1447 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1451 if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
1452 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
1453 session_id_len) != 0) {
1454 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1455 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
1461 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1462 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1466 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt);
1470 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1471 * are appropriate for this version.
1473 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1474 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1475 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
1476 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1477 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1483 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1485 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1486 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1488 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1489 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1490 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1491 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1495 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1496 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1497 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1498 extensions, NULL, 0)) {
1499 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1504 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1505 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1506 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1507 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1508 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1509 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1510 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1511 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1512 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1513 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1515 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1516 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1517 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1519 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1520 * backwards compat reasons
1522 int master_key_length;
1523 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1524 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1527 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1528 && master_key_length > 0) {
1529 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1530 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1531 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1533 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1534 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1539 if (session_id_len != 0
1540 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1541 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1542 session_id_len) == 0)
1547 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1548 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1549 /* actually a client application bug */
1550 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1551 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1552 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1557 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1558 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1559 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1560 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1561 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1563 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1565 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1566 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1567 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss, 1, &discard,
1568 s->session_ctx->lock);
1569 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1570 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1575 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1577 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1578 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1579 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1580 * used for resumption.
1582 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1583 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1584 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1585 if (session_id_len > 0)
1586 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1591 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1592 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1593 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1594 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1598 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1601 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1602 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1604 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1605 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1609 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1610 if (compression != 0) {
1611 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1612 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1616 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1617 * using compression.
1619 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1620 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1621 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1625 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1626 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1627 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1630 if (compression == 0)
1632 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1633 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1634 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1637 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1640 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1641 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1642 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1645 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1649 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1650 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1654 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1655 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1656 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1657 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1660 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1663 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1664 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1666 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1667 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1669 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1670 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1671 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1675 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1676 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1677 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1682 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1683 * we're done with this message
1686 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1687 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1688 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1689 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1693 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1694 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1696 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1697 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1700 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s,
1703 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1706 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1707 * should not be used.
1709 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
1710 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
1712 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1713 &extensions, NULL, 1)
1714 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1715 extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1716 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1720 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1723 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0
1724 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1725 && s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL
1729 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1730 * ClientHello will not change
1732 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1733 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_AS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1734 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1739 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1740 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1742 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s)) {
1743 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1748 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1749 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1750 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1753 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1754 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1755 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1759 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1761 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1762 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1765 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1768 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1769 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1771 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1772 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1773 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1774 size_t chainidx, certidx;
1775 unsigned int context = 0;
1776 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1778 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1779 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1780 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1784 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1786 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1787 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1788 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1789 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1790 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1793 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1794 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1795 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1796 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1797 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1798 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1802 certstart = certbytes;
1803 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1805 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE,
1806 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1809 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1810 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1811 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1812 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1816 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1817 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1820 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1821 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1822 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1826 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1827 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1828 NULL, chainidx == 0)
1829 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1830 rawexts, x, chainidx,
1831 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
1832 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1833 /* SSLfatal already called */
1836 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1839 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1840 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1841 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1842 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1848 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1850 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1851 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1852 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1853 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1854 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1855 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1856 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1857 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1858 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1859 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1860 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1861 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1863 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1864 SSLfatal(s, ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result),
1865 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1866 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1869 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1871 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1872 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1876 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1878 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1879 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1881 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1884 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1886 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1888 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1889 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1893 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) {
1895 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1896 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1897 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1901 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1902 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1905 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1906 if ((clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
1908 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1909 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1910 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1914 s->session->peer_type = certidx;
1916 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1918 s->session->peer = x;
1919 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1922 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1924 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1925 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1926 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1927 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1931 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1935 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1939 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1941 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1942 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1944 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1946 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1947 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1948 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1953 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1954 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1955 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1958 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1959 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1960 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1961 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1965 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1966 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1967 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1968 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1969 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1970 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1971 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1977 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1978 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1983 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
1985 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1986 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1988 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1989 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1990 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1991 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1992 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
1993 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1997 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1999 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
2000 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
2002 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
2003 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
2005 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
2006 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
2008 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
2009 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
2010 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2015 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) {
2016 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2020 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2021 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2022 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2026 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2027 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2032 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2034 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2035 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
2036 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
2039 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
2043 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2044 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2045 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
2046 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2047 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2051 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
2054 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
2055 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2056 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2060 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
2061 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
2062 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
2064 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
2065 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
2066 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
2067 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2072 /* test non-zero pubkey */
2073 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
2074 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2075 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2079 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
2080 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2086 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
2087 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2088 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2092 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
2093 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2099 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
2100 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2101 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2105 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
2106 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2111 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2114 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2115 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2117 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2118 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2119 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2128 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2132 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2133 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2138 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2142 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
2145 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2146 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2147 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2149 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
2150 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2151 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2155 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2156 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2158 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id)) {
2159 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2164 if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id)) == NULL) {
2165 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2166 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2170 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2171 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2172 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2176 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2177 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2178 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2179 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2185 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2186 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2189 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2190 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2191 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2192 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2193 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2197 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2198 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2203 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2206 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2207 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2208 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2209 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2211 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2213 save_param_start = *pkt;
2215 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2216 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2217 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2220 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2221 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
2222 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2227 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2228 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2229 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2230 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2231 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2234 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2235 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2236 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2239 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2240 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2241 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2245 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2246 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2250 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2254 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2260 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2261 * equals the length of the parameters.
2263 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2264 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2265 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2266 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2267 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2271 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2272 unsigned int sigalg;
2274 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2275 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2276 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2279 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) {
2280 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2284 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2286 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2287 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2288 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2292 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2293 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2294 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2298 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2299 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2300 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2301 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2304 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2306 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2307 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2312 * Check signature length
2314 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2315 /* wrong packet length */
2316 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2317 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2321 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2322 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2323 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2324 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2328 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2329 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2333 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2334 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2335 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2336 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2337 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2338 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2342 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2343 PACKET_remaining(¶ms));
2345 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2349 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2350 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2353 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2354 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2357 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2360 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2361 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2362 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2363 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2364 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2365 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2368 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2371 /* still data left over */
2372 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2373 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2374 SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2379 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2381 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2382 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2385 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2389 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2390 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2391 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2393 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2394 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2395 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2397 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2398 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
2399 s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
2400 s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2402 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
2403 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx)) {
2404 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2405 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2406 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2407 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2410 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2411 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2412 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2414 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2416 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2417 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2419 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2420 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2421 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2422 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2423 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2425 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2426 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2427 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2428 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2430 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2435 /* get the certificate types */
2436 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2437 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2438 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2439 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2440 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2443 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
2444 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2445 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2446 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2447 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2450 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2453 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2454 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2455 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2456 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2457 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2460 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) {
2461 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2462 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2463 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2464 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2466 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2467 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2468 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2469 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2470 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2474 /* get the CA RDNs */
2475 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2476 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2477 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2481 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2482 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2483 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2484 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2485 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2488 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2489 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2491 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2494 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2496 unsigned int ticklen;
2497 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2498 unsigned int sess_len;
2499 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2502 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2504 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2505 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)
2506 || !PACKET_memdup(&nonce, &s->session->ext.tick_nonce,
2507 &s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len)))
2508 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2509 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
2511 && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
2512 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2513 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2518 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2519 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2520 * be 0 here in that instance
2523 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2526 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2527 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2528 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2529 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2530 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2533 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2534 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2535 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2537 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2540 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2541 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2542 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2543 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2547 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2549 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2551 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2554 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2555 s->session = new_sess;
2559 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2560 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2562 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2564 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2565 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2566 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2568 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2569 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2570 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2571 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2574 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2575 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2576 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2580 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2581 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2582 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2584 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2587 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2588 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0
2589 || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2590 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2592 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2593 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2594 exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2595 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2601 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2602 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2603 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2604 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2605 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2606 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2607 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2608 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2609 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2612 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2613 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2615 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2616 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2617 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2618 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2622 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2624 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2625 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2627 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2628 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2631 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2634 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2638 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2639 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2641 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2646 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2647 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2648 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2649 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2652 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2653 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2654 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2655 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2658 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2659 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2660 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2661 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2664 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2665 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2666 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2669 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2675 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2677 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
2678 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2679 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2682 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2686 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2687 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2688 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2691 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s)
2694 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2697 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2698 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2703 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2704 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2705 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2707 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2708 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2709 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2712 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
2713 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2714 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2718 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2719 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2720 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2724 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2725 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2726 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2727 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2728 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2737 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2739 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2740 /* should contain no data */
2741 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2742 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2743 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2745 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2746 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2747 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2748 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2750 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2755 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
2756 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2757 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2760 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2763 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2765 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2768 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2769 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2772 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2773 size_t identitylen = 0;
2774 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2775 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2776 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2779 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2780 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2781 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2785 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2787 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2788 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2791 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2792 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2793 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2795 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2796 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2797 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2798 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2802 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2803 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2804 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2805 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2809 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2810 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2811 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2812 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2813 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2817 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2818 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2819 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2821 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2822 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2825 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2826 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2827 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2834 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2835 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2836 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2837 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2841 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2842 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2847 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2849 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2850 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2851 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2852 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2854 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2857 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2859 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2861 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2862 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2866 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2867 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2868 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2869 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2873 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2874 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2876 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2877 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2881 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2882 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2883 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2884 if (ssl_randbytes(s, pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2885 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2886 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2890 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2891 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2892 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2893 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2896 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2897 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2898 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2899 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2903 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2904 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2905 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2906 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2909 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2912 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2913 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2914 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2915 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2919 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2920 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) {
2921 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2925 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2926 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2930 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2931 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2935 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2936 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2941 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2943 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2945 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2946 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2947 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2949 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2951 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2952 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2956 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2958 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2959 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2963 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2965 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2966 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2967 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2971 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2972 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2976 /* send off the data */
2977 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2978 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key),
2980 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2981 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2985 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2986 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2990 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2993 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2994 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2999 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3001 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3002 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
3003 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
3004 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3007 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
3009 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3010 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3014 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
3016 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3017 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3021 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3022 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3026 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3027 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
3029 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
3030 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3035 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
3036 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3037 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3043 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3044 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3047 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3048 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3053 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3055 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3056 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3057 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3060 unsigned int md_len;
3061 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
3062 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
3063 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
3064 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3067 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
3068 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
3071 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3073 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3075 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3076 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3080 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
3081 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3082 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3083 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3087 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3088 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3089 * certificate key for key exchange
3092 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3094 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3096 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3097 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3101 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3102 /* Generate session key
3103 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3105 || ssl_randbytes(s, pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
3106 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3107 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3111 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3114 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3115 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3116 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3117 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
3118 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3119 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
3120 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3121 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3122 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3123 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3126 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3128 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3129 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
3130 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3134 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3136 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3139 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3140 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3145 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3146 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3147 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3148 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3149 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3153 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3154 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3155 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3159 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3160 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3161 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3164 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3165 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3170 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3173 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3175 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3176 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3178 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3179 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3182 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3184 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3185 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3186 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3187 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3188 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3194 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3195 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3200 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3202 unsigned long alg_k;
3204 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3207 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3208 * no need to do so here.
3210 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3211 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt))
3214 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3215 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt))
3217 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3218 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt))
3220 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3221 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt))
3223 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3224 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt))
3226 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3227 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
3229 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3230 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3231 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3237 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3238 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3239 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3240 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3241 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3246 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3248 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3251 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3252 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3254 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3256 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3257 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3258 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3265 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3266 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3267 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3270 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3271 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3272 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3280 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3281 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3282 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3283 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3286 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3289 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3290 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3292 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3293 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3294 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3295 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3296 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3297 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3301 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3302 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3308 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3309 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3314 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3315 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3316 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3318 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3320 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3321 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3324 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3325 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3327 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3328 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3333 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3336 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3339 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3340 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3341 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3342 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3344 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3348 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3349 SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3350 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3353 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3355 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3356 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3358 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3362 /* We need to get a client cert */
3363 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3365 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3366 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3368 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3370 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3373 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3374 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3375 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3377 } else if (i == 1) {
3379 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3380 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3384 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3385 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3388 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3389 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3390 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3391 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3393 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3394 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3395 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3401 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3404 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3405 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3406 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3410 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3413 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3416 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3417 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3418 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3421 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3422 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3424 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3429 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3430 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3431 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3433 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3434 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3436 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3437 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3444 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3446 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3450 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3451 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3453 /* we don't have a certificate */
3454 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3457 /* This is the passed certificate */
3458 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx);
3460 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3461 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3462 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3463 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3464 SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3468 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3469 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
3470 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
3472 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3473 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3478 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3479 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3480 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3481 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3485 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3486 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3487 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3488 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3496 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3497 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3499 size_t len, padding_len;
3500 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3502 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3503 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3505 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3506 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3507 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO,
3508 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3512 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3518 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3520 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3521 /* should contain no data */
3522 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ,
3523 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3524 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3527 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3528 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3529 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3533 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3534 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3535 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3536 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3537 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3542 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3544 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3547 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3550 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3552 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3553 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3554 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3555 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3559 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3560 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3562 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3563 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
3564 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3568 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3569 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3572 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3573 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3576 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3579 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3580 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3581 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3582 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3583 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3588 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3589 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3593 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3596 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3597 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3598 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3599 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3602 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3603 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3607 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3608 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3609 # error Max cipher length too short
3612 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3613 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3616 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3617 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3620 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3623 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3625 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3628 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3629 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3631 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3632 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3633 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3636 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3637 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3638 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3642 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3644 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3645 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3646 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver))
3649 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3->tmp.max_ver
3650 && c->min_tls <= s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3658 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3659 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3660 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3663 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3670 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3671 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3672 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3674 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3675 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3676 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3680 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3681 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3682 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3684 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3685 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3686 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3695 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3697 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3698 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3699 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3700 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3701 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3705 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;