1 /* ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
152 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
153 #include "statem_locl.h"
154 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
155 #include <openssl/rand.h>
156 #include <openssl/objects.h>
157 #include <openssl/evp.h>
158 #include <openssl/md5.h>
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
160 # include <openssl/dh.h>
162 #include <openssl/bn.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
164 # include <openssl/engine.h>
167 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
168 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
169 static int ssl_set_version(SSL *s);
170 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
171 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
176 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
182 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
184 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
185 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
186 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
187 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
194 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
201 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
203 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
206 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
207 * ciphersuite or for SRP
209 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
218 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
219 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
220 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
221 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
224 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
225 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
227 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
229 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
232 switch(st->hand_state) {
233 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
234 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
235 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
239 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
240 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
241 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
247 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
249 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
250 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
251 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
254 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
255 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
259 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
260 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
262 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
263 && s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL
264 && s->session->tlsext_tick != NULL
265 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
267 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
268 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
269 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
270 * the server is resuming.
273 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
275 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
276 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
277 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
278 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
282 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
283 if (ske_expected < 0)
285 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
287 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
288 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
289 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
290 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
293 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
294 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
295 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
297 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
298 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
307 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
308 * |tlsext_status_expected| is set
310 if (s->tlsext_status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
311 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
316 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
317 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
318 if (ske_expected < 0)
320 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
322 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
323 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
324 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
325 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
332 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
333 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
334 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
335 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
342 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
343 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
344 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
349 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
350 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET && s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
351 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
353 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
354 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
359 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
360 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
361 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
366 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
367 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
368 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
377 /* No valid transition found */
382 * client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
383 * when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
385 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
387 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
389 switch(st->hand_state) {
391 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
393 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
394 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
396 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
398 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
401 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
403 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
404 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
405 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
407 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
408 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
409 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
411 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
412 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
415 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
416 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
418 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
420 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
421 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
424 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
425 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
426 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
427 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
429 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
430 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
432 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
434 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
435 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
437 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
439 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
440 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
441 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
443 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
444 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
445 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
447 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
448 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
450 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
452 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
454 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
455 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
456 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
457 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
460 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
462 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
463 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
464 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
466 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
469 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
471 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
472 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
474 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
475 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
476 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
480 /* Shouldn't happen */
481 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
486 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
487 * the client to the server.
489 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
491 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
493 switch(st->hand_state) {
494 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
496 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
497 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
498 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
503 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
505 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
506 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
509 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
510 * messages unless we need to.
514 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
515 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
516 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
519 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
522 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
525 /* No pre work to be done */
529 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
533 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
534 * client to the server.
536 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
538 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
542 switch(st->hand_state) {
543 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
544 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->d1->cookie_len > 0 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
546 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
547 /* Disable buffering for SCTP */
548 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
551 * turn on buffering for the next lot of output
553 if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
554 s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
555 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
558 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
559 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
564 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
565 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
569 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
570 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
571 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
572 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
574 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
575 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
577 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
579 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
582 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
583 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
586 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
587 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
590 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
593 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
598 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
602 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
604 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
606 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
609 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
613 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
618 /* No post work to be done */
622 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
626 * Construct a message to be sent from the client to the server.
628 * Valid return values are:
632 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s)
634 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
636 switch(st->hand_state) {
637 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
638 return tls_construct_client_hello(s);
641 return tls_construct_client_certificate(s);
643 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
644 return tls_construct_client_key_exchange(s);
646 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
647 return tls_construct_client_verify(s);
649 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
651 return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
653 return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
655 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
656 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
657 return tls_construct_next_proto(s);
659 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
660 return tls_construct_finished(s,
662 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
664 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
667 /* Shouldn't happen */
675 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
676 * reading. Excludes the message header.
678 unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
680 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
682 switch(st->hand_state) {
683 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
684 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
686 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
687 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
690 return s->max_cert_list;
692 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
693 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
695 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
696 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
698 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
699 /* Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases.
700 * In practice these messages can get quite long if servers are
701 * configured to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
703 return s->max_cert_list;
705 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
706 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
708 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
709 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
711 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
712 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
714 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
715 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
718 /* Shouldn't happen */
726 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
728 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
730 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
732 switch(st->hand_state) {
733 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
734 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
736 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
737 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
740 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
742 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
743 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
745 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
746 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
748 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
749 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
751 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
752 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
754 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
755 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
757 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
758 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
760 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
761 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
764 /* Shouldn't happen */
768 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
772 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
775 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
777 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
779 switch(st->hand_state) {
780 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
781 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
782 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
783 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
784 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
785 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
786 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
787 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
788 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
791 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
792 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
799 /* Shouldn't happen */
804 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if
805 * the version is currently set to (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION.
806 * Returns 1 on success
809 static int ssl_set_version(SSL *s)
811 unsigned long mask, options = s->options;
813 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
815 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are
816 * some protocols below X enabled. This is required in order
817 * to maintain "version capability" vector contiguous. So
818 * that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favour of
819 * TLS1>=1, it would be insufficient to pass SSL_NO_TLSv1, the
820 * answer is SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3.
822 mask = SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 | SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
823 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
827 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT)
828 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2) {
829 if ((options & mask) != mask) {
830 s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
832 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
836 s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
839 if ((options & mask) == mask) {
840 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
843 s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
846 mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
847 if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1) && (options & mask) != mask)
848 s->version = TLS1_VERSION;
849 mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
850 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
851 if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1) && (options & mask) != mask)
852 s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
855 if (s->max_proto_version != 0 && (s->version > s->max_proto_version))
856 s->version = s->max_proto_version;
857 if (s->version < s->min_proto_version)
859 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
863 if (s->version != TLS1_2_VERSION && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
864 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION,
865 SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
869 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && FIPS_mode()) {
870 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
874 } else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
875 int max_version = DTLS_MAX_VERSION;
876 int min_version = DTLS_MIN_VERSION;
878 if (s->max_proto_version != 0)
879 max_version = s->max_proto_version;
880 if (s->min_proto_version != 0)
881 min_version = s->min_proto_version;
883 /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
884 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
885 || DTLS_VERSION_GT(DTLS1_2_VERSION, max_version)) {
886 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
887 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION,
888 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
892 * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error.
894 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
895 || DTLS_VERSION_GT(min_version, DTLS1_VERSION)) {
896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
900 * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features.
902 s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
903 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
906 * We only support one version: update method
908 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
909 || DTLS_VERSION_GE(min_version, DTLS1_2_VERSION))
910 s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
911 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
915 s->client_version = s->version;
920 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s)
923 unsigned char *p, *d;
927 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
931 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
933 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
935 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
936 if (ssl_set_version(s) == 0)
939 if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
941 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
942 * "ticket" without a session ID.
944 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
945 (sess->not_resumable)) {
946 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
949 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
951 p = s->s3->client_random;
954 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
955 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
957 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
960 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
969 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p,
970 sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
973 /* Do the message type and length last */
974 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
977 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
978 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
979 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
980 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
981 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
982 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
983 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
984 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
987 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
988 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
989 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
990 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
991 * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
992 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
993 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
994 * know that is maximum server supports.
995 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
996 * containing version 1.0.
998 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
999 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1000 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1001 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1002 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1003 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1004 * the negotiated version.
1006 *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
1007 *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
1010 memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1011 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1017 i = s->session->session_id_length;
1020 if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1021 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1024 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
1028 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1029 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1030 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1034 *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
1035 memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
1036 p += s->d1->cookie_len;
1039 /* Ciphers supported */
1040 i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]));
1042 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
1045 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
1047 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
1048 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
1051 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
1052 && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
1053 i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
1059 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1063 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s) || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
1066 j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1068 for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
1069 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1073 *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
1075 /* TLS extensions */
1076 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1077 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1081 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1083 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1089 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l)) {
1090 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1091 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1097 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1101 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1104 unsigned int cookie_len;
1107 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1108 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1109 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1114 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1115 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1116 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1117 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1121 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1122 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1123 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1126 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1128 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1130 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1131 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1132 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1135 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1137 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1138 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1140 size_t session_id_len;
1141 unsigned char *cipherchars;
1142 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1143 unsigned int compression;
1144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1148 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1149 unsigned int sversion;
1150 int max_version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
1152 if (s->max_proto_version != 0)
1153 max_version = s->max_proto_version;
1155 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1156 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1157 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1161 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
1162 #error Code needs updating for new TLS version
1164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1165 if ((sversion == SSL3_VERSION) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3) &&
1166 (s->min_proto_version <= SSL3_VERSION) &&
1167 (max_version >= SSL3_VERSION)) {
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1170 SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
1171 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1174 s->method = SSLv3_client_method();
1177 if ((sversion == TLS1_VERSION) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1) &&
1178 (s->min_proto_version <= TLS1_VERSION) &&
1179 (max_version >= TLS1_VERSION)) {
1180 s->method = TLSv1_client_method();
1181 } else if ((sversion == TLS1_1_VERSION) &&
1182 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1) &&
1183 (s->min_proto_version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) &&
1184 (max_version >= TLS1_1_VERSION)) {
1185 s->method = TLSv1_1_client_method();
1186 } else if ((sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION) &&
1187 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2) &&
1188 (s->min_proto_version <= TLS1_2_VERSION) &&
1189 (max_version >= TLS1_2_VERSION)) {
1190 s->method = TLSv1_2_client_method();
1192 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
1193 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1196 s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version;
1198 if ((s->version < s->min_proto_version)
1199 || !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
1200 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
1201 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1204 } else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1205 /* Work out correct protocol version to use */
1206 unsigned int hversion;
1208 int max_version = DTLS_MAX_VERSION;
1209 int min_version = DTLS_MIN_VERSION;
1211 if (s->max_proto_version != 0)
1212 max_version = s->max_proto_version;
1213 if (s->min_proto_version != 0)
1214 min_version = s->min_proto_version;
1216 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &hversion)) {
1217 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1218 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1222 options = s->options;
1223 if (hversion == DTLS1_2_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2) &&
1224 DTLS_VERSION_LE(min_version, DTLS1_2_VERSION) &&
1225 DTLS_VERSION_GE(max_version, DTLS1_2_VERSION))
1226 s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
1227 else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1229 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1230 s->version = hversion;
1231 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1233 } else if (hversion == DTLS1_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) &&
1234 DTLS_VERSION_LE(min_version, DTLS1_VERSION) &&
1235 DTLS_VERSION_GE(max_version, DTLS1_VERSION))
1236 s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
1238 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1239 s->version = hversion;
1240 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1243 s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version;
1245 unsigned char *vers;
1247 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &vers, 2)) {
1248 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1249 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1252 if ((vers[0] != (s->version >> 8))
1253 || (vers[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
1254 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1255 s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | vers[1];
1256 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1261 /* load the server hello data */
1262 /* load the server random */
1263 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1264 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1265 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1271 /* Get the session-id. */
1272 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1273 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1274 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1277 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1278 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1279 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1280 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1281 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1285 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1286 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1287 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1292 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
1293 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1294 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1295 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1296 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1297 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
1298 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
1299 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
1300 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
1301 * server wants to resume.
1303 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
1304 s->session->tlsext_tick) {
1305 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1306 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1307 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1308 &s->session->master_key_length,
1310 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1311 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1312 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1315 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1320 if (session_id_len != 0 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1321 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1322 session_id_len) == 0) {
1323 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1324 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1325 /* actually a client application bug */
1326 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1327 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1328 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1334 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1335 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1336 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1337 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1338 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1340 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1341 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1346 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1347 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1348 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1352 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1354 /* unknown cipher */
1355 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1356 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1359 /* Set version disabled mask now we know version */
1360 if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1361 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1363 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
1364 /* Skip TLS v1.0 ciphersuites if SSLv3 */
1365 if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1) && s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1366 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl |= SSL_TLSV1;
1368 * If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so
1371 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1372 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1373 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1377 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1378 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1380 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1381 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1382 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1387 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1388 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1389 * set and use it for comparison.
1391 if (s->session->cipher)
1392 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1393 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1394 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1395 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1396 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1399 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1400 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1402 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1403 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1404 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1407 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1408 if (compression != 0) {
1409 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1410 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1411 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1415 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1416 * using compression.
1418 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1419 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1423 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1424 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1425 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1426 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1429 if (compression == 0)
1431 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1432 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1433 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1436 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1439 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1440 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1441 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1442 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1445 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1449 /* TLS extensions */
1450 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt)) {
1451 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1455 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1456 /* wrong packet length */
1457 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1458 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1463 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1464 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1465 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1468 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1471 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1472 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1474 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1475 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1477 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
1481 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1482 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1483 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1487 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1489 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1491 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1492 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1495 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1497 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1498 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1500 unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1501 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1502 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1504 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1505 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1509 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1510 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
1511 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1512 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1515 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
1516 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1517 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1518 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1519 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1520 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1524 certstart = certbytes;
1525 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1527 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1528 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1531 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1532 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1533 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1534 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1537 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1538 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1544 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1545 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1546 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1547 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1548 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1551 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1553 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1554 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1558 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1560 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1561 * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
1563 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1566 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1569 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1571 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1574 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1575 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1579 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1583 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1584 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1588 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1589 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
1590 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
1591 (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1592 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
1594 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1595 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1596 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1599 s->session->peer_type = i;
1601 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1603 s->session->peer = x;
1604 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1607 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1611 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1613 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1616 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1620 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1625 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1626 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1627 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1631 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
1633 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
1635 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1636 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1637 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1638 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1642 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1644 save_param_start = *pkt;
1646 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1647 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
1648 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
1651 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1653 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1655 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1656 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1657 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
1658 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1659 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1660 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1665 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1666 * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1667 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1670 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1671 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1672 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1676 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1677 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1678 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1679 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1680 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1681 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1686 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
1687 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1689 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1691 * Dummy "if" to ensure sane C code in the event of various OPENSSL_NO_*
1696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1697 else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
1698 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1699 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1700 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1701 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1702 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1703 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1708 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1709 PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1711 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1712 PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1714 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1715 PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1717 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1718 PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1719 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1723 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) {
1724 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1728 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1729 if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS))
1730 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1732 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
1733 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1734 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1735 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1739 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1740 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1741 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1742 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1746 s->s3->peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1749 if (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1750 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1755 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(s->s3->peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
1756 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1761 if ((dh->p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1762 PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1763 || (dh->g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1764 PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1766 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1767 PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL)) == NULL) {
1768 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1772 if (BN_is_zero(dh->p) || BN_is_zero(dh->g) || BN_is_zero(dh->pub_key)) {
1773 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1777 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1778 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1779 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1782 if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS))
1783 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1784 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1786 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
1788 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1789 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1791 unsigned char *ecparams;
1795 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1796 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1797 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1799 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
1800 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1804 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1805 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1807 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
1808 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1812 curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2));
1813 if (curve_nid == 0) {
1814 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1815 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1816 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1820 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
1821 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
1823 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
1824 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
1825 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
1826 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1827 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1830 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1833 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
1834 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1838 if (EC_KEY_oct2key(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->s3->peer_tmp),
1839 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1840 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt), NULL) == 0) {
1841 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1846 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1847 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1851 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1852 else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1853 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1855 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1856 else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1857 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1859 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1861 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1862 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1865 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1867 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1871 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
1872 * equals the length of the parameters.
1874 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
1875 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
1876 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
1877 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1882 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1883 unsigned char *sigalgs;
1885 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sigalgs, 2)) {
1886 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1889 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalgs, pkey);
1896 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1898 } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
1899 md = EVP_md5_sha1();
1904 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
1905 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1906 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1909 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1911 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1916 * Check signature length
1918 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)j) {
1919 /* wrong packet length */
1920 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
1923 if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1924 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1925 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1926 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1927 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1928 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
1929 PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
1930 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1931 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1934 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
1935 PACKET_remaining(&signature), pkey) <= 0) {
1937 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1938 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1942 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
1943 if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
1944 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1945 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
1946 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1947 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1950 /* still data left over */
1951 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1952 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
1956 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1957 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1959 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1961 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1964 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1965 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1967 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1968 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1969 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1972 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1974 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1975 unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len;
1976 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
1977 unsigned char *data;
1978 unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
1979 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
1981 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
1982 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1986 /* get the certificate types */
1987 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num)
1988 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) {
1989 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1990 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1993 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
1994 s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
1995 if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
1996 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
1997 s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
1998 if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
1999 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2002 memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, data, ctype_num);
2003 s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num;
2004 ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
2006 for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
2007 s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = data[i];
2009 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2010 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
2011 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, list_len)) {
2012 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2013 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2014 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2018 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2019 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2020 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2021 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2023 if ((list_len & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, list_len)) {
2024 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2025 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2026 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2029 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2030 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2035 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2038 /* get the CA RDNs */
2039 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
2040 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) {
2041 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2042 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2046 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2047 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len)
2048 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2049 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2050 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2051 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2055 namestart = namebytes;
2057 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
2058 name_len)) == NULL) {
2059 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2060 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2064 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2065 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2066 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2067 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2070 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2071 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2076 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2077 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2078 s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
2079 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2080 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2083 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2086 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2088 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2092 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2094 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2097 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2100 unsigned int ticklen;
2101 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint;
2103 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2104 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2105 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) {
2106 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2107 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2111 /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
2113 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2115 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2116 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2117 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2119 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2122 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2124 * Remove the old session from the cache
2126 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) {
2127 if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
2128 s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx,
2131 /* We carry on if this fails */
2132 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2136 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2137 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2138 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2142 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2143 s->session = new_sess;
2146 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
2147 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
2149 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2150 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
2151 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2154 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen)) {
2155 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2156 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2160 s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2161 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
2163 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2164 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2165 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2166 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2167 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2168 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2169 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2170 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2171 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2173 EVP_Digest(s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen,
2174 s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
2175 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
2176 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2178 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2180 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2181 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2184 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2187 unsigned long resplen;
2190 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2191 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2192 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2193 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2196 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &resplen)
2197 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2198 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2199 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2202 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2203 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) {
2204 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2205 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2208 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, resplen)) {
2209 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2210 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2213 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
2214 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2216 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2217 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2218 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2221 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2223 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2224 /* should contain no data */
2225 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2226 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2227 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2228 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2231 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2232 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2233 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2234 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2235 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2236 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2237 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2243 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2246 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2247 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2248 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2249 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2253 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |tlsext_ocsp_resp| and
2254 * |tlsext_ocsp_resplen| values will be set if we actually received a status
2255 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2257 if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb != NULL) {
2259 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2261 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
2262 SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2263 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2264 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2265 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2268 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2269 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2270 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2274 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2275 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2276 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2277 && s->renegotiate != 0)
2278 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2281 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2284 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2288 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2289 size_t pskhdrlen = 0;
2291 unsigned long alg_k;
2292 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2294 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2295 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2297 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2298 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2300 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2301 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2302 int encoded_pt_len = 0;
2304 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2306 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2308 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2311 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2312 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2315 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2316 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2319 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2321 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2324 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2325 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2326 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2330 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2332 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2333 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2336 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2337 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2338 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2340 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2341 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2342 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2345 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2346 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2347 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2349 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2350 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2354 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2355 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2356 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2357 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2358 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2361 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2362 s->session->psk_identity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2363 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2364 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2368 s2n(identitylen, p);
2369 memcpy(p, identity, identitylen);
2370 pskhdrlen = 2 + identitylen;
2374 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2376 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2380 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2385 /* Fool emacs indentation */
2388 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2389 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2391 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2392 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2396 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2398 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2400 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2401 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2405 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2406 if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2407 || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2408 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2409 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2413 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2414 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2415 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0)
2419 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2420 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
2422 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2423 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2424 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2425 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2429 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, p, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2430 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2431 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2435 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2438 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
2440 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
2444 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2445 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
2451 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2452 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2454 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2456 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2457 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2460 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey, NID_undef);
2461 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2463 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) {
2464 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2465 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2470 /* send off the data */
2471 n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
2473 BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p);
2475 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2480 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2481 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2483 if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
2484 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2486 /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
2487 skey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2489 || (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
2490 || (skey->pkey.ec == NULL)) {
2491 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2492 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2497 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey, NID_undef);
2499 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) {
2500 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2504 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2505 encoded_pt_len = EC_KEY_key2buf(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ckey),
2506 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
2507 &encodedPoint, NULL);
2509 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2510 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2514 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2519 *p = n; /* length of encoded point */
2520 /* Encoded point will be copied here */
2522 /* copy the point */
2523 memcpy(p, encodedPoint, n);
2524 /* increment n to account for length field */
2527 /* Free allocated memory */
2528 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2530 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2531 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2532 else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2533 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2534 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2537 unsigned int md_len;
2538 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2539 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
2540 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2541 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2542 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2546 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2551 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2553 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2555 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2556 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2560 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2561 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2562 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2563 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2567 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2568 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2569 * certificate key for key exchange
2572 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2574 if (pkey_ctx == NULL
2575 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
2576 /* Generate session key */
2577 || RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2578 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2579 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2580 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2584 * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
2586 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
2587 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
2588 (pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) {
2590 * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
2597 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2600 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2601 if (EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,
2602 EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
2603 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2604 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2605 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2606 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2607 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
2608 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2609 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2610 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2613 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2614 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2615 (pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8,
2617 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2621 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2623 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2625 *(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
2627 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2628 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2632 if (msglen >= 0x80) {
2634 *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
2637 *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
2640 memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
2641 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2642 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2643 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) {
2644 /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
2645 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
2647 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2651 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2652 else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2653 if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
2654 /* send off the data */
2655 n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
2657 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p);
2660 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2661 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2664 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2665 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2666 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2667 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2668 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2674 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2675 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2679 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2683 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
2684 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2685 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2690 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2691 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2696 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2697 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2699 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2700 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2702 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2704 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2705 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2707 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2708 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2710 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2711 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2712 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2714 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2718 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
2720 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2723 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2725 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2726 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
2727 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
2728 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2734 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
2735 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
2737 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
2738 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2739 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2742 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
2743 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2744 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2748 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2749 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2750 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2751 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2754 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2757 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2758 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2760 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2761 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2762 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
2765 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2766 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2772 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2773 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2777 int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s)
2781 const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
2784 unsigned long n = 0;
2788 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2790 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2794 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2795 pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
2797 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2798 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2799 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2802 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2803 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
2804 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2811 fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2813 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
2814 || !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
2815 || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
2816 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
2817 s->session->master_key_length,
2818 s->session->master_key))
2819 || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
2820 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2823 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2824 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2825 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2826 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
2827 BUF_reverse(p + 2, NULL, u);
2833 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
2834 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
2836 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) {
2837 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2841 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2844 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2849 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
2850 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
2851 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
2853 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2855 if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
2857 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
2858 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys])
2861 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
2862 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
2864 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
2865 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
2870 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2873 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2876 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2877 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
2878 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
2879 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2881 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2885 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2886 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2889 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2891 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
2892 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2894 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
2898 /* We need to get a client cert */
2899 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2901 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2902 * return(-1); We then get retied later
2904 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
2906 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2909 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2910 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
2911 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
2913 } else if (i == 1) {
2915 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2916 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
2920 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2921 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
2924 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2925 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
2926 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
2927 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2929 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
2930 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2931 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2932 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2938 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2941 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
2945 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2947 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
2948 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req ==
2949 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) {
2950 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2951 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2952 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2959 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
2961 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
2964 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2968 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2969 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2971 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2972 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2974 /* we don't have a certificate */
2975 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
2978 /* This is the passed certificate */
2980 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2981 idx = s->session->peer_type;
2982 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
2983 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
2985 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
2990 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
2991 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
2992 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
2994 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2995 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT);
2999 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3000 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
3002 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3003 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3004 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3005 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3008 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3009 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3010 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3011 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3015 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3016 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
3017 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3019 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3023 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3024 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3025 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3026 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3033 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3037 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3038 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s)
3040 unsigned int len, padding_len;
3043 len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
3044 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3045 d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3047 memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
3048 d[5 + len] = padding_len;
3049 memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
3050 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
3051 l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
3052 s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
3059 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3062 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3063 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3064 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3065 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3066 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3071 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3072 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3076 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
3082 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3083 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3084 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3090 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
3091 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3092 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3093 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
3095 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3096 if (c->id == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
3097 if (!empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3100 empty_reneg_info_scsv = 0;
3103 j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, p);
3107 * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
3111 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3112 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3113 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3115 j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p);
3117 #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
3119 "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n");
3122 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3123 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3124 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3126 j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p);