2 * Copyright 2016-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
11 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
12 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 * Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
17 int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
18 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
21 const unsigned char *data;
23 /* Parse the length byte */
24 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen)
25 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ilen)) {
26 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
27 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
28 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
32 /* Check that the extension matches */
33 if (ilen != s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) {
34 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
35 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
36 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
40 if (memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
41 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) {
42 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
43 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
44 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
48 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
54 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
56 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
57 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
58 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
59 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
60 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
61 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
62 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
63 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
64 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
65 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
66 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
67 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
68 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
69 * the value of the Host: field.
70 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
71 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
72 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
74 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
76 int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
77 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
79 unsigned int servname_type;
82 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sni)
83 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
84 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
85 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
90 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
91 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
92 * syntax inextensibly and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
94 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
95 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
96 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
98 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
99 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
101 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
102 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
103 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
104 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
109 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
110 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
114 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
115 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
119 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.hostname);
120 s->session->ext.hostname = NULL;
121 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->ext.hostname)) {
122 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
126 s->servername_done = 1;
129 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
130 * fall back to a full handshake.
132 s->servername_done = s->session->ext.hostname
133 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->ext.hostname,
134 strlen(s->session->ext.hostname));
140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
141 int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
142 size_t chainidx, int *al)
146 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &srp_I)
147 || PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) {
148 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
153 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
154 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
156 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
157 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
165 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
166 int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
167 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
169 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
171 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ec_point_format_list)
172 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
173 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
178 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
179 &s->session->ext.ecpointformats,
180 &s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len)) {
181 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
188 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
190 int tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
191 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
193 if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb &&
194 !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
195 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
196 s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
197 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
204 int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
205 size_t chainidx, int *al)
207 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
209 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs)
210 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
211 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
215 if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs)) {
216 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
224 int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
225 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
227 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
229 /* Not defined if we get one of these in a client Certificate */
233 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->ext.status_type)) {
234 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
238 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
240 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
242 s->ext.status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing;
246 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2 (pkt, &responder_id_list)) {
247 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
252 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
253 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
255 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
256 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
257 s->ext.ocsp.ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
258 if (s->ext.ocsp.ids == NULL) {
259 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
263 s->ext.ocsp.ids = NULL;
266 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
269 const unsigned char *id_data;
271 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, &responder_id)
272 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
273 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
277 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
278 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
279 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
280 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
282 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
286 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
287 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
288 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
292 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->ext.ocsp.ids, id)) {
293 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
294 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
299 /* Read in request_extensions */
300 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exts)) {
301 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
305 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
306 const unsigned char *ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
308 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.exts,
309 X509_EXTENSION_free);
311 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
312 if (s->ext.ocsp.exts == NULL || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
313 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
322 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
323 int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
324 size_t chainidx, int *al)
327 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
330 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
338 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.|pkt| holds the contents of the ALPN
339 * extension, not including type and length. |al| is a pointer to the alert
340 * value to send in the event of a failure. Returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
342 int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
343 size_t chainidx, int *al)
345 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
347 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
350 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
351 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
352 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
356 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
358 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
359 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
360 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
361 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
364 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
366 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
367 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
368 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
369 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
370 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
371 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
378 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
379 int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
380 size_t chainidx, int *al)
382 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr;
383 unsigned int ct, mki_len, id;
387 /* Ignore this if we have no SRTP profiles */
388 if (SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) == NULL)
391 /* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list and check it is even */
392 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || (ct & 1) != 0
393 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) {
394 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
395 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
396 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
400 srvr = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
401 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
402 /* Search all profiles for a match initially */
403 srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);
405 while (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
406 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &id)) {
407 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
408 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
409 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
414 * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than
416 * If no profiles have been have been configured then this
419 for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++) {
420 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof =
421 sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i);
423 if (sprof->id == id) {
424 s->srtp_profile = sprof;
431 /* Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */
432 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki_len)) {
433 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
434 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
435 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
439 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, mki_len)
440 || PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
441 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
442 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
450 int tls_parse_ctos_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
451 size_t chainidx, int *al)
453 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC))
460 * Process a psk_kex_modes extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
461 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
462 * If a failure occurs then |*al| is set to an appropriate alert value.
464 int tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
465 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
467 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
468 PACKET psk_kex_modes;
471 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &psk_kex_modes)
472 || PACKET_remaining(&psk_kex_modes) == 0) {
473 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
477 while (PACKET_get_1(&psk_kex_modes, &mode)) {
478 if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
479 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
480 else if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE)
481 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
489 * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
490 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
491 * If a failure occurs then |*al| is set to an appropriate alert value.
493 int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
494 size_t chainidx, int *al)
496 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
497 unsigned int group_id;
498 PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
499 const unsigned char *clntcurves, *srvrcurves;
500 size_t clnt_num_curves, srvr_num_curves;
501 int group_nid, found = 0;
502 unsigned int curve_flags;
504 if (s->hit && (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE) == 0)
508 if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
509 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
510 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
514 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) {
515 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
516 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
520 /* Get our list of supported curves */
521 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &srvrcurves, &srvr_num_curves)) {
522 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
523 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
527 /* Get the clients list of supported curves. */
528 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &clntcurves, &clnt_num_curves)) {
529 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
530 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
533 if (clnt_num_curves == 0) {
535 * This can only happen if the supported_groups extension was not sent,
536 * because we verify that the length is non-zero when we process that
539 *al = SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION;
540 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
541 SSL_R_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXTENSION);
545 while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
546 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
547 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt)
548 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
549 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
550 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
551 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
556 * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the
557 * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them.
562 /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */
563 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntcurves, clnt_num_curves, 0)) {
564 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
565 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
569 /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */
570 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrcurves, srvr_num_curves, 1)) {
571 /* Share not suitable */
575 group_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(group_id, &curve_flags);
577 if (group_nid == 0) {
578 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
579 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
580 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
584 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
585 /* Can happen for some curves, e.g. X25519 */
586 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
588 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, group_nid)) {
589 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
590 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
594 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
596 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
597 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
600 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
601 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx,
603 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
604 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
605 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
606 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
609 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
612 s->s3->group_id = group_id;
614 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
615 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
616 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
617 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
618 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
629 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
630 int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
631 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
633 PACKET supported_groups_list;
635 /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
636 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_groups_list)
637 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
638 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
639 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
643 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.supportedgroups);
644 s->session->ext.supportedgroups = NULL;
645 s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len = 0;
646 if (!PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list,
647 &s->session->ext.supportedgroups,
648 &s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len)) {
649 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
657 int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
658 size_t chainidx, int *al)
660 /* The extension must always be empty */
661 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
662 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
666 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
672 int tls_parse_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
673 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
675 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
676 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
683 int tls_parse_ctos_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
684 size_t chainidx, int *al)
686 PACKET identities, binders, binder;
687 size_t binderoffset, hashsize;
688 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
690 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
691 uint32_t ticket_age = 0, now, agesec, agems;
694 * If we have no PSK kex mode that we recognise then we can't resume so
695 * ignore this extension
697 if ((s->ext.psk_kex_mode
698 & (TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE | TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE)) == 0)
701 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &identities)) {
702 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
706 for (id = 0; PACKET_remaining(&identities) != 0; id++) {
708 unsigned long ticket_agel;
711 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&identities, &identity)
712 || !PACKET_get_net_4(&identities, &ticket_agel)) {
713 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
717 ticket_age = (uint32_t)ticket_agel;
719 ret = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&identity),
720 PACKET_remaining(&identity), NULL, 0, &sess);
721 if (ret == TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC || ret == TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER) {
722 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
725 if (ret == TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
728 md = ssl_md(sess->cipher->algorithm2);
731 * Don't recognise this cipher so we can't use the session.
734 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
740 * TODO(TLS1.3): Somehow we need to handle the case of a ticket renewal.
750 binderoffset = PACKET_data(pkt) - (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
751 hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
753 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &binders)) {
754 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
758 for (i = 0; i <= id; i++) {
759 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&binders, &binder)) {
760 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
765 if (PACKET_remaining(&binder) != hashsize
766 || tls_psk_do_binder(s, md,
767 (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
768 binderoffset, PACKET_data(&binder), NULL,
770 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
771 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
775 sess->ext.tick_identity = id;
777 now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
778 agesec = now - (uint32_t)sess->time;
779 agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
780 ticket_age -= sess->ext.tick_age_add;
784 * For simplicity we do our age calculations in seconds. If the client does
785 * it in ms then it could appear that their ticket age is longer than ours
786 * (our ticket age calculation should always be slightly longer than the
787 * client's due to the network latency). Therefore we add 1000ms to our age
788 * calculation to adjust for rounding errors.
790 if (sess->timeout >= (long)agesec
791 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 == agesec
792 && ticket_age <= agems + 1000
793 && ticket_age + TICKET_AGE_ALLOWANCE >= agems + 1000) {
795 * Ticket age is within tolerance and not expired. We allow it for early
798 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
802 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
806 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
811 * Add the server's renegotiation binding
813 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
814 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
815 size_t chainidx, int *al)
817 if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding)
818 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
820 /* Still add this even if SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION is set */
821 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
822 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
823 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
824 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
825 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
826 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
827 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len)
828 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
829 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
830 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
831 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
834 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
837 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
838 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
839 size_t chainidx, int *al)
841 if (s->hit || s->servername_done != 1
842 || s->session->ext.hostname == NULL)
843 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
845 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
846 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
847 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SERVER_NAME, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
848 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
851 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
854 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
855 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
856 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
857 size_t chainidx, int *al)
859 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
860 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
861 int using_ecc = ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))
862 && (s->session->ext.ecpointformats != NULL);
863 const unsigned char *plist;
867 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
869 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
870 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
871 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
872 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
873 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
874 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
875 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
878 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
882 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
883 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
884 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
885 size_t chainidx, int *al)
887 const unsigned char *groups;
888 size_t numgroups, i, first = 1;
890 /* s->s3->group_id is non zero if we accepted a key_share */
891 if (s->s3->group_id == 0)
892 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
894 /* Get our list of supported groups */
895 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &groups, &numgroups) || numgroups == 0) {
896 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
897 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
900 /* Copy group ID if supported */
901 for (i = 0; i < numgroups; i++, groups += 2) {
902 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, groups, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
905 * Check if the client is already using our preferred group. If
906 * so we don't need to add this extension
908 if (s->s3->group_id == GET_GROUP_ID(groups, 0))
909 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
911 /* Add extension header */
912 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
913 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
914 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
915 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
916 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
917 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
918 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
923 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, GET_GROUP_ID(groups, 0))) {
924 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
925 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
926 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
931 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
932 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
933 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
936 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
940 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
941 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
942 size_t chainidx, int *al)
944 if (!s->ext.ticket_expected || !tls_use_ticket(s)) {
945 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
946 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
949 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
950 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
952 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
955 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
958 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
959 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
960 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
961 size_t chainidx, int *al)
963 if (!s->ext.status_expected)
964 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
966 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && chainidx != 0)
967 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
969 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
970 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
971 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
972 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
976 * In TLSv1.3 we include the certificate status itself. In <= TLSv1.2 we
977 * send back an empty extension, with the certificate status appearing as a
980 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt))
981 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
982 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
983 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
986 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
990 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
991 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
992 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
993 size_t chainidx, int *al)
995 const unsigned char *npa;
998 int npn_seen = s->s3->npn_seen;
1000 s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
1001 if (!npn_seen || s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb == NULL)
1002 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1004 ret = s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1005 s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb_arg);
1006 if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1007 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1008 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1009 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_NEXT_PROTO_NEG,
1010 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1011 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1013 s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
1016 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1020 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1021 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
1023 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
1024 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1026 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1027 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1028 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1029 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1030 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
1031 s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
1032 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1033 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1035 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1038 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1041 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1042 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1043 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1044 size_t chainidx, int *al)
1046 if (s->srtp_profile == NULL)
1047 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1049 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1050 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1051 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1052 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1053 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1054 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1055 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1056 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1059 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1063 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1064 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
1066 if (!s->ext.use_etm)
1067 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1070 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1071 * for other cases too.
1073 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1074 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1075 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1076 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) {
1078 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1081 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1082 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1083 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ETM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1084 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1087 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1090 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1091 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
1093 if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0)
1094 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1096 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1097 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1098 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1099 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1102 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1105 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1106 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1107 size_t chainidx, int *al)
1109 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1110 unsigned char *encodedPoint;
1111 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
1112 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp, *skey = NULL;
1115 /* No key_share received from client */
1116 if (s->hello_retry_request) {
1117 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1118 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1119 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)
1120 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1121 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1122 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1123 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1126 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1129 /* Must be resuming. */
1130 if (!s->hit || !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) {
1131 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1133 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1135 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1138 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1139 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1140 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) {
1141 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1142 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1145 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
1147 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1148 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1151 /* Generate encoding of server key */
1152 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
1153 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
1154 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1155 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1156 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1159 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
1160 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1161 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1162 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1163 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1164 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1166 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1168 /* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */
1169 s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey;
1170 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
1171 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1172 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1176 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1179 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1180 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1181 size_t chainidx, int *al)
1183 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1184 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1185 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1186 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1187 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1188 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1189 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1192 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x80
1193 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x81)
1194 || (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG) == 0)
1195 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1197 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_CRYPTOPRO_BUG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1199 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1202 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1205 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1206 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1207 size_t chainidx, int *al)
1209 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
1210 if (s->max_early_data == 0)
1211 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1213 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
1214 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1215 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->max_early_data)
1216 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1217 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1218 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1221 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1224 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED)
1225 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1227 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
1228 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1229 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1230 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1231 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1234 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1237 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1238 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
1241 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1243 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
1244 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1245 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick_identity)
1246 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1247 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1248 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1251 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;