2 * Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
11 #include "../ssl_local.h"
12 #include "statem_local.h"
13 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
15 DEFINE_STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE)
16 DEFINE_STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID)
17 DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION)
19 #define COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION 0
22 * 2 bytes for packet length, 2 bytes for format version, 2 bytes for
23 * protocol version, 2 bytes for group id, 2 bytes for cipher id, 1 byte for
24 * key_share present flag, 4 bytes for timestamp, 2 bytes for the hashlen,
25 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE for transcript hash, 1 byte for app cookie length, app cookie
26 * length bytes, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes for the HMAC of the whole thing.
28 #define MAX_COOKIE_SIZE (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 4 + 2 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + 1 \
29 + SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
32 * Message header + 2 bytes for protocol version + number of random bytes +
33 * + 1 byte for legacy session id length + number of bytes in legacy session id
34 * + 2 bytes for ciphersuite + 1 byte for legacy compression
35 * + 2 bytes for extension block length + 6 bytes for key_share extension
36 * + 4 bytes for cookie extension header + the number of bytes in the cookie
38 #define MAX_HRR_SIZE (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 \
39 + SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH + 2 + 1 + 2 + 6 + 4 \
43 * Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
45 int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
46 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
49 const unsigned char *data;
51 /* Parse the length byte */
52 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen)
53 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ilen)) {
54 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
55 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
59 /* Check that the extension matches */
60 if (ilen != s->s3.previous_client_finished_len) {
61 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
62 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
66 if (memcmp(data, s->s3.previous_client_finished,
67 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len)) {
68 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
69 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
73 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1;
79 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
81 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
82 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
83 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
84 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
85 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
86 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
87 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
88 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
89 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
90 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
91 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
92 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
93 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
94 * the value of the Host: field.
95 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
96 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
97 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
99 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
101 int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
102 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
104 unsigned int servname_type;
105 PACKET sni, hostname;
107 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sni)
108 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
109 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
110 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
111 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
116 * Although the intent was for server_name to be extensible, RFC 4366
117 * was not clear about it; and so OpenSSL among other implementations,
118 * always and only allows a 'host_name' name types.
119 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
120 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
121 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
123 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
124 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
126 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
127 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
128 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
129 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
130 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
135 * In TLSv1.2 and below the SNI is associated with the session. In TLSv1.3
136 * we always use the SNI value from the handshake.
138 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
139 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
140 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME,
141 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
142 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
146 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
147 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME,
148 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
149 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
154 * Store the requested SNI in the SSL as temporary storage.
155 * If we accept it, it will get stored in the SSL_SESSION as well.
157 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.hostname);
158 s->ext.hostname = NULL;
159 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->ext.hostname)) {
160 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
161 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
165 s->servername_done = 1;
168 * In TLSv1.2 and below we should check if the SNI is consistent between
169 * the initial handshake and the resumption. In TLSv1.3 SNI is not
170 * associated with the session.
173 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
174 * fall back to a full handshake.
176 s->servername_done = (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL)
177 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->ext.hostname,
178 strlen(s->session->ext.hostname));
184 int tls_parse_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
185 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
189 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) {
190 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
191 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
195 /* Received |value| should be a valid max-fragment-length code. */
196 if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) {
197 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
198 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
199 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
204 * RFC 6066: The negotiated length applies for the duration of the session
205 * including session resumptions.
206 * We should receive the same code as in resumed session !
208 if (s->hit && s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode != value) {
209 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
210 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
211 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
216 * Store it in session, so it'll become binding for us
217 * and we'll include it in a next Server Hello.
219 s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value;
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
224 int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
229 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &srp_I)
230 || PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) {
231 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
232 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SRP,
233 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
238 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
239 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
241 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
242 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SRP,
243 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
251 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
252 int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
253 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
255 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
257 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ec_point_format_list)
258 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
259 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS,
260 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
265 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
266 &s->ext.peer_ecpointformats,
267 &s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len)) {
268 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
269 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
276 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
278 int tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
279 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
281 if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb &&
282 !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
283 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
284 s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
285 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
286 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
293 int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs_cert(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
294 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
296 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
298 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs)
299 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
300 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
301 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS_CERT, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
305 if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 1)) {
306 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
307 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS_CERT, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
314 int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
317 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
319 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs)
320 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
321 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
322 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
326 if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 0)) {
327 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
328 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
335 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
336 int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
337 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
339 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
341 /* We ignore this in a resumption handshake */
345 /* Not defined if we get one of these in a client Certificate */
349 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->ext.status_type)) {
350 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
351 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
355 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
357 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
359 s->ext.status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing;
363 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2 (pkt, &responder_id_list)) {
364 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
365 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
370 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
371 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
373 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
374 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
375 s->ext.ocsp.ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
376 if (s->ext.ocsp.ids == NULL) {
377 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
378 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
382 s->ext.ocsp.ids = NULL;
385 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
388 const unsigned char *id_data;
390 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, &responder_id)
391 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
392 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
393 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
397 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
398 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
399 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
400 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
402 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
403 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
407 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
408 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
409 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
410 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
415 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->ext.ocsp.ids, id)) {
416 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
417 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
418 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
424 /* Read in request_extensions */
425 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exts)) {
426 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
427 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
431 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
432 const unsigned char *ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
434 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.exts,
435 X509_EXTENSION_free);
437 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
438 if (s->ext.ocsp.exts == NULL || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
439 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
440 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
449 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
450 int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
454 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
457 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
465 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.|pkt| holds the contents of the ALPN
466 * extension, not including type and length. Returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
468 int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
471 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
473 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
476 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
477 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
478 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN,
479 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
483 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
485 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
486 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
487 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
488 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN,
489 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
492 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
494 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_proposed);
495 s->s3.alpn_proposed = NULL;
496 s->s3.alpn_proposed_len = 0;
497 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
498 &s->s3.alpn_proposed, &s->s3.alpn_proposed_len)) {
499 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN,
500 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
507 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
508 int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
511 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr;
512 unsigned int ct, mki_len, id;
516 /* Ignore this if we have no SRTP profiles */
517 if (SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) == NULL)
520 /* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list and check it is even */
521 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || (ct & 1) != 0
522 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) {
523 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
524 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
528 srvr = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
529 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
530 /* Search all profiles for a match initially */
531 srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);
533 while (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
534 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &id)) {
535 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
536 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
541 * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than
543 * If no profiles have been have been configured then this
546 for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++) {
547 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof =
548 sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i);
550 if (sprof->id == id) {
551 s->srtp_profile = sprof;
558 /* Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */
559 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki_len)) {
560 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
561 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
565 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, mki_len)
566 || PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
567 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
568 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
576 int tls_parse_ctos_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
579 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC))
586 * Process a psk_kex_modes extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
587 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
589 int tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
590 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
593 PACKET psk_kex_modes;
596 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &psk_kex_modes)
597 || PACKET_remaining(&psk_kex_modes) == 0) {
598 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES,
599 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
603 while (PACKET_get_1(&psk_kex_modes, &mode)) {
604 if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
605 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
606 else if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE
607 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX) != 0)
608 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
616 * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
617 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
619 int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
622 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
623 unsigned int group_id;
624 PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
625 const uint16_t *clntgroups, *srvrgroups;
626 size_t clnt_num_groups, srvr_num_groups;
629 if (s->hit && (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE) == 0)
633 if (s->s3.peer_tmp != NULL) {
634 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
635 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
639 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) {
640 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
641 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
645 /* Get our list of supported groups */
646 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &srvrgroups, &srvr_num_groups);
647 /* Get the clients list of supported groups. */
648 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &clntgroups, &clnt_num_groups);
649 if (clnt_num_groups == 0) {
651 * This can only happen if the supported_groups extension was not sent,
652 * because we verify that the length is non-zero when we process that
655 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
656 SSL_R_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXTENSION);
660 if (s->s3.group_id != 0 && PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) == 0) {
662 * If we set a group_id already, then we must have sent an HRR
663 * requesting a new key_share. If we haven't got one then that is an
666 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
667 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
671 while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
672 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
673 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt)
674 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
675 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
676 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
681 * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the
682 * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them.
688 * If we sent an HRR then the key_share sent back MUST be for the group
689 * we requested, and must be the only key_share sent.
691 if (s->s3.group_id != 0
692 && (group_id != s->s3.group_id
693 || PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) != 0)) {
694 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
695 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
699 /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */
700 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntgroups, clnt_num_groups, 0)) {
701 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
702 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
706 /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */
707 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrgroups, srvr_num_groups, 1)) {
708 /* Share not suitable */
712 if ((s->s3.peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(s, group_id)) == NULL) {
713 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
714 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
718 s->s3.group_id = group_id;
720 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3.peer_tmp,
721 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
722 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
723 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
724 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
735 int tls_parse_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
738 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
739 unsigned int format, version, key_share, group_id;
742 PACKET cookie, raw, chhash, appcookie;
744 const unsigned char *data, *mdin, *ciphdata;
745 unsigned char hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
746 unsigned char hrr[MAX_HRR_SIZE];
747 size_t rawlen, hmaclen, hrrlen, ciphlen;
748 unsigned long tm, now;
750 /* Ignore any cookie if we're not set up to verify it */
751 if (s->ctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb == NULL
752 || (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
755 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie)) {
756 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
757 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
762 data = PACKET_data(&raw);
763 rawlen = PACKET_remaining(&raw);
764 if (rawlen < SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
765 || !PACKET_forward(&raw, rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) {
766 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
767 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
770 mdin = PACKET_data(&raw);
772 /* Verify the HMAC of the cookie */
773 hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
774 pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
775 s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key,
776 sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext
778 if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) {
779 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
781 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
782 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
786 hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
787 if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(hctx, NULL, "SHA2-256", s->ctx->propq, pkey,
789 || EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, data,
790 rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0
791 || hmaclen != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
792 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
794 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
795 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
799 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
802 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(hmac, mdin, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0) {
803 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
804 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
808 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &format)) {
809 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
810 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
813 /* Check the cookie format is something we recognise. Ignore it if not */
814 if (format != COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION)
818 * The rest of these checks really shouldn't fail since we have verified the
822 /* Check the version number is sane */
823 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &version)) {
824 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
825 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
828 if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
829 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
830 SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
834 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &group_id)) {
835 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
836 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
840 ciphdata = PACKET_data(&cookie);
841 if (!PACKET_forward(&cookie, 2)) {
842 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
843 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
846 if (group_id != s->s3.group_id
847 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher
848 != ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, ciphdata, 0)) {
850 * We chose a different cipher or group id this time around to what is
851 * in the cookie. Something must have changed.
853 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
858 if (!PACKET_get_1(&cookie, &key_share)
859 || !PACKET_get_net_4(&cookie, &tm)
860 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&cookie, &chhash)
861 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cookie, &appcookie)
862 || PACKET_remaining(&cookie) != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
863 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
864 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
868 /* We tolerate a cookie age of up to 10 minutes (= 60 * 10 seconds) */
869 now = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
870 if (tm > now || (now - tm) > 600) {
871 /* Cookie is stale. Ignore it */
875 /* Verify the app cookie */
876 if (s->ctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&appcookie),
877 PACKET_remaining(&appcookie)) == 0) {
878 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
879 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
884 * Reconstruct the HRR that we would have sent in response to the original
885 * ClientHello so we can add it to the transcript hash.
886 * Note: This won't work with custom HRR extensions
888 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&hrrpkt, hrr, sizeof(hrr), 0)) {
889 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
890 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
893 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)
894 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(&hrrpkt)
895 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLS1_2_VERSION)
896 || !WPACKET_memcpy(&hrrpkt, hrrrandom, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
897 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&hrrpkt, s->tmp_session_id,
898 s->tmp_session_id_len)
899 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher, &hrrpkt,
901 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt, 0)
902 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)) {
903 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
904 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
905 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
908 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
909 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
910 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, s->version)
911 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt)) {
912 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
913 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
914 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
918 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
919 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
920 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, s->s3.group_id)
921 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt)) {
922 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
923 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
924 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
928 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
929 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
930 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(&hrrpkt, data, rawlen)
931 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* cookie extension */
932 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* extension block */
933 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* message */
934 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&hrrpkt, &hrrlen)
935 || !WPACKET_finish(&hrrpkt)) {
936 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
937 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
938 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
942 /* Reconstruct the transcript hash */
943 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, PACKET_data(&chhash),
944 PACKET_remaining(&chhash), hrr,
946 /* SSLfatal() already called */
950 /* Act as if this ClientHello came after a HelloRetryRequest */
951 s->hello_retry_request = 1;
959 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
960 int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
961 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
963 PACKET supported_groups_list;
965 /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
966 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_groups_list)
967 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
968 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
969 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
970 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
974 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
975 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_supportedgroups);
976 s->ext.peer_supportedgroups = NULL;
977 s->ext.peer_supportedgroups_len = 0;
978 if (!tls1_save_u16(&supported_groups_list,
979 &s->ext.peer_supportedgroups,
980 &s->ext.peer_supportedgroups_len)) {
981 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
982 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
983 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
992 int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
995 /* The extension must always be empty */
996 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
997 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
998 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EMS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1002 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
1005 s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
1011 int tls_parse_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1012 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1014 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1015 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1016 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1020 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1021 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1022 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1029 static SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *tick,
1032 SSL_SESSION *tmpsess = NULL;
1034 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1036 switch (PACKET_remaining(tick)) {
1038 return SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1040 case SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH:
1044 return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1047 tmpsess = lookup_sess_in_cache(s, PACKET_data(tick),
1048 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH);
1050 if (tmpsess == NULL)
1051 return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1054 return SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1057 int tls_parse_ctos_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1060 PACKET identities, binders, binder;
1061 size_t binderoffset, hashsize;
1062 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1063 unsigned int id, i, ext = 0;
1064 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1067 * If we have no PSK kex mode that we recognise then we can't resume so
1068 * ignore this extension
1070 if ((s->ext.psk_kex_mode
1071 & (TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE | TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE)) == 0)
1074 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &identities)) {
1075 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1076 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1080 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1081 for (id = 0; PACKET_remaining(&identities) != 0; id++) {
1083 unsigned long ticket_agel;
1086 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&identities, &identity)
1087 || !PACKET_get_net_4(&identities, &ticket_agel)) {
1088 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1089 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1093 idlen = PACKET_remaining(&identity);
1094 if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL
1095 && !s->psk_find_session_cb(s, PACKET_data(&identity), idlen,
1097 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1098 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1102 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1104 && s->psk_server_callback != NULL
1105 && idlen <= PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1107 unsigned char pskdata[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
1108 unsigned int pskdatalen;
1110 if (!PACKET_strndup(&identity, &pskid)) {
1111 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1112 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1115 pskdatalen = s->psk_server_callback(s, pskid, pskdata,
1117 OPENSSL_free(pskid);
1118 if (pskdatalen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
1119 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1120 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1122 } else if (pskdatalen > 0) {
1123 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1124 const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 };
1127 * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know
1128 * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec
1130 cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id);
1131 if (cipher == NULL) {
1132 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
1133 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1134 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1138 sess = SSL_SESSION_new();
1140 || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(sess, pskdata,
1142 || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(sess, cipher)
1143 || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(sess,
1145 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
1146 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1147 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1150 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
1153 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1156 /* We found a PSK */
1157 SSL_SESSION *sesstmp = ssl_session_dup(sess, 0);
1159 if (sesstmp == NULL) {
1160 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1161 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1164 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1168 * We've just been told to use this session for this context so
1169 * make sure the sid_ctx matches up.
1171 memcpy(sess->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
1172 sess->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length;
1175 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
1176 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1178 uint32_t ticket_age = 0, now, agesec, agems;
1182 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
1183 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
1184 * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
1186 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
1187 || (s->max_early_data > 0
1188 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))
1189 ret = tls_get_stateful_ticket(s, &identity, &sess);
1191 ret = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&identity),
1192 PACKET_remaining(&identity), NULL, 0,
1195 if (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY) {
1196 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1197 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1201 if (ret == SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
1202 || ret == SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER) {
1203 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1204 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1207 if (ret == SSL_TICKET_NONE || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
1210 /* Check for replay */
1211 if (s->max_early_data > 0
1212 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0
1213 && !SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, sess)) {
1214 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1219 ticket_age = (uint32_t)ticket_agel;
1220 now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
1221 agesec = now - (uint32_t)sess->time;
1222 agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
1223 ticket_age -= sess->ext.tick_age_add;
1226 * For simplicity we do our age calculations in seconds. If the
1227 * client does it in ms then it could appear that their ticket age
1228 * is longer than ours (our ticket age calculation should always be
1229 * slightly longer than the client's due to the network latency).
1230 * Therefore we add 1000ms to our age calculation to adjust for
1234 && sess->timeout >= (long)agesec
1235 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 == agesec
1236 && ticket_age <= agems + 1000
1237 && ticket_age + TICKET_AGE_ALLOWANCE >= agems + 1000) {
1239 * Ticket age is within tolerance and not expired. We allow it
1242 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
1246 md = ssl_md(s->ctx, sess->cipher->algorithm2);
1247 if (!EVP_MD_is_a(md,
1248 EVP_MD_name(ssl_md(s->ctx, s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2)))) {
1249 /* The ciphersuite is not compatible with this session. */
1250 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1252 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
1253 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1262 binderoffset = PACKET_data(pkt) - (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1263 hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
1265 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &binders)) {
1266 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1267 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1271 for (i = 0; i <= id; i++) {
1272 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&binders, &binder)) {
1273 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1274 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1279 if (PACKET_remaining(&binder) != hashsize) {
1280 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1281 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1284 if (tls_psk_do_binder(s, md, (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1285 binderoffset, PACKET_data(&binder), NULL, sess, 0,
1287 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1291 s->ext.tick_identity = id;
1293 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
1297 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1301 int tls_parse_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1302 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1304 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1305 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH,
1306 SSL_R_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH_ENCODING_ERR);
1310 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
1316 * Add the server's renegotiation binding
1318 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1319 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1322 if (!s->s3.send_connection_binding)
1323 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1325 /* Still add this even if SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION is set */
1326 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1327 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1328 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1329 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.previous_client_finished,
1330 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len)
1331 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.previous_server_finished,
1332 s->s3.previous_server_finished_len)
1333 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1334 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1335 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1336 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1337 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1340 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1343 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1344 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1347 if (s->servername_done != 1)
1348 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1351 * Prior to TLSv1.3 we ignore any SNI in the current handshake if resuming.
1352 * We just use the servername from the initial handshake.
1354 if (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1355 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1357 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1358 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1359 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1360 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1361 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1364 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1367 /* Add/include the server's max fragment len extension into ServerHello */
1368 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1369 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1372 if (!USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session))
1373 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1376 * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length
1377 * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value.
1379 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length)
1380 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1381 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode)
1382 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1383 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1384 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1385 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1388 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1392 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1393 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1396 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1397 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1398 int using_ecc = ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))
1399 && (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats != NULL);
1400 const unsigned char *plist;
1404 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1406 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1407 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1408 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1409 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
1410 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1411 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1412 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1413 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1416 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1420 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1421 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1422 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1425 const uint16_t *groups;
1426 size_t numgroups, i, first = 1;
1428 /* s->s3.group_id is non zero if we accepted a key_share */
1429 if (s->s3.group_id == 0)
1430 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1432 /* Get our list of supported groups */
1433 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &numgroups);
1434 if (numgroups == 0) {
1435 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1436 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1437 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1440 /* Copy group ID if supported */
1441 for (i = 0; i < numgroups; i++) {
1442 uint16_t group = groups[i];
1444 if (tls_valid_group(s, group, SSL_version(s))
1445 && tls_group_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1448 * Check if the client is already using our preferred group. If
1449 * so we don't need to add this extension
1451 if (s->s3.group_id == group)
1452 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1454 /* Add extension header */
1455 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
1456 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
1457 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1458 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1459 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1460 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
1461 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1462 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1467 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, group)) {
1468 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1469 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
1470 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1471 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1476 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1477 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1478 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
1479 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1480 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1483 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1487 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1488 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1491 if (!s->ext.ticket_expected || !tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1492 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1493 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1496 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1497 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1498 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1499 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1500 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1503 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1506 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1507 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1508 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1511 /* We don't currently support this extension inside a CertificateRequest */
1512 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST)
1513 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1515 if (!s->ext.status_expected)
1516 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1518 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && chainidx != 0)
1519 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1521 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1522 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1523 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1524 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1525 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1529 * In TLSv1.3 we include the certificate status itself. In <= TLSv1.2 we
1530 * send back an empty extension, with the certificate status appearing as a
1533 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
1534 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1535 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1537 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1538 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1539 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1540 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1543 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1547 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1548 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1549 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1552 const unsigned char *npa;
1553 unsigned int npalen;
1555 int npn_seen = s->s3.npn_seen;
1558 if (!npn_seen || s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb == NULL)
1559 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1561 ret = s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1562 s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb_arg);
1563 if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1564 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1565 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1566 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1567 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_NEXT_PROTO_NEG,
1568 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1569 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1574 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1578 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1579 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1581 if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL)
1582 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1584 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1585 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1586 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1587 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1588 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3.alpn_selected,
1589 s->s3.alpn_selected_len)
1590 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1591 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1592 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1593 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1594 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1597 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1600 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1601 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1602 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1605 if (s->srtp_profile == NULL)
1606 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1608 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1609 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1610 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1611 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1612 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1613 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1614 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1615 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1616 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1619 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1623 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1624 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1626 if (!s->ext.use_etm)
1627 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1630 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1631 * for other cases too.
1633 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1634 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1635 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1636 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12
1637 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_MAGMA
1638 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_KUZNYECHIK) {
1640 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1643 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1644 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1645 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ETM,
1646 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1647 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1650 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1653 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1654 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1656 if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0)
1657 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1659 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1660 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1661 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EMS,
1662 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1663 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1666 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1669 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1670 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1673 if (!ossl_assert(SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1674 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1675 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
1676 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1677 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1680 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
1681 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1682 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->version)
1683 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1684 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1685 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
1686 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1687 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1690 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1693 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1694 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1697 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1698 unsigned char *encodedPoint;
1699 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
1700 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3.peer_tmp, *skey = NULL;
1702 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
1704 /* Original key_share was acceptable so don't ask for another one */
1705 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1707 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1708 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1709 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3.group_id)
1710 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1711 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1712 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1713 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1714 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1717 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1721 /* No key_share received from client - must be resuming */
1722 if (!s->hit || !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) {
1723 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1724 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1725 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1727 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1730 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1731 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1732 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3.group_id)) {
1733 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1734 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1735 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1738 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, ckey);
1740 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1741 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1742 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1745 /* Generate encoding of server key */
1746 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
1747 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
1748 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1750 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1751 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1754 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
1755 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1756 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1757 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1758 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1759 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1760 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1762 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1764 /* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */
1765 s->s3.tmp.pkey = skey;
1766 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
1767 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1768 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1770 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1772 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1776 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1777 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1779 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1780 unsigned char *hashval1, *hashval2, *appcookie1, *appcookie2, *cookie;
1781 unsigned char *hmac, *hmac2;
1782 size_t startlen, ciphlen, totcookielen, hashlen, hmaclen, appcookielen;
1785 int ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1787 if ((s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
1788 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1790 if (s->ctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb == NULL) {
1791 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1792 SSL_R_NO_COOKIE_CALLBACK_SET);
1793 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1796 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
1797 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1798 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1799 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &startlen)
1800 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, MAX_COOKIE_SIZE, &cookie)
1801 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION)
1802 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION)
1803 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3.group_id)
1804 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher, pkt,
1806 /* Is there a key_share extension present in this HRR? */
1807 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->s3.peer_tmp == NULL)
1808 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, (unsigned int)time(NULL))
1809 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1810 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashval1)) {
1811 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1812 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1813 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1817 * Get the hash of the initial ClientHello. ssl_handshake_hash() operates
1818 * on raw buffers, so we first reserve sufficient bytes (above) and then
1819 * subsequently allocate them (below)
1821 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
1822 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval1, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
1823 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1824 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1827 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hashlen, &hashval2)
1828 || !ossl_assert(hashval1 == hashval2)
1829 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1830 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1831 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH, &appcookie1)) {
1832 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1833 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1834 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1837 /* Generate the application cookie */
1838 if (s->ctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb(s, appcookie1, &appcookielen) == 0) {
1839 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1840 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1841 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1844 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, appcookielen, &appcookie2)
1845 || !ossl_assert(appcookie1 == appcookie2)
1846 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1847 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &totcookielen)
1848 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, &hmac)) {
1849 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1850 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1851 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1853 hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
1855 totcookielen -= startlen;
1856 if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen <= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) {
1857 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1858 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1859 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1862 /* HMAC the cookie */
1863 hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
1864 pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
1865 s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key,
1866 sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext
1868 if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) {
1869 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1870 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1874 if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(hctx, NULL, "SHA2-256", s->ctx->propq, pkey,
1875 s->ctx->libctx) <= 0
1876 || EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, cookie,
1877 totcookielen) <= 0) {
1878 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1879 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1883 if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen + hmaclen <= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE)) {
1884 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1885 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1889 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hmaclen, &hmac2)
1890 || !ossl_assert(hmac == hmac2)
1891 || !ossl_assert(cookie == hmac - totcookielen)
1892 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1893 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1894 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1895 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1899 ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1902 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
1903 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1906 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1910 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1911 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1914 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1915 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1916 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1917 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1918 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1919 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1920 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1923 if (((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x80
1924 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x81)
1925 || (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG) == 0)
1926 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1928 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1929 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1930 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_CRYPTOPRO_BUG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1931 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1934 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1937 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1938 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1941 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
1942 if (s->max_early_data == 0)
1943 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1945 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
1946 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1947 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->max_early_data)
1948 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1949 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1950 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1951 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1954 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1957 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED)
1958 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1960 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
1961 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1962 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1963 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1964 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1965 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1968 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1971 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1972 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1975 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1977 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
1978 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1979 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->ext.tick_identity)
1980 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1981 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1982 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1983 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1986 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;