2 * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
11 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
12 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
13 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
16 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
19 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
21 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
23 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
24 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
25 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3.previous_client_finished,
26 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len)
27 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
28 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
29 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
30 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
33 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
36 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
37 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
40 if (s->ext.hostname == NULL)
41 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
43 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
44 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
45 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
46 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
47 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
48 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
49 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
50 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.hostname,
51 strlen(s->ext.hostname))
52 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
53 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
54 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
55 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
56 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
59 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
62 /* Push a Max Fragment Len extension into ClientHello */
63 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
64 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
67 if (s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode == TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED)
68 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
70 /* Add Max Fragment Length extension if client enabled it. */
72 * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length
73 * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value.
75 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length)
76 /* Sub-packet for Max Fragment Length extension (1 byte) */
77 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
78 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode)
79 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
80 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
81 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
82 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
85 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
88 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
89 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
90 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
92 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
93 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
94 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
96 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
97 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
98 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
99 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
100 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
101 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
102 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
103 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
104 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
105 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
106 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SRP,
107 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
108 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
111 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
115 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
116 static int use_ecc(SSL *s)
119 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
120 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = NULL;
122 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
123 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
126 cipher_stack = SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(s);
127 end = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack);
128 for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
129 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
131 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
132 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
133 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
134 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
135 || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
141 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_stack);
145 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
146 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
149 const unsigned char *pformats;
153 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
155 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
156 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
158 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
159 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
160 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
161 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
162 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
163 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
164 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
165 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
168 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
171 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
172 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
175 const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
176 size_t num_groups = 0, i;
177 int min_version, max_version, reason;
180 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
182 reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL);
184 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
185 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, reason);
186 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
190 * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
192 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
194 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
195 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
196 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
197 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
198 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)) {
199 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
200 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
201 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
202 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
204 /* Copy group ID if supported */
205 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
206 uint16_t ctmp = pgroups[i];
208 if (tls_valid_group(s, ctmp, max_version)
209 && tls_curve_allowed(s, ctmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
210 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, ctmp)) {
211 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
212 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
213 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
214 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
218 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
219 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
220 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
221 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
222 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
225 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
229 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
230 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
235 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
236 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
238 if (!s->new_session && s->session != NULL
239 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
240 && s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
241 ticklen = s->session->ext.ticklen;
242 } else if (s->session && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL
243 && s->ext.session_ticket->data != NULL) {
244 ticklen = s->ext.session_ticket->length;
245 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
246 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
247 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
248 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET,
249 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
250 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
252 memcpy(s->session->ext.tick,
253 s->ext.session_ticket->data, ticklen);
254 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
259 if (ticklen == 0 && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL &&
260 s->ext.session_ticket->data == NULL)
261 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
263 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
264 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
265 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
266 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
267 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
270 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
273 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
274 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
278 const uint16_t *salg;
280 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s))
281 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
283 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg);
284 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
285 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
286 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
287 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
288 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
289 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
290 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
291 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
292 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SIG_ALGS,
293 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
294 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
297 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
300 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
301 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
302 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
307 /* This extension isn't defined for client Certificates */
309 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
311 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
312 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
314 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
315 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
316 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
317 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
318 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
319 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
320 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
321 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
322 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
324 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->ext.ocsp.ids); i++) {
325 unsigned char *idbytes;
326 OCSP_RESPID *id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->ext.ocsp.ids, i);
327 int idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
330 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
331 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
332 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
333 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
334 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
335 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
336 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
339 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
340 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
341 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
342 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
343 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
345 if (s->ext.ocsp.exts) {
346 unsigned char *extbytes;
347 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, NULL);
350 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
351 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
352 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
353 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
355 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
356 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, &extbytes)
358 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
359 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
360 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
361 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
364 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
365 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
366 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
367 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
370 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
374 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
375 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
376 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
378 if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
379 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
382 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
383 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
385 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
386 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
387 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_NPN,
388 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
389 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
392 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
396 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
397 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
401 if (s->ext.alpn == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
402 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
404 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
405 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
406 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
407 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
408 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)
409 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
410 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ALPN,
411 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
412 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
416 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
421 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
422 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
425 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
429 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
431 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
432 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
433 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
434 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
435 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
436 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
437 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
438 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
441 end = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
442 for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
443 const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof =
444 sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
446 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
447 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
448 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
449 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
452 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
453 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
454 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
455 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
456 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
457 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
458 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
461 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
465 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
466 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
468 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
469 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
471 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
472 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
473 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ETM,
474 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
475 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
478 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
481 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
482 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
483 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
485 if (s->ct_validation_callback == NULL)
486 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
488 /* Not defined for client Certificates */
490 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
492 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
493 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
494 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SCT,
495 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
496 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
499 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
503 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
504 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
506 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
507 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
509 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
510 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
511 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EMS,
512 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
513 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
516 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
519 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
520 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
523 int currv, min_version, max_version, reason;
525 reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL);
527 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
528 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, reason);
529 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
533 * Don't include this if we can't negotiate TLSv1.3. We can do a straight
534 * comparison here because we will never be called in DTLS.
536 if (max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION)
537 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
539 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
540 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
541 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
542 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
543 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
544 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
545 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
548 for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
549 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
550 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
551 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
552 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
553 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
556 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
557 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
558 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
559 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
560 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
563 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
567 * Construct a psk_kex_modes extension.
569 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
570 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
573 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
574 int nodhe = s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX;
576 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes)
577 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
578 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
579 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
580 || (nodhe && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE))
581 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
582 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
583 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
584 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
585 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
588 s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
590 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
593 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
596 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
597 static int add_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int curve_id)
599 unsigned char *encoded_point = NULL;
600 EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
603 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
604 if (!ossl_assert(s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)) {
605 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE,
606 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
610 * Could happen if we got an HRR that wasn't requesting a new key_share
612 key_share_key = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
614 key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
615 if (key_share_key == NULL) {
616 /* SSLfatal() already called */
621 /* Encode the public key. */
622 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key,
624 if (encodedlen == 0) {
625 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
629 /* Create KeyShareEntry */
630 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
631 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_point, encodedlen)) {
632 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE,
633 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
638 * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're
639 * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now
640 * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
642 s->s3.tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
643 s->s3.group_id = curve_id;
644 OPENSSL_free(encoded_point);
648 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL)
649 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
650 OPENSSL_free(encoded_point);
655 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
656 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
659 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
660 size_t i, num_groups = 0;
661 const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
662 uint16_t curve_id = 0;
664 /* key_share extension */
665 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
666 /* Extension data sub-packet */
667 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
668 /* KeyShare list sub-packet */
669 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
670 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
671 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
672 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
675 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
678 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
681 if (s->s3.group_id != 0) {
682 curve_id = s->s3.group_id;
684 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
686 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pgroups[i], SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
689 curve_id = pgroups[i];
695 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
696 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
697 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
700 if (!add_key_share(s, pkt, curve_id)) {
701 /* SSLfatal() already called */
702 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
705 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
706 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
707 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
708 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
710 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
712 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
716 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
717 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
719 EXT_RETURN ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
721 /* Should only be set if we've had an HRR */
722 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0)
723 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
725 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
726 /* Extension data sub-packet */
727 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
728 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.tls13_cookie,
729 s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)
730 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
731 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_COOKIE,
732 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
736 ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT;
738 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.tls13_cookie);
739 s->ext.tls13_cookie = NULL;
740 s->ext.tls13_cookie_len = 0;
745 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
746 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
749 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
750 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
751 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
752 const unsigned char *id = NULL;
754 SSL_SESSION *psksess = NULL;
755 SSL_SESSION *edsess = NULL;
756 const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL;
758 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
759 handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s);
761 if (s->psk_use_session_cb != NULL
762 && (!s->psk_use_session_cb(s, handmd, &id, &idlen, &psksess)
764 && psksess->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION))) {
765 SSL_SESSION_free(psksess);
766 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
768 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
771 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
772 if (psksess == NULL && s->psk_client_callback != NULL) {
773 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
776 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
777 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, NULL, identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
780 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
781 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
782 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
783 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
784 } else if (psklen > 0) {
785 const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 };
786 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
788 idlen = strlen(identity);
789 if (idlen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
790 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
791 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
792 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
793 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
795 id = (unsigned char *)identity;
798 * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know
799 * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec
801 cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id);
802 if (cipher == NULL) {
803 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
804 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
805 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
806 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
809 psksess = SSL_SESSION_new();
811 || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(psksess, psk, psklen)
812 || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(psksess, cipher)
813 || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(psksess, TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
814 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
815 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
816 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
817 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
818 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
820 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
823 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
825 SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
826 s->psksession = psksess;
827 if (psksess != NULL) {
828 OPENSSL_free(s->psksession_id);
829 s->psksession_id = OPENSSL_memdup(id, idlen);
830 if (s->psksession_id == NULL) {
831 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
832 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
833 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
835 s->psksession_id_len = idlen;
838 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
839 || (s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0
840 && (psksess == NULL || psksess->ext.max_early_data == 0))) {
841 s->max_early_data = 0;
842 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
844 edsess = s->session->ext.max_early_data != 0 ? s->session : psksess;
845 s->max_early_data = edsess->ext.max_early_data;
847 if (edsess->ext.hostname != NULL) {
848 if (s->ext.hostname == NULL
849 || (s->ext.hostname != NULL
850 && strcmp(s->ext.hostname, edsess->ext.hostname) != 0)) {
851 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
852 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
853 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_SNI);
854 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
858 if ((s->ext.alpn == NULL && edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL)) {
859 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
860 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN);
861 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
865 * Verify that we are offering an ALPN protocol consistent with the early
868 if (edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
869 PACKET prots, alpnpkt;
872 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&prots, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) {
873 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
874 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
875 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
877 while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&prots, &alpnpkt)) {
878 if (PACKET_equal(&alpnpkt, edsess->ext.alpn_selected,
879 edsess->ext.alpn_selected_len)) {
885 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
886 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
887 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN);
888 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
892 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
893 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
894 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
895 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
896 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
897 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
901 * We set this to rejected here. Later, if the server acknowledges the
902 * extension, we set it to accepted.
904 s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
905 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
907 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
910 #define F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN 0xff
911 #define F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN 0x200
914 * PSK pre binder overhead =
915 * 2 bytes for TLSEXT_TYPE_psk
916 * 2 bytes for extension length
917 * 2 bytes for identities list length
918 * 2 bytes for identity length
919 * 4 bytes for obfuscated_ticket_age
920 * 2 bytes for binder list length
921 * 1 byte for binder length
922 * The above excludes the number of bytes for the identity itself and the
923 * subsequent binder bytes
925 #define PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 4 + 2 + 1)
927 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
928 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
931 unsigned char *padbytes;
934 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) == 0)
935 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
938 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See RFC7685.
939 * This code calculates the length of all extensions added so far but
940 * excludes the PSK extension (because that MUST be written last). Therefore
941 * this extension MUST always appear second to last.
943 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
944 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING,
945 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
946 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
950 * If we're going to send a PSK then that will be written out after this
951 * extension, so we need to calculate how long it is going to be.
953 if (s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION
954 && s->session->ext.ticklen != 0
955 && s->session->cipher != NULL) {
956 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
960 * Add the fixed PSK overhead, the identity length and the binder
963 hlen += PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD + s->session->ext.ticklen
968 if (hlen > F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN && hlen < F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN) {
969 /* Calculate the amount of padding we need to add */
970 hlen = F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN - hlen;
973 * Take off the size of extension header itself (2 bytes for type and
974 * 2 bytes for length bytes), but ensure that the extension is at least
975 * 1 byte long so as not to have an empty extension last (WebSphere 7.x,
976 * 8.x are intolerant of that condition)
983 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
984 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
985 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING,
986 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
987 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
989 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
992 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
996 * Construct the pre_shared_key extension
998 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
999 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1001 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1002 uint32_t now, agesec, agems = 0;
1003 size_t reshashsize = 0, pskhashsize = 0, binderoffset, msglen;
1004 unsigned char *resbinder = NULL, *pskbinder = NULL, *msgstart = NULL;
1005 const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL, *mdres = NULL, *mdpsk = NULL;
1008 s->ext.tick_identity = 0;
1011 * Note: At this stage of the code we only support adding a single
1012 * resumption PSK. If we add support for multiple PSKs then the length
1013 * calculations in the padding extension will need to be adjusted.
1017 * If this is an incompatible or new session then we have nothing to resume
1018 * so don't add this extension.
1020 if (s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION
1021 || (s->session->ext.ticklen == 0 && s->psksession == NULL))
1022 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1024 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
1025 handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s);
1027 if (s->session->ext.ticklen != 0) {
1028 /* Get the digest associated with the ciphersuite in the session */
1029 if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
1030 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1031 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1032 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1034 mdres = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
1035 if (mdres == NULL) {
1037 * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
1043 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdres != handmd) {
1045 * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the session
1046 * so we can't use it.
1052 * Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says
1053 * nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most
1054 * implementations follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in
1055 * seconds since epoch. We've already made the assumption that we can do
1056 * this in multiple places in the code, so portability shouldn't be an
1059 now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
1060 agesec = now - (uint32_t)s->session->time;
1062 * We calculate the age in seconds but the server may work in ms. Due to
1063 * rounding errors we could overestimate the age by up to 1s. It is
1064 * better to underestimate it. Otherwise, if the RTT is very short, when
1065 * the server calculates the age reported by the client it could be
1066 * bigger than the age calculated on the server - which should never
1072 if (s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint < agesec) {
1073 /* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */
1078 * Calculate age in ms. We're just doing it to nearest second. Should be
1081 agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
1083 if (agesec != 0 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 != agesec) {
1085 * Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session.
1086 * If so we just ignore it.
1092 * Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed
1095 agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add;
1097 reshashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdres);
1098 s->ext.tick_identity++;
1103 if (!dores && s->psksession == NULL)
1104 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1106 if (s->psksession != NULL) {
1107 mdpsk = ssl_md(s->psksession->cipher->algorithm2);
1108 if (mdpsk == NULL) {
1110 * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
1111 * If this happens it's an application bug.
1113 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1115 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1118 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdpsk != handmd) {
1120 * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the PSK
1121 * session. This is an application bug.
1123 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1125 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1128 pskhashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdpsk);
1131 /* Create the extension, but skip over the binder for now */
1132 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
1133 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1134 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1135 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1136 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1137 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1141 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick,
1142 s->session->ext.ticklen)
1143 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, agems)) {
1144 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1145 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1146 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1150 if (s->psksession != NULL) {
1151 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->psksession_id,
1152 s->psksession_id_len)
1153 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)) {
1154 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1155 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1156 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1158 s->ext.tick_identity++;
1161 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1162 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &binderoffset)
1163 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1165 && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, reshashsize, &resbinder))
1166 || (s->psksession != NULL
1167 && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, pskhashsize, &pskbinder))
1168 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1169 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1170 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &msglen)
1172 * We need to fill in all the sub-packet lengths now so we can
1173 * calculate the HMAC of the message up to the binders
1175 || !WPACKET_fill_lengths(pkt)) {
1176 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1177 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1178 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1181 msgstart = WPACKET_get_curr(pkt) - msglen;
1184 && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdres, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL,
1185 resbinder, s->session, 1, 0) != 1) {
1186 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1187 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1190 if (s->psksession != NULL
1191 && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdpsk, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL,
1192 pskbinder, s->psksession, 1, 1) != 1) {
1193 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1194 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1197 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1199 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1203 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1204 unsigned int context,
1205 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1207 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1208 if (!s->pha_enabled)
1209 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1211 /* construct extension - 0 length, no contents */
1212 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_post_handshake_auth)
1213 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1214 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1215 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1216 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH,
1217 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1218 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1221 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT;
1223 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1225 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1231 * Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
1233 int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1234 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1236 size_t expected_len = s->s3.previous_client_finished_len
1237 + s->s3.previous_server_finished_len;
1239 const unsigned char *data;
1241 /* Check for logic errors */
1242 if (!ossl_assert(expected_len == 0
1243 || s->s3.previous_client_finished_len != 0)
1244 || !ossl_assert(expected_len == 0
1245 || s->s3.previous_server_finished_len != 0)) {
1246 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1247 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1251 /* Parse the length byte */
1252 if (!PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &ilen)) {
1253 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1254 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
1258 /* Consistency check */
1259 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ilen) {
1260 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1261 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
1265 /* Check that the extension matches */
1266 if (ilen != expected_len) {
1267 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1268 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
1272 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3.previous_client_finished_len)
1273 || memcmp(data, s->s3.previous_client_finished,
1274 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len) != 0) {
1275 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1276 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
1280 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3.previous_server_finished_len)
1281 || memcmp(data, s->s3.previous_server_finished,
1282 s->s3.previous_server_finished_len) != 0) {
1283 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1284 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
1287 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1;
1292 /* Parse the server's max fragment len extension packet */
1293 int tls_parse_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1294 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1298 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) {
1299 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
1300 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1304 /* |value| should contains a valid max-fragment-length code. */
1305 if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) {
1306 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1307 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
1308 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
1312 /* Must be the same value as client-configured one who was sent to server */
1314 * RFC 6066: if a client receives a maximum fragment length negotiation
1315 * response that differs from the length it requested, ...
1316 * It must abort with SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER alert
1318 if (value != s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) {
1319 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1320 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
1321 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
1326 * Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation succeeded.
1327 * The negotiated Maximum Fragment Length is binding now.
1329 s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value;
1334 int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1335 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1337 if (s->ext.hostname == NULL) {
1338 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1339 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1343 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
1344 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1345 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1350 if (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL) {
1351 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1352 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1355 s->session->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->ext.hostname);
1356 if (s->session->ext.hostname == NULL) {
1357 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1358 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1366 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1367 int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1368 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1370 size_t ecpointformats_len;
1371 PACKET ecptformatlist;
1373 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ecptformatlist)) {
1374 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS,
1375 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1379 ecpointformats_len = PACKET_remaining(&ecptformatlist);
1380 if (ecpointformats_len == 0) {
1381 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1382 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1386 s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len = 0;
1387 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.ecpointformats);
1388 s->session->ext.ecpointformats = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len);
1389 if (s->session->ext.ecpointformats == NULL) {
1390 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1391 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1395 s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len = ecpointformats_len;
1397 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ecptformatlist,
1398 s->session->ext.ecpointformats,
1399 ecpointformats_len)) {
1400 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1401 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1410 int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1411 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1413 if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb != NULL &&
1414 !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
1415 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
1416 s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
1417 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1418 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1422 if (!tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1423 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION,
1424 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1427 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
1428 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1429 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1433 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1438 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1439 int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1440 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1442 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
1443 /* We ignore this if the server sends a CertificateRequest */
1444 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for this */
1449 * MUST only be sent if we've requested a status
1450 * request message. In TLS <= 1.2 it must also be empty.
1452 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1453 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION,
1454 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1457 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
1458 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1459 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1463 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1464 /* We only know how to handle this if it's for the first Certificate in
1465 * the chain. We ignore any other responses.
1470 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1471 return tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt);
1474 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1475 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
1482 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1483 int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1486 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
1487 /* We ignore this if the server sends it in a CertificateRequest */
1488 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for this */
1493 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
1494 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
1495 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
1497 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1498 size_t size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1500 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
1501 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.scts);
1504 s->ext.scts_len = (uint16_t)size;
1506 s->ext.scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
1507 if (s->ext.scts == NULL
1508 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.scts, size)) {
1509 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT,
1510 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1515 ENDPOINT role = (context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0
1516 ? ENDPOINT_CLIENT : ENDPOINT_BOTH;
1519 * If we didn't ask for it then there must be a custom extension,
1520 * otherwise this is unsolicited.
1522 if (custom_ext_find(&s->cert->custext, role,
1523 TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
1525 SSLfatal(s, TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT,
1526 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1530 if (!custom_ext_parse(s, context,
1531 TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
1532 PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt),
1534 /* SSLfatal already called */
1544 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1546 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1547 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
1548 * fill the length of the block. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
1550 static int ssl_next_proto_validate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1552 PACKET tmp_protocol;
1554 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
1555 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
1556 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0) {
1557 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_NEXT_PROTO_VALIDATE,
1558 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1566 int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1569 unsigned char *selected;
1570 unsigned char selected_len;
1573 /* Check if we are in a renegotiation. If so ignore this extension */
1574 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
1577 /* We must have requested it. */
1578 if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL) {
1579 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN,
1580 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1584 /* The data must be valid */
1586 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(s, &tmppkt)) {
1587 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1590 if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1592 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
1593 s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) !=
1594 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1595 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN,
1596 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1601 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
1602 * a single Serverhello
1604 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.npn);
1605 s->ext.npn = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1606 if (s->ext.npn == NULL) {
1607 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN,
1608 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1612 memcpy(s->ext.npn, selected, selected_len);
1613 s->ext.npn_len = selected_len;
1620 int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1625 /* We must have requested it. */
1626 if (!s->s3.alpn_sent) {
1627 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1628 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1632 * The extension data consists of:
1633 * uint16 list_length
1634 * uint8 proto_length;
1635 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
1637 if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(pkt, &len)
1638 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &len)
1639 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len) {
1640 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1641 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1644 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected);
1645 s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
1646 if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) {
1647 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1648 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1651 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3.alpn_selected, len)) {
1652 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1653 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1656 s->s3.alpn_selected_len = len;
1658 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
1659 || s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len != len
1660 || memcmp(s->session->ext.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected, len)
1662 /* ALPN not consistent with the old session so cannot use early_data */
1663 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
1667 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have been
1668 * initialised to NULL. We should update it with the selected ALPN.
1670 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
1671 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1672 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1675 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
1676 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected_len);
1677 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
1678 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1679 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1682 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3.alpn_selected_len;
1688 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1689 int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1692 unsigned int id, ct, mki;
1694 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt;
1695 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1697 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || ct != 2
1698 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &id)
1699 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki)
1700 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1701 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1702 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
1707 /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */
1708 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1709 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
1713 /* Throw an error if the server gave us an unsolicited extension */
1714 clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
1716 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1717 SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES);
1722 * Check to see if the server gave us something we support (and
1723 * presumably offered)
1725 for (i = 0; i < sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); i++) {
1726 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1728 if (prof->id == id) {
1729 s->srtp_profile = prof;
1734 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1735 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
1740 int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1743 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
1744 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1745 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
1746 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
1752 int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1755 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
1757 s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
1759 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
1764 int tls_parse_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1765 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1767 unsigned int version;
1769 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)
1770 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1771 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1772 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
1773 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1778 * The only protocol version we support which is valid in this extension in
1779 * a ServerHello is TLSv1.3 therefore we shouldn't be getting anything else.
1781 if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1782 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1783 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
1784 SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
1788 /* We ignore this extension for HRRs except to sanity check it */
1789 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST)
1792 /* We just set it here. We validate it in ssl_choose_client_version */
1793 s->version = version;
1798 int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1801 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1802 unsigned int group_id;
1804 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3.tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
1807 if (ckey == NULL || s->s3.peer_tmp != NULL) {
1808 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1809 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1813 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &group_id)) {
1814 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1815 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1819 if ((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0) {
1820 const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
1821 size_t i, num_groups;
1823 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1824 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1825 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1830 * It is an error if the HelloRetryRequest wants a key_share that we
1831 * already sent in the first ClientHello
1833 if (group_id == s->s3.group_id) {
1834 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1835 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1839 /* Validate the selected group is one we support */
1840 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
1841 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
1842 if (group_id == pgroups[i])
1846 || !tls_curve_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1847 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1848 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1852 s->s3.group_id = group_id;
1853 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
1854 s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
1858 if (group_id != s->s3.group_id) {
1860 * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
1863 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1864 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1868 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &encoded_pt)
1869 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
1870 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1871 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1875 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
1877 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1878 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1881 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1882 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
1883 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1885 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1889 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) {
1890 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1891 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1894 s->s3.peer_tmp = skey;
1900 int tls_parse_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1905 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie)
1906 || !PACKET_memdup(&cookie, &s->ext.tls13_cookie,
1907 &s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)) {
1908 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_COOKIE,
1909 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1916 int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1917 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1919 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
1920 unsigned long max_early_data;
1922 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &max_early_data)
1923 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1924 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1925 SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA);
1929 s->session->ext.max_early_data = max_early_data;
1934 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1935 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1936 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1940 if (!s->ext.early_data_ok
1943 * If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume
1944 * using the first identity, or the SNI/ALPN is not consistent so the
1945 * server should not be accepting it.
1947 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1948 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1952 s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED;
1957 int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1960 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1961 unsigned int identity;
1963 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &identity) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1964 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK,
1965 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1969 if (identity >= (unsigned int)s->ext.tick_identity) {
1970 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK,
1971 SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY);
1976 * Session resumption tickets are always sent before PSK tickets. If the
1977 * ticket index is 0 then it must be for a session resumption ticket if we
1978 * sent two tickets, or if we didn't send a PSK ticket.
1980 if (identity == 0 && (s->psksession == NULL || s->ext.tick_identity == 2)) {
1982 SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
1983 s->psksession = NULL;
1987 if (s->psksession == NULL) {
1988 /* Should never happen */
1989 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK,
1990 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1995 * If we used the external PSK for sending early_data then s->early_secret
1996 * is already set up, so don't overwrite it. Otherwise we copy the
1997 * early_secret across that we generated earlier.
1999 if ((s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
2000 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
2001 || s->session->ext.max_early_data > 0
2002 || s->psksession->ext.max_early_data == 0)
2003 memcpy(s->early_secret, s->psksession->early_secret, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
2005 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2006 s->session = s->psksession;
2007 s->psksession = NULL;
2009 /* Early data is only allowed if we used the first ticket */
2011 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;