2 * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
11 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
12 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
13 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
16 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
19 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
21 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
23 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
24 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
25 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
26 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
27 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
28 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
29 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
30 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
33 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
36 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
37 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
40 if (s->ext.hostname == NULL)
41 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
43 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
44 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
45 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
46 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
47 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
48 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
49 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
50 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.hostname,
51 strlen(s->ext.hostname))
52 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
53 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
54 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
55 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
56 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
59 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
62 /* Push a Max Fragment Len extension into ClientHello */
63 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
64 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
67 if (s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode == TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED)
68 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
70 /* Add Max Fragment Length extension if client enabled it. */
72 * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length
73 * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value.
75 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length)
76 /* Sub-packet for Max Fragment Length extension (1 byte) */
77 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
78 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode)
79 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
80 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
81 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
82 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
85 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
88 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
89 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
90 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
92 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
93 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
94 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
96 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
97 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
98 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
99 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
100 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
101 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
102 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
103 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
104 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
105 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
106 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SRP,
107 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
108 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
111 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
115 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
116 static int use_ecc(SSL *s)
119 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
120 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = NULL;
122 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
123 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
126 cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
127 end = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack);
128 for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
129 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
131 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
132 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
133 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
134 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
135 || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
142 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
143 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
146 const unsigned char *pformats;
150 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
152 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
153 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
155 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
156 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
157 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
158 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
159 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
160 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
161 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
162 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
165 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
168 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
169 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
172 const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
173 size_t num_groups = 0, i;
176 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
179 * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
181 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */
182 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
184 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
185 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
186 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
187 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
188 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
189 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
190 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
191 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
193 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
194 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
195 uint16_t ctmp = pgroups[i];
197 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, ctmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
198 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, ctmp)) {
199 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
200 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
201 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
202 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
206 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
207 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
208 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
209 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
210 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
213 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
217 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
218 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
223 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
224 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
226 if (!s->new_session && s->session != NULL
227 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
228 && s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
229 ticklen = s->session->ext.ticklen;
230 } else if (s->session && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL
231 && s->ext.session_ticket->data != NULL) {
232 ticklen = s->ext.session_ticket->length;
233 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
234 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
235 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
236 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET,
237 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
238 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
240 memcpy(s->session->ext.tick,
241 s->ext.session_ticket->data, ticklen);
242 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
247 if (ticklen == 0 && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL &&
248 s->ext.session_ticket->data == NULL)
249 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
251 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
252 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
253 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
254 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
255 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
258 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
261 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
262 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
266 const uint16_t *salg;
268 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s))
269 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
271 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg);
272 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
273 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
274 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
275 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
276 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
277 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
278 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
279 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
280 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SIG_ALGS,
281 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
282 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
285 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
288 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
289 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
290 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
295 /* This extension isn't defined for client Certificates */
297 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
299 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
300 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
302 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
303 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
304 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
305 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
306 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
307 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
308 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
309 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
310 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
312 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->ext.ocsp.ids); i++) {
313 unsigned char *idbytes;
314 OCSP_RESPID *id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->ext.ocsp.ids, i);
315 int idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
318 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
319 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
320 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
321 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
322 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
323 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
324 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
327 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
328 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
329 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
330 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
331 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
333 if (s->ext.ocsp.exts) {
334 unsigned char *extbytes;
335 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, NULL);
338 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
339 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
340 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
341 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
343 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
344 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, &extbytes)
346 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
347 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST,
348 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
349 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
352 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
353 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
354 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
355 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
358 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
362 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
363 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
364 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
366 if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
367 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
370 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
371 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
373 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
374 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
375 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_NPN,
376 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
377 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
380 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
384 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
385 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
387 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
389 if (s->ext.alpn == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
390 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
392 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
393 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
394 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
395 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
396 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)
397 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
398 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ALPN,
399 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
400 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
402 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
404 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
409 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
410 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
413 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
417 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
419 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
420 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
421 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
422 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
423 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
424 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
425 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
426 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
429 end = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
430 for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
431 const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof =
432 sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
434 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
435 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
436 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
437 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
440 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
441 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
442 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
443 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
444 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
445 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
446 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
449 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
453 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
454 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
456 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
457 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
459 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
460 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
461 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ETM,
462 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
463 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
466 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
469 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
470 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
471 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
473 if (s->ct_validation_callback == NULL)
474 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
476 /* Not defined for client Certificates */
478 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
480 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
481 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
482 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SCT,
483 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
484 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
487 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
491 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
492 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
494 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
495 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
496 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EMS,
497 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
498 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
501 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
504 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
505 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
508 int currv, min_version, max_version, reason;
510 reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version);
512 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
513 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, reason);
514 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
518 * Don't include this if we can't negotiate TLSv1.3. We can do a straight
519 * comparison here because we will never be called in DTLS.
521 if (max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION)
522 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
524 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
525 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
526 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
527 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
528 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
529 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
530 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
534 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to whether
535 * we should include versions <TLS1.2. For the moment we do. To be
538 for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
539 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this first if clause prior to release!! */
540 if (currv == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
541 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)) {
542 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
543 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
544 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
545 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
547 } else if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
548 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
549 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
550 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
551 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
554 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
555 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
556 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
557 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
558 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
561 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
565 * Construct a psk_kex_modes extension.
567 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
568 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
571 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
572 int nodhe = s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX;
574 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes)
575 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
576 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
577 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
578 || (nodhe && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE))
579 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
580 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
581 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
582 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
583 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
586 s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
588 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
591 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
594 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
595 static int add_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int curve_id)
597 unsigned char *encoded_point = NULL;
598 EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
601 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
602 if (!ossl_assert(s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)) {
603 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE,
604 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
608 * Could happen if we got an HRR that wasn't requesting a new key_share
610 key_share_key = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
612 key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
613 if (key_share_key == NULL) {
614 /* SSLfatal() already called */
619 /* Encode the public key. */
620 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key,
622 if (encodedlen == 0) {
623 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
627 /* Create KeyShareEntry */
628 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
629 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_point, encodedlen)) {
630 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE,
631 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
636 * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're
637 * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now
638 * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
640 s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
641 s->s3->group_id = curve_id;
642 OPENSSL_free(encoded_point);
646 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL)
647 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
648 OPENSSL_free(encoded_point);
653 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
654 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
657 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
658 size_t i, num_groups = 0;
659 const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
660 uint16_t curve_id = 0;
662 /* key_share extension */
663 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
664 /* Extension data sub-packet */
665 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
666 /* KeyShare list sub-packet */
667 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
668 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
669 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
670 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
673 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
676 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
679 if (s->s3->group_id != 0) {
680 curve_id = s->s3->group_id;
682 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
684 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pgroups[i], SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
687 curve_id = pgroups[i];
693 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
694 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
695 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
698 if (!add_key_share(s, pkt, curve_id)) {
699 /* SSLfatal() already called */
700 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
703 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
704 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
705 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
706 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
710 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
713 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
714 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
716 EXT_RETURN ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
718 /* Should only be set if we've had an HRR */
719 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0)
720 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
722 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
723 /* Extension data sub-packet */
724 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
725 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.tls13_cookie,
726 s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)
727 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
728 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_COOKIE,
729 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
733 ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT;
735 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.tls13_cookie);
736 s->ext.tls13_cookie = NULL;
737 s->ext.tls13_cookie_len = 0;
742 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
743 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
746 const unsigned char *id = NULL;
748 SSL_SESSION *psksess = NULL;
749 SSL_SESSION *edsess = NULL;
750 const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL;
752 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
753 handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s);
755 if (s->psk_use_session_cb != NULL
756 && (!s->psk_use_session_cb(s, handmd, &id, &idlen, &psksess)
758 && psksess->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION))) {
759 SSL_SESSION_free(psksess);
760 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
762 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
765 SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
766 s->psksession = psksess;
767 if (psksess != NULL) {
768 OPENSSL_free(s->psksession_id);
769 s->psksession_id = OPENSSL_memdup(id, idlen);
770 if (s->psksession_id == NULL) {
771 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
772 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
773 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
775 s->psksession_id_len = idlen;
778 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
779 || (s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0
780 && (psksess == NULL || psksess->ext.max_early_data == 0))) {
781 s->max_early_data = 0;
782 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
784 edsess = s->session->ext.max_early_data != 0 ? s->session : psksess;
785 s->max_early_data = edsess->ext.max_early_data;
787 if (edsess->ext.hostname != NULL) {
788 if (s->ext.hostname == NULL
789 || (s->ext.hostname != NULL
790 && strcmp(s->ext.hostname, edsess->ext.hostname) != 0)) {
791 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
792 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
793 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_SNI);
794 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
798 if ((s->ext.alpn == NULL && edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL)) {
799 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
800 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN);
801 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
805 * Verify that we are offering an ALPN protocol consistent with the early
808 if (edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
809 PACKET prots, alpnpkt;
812 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&prots, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) {
813 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
814 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
815 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
817 while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&prots, &alpnpkt)) {
818 if (PACKET_equal(&alpnpkt, edsess->ext.alpn_selected,
819 edsess->ext.alpn_selected_len)) {
825 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
826 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
827 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN);
828 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
832 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
833 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
834 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
835 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA,
836 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
837 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
841 * We set this to rejected here. Later, if the server acknowledges the
842 * extension, we set it to accepted.
844 s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
845 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
847 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
850 #define F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN 0xff
851 #define F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN 0x200
854 * PSK pre binder overhead =
855 * 2 bytes for TLSEXT_TYPE_psk
856 * 2 bytes for extension length
857 * 2 bytes for identities list length
858 * 2 bytes for identity length
859 * 4 bytes for obfuscated_ticket_age
860 * 2 bytes for binder list length
861 * 1 byte for binder length
862 * The above excludes the number of bytes for the identity itself and the
863 * subsequent binder bytes
865 #define PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 4 + 2 + 1)
867 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
868 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
871 unsigned char *padbytes;
874 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) == 0)
875 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
878 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See RFC7685.
879 * This code calculates the length of all extensions added so far but
880 * excludes the PSK extension (because that MUST be written last). Therefore
881 * this extension MUST always appear second to last.
883 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
884 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING,
885 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
886 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
890 * If we're going to send a PSK then that will be written out after this
891 * extension, so we need to calculate how long it is going to be.
893 if (s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION
894 && s->session->ext.ticklen != 0
895 && s->session->cipher != NULL) {
896 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
900 * Add the fixed PSK overhead, the identity length and the binder
903 hlen += PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD + s->session->ext.ticklen
908 if (hlen > F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN && hlen < F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN) {
909 /* Calculate the amount of padding we need to add */
910 hlen = F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN - hlen;
913 * Take off the size of extension header itself (2 bytes for type and
914 * 2 bytes for length bytes), but ensure that the extension is at least
915 * 1 byte long so as not to have an empty extension last (WebSphere 7.x,
916 * 8.x are intolerant of that condition)
923 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
924 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
925 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING,
926 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
927 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
929 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
932 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
936 * Construct the pre_shared_key extension
938 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
939 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
941 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
942 uint32_t now, agesec, agems = 0;
943 size_t reshashsize = 0, pskhashsize = 0, binderoffset, msglen;
944 unsigned char *resbinder = NULL, *pskbinder = NULL, *msgstart = NULL;
945 const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL, *mdres = NULL, *mdpsk = NULL;
948 s->session->ext.tick_identity = TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY;
951 * Note: At this stage of the code we only support adding a single
952 * resumption PSK. If we add support for multiple PSKs then the length
953 * calculations in the padding extension will need to be adjusted.
957 * If this is an incompatible or new session then we have nothing to resume
958 * so don't add this extension.
960 if (s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION
961 || (s->session->ext.ticklen == 0 && s->psksession == NULL))
962 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
964 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
965 handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s);
967 if (s->session->ext.ticklen != 0) {
968 /* Get the digest associated with the ciphersuite in the session */
969 if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
970 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
971 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
972 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
974 mdres = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
977 * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
983 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdres != handmd) {
985 * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the session
986 * so we can't use it.
992 * Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says
993 * nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most
994 * implementations follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in
995 * seconds since epoch. We've already made the assumption that we can do
996 * this in multiple places in the code, so portability shouldn't be an
999 now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
1000 agesec = now - (uint32_t)s->session->time;
1002 * We calculate the age in seconds but the server may work in ms. Due to
1003 * rounding errors we could overestimate the age by up to 1s. It is
1004 * better to underestimate it. Otherwise, if the RTT is very short, when
1005 * the server calculates the age reported by the client it could be
1006 * bigger than the age calculated on the server - which should never
1012 if (s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint < agesec) {
1013 /* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */
1018 * Calculate age in ms. We're just doing it to nearest second. Should be
1021 agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
1023 if (agesec != 0 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 != agesec) {
1025 * Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session.
1026 * If so we just ignore it.
1032 * Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed
1035 agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add;
1037 reshashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdres);
1042 if (!dores && s->psksession == NULL)
1043 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1045 if (s->psksession != NULL) {
1046 mdpsk = ssl_md(s->psksession->cipher->algorithm2);
1047 if (mdpsk == NULL) {
1049 * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
1050 * If this happens it's an application bug.
1052 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1054 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1057 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdpsk != handmd) {
1059 * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the PSK
1060 * session. This is an application bug.
1062 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1064 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1067 pskhashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdpsk);
1070 /* Create the extension, but skip over the binder for now */
1071 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
1072 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1073 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1074 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1075 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1076 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1080 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick,
1081 s->session->ext.ticklen)
1082 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, agems)) {
1083 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1084 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1085 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1089 if (s->psksession != NULL) {
1090 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->psksession_id,
1091 s->psksession_id_len)
1092 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)) {
1093 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1094 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1095 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1099 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1100 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &binderoffset)
1101 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1103 && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, reshashsize, &resbinder))
1104 || (s->psksession != NULL
1105 && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, pskhashsize, &pskbinder))
1106 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1107 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1108 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &msglen)
1110 * We need to fill in all the sub-packet lengths now so we can
1111 * calculate the HMAC of the message up to the binders
1113 || !WPACKET_fill_lengths(pkt)) {
1114 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK,
1115 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1116 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1119 msgstart = WPACKET_get_curr(pkt) - msglen;
1122 && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdres, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL,
1123 resbinder, s->session, 1, 0) != 1) {
1124 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1125 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1128 if (s->psksession != NULL
1129 && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdpsk, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL,
1130 pskbinder, s->psksession, 1, 1) != 1) {
1131 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1132 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1136 s->session->ext.tick_identity = 0;
1137 if (s->psksession != NULL)
1138 s->psksession->ext.tick_identity = (dores ? 1 : 0);
1140 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1142 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1146 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1147 unsigned int context,
1148 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1150 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1151 if (!s->pha_forced) {
1154 /* check for cert, if present, we can do post-handshake auth */
1155 if (s->cert == NULL)
1156 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1158 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1159 if (s->cert->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL
1160 && s->cert->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
1164 /* no identity certificates, so no extension */
1166 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1169 /* construct extension - 0 length, no contents */
1170 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_post_handshake_auth)
1171 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1172 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1173 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1174 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH,
1175 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1176 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1179 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT;
1181 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1183 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1189 * Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
1191 int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1192 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1194 size_t expected_len = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len
1195 + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len;
1197 const unsigned char *data;
1199 /* Check for logic errors */
1200 if (!ossl_assert(expected_len == 0
1201 || s->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0)
1202 || !ossl_assert(expected_len == 0
1203 || s->s3->previous_server_finished_len != 0)) {
1204 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1205 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1209 /* Parse the length byte */
1210 if (!PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &ilen)) {
1211 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1212 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
1216 /* Consistency check */
1217 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ilen) {
1218 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1219 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
1223 /* Check that the extension matches */
1224 if (ilen != expected_len) {
1225 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1226 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
1230 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1231 || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1232 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) != 0) {
1233 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1234 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
1238 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_server_finished_len)
1239 || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
1240 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) != 0) {
1241 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1242 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
1245 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
1250 /* Parse the server's max fragment len extension packet */
1251 int tls_parse_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1252 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1256 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) {
1257 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
1258 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1262 /* |value| should contains a valid max-fragment-length code. */
1263 if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) {
1264 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1265 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
1266 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
1270 /* Must be the same value as client-configured one who was sent to server */
1272 * RFC 6066: if a client receives a maximum fragment length negotiation
1273 * response that differs from the length it requested, ...
1274 * It must abort with SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER alert
1276 if (value != s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) {
1277 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1278 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
1279 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
1284 * Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation succeeded.
1285 * The negotiated Maximum Fragment Length is binding now.
1287 s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value;
1292 int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1293 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1295 if (s->ext.hostname == NULL) {
1296 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1297 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1301 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
1302 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1303 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1308 if (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL) {
1309 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1310 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1313 s->session->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->ext.hostname);
1314 if (s->session->ext.hostname == NULL) {
1315 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1316 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1324 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1325 int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1326 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1328 size_t ecpointformats_len;
1329 PACKET ecptformatlist;
1331 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ecptformatlist)) {
1332 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS,
1333 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1337 ecpointformats_len = PACKET_remaining(&ecptformatlist);
1338 if (ecpointformats_len == 0) {
1339 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1340 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1344 s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len = 0;
1345 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.ecpointformats);
1346 s->session->ext.ecpointformats = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len);
1347 if (s->session->ext.ecpointformats == NULL) {
1348 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1349 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1353 s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len = ecpointformats_len;
1355 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ecptformatlist,
1356 s->session->ext.ecpointformats,
1357 ecpointformats_len)) {
1358 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1359 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1368 int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1369 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1371 if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb != NULL &&
1372 !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
1373 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
1374 s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
1375 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1376 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1380 if (!tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1381 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION,
1382 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1385 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
1386 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1387 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1391 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1396 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1397 int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1398 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1401 * MUST only be sent if we've requested a status
1402 * request message. In TLS <= 1.2 it must also be empty.
1404 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1405 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION,
1406 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1409 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
1410 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1411 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1415 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1416 /* We only know how to handle this if it's for the first Certificate in
1417 * the chain. We ignore any other responses.
1422 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1423 return tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt);
1426 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1427 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
1434 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1435 int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1439 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
1440 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
1441 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
1443 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1444 size_t size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1446 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
1447 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.scts);
1450 s->ext.scts_len = (uint16_t)size;
1452 s->ext.scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
1453 if (s->ext.scts == NULL
1454 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.scts, size)) {
1455 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT,
1456 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1461 ENDPOINT role = (context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0
1462 ? ENDPOINT_CLIENT : ENDPOINT_BOTH;
1465 * If we didn't ask for it then there must be a custom extension,
1466 * otherwise this is unsolicited.
1468 if (custom_ext_find(&s->cert->custext, role,
1469 TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
1471 SSLfatal(s, TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT,
1472 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1476 if (!custom_ext_parse(s, context,
1477 TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
1478 PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt),
1480 /* SSLfatal already called */
1490 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1492 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1493 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
1494 * fill the length of the block. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
1496 static int ssl_next_proto_validate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1498 PACKET tmp_protocol;
1500 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
1501 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
1502 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0) {
1503 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_NEXT_PROTO_VALIDATE,
1504 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1512 int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1515 unsigned char *selected;
1516 unsigned char selected_len;
1519 /* Check if we are in a renegotiation. If so ignore this extension */
1520 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
1523 /* We must have requested it. */
1524 if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL) {
1525 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN,
1526 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1530 /* The data must be valid */
1532 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(s, &tmppkt)) {
1533 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1536 if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1538 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
1539 s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) !=
1540 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1541 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN,
1542 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1547 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
1548 * a single Serverhello
1550 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.npn);
1551 s->ext.npn = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1552 if (s->ext.npn == NULL) {
1553 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN,
1554 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1558 memcpy(s->ext.npn, selected, selected_len);
1559 s->ext.npn_len = selected_len;
1560 s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
1566 int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1571 /* We must have requested it. */
1572 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
1573 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1574 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1578 * The extension data consists of:
1579 * uint16 list_length
1580 * uint8 proto_length;
1581 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
1583 if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(pkt, &len)
1584 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &len)
1585 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len) {
1586 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1587 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1590 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1591 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
1592 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1593 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1594 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1597 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
1598 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1599 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1602 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
1604 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
1605 || s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len != len
1606 || memcmp(s->session->ext.alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)
1608 /* ALPN not consistent with the old session so cannot use early_data */
1609 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
1612 /* If a new session then update it with the selected ALPN */
1613 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
1614 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
1615 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
1616 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
1617 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1620 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1626 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1627 int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1630 unsigned int id, ct, mki;
1632 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt;
1633 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1635 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || ct != 2
1636 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &id)
1637 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki)
1638 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1639 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1640 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
1645 /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */
1646 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1647 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
1651 /* Throw an error if the server gave us an unsolicited extension */
1652 clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
1654 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1655 SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES);
1660 * Check to see if the server gave us something we support (and
1661 * presumably offered)
1663 for (i = 0; i < sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); i++) {
1664 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1666 if (prof->id == id) {
1667 s->srtp_profile = prof;
1672 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1673 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
1678 int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1681 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
1682 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1683 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
1684 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
1690 int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1693 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
1695 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
1700 int tls_parse_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1701 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1703 unsigned int version;
1705 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)
1706 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1707 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1708 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
1709 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1713 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1714 if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
1715 version = TLS1_3_VERSION;
1717 /* We ignore this extension for HRRs except to sanity check it */
1718 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
1720 * The only protocol version we support which has an HRR message is
1721 * TLSv1.3, therefore we shouldn't be getting an HRR for anything else.
1723 if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1724 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1725 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
1726 SSL_R_BAD_HRR_VERSION);
1732 /* We just set it here. We validate it in ssl_choose_client_version */
1733 s->version = version;
1738 int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1742 unsigned int group_id;
1744 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
1747 if (ckey == NULL || s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
1748 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1749 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1753 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &group_id)) {
1754 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1755 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1759 if ((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0) {
1760 const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
1761 size_t i, num_groups;
1763 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1764 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1765 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1770 * It is an error if the HelloRetryRequest wants a key_share that we
1771 * already sent in the first ClientHello
1773 if (group_id == s->s3->group_id) {
1774 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1775 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1779 /* Validate the selected group is one we support */
1780 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
1781 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
1782 if (group_id == pgroups[i])
1786 || !tls_curve_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1787 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1788 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1792 s->s3->group_id = group_id;
1793 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
1794 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
1798 if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) {
1800 * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
1803 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1804 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1808 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &encoded_pt)
1809 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
1810 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1811 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1815 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
1817 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1818 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1821 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1822 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
1823 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1825 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1829 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) {
1830 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1831 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1834 s->s3->peer_tmp = skey;
1840 int tls_parse_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1845 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie)
1846 || !PACKET_memdup(&cookie, &s->ext.tls13_cookie,
1847 &s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)) {
1848 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_COOKIE,
1849 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1856 int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1857 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1859 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
1860 unsigned long max_early_data;
1862 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &max_early_data)
1863 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1864 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1865 SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA);
1869 s->session->ext.max_early_data = max_early_data;
1874 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1875 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1876 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1880 if (!s->ext.early_data_ok
1882 || s->session->ext.tick_identity != 0) {
1884 * If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume
1885 * using the first identity, or the SNI/ALPN is not consistent so the
1886 * server should not be accepting it.
1888 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1889 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1893 s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED;
1898 int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1902 unsigned int identity;
1904 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &identity) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1905 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK,
1906 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1910 if (s->session->ext.tick_identity == (int)identity) {
1912 SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
1913 s->psksession = NULL;
1917 if (s->psksession == NULL
1918 || s->psksession->ext.tick_identity != (int)identity) {
1919 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK,
1920 SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY);
1925 * If we used the external PSK for sending early_data then s->early_secret
1926 * is already set up, so don't overwrite it. Otherwise we copy the
1927 * early_secret across that we generated earlier.
1929 if ((s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
1930 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
1931 || s->session->ext.max_early_data > 0
1932 || s->psksession->ext.max_early_data == 0)
1933 memcpy(s->early_secret, s->psksession->early_secret, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
1935 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
1936 s->session = s->psksession;
1937 s->psksession = NULL;