1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 #include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
179 return(SSLv3_server_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
186 ssl_undefined_function,
187 ssl3_get_server_method)
190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
191 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
193 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
195 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
197 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
198 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
200 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
202 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
203 we do so if There is no srp login name */
205 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
209 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
216 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
219 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
220 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
222 int new_state,state,skip=0;
224 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
228 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
230 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
231 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
233 /* init things to blank */
235 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
244 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
245 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
246 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
248 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
250 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
261 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
263 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
267 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
268 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
271 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
273 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
278 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
280 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
282 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
287 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
295 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
302 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
303 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
305 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
307 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
308 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
310 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
312 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
313 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
314 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
316 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
317 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
319 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
320 * client that doesn't support secure
323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
324 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
330 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
331 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
332 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
333 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
337 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
338 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
341 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
342 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
343 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
344 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
347 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
350 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
354 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
355 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
356 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
359 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
360 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
362 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
363 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
366 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
368 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
369 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
372 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
374 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
375 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
376 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
377 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
379 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
387 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
391 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
392 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
393 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
394 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
398 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
399 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
401 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
405 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
408 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
412 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
413 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
414 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
415 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
416 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5|SSL_aSRP))
417 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
419 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
420 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
421 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
422 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
423 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
425 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
430 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
437 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
442 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
443 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
444 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
446 /* clear this, it may get reset by
447 * send_server_key_exchange */
448 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
449 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
450 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
451 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
453 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
454 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
455 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
456 * be able to handle this) */
457 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
459 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
462 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
463 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
465 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
467 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
468 * message only if the cipher suite is either
469 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
470 * server certificate contains the server's
471 * public key for key exchange.
473 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
474 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
475 * hint if provided */
476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
477 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
479 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
480 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
481 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
483 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
484 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
485 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
486 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
487 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
488 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
494 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
495 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
500 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
504 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
505 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
506 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
507 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
508 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
509 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
510 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
511 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
512 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
513 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
514 * and in RFC 2246): */
515 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
516 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
517 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
518 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
519 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
520 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
521 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
522 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
523 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
524 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
525 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
527 /* no cert request */
529 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
530 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
531 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
532 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
537 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
538 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
539 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
540 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
541 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
543 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
544 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
550 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
551 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
552 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
553 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
554 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
555 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
559 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
561 /* This code originally checked to see if
562 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
563 * and then flushed. This caused problems
564 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
565 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
566 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
567 * still exist. So instead we just flush
571 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
572 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
577 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
579 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
582 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
583 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
584 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
585 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
589 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
591 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
593 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
594 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
597 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
601 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
602 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
603 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
608 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
609 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
610 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
611 * message is not sent.
612 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
613 * the client uses its key from the certificate
616 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
617 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
619 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
620 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
622 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
626 else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
628 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
630 if (!s->session->peer)
632 /* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
633 * at this point and digest cached records.
635 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
637 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
640 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
641 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
649 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
652 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
653 * a client cert, it can be verified
654 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
655 * should be generalized. But it is next step
657 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
658 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
660 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
661 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
665 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
666 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
677 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
678 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
680 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
681 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
682 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
683 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
685 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
686 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
688 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
689 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
691 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
696 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
697 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
698 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
699 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
700 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
702 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
706 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
707 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
708 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
709 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
710 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
711 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
714 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
715 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
716 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
719 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
723 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
724 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
725 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
726 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
727 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
728 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
732 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
733 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
734 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
735 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
736 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
742 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
743 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
745 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
746 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
747 { ret= -1; goto end; }
749 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
750 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
752 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
753 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
756 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
757 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
765 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
766 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
767 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
768 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
769 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
770 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
771 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
772 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
775 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
776 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
778 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
780 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
781 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
784 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
788 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
793 /* clean a few things up */
794 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
796 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
799 /* remove buffering on output */
800 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
804 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
809 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
811 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
813 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
815 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
829 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
833 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
838 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
842 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
849 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
853 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
857 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
860 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
862 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
863 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
866 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
867 return ssl_do_write(s);
870 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
875 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
876 * so permit appropriate message length */
877 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
883 if (!ok) return((int)n);
884 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
885 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
887 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
889 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
891 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
894 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
895 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
896 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
897 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
899 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
900 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
904 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
906 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
907 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
910 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
916 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
918 int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
919 unsigned int cookie_len;
924 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
928 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
930 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
933 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
934 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
935 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
936 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
939 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
942 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
945 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
946 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
947 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
948 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
949 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
952 if (!ok) return((int)n);
954 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
956 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
957 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
958 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
961 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
962 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
963 : (s->client_version < s->version))
965 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
966 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
967 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
969 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
970 s->version = s->client_version;
972 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
976 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
977 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
978 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
980 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
982 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
984 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
985 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
987 if (cookie_length == 0)
991 /* load the client random */
992 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
995 /* get the session-id */
999 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1000 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1001 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1002 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1003 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1005 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1006 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1007 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1008 * setting will be ignored.
1010 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1012 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1017 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1019 { /* previous session */
1026 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1036 cookie_len = *(p++);
1039 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1040 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1041 * does not cause an overflow.
1043 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1046 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1051 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1052 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1055 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1057 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1059 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1062 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1064 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1067 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1069 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1070 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1072 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1074 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1077 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1082 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
1084 /* Select version to use */
1085 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1086 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
1088 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1089 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1091 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1094 s->version = s->client_version;
1095 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1098 else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1099 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
1101 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1102 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1107 s->version = s->client_version;
1108 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1111 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1116 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1118 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1119 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1120 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1125 /* not enough data */
1126 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1127 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1130 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1137 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1138 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1141 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1144 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1146 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1148 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1150 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1151 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1159 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1160 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1163 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1165 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1166 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1167 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1168 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1169 * enabled, though. */
1170 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1171 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1173 s->session->cipher = c;
1180 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1181 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1182 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1192 /* not enough data */
1193 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1197 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1202 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1209 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1214 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1216 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1218 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
1220 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1225 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1226 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1227 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1228 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1231 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1232 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1238 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1240 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1242 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1243 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1244 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1247 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1248 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1252 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1253 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1254 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1256 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1261 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1264 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1266 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1267 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1269 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1270 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1275 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1276 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1277 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1278 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1279 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1280 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1281 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1283 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1284 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1285 /* Can't disable compression */
1286 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1291 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1292 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1294 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1295 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1297 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1301 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1303 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1306 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1307 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1309 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1314 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1321 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1322 { /* See if we have a match */
1323 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1325 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1326 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1328 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1341 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1346 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1347 * using compression.
1349 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1356 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1361 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1362 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1364 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1366 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1367 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1368 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1369 if (ciphers == NULL)
1371 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1376 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s))
1378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1381 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1383 if (s->cert->cert_cb)
1385 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1388 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1394 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1397 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1399 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1400 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1404 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1405 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1408 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1412 /* Session-id reuse */
1413 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1414 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1415 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1416 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1418 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1420 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1421 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1423 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1424 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1426 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1430 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1431 else if (ec != NULL)
1432 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1434 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1438 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1441 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1443 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1447 /* we now have the following setup.
1449 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1450 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1451 * compression - basically ignored right now
1452 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1453 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1454 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1455 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1458 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1459 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1461 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1468 if (ret < 0) ret=-ret;
1472 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1475 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1476 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1479 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1482 unsigned char *p,*d;
1487 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1489 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1490 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1491 p=s->s3->server_random;
1492 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1495 /* Do the message type and length last */
1496 d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
1498 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1499 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1502 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1503 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1505 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1506 * back in the server hello:
1507 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1508 * we send back the old session ID.
1509 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1510 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1511 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1512 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1514 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1515 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1516 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1517 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1520 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1522 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1524 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1525 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1531 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1534 /* put the cipher */
1535 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1538 /* put the compression method */
1539 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1542 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1545 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1547 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1548 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1550 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1553 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &al)) == NULL)
1555 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1562 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1563 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1566 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1567 return ssl_do_write(s);
1570 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1573 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1575 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1576 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1579 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1580 return ssl_do_write(s);
1583 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1585 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1589 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1595 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1596 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1597 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1600 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1603 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1604 unsigned char *p,*d;
1614 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1615 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1617 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1622 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1624 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1625 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1628 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1630 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1631 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1632 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1635 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1644 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1645 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1650 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1654 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1655 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1658 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1659 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1660 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1661 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1664 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1665 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1669 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1671 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1675 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1677 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1682 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1683 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1684 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1686 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1695 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1696 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1697 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1698 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1710 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1711 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1713 const EC_GROUP *group;
1715 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1716 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1718 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1719 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1720 if (nid != NID_undef)
1721 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1723 else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
1725 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1726 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1727 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1731 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1736 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1738 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1742 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1748 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1750 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1752 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1756 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1757 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1758 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1759 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1761 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1768 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1769 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1770 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1776 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1777 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1783 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1784 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1785 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1788 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1791 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1795 /* Encode the public key.
1796 * First check the size of encoding and
1797 * allocate memory accordingly.
1799 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1800 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1801 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1804 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1805 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1806 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1807 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1809 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1814 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1815 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1816 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1817 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1819 if (encodedlen == 0)
1821 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1825 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1827 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1828 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1829 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1830 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1835 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1836 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1844 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1845 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1846 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1848 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1849 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1852 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1853 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1854 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1856 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1857 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1858 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1859 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1861 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1872 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1873 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1876 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1878 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1879 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1880 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1887 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
1888 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1890 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1893 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1896 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1904 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+kn))
1906 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1909 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1911 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1913 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1914 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1926 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1927 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1929 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1930 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1931 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1932 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1933 * the actual encoded point itself
1935 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1943 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1944 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1946 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1947 encodedPoint = NULL;
1952 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1953 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1955 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1956 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1957 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1958 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1965 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1966 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1967 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1968 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1972 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1974 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1975 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1976 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1977 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1978 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1979 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1980 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
1981 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1982 (unsigned int *)&i);
1986 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1987 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1989 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1999 /* send signature algorithm */
2000 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2002 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
2004 /* Should never happen */
2005 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2006 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2012 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
2015 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2016 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2017 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2018 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2019 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
2020 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
2022 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2027 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2032 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2033 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2034 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2039 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2042 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2043 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2044 return ssl_do_write(s);
2046 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2048 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2049 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2050 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2052 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2056 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2058 unsigned char *p,*d;
2060 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2064 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2068 d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s);
2070 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2072 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2077 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2079 const unsigned char *psigs;
2080 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2082 memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
2091 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2095 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2097 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2098 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2099 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+n+j+2))
2101 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2104 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2105 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2108 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2115 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2116 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2122 /* else no CA names */
2123 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2126 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2128 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2129 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
2131 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4))
2133 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2136 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2138 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2146 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2149 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2150 return ssl_do_write(s);
2155 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2159 unsigned long alg_k;
2161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2163 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2165 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2167 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2171 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2174 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2175 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2176 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2177 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2180 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2181 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2182 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2183 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2187 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2188 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2190 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2192 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2193 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2195 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2197 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2199 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2200 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2202 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2203 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2204 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2205 * be sent already */
2208 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2216 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2217 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2218 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2219 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2221 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2228 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2229 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2234 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2246 /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
2247 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
2248 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
2249 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
2250 * case that the decrypt fails. See
2251 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
2253 /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
2254 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2255 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2257 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2260 /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
2261 * decrypt_good will be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. */
2262 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2264 /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
2265 * then version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero.
2266 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2267 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2268 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
2269 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
2270 * decryption error. */
2271 version_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version>>8));
2272 version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version&0xff));
2274 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2275 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
2276 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
2277 * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
2278 * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
2279 * support the requested protocol version. If
2280 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2281 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)
2283 unsigned char workaround_good;
2284 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version>>8));
2285 workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version&0xff));
2286 version_good |= workaround_good;
2289 /* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good
2290 * to remain non-zero (0xff). */
2291 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2293 /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using
2294 * decrypt_good_mask. */
2295 for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++)
2297 p[i] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[i],
2298 rand_premaster_secret[i]);
2301 s->session->master_key_length=
2302 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2303 s->session->master_key,
2305 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2309 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2310 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2313 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2320 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2331 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2332 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2333 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2334 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2337 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2338 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2339 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
2340 (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
2342 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2346 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2348 else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2350 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2355 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2359 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2360 EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2363 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2364 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2366 if (dh_clnt == NULL)
2368 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2372 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2373 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2376 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2383 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2392 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2399 s->session->master_key_length=
2400 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2401 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2402 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2409 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2411 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2412 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2413 krb5_data authenticator;
2415 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2416 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2417 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2418 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2419 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2420 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2422 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2423 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2425 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2427 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2430 enc_ticket.length = i;
2432 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2435 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2439 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2440 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2443 authenticator.length = i;
2445 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2447 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2448 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2452 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2453 p+=authenticator.length;
2457 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2460 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2463 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2465 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2466 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2470 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2471 enc_pms.length + 6))
2473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2474 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2478 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2482 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2483 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2485 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2486 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2492 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2493 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2495 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2496 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2499 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2500 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2502 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2503 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2509 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2516 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2517 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2519 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2523 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2525 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2528 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2531 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2532 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2535 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2538 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2541 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2544 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2547 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2551 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2554 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2557 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2559 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2560 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2561 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2562 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2563 * the protocol version.
2564 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2565 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2567 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2570 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2575 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2577 s->session->master_key_length=
2578 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2579 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2581 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2583 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2584 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2586 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2587 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2592 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2593 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2594 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2595 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2599 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2601 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2602 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2607 const EC_GROUP *group;
2608 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2610 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2611 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2613 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2614 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2618 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2619 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2621 /* use the certificate */
2622 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2626 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2627 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2629 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2632 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2633 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2635 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2636 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2643 /* Let's get client's public key */
2644 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2646 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2647 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2653 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2655 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2657 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2661 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2663 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2665 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2666 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2667 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2668 * never executed. When that support is
2669 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2670 * received in the certificate is
2671 * authorized for key agreement.
2672 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2673 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2676 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2677 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2678 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2682 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2683 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2685 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2689 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2693 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2694 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2696 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2698 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2699 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2703 /* Get encoded point length */
2708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2712 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2713 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2719 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2720 * currently, so set it to the start
2722 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2725 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2726 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2727 if (field_size <= 0)
2729 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2733 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2741 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2742 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2743 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2744 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2745 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2746 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2748 /* Compute the master secret */
2749 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2750 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2752 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2757 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2758 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2760 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2761 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2762 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2764 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2766 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2772 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2775 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2777 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2778 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2781 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2784 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2788 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2789 * string for the callback */
2790 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2791 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2792 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2793 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2794 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2796 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2798 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2799 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2802 else if (psk_len == 0)
2804 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2805 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2806 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2807 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2811 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2812 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2814 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2816 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2820 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2821 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2822 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2823 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2825 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2826 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2830 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2831 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2832 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2833 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2834 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2836 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2837 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2841 s->session->master_key_length=
2842 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2843 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2846 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2852 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2853 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2861 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2862 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2865 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2870 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2871 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A))
2873 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2874 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2877 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2878 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2879 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2880 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2882 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2883 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2887 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2889 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2896 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2897 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2900 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2901 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2902 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2903 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2904 unsigned long alg_a;
2908 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2909 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2910 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2911 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2912 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2913 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2915 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2916 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2917 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2918 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2919 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2920 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2921 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2922 if (client_pub_pkey)
2924 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2927 /* Decrypt session key */
2928 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ||
2929 Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
2930 Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
2932 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2937 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2940 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2943 /* Generate master secret */
2944 s->session->master_key_length=
2945 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2946 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2947 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2948 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2953 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2954 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2962 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2963 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2964 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2970 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2971 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2974 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2975 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2976 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2977 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2978 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2979 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2984 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2986 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2992 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2994 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2996 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2997 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2998 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
3000 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
3003 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3005 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
3007 peer=s->session->peer;
3008 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
3009 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
3017 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
3019 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3020 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3022 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3023 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
3032 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
3033 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3037 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3039 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3040 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3044 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3046 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3047 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3051 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3052 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3053 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3054 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3055 * signature without length field */
3056 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3057 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3063 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3065 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3068 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3073 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3077 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3086 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3087 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3091 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3092 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3095 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3099 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3103 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3107 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3111 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3114 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3115 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3117 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3118 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3122 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3124 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3130 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3131 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3133 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3134 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3138 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3139 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3144 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3151 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3152 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3154 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3155 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3156 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3160 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3161 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3168 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3170 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3171 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3172 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3176 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3178 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3184 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3185 { unsigned char signature[64];
3187 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3188 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3190 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3192 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3193 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3195 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3196 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3199 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3201 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3207 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3208 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3217 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3220 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3222 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3223 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3224 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3226 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3227 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3231 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3233 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3235 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3236 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3238 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3240 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3247 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3249 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3251 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3252 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3254 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3255 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3258 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3259 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3262 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3265 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3269 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3271 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3275 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3277 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3286 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3287 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3290 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3293 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3295 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3296 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3301 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3304 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3309 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3313 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3322 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3324 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3325 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3327 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3331 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3332 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3333 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3336 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3339 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3340 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3342 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3348 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3351 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3352 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3357 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3358 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3359 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3360 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3362 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3363 * when we arrive here. */
3364 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3366 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3367 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3373 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3374 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3375 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3376 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3377 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3385 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3388 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3389 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3393 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3397 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3399 cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3402 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3403 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3404 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3406 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3411 ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk);
3412 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3415 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3416 return ssl_do_write(s);
3419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3420 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3421 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3423 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3425 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3426 const unsigned char *const_p;
3427 int len, slen_full, slen;
3432 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3433 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3434 unsigned char key_name[16];
3436 /* get session encoding length */
3437 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3438 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3441 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3443 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3447 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3449 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3451 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3457 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3459 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3460 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3466 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3467 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3469 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3470 * follows handshake_header_length +
3471 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3472 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3473 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3474 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3476 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3477 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3478 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3480 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3481 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3482 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3483 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3484 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3487 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3489 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3498 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3499 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3500 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3501 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3502 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3503 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3506 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3507 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3508 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3509 * as their sessions. */
3510 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3512 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3514 /* Output key name */
3516 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3519 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3520 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3521 /* Encrypt session data */
3522 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3524 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3526 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3528 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3529 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3530 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3533 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3535 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3536 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3537 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3538 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3540 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3544 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3545 return ssl_do_write(s);
3548 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3550 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3553 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3554 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3555 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3558 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3561 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3564 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3565 /* message length */
3566 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3568 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3569 /* length of OCSP response */
3570 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3571 /* actual response */
3572 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3573 /* number of bytes to write */
3574 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3575 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3579 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3580 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3583 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3584 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3585 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3586 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3589 int proto_len, padding_len;
3591 const unsigned char *p;
3593 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3594 * extension in their ClientHello */
3595 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3601 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3602 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3603 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3605 514, /* See the payload format below */
3611 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3612 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3613 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3614 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3621 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3623 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3625 /* The payload looks like:
3627 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3628 * uint8 padding_len;
3629 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3632 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3634 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3635 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3638 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3639 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3644 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3645 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;