2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2003 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
125 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
126 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
129 #include "ssl_locl.h"
130 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
131 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
132 #include <openssl/rand.h>
133 #include <openssl/objects.h>
134 #include <openssl/evp.h>
135 #include <openssl/x509.h>
136 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
137 #include <openssl/md5.h>
138 #include "cryptlib.h"
140 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
141 static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s);
142 static int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s);
143 static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s);
144 static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s);
145 static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s);
146 static int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s);
147 static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s);
148 static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s);
149 static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s);
150 static int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s);
152 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
153 static int nid2curve_id(int nid);
156 static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
158 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
159 return(SSLv3_server_method());
164 SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void)
167 static SSL_METHOD SSLv3_server_data;
171 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_METHOD);
175 memcpy((char *)&SSLv3_server_data,(char *)sslv3_base_method(),
177 SSLv3_server_data.ssl_accept=ssl3_accept;
178 SSLv3_server_data.get_ssl_method=ssl3_get_server_method;
182 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_METHOD);
184 return(&SSLv3_server_data);
187 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
190 unsigned long l,Time=time(NULL);
191 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
194 int new_state,state,skip=0;
196 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
200 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
202 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
203 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
205 /* init things to blank */
207 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
221 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
223 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
227 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
228 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
231 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
233 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
238 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
240 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
242 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
247 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
255 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
263 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
265 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
266 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
268 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
271 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
272 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
276 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
277 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
278 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
279 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
283 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
284 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
287 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
288 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
289 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
290 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
293 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
296 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
300 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
301 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
302 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
305 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
306 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
308 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
312 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
313 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
314 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
315 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
318 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
320 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
324 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
325 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
326 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH */
327 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
329 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
330 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
334 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
338 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
339 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
340 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
342 /* clear this, it may get reset by
343 * send_server_key_exchange */
344 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
345 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
347 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
349 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
350 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
351 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
352 * be able to handle this) */
353 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
355 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
358 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
359 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
361 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
362 * message only if the cipher suite is either
363 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
364 * server certificate contains the server's
365 * public key for key exchange.
367 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
369 || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
371 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
372 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
373 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
379 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
380 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
385 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
389 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
390 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
391 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
392 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
393 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
394 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
395 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
396 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
397 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
398 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
399 * and in RFC 2246): */
400 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
401 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
402 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
403 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
404 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
405 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
407 /* no cert request */
409 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
410 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
414 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
415 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
416 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
417 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
418 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
420 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
421 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
427 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
428 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
429 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
430 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
431 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
432 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
436 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
437 /* number of bytes to be flushed */
438 num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
441 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
442 num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
443 if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
444 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
447 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
450 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
451 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
452 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
453 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
457 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
459 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
461 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
462 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
465 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
469 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
470 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
471 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
476 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
477 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
478 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
479 * message is not sent.
481 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
486 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
489 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
490 * a client cert, it can be verified
492 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
493 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
494 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
495 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
496 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
497 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
501 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
502 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
504 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
505 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
506 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
508 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
512 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
513 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
514 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
515 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
516 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
520 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
524 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
525 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
527 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
528 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
529 { ret= -1; goto end; }
531 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
532 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
534 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
535 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
538 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
539 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
547 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
548 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
549 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
550 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
551 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
552 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
553 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
554 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
556 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
558 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
563 /* clean a few things up */
564 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
566 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
569 /* remove buffering on output */
570 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
574 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
576 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
577 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
581 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
583 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
585 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
587 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
601 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
605 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
610 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
614 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
621 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
625 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
629 static int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
633 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
635 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
636 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
641 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
642 /* number of bytes to write */
647 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
648 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
651 static int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
656 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
657 * so permit appropriate message length */
658 n=ssl3_get_message(s,
664 if (!ok) return((int)n);
665 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
666 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
668 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
669 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
670 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
671 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
672 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
673 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
675 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
676 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
684 static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
686 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
689 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
692 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
694 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
695 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
696 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
697 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
700 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
703 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
705 n=ssl3_get_message(s,
706 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
707 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
708 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
709 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
712 if (!ok) return((int)n);
713 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
715 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
716 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
717 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
720 if (s->client_version < s->version)
722 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
723 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
725 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
726 s->version = s->client_version;
728 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
732 /* load the client random */
733 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
736 /* get the session-id */
740 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
741 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
742 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
743 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
744 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
745 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
746 * an earlier library version)
748 if (j == 0 || (s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
750 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
755 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s,p,j);
757 { /* previous session */
764 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
771 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
773 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
774 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
775 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
780 /* not enough data */
781 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
782 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
785 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
792 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
793 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
796 id=s->session->cipher->id;
799 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
801 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
803 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
805 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
806 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
816 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
818 /* Very bad for multi-threading.... */
819 s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,
824 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
825 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
826 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
827 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
837 /* not enough data */
838 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
839 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
845 if (p[j] == 0) break;
852 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
853 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
857 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
858 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
859 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
860 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
861 if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL)
862 { /* See if we have a match */
865 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
868 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
881 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
886 /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
887 #if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test
888 * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b,
889 * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */
890 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
894 /* wrong number of bytes,
895 * there could be more to follow */
896 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
897 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
903 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
908 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
909 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
910 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
911 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
914 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
915 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
919 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
924 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
925 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
928 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
932 /* Session-id reuse */
933 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
934 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
938 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
940 sk=s->session->ciphers;
941 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
943 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
944 if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL)
946 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
950 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
952 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
954 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
958 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
961 /* we now have the following setup.
963 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
964 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
965 * compression - basically ignored right now
966 * ssl version is set - sslv3
967 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
968 * s->hit - session reuse flag
969 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
976 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
979 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
983 static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
988 unsigned long l,Time;
990 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
992 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
993 p=s->s3->server_random;
994 Time=time(NULL); /* Time */
996 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-sizeof(Time));
997 /* Do the message type and length last */
1000 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1001 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1004 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1005 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1007 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1008 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1009 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1010 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1011 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1012 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1013 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1015 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))
1016 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1018 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1019 if (sl > sizeof s->session->session_id)
1021 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1025 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1028 /* put the cipher */
1029 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1032 /* put the compression method */
1033 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1036 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1041 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1044 s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
1045 /* number of bytes to write */
1050 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1051 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1054 static int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1058 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1060 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1063 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1068 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1069 /* number of bytes to write */
1074 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1075 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1078 static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1080 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1084 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1087 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1091 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1092 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1095 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1098 unsigned char *p,*d;
1108 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1109 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1111 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;
1116 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1119 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1122 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1124 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1125 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1126 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1129 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1130 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1138 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1139 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1144 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1148 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1149 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1152 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1153 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1154 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1155 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1158 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1159 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1163 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1170 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1172 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1177 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1178 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1179 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1181 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1190 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1191 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1192 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1193 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1205 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1206 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1208 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1209 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1211 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1212 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1213 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1217 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1222 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1224 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1225 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1229 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1235 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1242 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1243 if ((ecdh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1244 (ecdh->priv_key == NULL) ||
1245 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1247 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1254 if ((ecdh->group == NULL) ||
1255 (ecdh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1256 (ecdh->priv_key == NULL))
1258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1262 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1263 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(ecdh->group) > 163))
1265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1269 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1270 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1271 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1274 nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_nid(ecdh->group)))
1277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1281 /* Encode the public key.
1282 * First check the size of encoding and
1283 * allocate memory accordingly.
1285 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(ecdh->group,
1287 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1290 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1291 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1292 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1293 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1300 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(ecdh->group,
1302 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1303 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1305 if (encodedlen == 0)
1307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1311 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1313 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1314 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1315 * In this situation, we need three additional bytes
1316 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1321 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1322 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1329 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1331 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1335 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1337 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1341 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
1343 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1346 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1349 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1357 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1362 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1365 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1373 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1375 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1376 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1377 * [1 byte CurveType], [1 byte CurveName]
1378 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1379 * the actual encoded point itself
1381 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1387 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1388 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1390 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1398 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1399 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1401 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1405 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1407 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1408 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1409 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1410 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1411 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1412 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1413 (unsigned int *)&i);
1417 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1418 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1428 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1429 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1432 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1433 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1434 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1435 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1436 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1437 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1439 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1447 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1448 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1450 /* let's do ECDSA */
1451 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1452 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1453 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1454 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1455 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1456 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1467 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1468 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1474 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1477 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1483 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1484 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1485 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1487 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1490 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1491 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1493 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1497 static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1499 unsigned char *p,*d;
1501 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1505 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1509 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1511 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1513 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1522 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1526 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1528 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1529 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1530 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1535 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1536 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1539 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1546 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1547 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1553 /* else no CA names */
1554 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1557 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1558 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1561 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1566 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1567 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1570 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1579 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1580 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1586 static const int KDF1_SHA1_len = 20;
1587 static void *KDF1_SHA1(void *in, size_t inlen, void *out, size_t outlen)
1589 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
1590 if (outlen != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
1592 return SHA1(in, inlen, out);
1598 static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1604 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1606 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1608 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1612 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1614 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1616 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1617 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1618 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1619 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1620 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1623 n=ssl3_get_message(s,
1624 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1625 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1626 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1630 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1631 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1633 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
1635 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1638 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1639 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1641 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1642 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1643 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1644 * be sent already */
1647 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1655 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1656 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1657 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1658 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
1660 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1668 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
1673 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
1675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1685 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1689 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1691 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1692 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1695 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
1697 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1698 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1699 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1700 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1701 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1703 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1704 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
1705 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
1707 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1708 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1710 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1711 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1712 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1713 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1714 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1715 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1716 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1722 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1723 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1724 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1726 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
1727 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1728 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1729 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2); /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1732 s->session->master_key_length=
1733 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1734 s->session->master_key,
1736 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1740 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1741 if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
1746 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
1748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1758 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
1760 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
1766 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
1768 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1769 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1773 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
1776 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
1779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
1783 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
1787 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1791 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
1796 s->session->master_key_length=
1797 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1798 s->session->master_key,p,i);
1799 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1803 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1806 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
1807 krb5_data enc_ticket;
1808 krb5_data authenticator;
1810 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
1811 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
1812 EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
1813 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
1814 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
1815 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
1817 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
1818 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
1820 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
1822 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
1825 enc_ticket.length = i;
1826 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
1827 p+=enc_ticket.length;
1830 authenticator.length = i;
1831 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
1832 p+=authenticator.length;
1836 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
1839 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
1842 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
1844 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1845 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1849 if (n != enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
1852 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1853 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1857 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
1861 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
1862 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
1864 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
1865 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1866 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1871 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
1872 ** but will return authtime == 0.
1874 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
1875 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
1878 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
1879 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
1881 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
1882 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1883 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1888 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
1890 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
1895 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
1896 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1898 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
1902 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
1904 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
1906 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1907 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
1910 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
1911 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
1913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1914 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
1917 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1919 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1920 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1923 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
1925 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1926 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
1930 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1932 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1933 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1936 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
1938 s->session->master_key_length=
1939 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1940 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
1942 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
1944 int len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
1945 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
1947 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
1948 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
1953 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
1954 ** but it caused problems for apache.
1955 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
1956 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
1960 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1962 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1963 if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
1968 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
1969 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
1971 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1972 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1976 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
1979 /* use the certificate */
1980 srvr_ecdh->group = s->cert->key->privatekey-> \
1982 srvr_ecdh->priv_key = s->cert->key->privatekey-> \
1983 pkey.eckey->priv_key;
1987 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
1988 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
1990 srvr_ecdh->group = s->s3->tmp.ecdh->group;
1991 srvr_ecdh->priv_key = s->s3->tmp.ecdh->priv_key;
1994 /* Let's get client's public key */
1995 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(srvr_ecdh->group))
1998 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1999 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2005 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2009 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2010 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2013 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2015 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2017 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2018 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2019 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2020 * never executed. When that support is
2021 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2022 * received in the certificate is
2023 * authorized for key agreement.
2024 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2025 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2028 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2029 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2030 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2034 EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2035 clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.eckey->pub_key);
2036 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2040 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2041 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2043 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2046 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2050 /* Get encoded point length */
2053 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(srvr_ecdh->group,
2054 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2060 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2061 * currently, so set it to the start
2063 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2066 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2067 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_ecdh->group);
2068 if (field_size <= 0)
2070 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2074 /* If field size is not more than 24 octets, then use SHA-1 hash of result;
2075 * otherwise, use result (see section 4.8 of draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt;
2076 * this is new with this version of the Internet Draft).
2078 if (field_size <= 24 * 8)
2079 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, KDF1_SHA1_len, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, KDF1_SHA1);
2081 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2089 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2090 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2091 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2093 srvr_ecdh->priv_key = NULL;
2094 srvr_ecdh->group = NULL;
2095 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2097 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2099 /* Compute the master secret */
2100 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2101 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2103 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2109 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2111 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2117 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2118 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2122 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2123 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2124 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2126 srvr_ecdh->priv_key = NULL;
2127 srvr_ecdh->group = NULL;
2128 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2130 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2135 static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2137 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2144 n=ssl3_get_message(s,
2145 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2146 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2151 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2153 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2155 peer=s->session->peer;
2156 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2157 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2165 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2167 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2168 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2170 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2181 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2185 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2188 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2192 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2195 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2199 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2200 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2206 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2210 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2211 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2214 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2218 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2219 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2221 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2222 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2226 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2232 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2239 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2240 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2242 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2243 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2244 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2248 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2255 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2256 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2258 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2259 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2260 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.eckey);
2264 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2266 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2274 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2283 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2286 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2290 static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2292 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2294 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2295 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
2296 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2298 n=ssl3_get_message(s,
2305 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2307 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2309 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2310 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2313 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2316 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2317 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2320 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2323 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2327 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2329 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2333 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2335 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2344 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2348 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2351 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2353 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2354 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2359 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2367 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2368 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2371 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2380 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2382 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2383 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2385 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2389 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2390 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2391 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2393 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2394 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2400 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2403 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2404 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2409 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2410 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2411 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
2412 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2414 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2415 * when we arrive here. */
2416 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2418 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2419 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2425 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2426 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2427 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
2428 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2429 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2437 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2440 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
2441 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
2445 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2450 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
2452 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
2454 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2455 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
2456 & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
2457 != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
2459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2463 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
2464 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2469 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2470 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2474 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2475 /* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
2476 static int nid2curve_id(int nid)
2478 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
2479 * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
2481 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
2483 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
2485 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
2487 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
2489 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
2491 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
2493 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
2495 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
2497 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
2499 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
2501 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
2503 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
2505 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
2507 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
2509 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
2511 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
2513 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
2515 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
2517 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
2519 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
2521 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
2523 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
2525 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
2527 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
2529 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */