1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 # include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 # include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
179 return (SSLv3_server_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
186 ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method)
188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
189 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
191 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
193 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
195 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
196 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
197 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
199 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
203 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
205 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
212 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
215 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
216 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
218 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
220 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
224 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
225 cb = s->info_callback;
226 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
227 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
229 /* init things to blank */
231 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
234 if (s->cert == NULL) {
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
240 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
241 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
244 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
245 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
254 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
256 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
260 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
261 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
267 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
269 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
272 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
274 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
275 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
277 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
280 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
283 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
289 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
291 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
296 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
297 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
299 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
301 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
303 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
305 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
306 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
308 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
310 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
314 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
315 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
316 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
317 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
319 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
321 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
322 * support secure renegotiation.
324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
325 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
326 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
328 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
332 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
335 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
336 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
340 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
341 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
344 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
347 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
348 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
351 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
354 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
355 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
358 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
360 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
363 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
364 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
368 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
371 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
373 * callback indicates firther work to be done
375 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
378 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
379 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
381 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
382 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
384 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
387 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
394 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
398 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
399 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
400 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
403 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
405 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
406 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
408 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
412 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
415 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
419 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
420 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
421 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
422 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
425 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 |
427 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
428 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
432 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
433 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
435 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
438 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
444 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
449 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
450 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
451 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
454 * clear this, it may get reset by
455 * send_server_key_exchange
457 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
460 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
461 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
462 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
463 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
464 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
469 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
473 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
476 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
477 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
479 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kEDH))
480 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
481 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
482 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
483 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
484 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
485 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
486 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
491 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
497 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
501 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
503 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
504 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
506 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
507 * during re-negotiation:
509 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
510 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
512 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
513 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
516 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
518 * ... except when the application insists on
519 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
522 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
524 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
526 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
527 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
528 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
530 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
533 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
534 /* no cert request */
536 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
537 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
538 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
539 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
540 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
545 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
546 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
549 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
550 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
552 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
553 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
559 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
561 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
564 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
565 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
569 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
572 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
573 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
574 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
575 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
576 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
580 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
581 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
585 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
587 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
590 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
591 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
592 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
593 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
597 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
599 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
600 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
605 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
609 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
610 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
611 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
616 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
617 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
618 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
619 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
621 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
622 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
624 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
625 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
627 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
630 } else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
631 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
633 if (!s->session->peer)
636 * For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer at this point and
637 * digest cached records.
639 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
641 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
644 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
645 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
646 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
653 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
657 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
658 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
659 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
662 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
663 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
664 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
668 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
669 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
672 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
681 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
683 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
692 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
693 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
694 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
698 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
699 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
701 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
702 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
704 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
709 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
710 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
711 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
713 * Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
714 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the
715 * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be
717 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
718 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
719 * the client's Finished message is read.
721 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
722 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
724 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
728 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
732 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
733 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
735 * Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has
736 * already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
737 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
738 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
739 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
740 * the client's Finished message is read.
742 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
743 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
744 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
745 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
749 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
750 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
751 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
752 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
755 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
759 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
760 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
761 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
762 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
765 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
769 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
770 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
771 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
774 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
780 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
781 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
783 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
784 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
786 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
790 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
792 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
796 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
799 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
800 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
803 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
809 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
810 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
811 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
812 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
813 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
815 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
817 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
820 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
822 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
823 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
825 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
826 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
828 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
831 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
836 /* clean a few things up */
837 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
839 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
842 /* remove buffering on output */
843 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
847 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
852 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
854 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
856 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
859 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
874 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
876 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
880 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
881 new_state = s->state;
883 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
884 s->state = new_state;
890 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
894 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
898 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
902 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
903 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
904 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
909 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
910 /* number of bytes to write */
915 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
916 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
919 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
925 * this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
926 * so permit appropriate message length
928 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
931 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
934 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
935 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
937 * We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
940 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE) {
941 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO,
942 SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
946 * Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
947 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
949 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
950 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
951 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
952 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
955 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
956 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
957 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
958 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
961 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
967 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
969 int i, j, ok, al, ret = -1;
970 unsigned int cookie_len;
973 unsigned char *p, *d, *q;
975 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
976 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
978 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
981 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
982 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
983 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
984 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
986 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
987 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
990 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
991 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
992 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
993 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
994 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
999 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1002 * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
1003 * for session id length
1005 if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) {
1006 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1007 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1012 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
1013 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
1015 s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
1018 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
1019 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) {
1020 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1021 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
1022 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
1024 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
1027 s->version = s->client_version;
1029 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1034 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
1035 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
1038 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1039 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
1041 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1043 if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
1044 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1048 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
1050 if (cookie_length == 0)
1054 /* load the client random */
1055 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1056 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1058 /* get the session-id */
1061 if (p + j > d + n) {
1062 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1069 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1070 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1071 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1072 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1073 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
1074 * for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1075 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1076 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1077 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1078 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
1081 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1082 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1085 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1087 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1089 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1090 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1091 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1092 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1093 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1095 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous
1102 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1109 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
1111 if (p + 1 > d + n) {
1112 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1113 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1116 cookie_len = *(p++);
1118 if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
1119 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1120 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1125 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1126 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1127 * does not cause an overflow.
1129 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
1131 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1136 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1137 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
1138 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1140 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1141 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1143 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1145 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1148 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1150 /* default verification */
1151 else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1152 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1153 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1164 if (p + 2 > d + n) {
1165 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1172 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1177 /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
1178 if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
1179 /* not enough data */
1180 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1184 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) {
1189 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1192 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1195 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1196 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1198 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1199 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1201 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1202 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1210 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
1214 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1215 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
1217 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
1218 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
1219 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
1220 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
1221 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
1223 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1224 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
1225 s->session->cipher = c;
1232 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1235 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1237 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1244 if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
1245 /* not enough data */
1246 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1251 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
1259 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1263 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1264 /* TLS extensions */
1265 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1266 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d + n, &al)) {
1267 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1272 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
1273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1278 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1279 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1280 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1281 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1285 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1286 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1287 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1292 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1293 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1295 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1296 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1297 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1299 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1301 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1302 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1306 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1308 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1313 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1314 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1319 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1322 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1324 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1325 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1327 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1328 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1334 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1335 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1336 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1338 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1339 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1340 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1341 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1342 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1343 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1344 /* Can't disable compression */
1345 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
1346 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1348 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1351 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1352 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1353 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1354 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1355 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1359 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1360 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1362 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1365 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1366 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
1367 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1371 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1373 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1378 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1379 /* See if we have a match */
1380 int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
1382 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1383 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1384 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1386 for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
1396 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1402 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1403 * using compression.
1405 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1406 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1407 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1413 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1417 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1418 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1420 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1422 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1423 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1424 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1425 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1426 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1431 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1434 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1438 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1440 /* Session-id reuse */
1441 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1442 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1443 SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL;
1444 SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL;
1446 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) {
1447 sk = s->session->ciphers;
1448 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
1449 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
1450 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1452 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1456 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc;
1457 else if (ec != NULL)
1458 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec;
1460 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1463 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1466 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION
1467 || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1468 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
1469 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1475 * we now have the following setup.
1477 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1478 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1479 * compression - basically ignored right now
1480 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1481 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1482 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1483 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1486 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1487 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1488 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1489 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1498 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1500 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1503 if (ciphers != NULL)
1504 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1508 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1511 unsigned char *p, *d;
1515 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
1516 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1517 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1518 p = s->s3->server_random;
1519 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1520 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1524 /* Do the message type and length last */
1527 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1528 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1531 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1532 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1535 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1536 * back in the server hello:
1537 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1538 * we send back the old session ID.
1539 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1540 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1541 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1542 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1544 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1545 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1546 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1547 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1550 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1552 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1554 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1555 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1557 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1561 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1564 /* put the cipher */
1565 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1568 /* put the compression method */
1569 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1572 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1575 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1578 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1579 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1580 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1584 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p,
1585 buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) ==
1587 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1588 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1595 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1598 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1599 /* number of bytes to write */
1600 s->init_num = p - buf;
1604 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1605 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1608 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1612 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
1613 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1616 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1621 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1622 /* number of bytes to write */
1627 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1628 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1631 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1633 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1637 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1640 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1641 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1643 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1644 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
1645 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1648 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1651 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1652 unsigned char *p, *d;
1662 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1663 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
1664 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1669 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1671 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1672 if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
1673 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
1674 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1675 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1676 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1678 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1681 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1683 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1687 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
1690 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1691 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1692 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1697 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
1700 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1701 if (type & SSL_kEDH) {
1703 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1704 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1705 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1707 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1710 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1711 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1712 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1716 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1717 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1718 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1722 if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1723 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1728 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1729 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1730 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
1731 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1736 dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1737 dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1738 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
1739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1748 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1749 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
1750 const EC_GROUP *group;
1752 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
1753 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1754 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1755 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1757 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
1758 s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1760 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1761 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1762 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1763 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1767 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1768 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1769 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1773 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1774 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1775 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1778 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
1779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1783 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
1784 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1785 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1786 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
1787 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
1788 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1794 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1795 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1796 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
1797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1801 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1802 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1803 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1804 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1809 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1810 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1814 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1816 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1817 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1822 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1823 * allocate memory accordingly.
1825 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1826 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1827 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1830 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1831 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
1832 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1833 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
1834 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1835 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1839 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1840 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1841 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1842 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1844 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1845 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1849 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1853 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1854 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1855 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1861 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1862 * can set these to NULLs
1869 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1870 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1871 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1873 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1875 n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1877 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1878 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1879 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1880 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1881 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1882 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1883 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1884 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1887 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1888 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1889 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1890 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1894 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1895 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1896 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1899 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1900 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1902 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1909 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1910 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
1911 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1913 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1916 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1922 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + 4 + kn)) {
1923 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1926 d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1929 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1930 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1931 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1941 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1942 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
1944 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1945 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1946 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1947 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1949 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1957 memcpy((unsigned char *)p,
1958 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1959 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1960 encodedPoint = NULL;
1965 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1966 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1967 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1968 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1969 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
1970 strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1971 p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1978 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1979 * points to the space at the end.
1981 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1982 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
1983 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1986 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1987 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1988 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1989 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,
1990 (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5
1993 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1994 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1995 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1996 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1997 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n) <= 0
1998 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q,
1999 (unsigned int *)&i) <= 0) {
2000 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2002 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2008 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
2009 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
2010 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
2019 * For TLS1.2 and later send signature algorithm
2021 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
2022 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
2023 /* Should never happen */
2024 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2026 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2032 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2034 if (EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
2035 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2036 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2037 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2038 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2039 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n) <= 0
2040 || EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
2041 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) {
2042 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
2043 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2048 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2051 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2052 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2053 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2054 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2059 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
2063 * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off
2065 s->init_num = n + 4;
2069 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2070 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2071 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2073 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2075 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2076 if (encodedPoint != NULL)
2077 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2078 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2080 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2081 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2085 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2087 unsigned char *p, *d;
2088 int i, j, nl, off, n;
2089 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2093 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
2096 d = p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
2098 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2100 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
2105 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
2106 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
2116 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2119 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2120 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2121 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2122 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, 4 + n + j + 2)) {
2123 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2127 p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4 + n]);
2128 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) {
2130 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2135 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2144 /* else no CA names */
2145 p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4 + off]);
2148 d = (unsigned char *)buf->data;
2149 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
2153 * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off
2156 s->init_num = n + 4;
2158 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2159 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) {
2160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2163 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2166 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2173 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2176 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2177 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2179 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2183 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2187 unsigned long alg_k;
2189 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2191 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2193 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2197 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2199 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2201 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2202 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2203 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2204 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2205 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2208 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2209 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2210 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2211 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
2215 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2217 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2220 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2221 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2223 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2226 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2227 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
2228 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2229 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2231 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2234 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2236 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2241 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2242 if ((pkey == NULL) ||
2243 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2244 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2246 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2249 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2252 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2253 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2256 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
2257 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2259 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2268 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2269 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2270 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2271 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2272 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2274 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2275 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2277 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2282 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2283 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2284 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2285 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2286 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2290 * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
2292 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2293 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2296 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2300 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2301 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2304 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2307 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2308 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2309 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2310 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2311 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2312 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2315 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2317 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2320 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2321 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2322 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2323 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2324 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2325 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2328 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2329 unsigned char workaround_good;
2331 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2333 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2334 version_good |= workaround_good;
2338 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2339 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2341 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2344 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2345 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2346 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2347 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2349 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2350 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
2351 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2354 s->session->master_key_length =
2355 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2357 session->master_key,
2360 (rand_premaster_secret));
2361 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2364 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2365 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2368 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
2369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2370 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2378 if (n == 0L) { /* the parameters are in the cert */
2379 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2381 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2384 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
2385 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2387 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2390 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
2393 pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
2395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2399 i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
2402 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2407 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2408 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
2412 s->session->master_key_length =
2413 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2415 session->master_key,
2417 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2421 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
2422 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2423 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2424 krb5_data authenticator;
2426 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2427 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2428 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2429 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2430 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2432 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2433 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2436 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2439 kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2442 enc_ticket.length = i;
2444 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) {
2445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2446 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2450 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2451 p += enc_ticket.length;
2454 authenticator.length = i;
2456 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) {
2457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2458 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2462 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2463 p += authenticator.length;
2467 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2468 p += enc_pms.length;
2471 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
2473 if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) {
2474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2475 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2479 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2480 enc_pms.length + 6)) {
2481 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2482 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2486 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2489 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2490 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2492 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2493 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2494 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2499 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
2500 * return authtime == 0.
2502 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2503 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) {
2505 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2506 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2508 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2509 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2514 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) {
2515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2519 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2520 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2522 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2526 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2528 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) {
2529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2530 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2533 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl,
2534 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2537 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2541 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2542 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2543 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2547 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
2548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2549 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2554 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2556 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2560 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8))
2561 && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
2563 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2564 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
2565 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
2566 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
2567 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If
2568 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2569 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
2572 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
2573 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2574 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2580 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2582 s->session->master_key_length =
2583 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2585 session->master_key,
2588 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) {
2589 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2590 if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) {
2591 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2592 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ,
2597 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2598 * but it caused problems for apache.
2599 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2600 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2604 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, sizeof(pms));
2608 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2610 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2611 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2615 const EC_GROUP *group;
2616 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2618 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2619 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2620 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2624 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2625 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2626 /* use the certificate */
2627 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2630 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2631 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2633 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2636 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2637 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2639 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2640 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2645 /* Let's get client's public key */
2646 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
2647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2652 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2654 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
2655 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2656 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2657 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2660 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2661 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
2663 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2664 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2665 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2666 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2667 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2668 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2670 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2671 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2672 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2676 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2677 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
2679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2682 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2685 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2686 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2688 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
2689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2690 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2694 /* Get encoded point length */
2698 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2701 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
2702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2706 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
2709 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2712 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2713 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2714 if (field_size <= 0) {
2715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2718 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
2721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2725 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2726 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2727 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2728 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2729 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2730 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2732 /* Compute the master secret */
2733 s->session->master_key_length =
2734 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2736 session->master_key,
2739 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2743 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2744 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2745 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2746 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
2747 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2749 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2751 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2758 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2759 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2760 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2763 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2765 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2770 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
2772 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2773 memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
2774 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2776 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2777 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1);
2779 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2780 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2782 } else if (psk_len == 0) {
2784 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2787 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2788 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2792 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2793 pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
2795 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2797 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2801 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2802 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2803 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i);
2804 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2805 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2809 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2810 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2811 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2812 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2813 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
2814 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2818 s->session->master_key_length =
2819 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2821 session->master_key,
2826 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2831 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2832 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2837 if (param_len > n) {
2838 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2839 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2840 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2843 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
2844 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2847 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2848 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2849 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2850 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2851 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2854 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2855 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2856 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2857 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2858 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2862 if ((s->session->master_key_length =
2863 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
2864 s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
2865 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2871 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2872 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2874 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2875 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2876 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2877 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2878 unsigned long alg_a;
2882 /* Get our certificate private key */
2883 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2884 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2885 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2886 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2887 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2889 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2890 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2891 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2892 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2895 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2896 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2900 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2901 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2902 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2903 * client certificate for authorization only.
2905 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2906 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2907 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2910 /* Decrypt session key */
2912 ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
2913 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2914 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2915 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2916 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2921 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2922 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2923 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2924 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2927 /* Generate master secret */
2928 s->session->master_key_length =
2929 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2931 session->master_key,
2932 premaster_secret, 32);
2933 OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret));
2934 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2935 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2936 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2941 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2942 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2948 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2949 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2955 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2956 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2959 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2960 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2961 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2962 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2963 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2964 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2966 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2970 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2972 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2974 int al, ok, ret = 0;
2978 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2980 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2983 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received
2984 * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non
2985 * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even
2986 * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static
2987 * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the
2988 * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here.
2990 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2995 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2996 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2997 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2998 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
2999 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
3004 peer = s->session->peer;
3005 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
3006 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
3008 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3009 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3010 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3011 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3015 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3016 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3017 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3019 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
3022 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3023 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) {
3026 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3027 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
3028 /* Should never happen */
3030 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3031 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3034 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
3035 if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) {
3036 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3037 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3038 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3041 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
3043 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
3044 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3048 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3057 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3061 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3062 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
3063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3064 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3068 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3071 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3072 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
3073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3074 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3078 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3081 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3082 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
3083 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3084 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3088 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
3089 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3094 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3095 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
3096 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3097 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3100 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3101 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3105 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3111 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3112 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3113 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3114 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3115 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
3118 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3119 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3124 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3125 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3126 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3127 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3128 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
3131 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3137 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
3138 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3139 unsigned char signature[64];
3141 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3143 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3147 if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) <= 0) {
3148 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3149 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3150 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3154 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i);
3156 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
3157 signature[63 - idx] = p[idx];
3159 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3161 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3163 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3164 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3168 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3169 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3176 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3177 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3180 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3181 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3182 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3183 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3185 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3186 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3190 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3192 int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
3194 unsigned long l, nc, llen, n;
3195 const unsigned char *p, *q;
3197 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3199 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3202 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
3207 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
3208 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3209 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3211 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3212 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3216 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
3218 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
3219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3220 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3221 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3224 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3228 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
3229 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3233 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3235 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3241 if (llen + 3 != n) {
3242 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3246 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
3248 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
3249 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3251 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3256 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l);
3258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3262 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3264 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3267 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3275 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3276 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3277 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3278 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3280 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3283 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3284 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3285 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3286 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3287 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3288 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3291 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3292 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
3293 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3297 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3299 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3300 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3301 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
3306 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3307 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3308 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3309 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3312 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
3315 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3316 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3317 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3322 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3323 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3324 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
3326 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3327 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3335 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3337 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3343 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3347 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3352 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
3353 x = ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3355 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3356 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3357 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) {
3358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
3359 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3360 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3365 l = ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, x);
3367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3368 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3371 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3372 s->init_num = (int)l;
3376 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3377 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3380 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3381 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3382 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3384 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3388 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
3389 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
3390 const unsigned char *const_p;
3391 int len, slen_full, slen;
3394 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3395 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3396 unsigned char key_name[16];
3398 /* get session encoding length */
3399 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3401 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3404 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3405 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3408 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3410 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3414 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3415 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3418 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3422 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3425 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3428 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3430 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3431 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3432 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3436 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3437 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3440 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3443 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3444 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3445 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3446 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3447 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3448 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3450 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3451 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3452 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3455 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3457 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3458 /* Skip message length for now */
3461 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3462 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3464 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3465 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3469 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
3471 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3472 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3474 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3475 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL))
3477 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3481 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3482 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3483 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3485 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3487 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3489 /* Output key name */
3491 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3494 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3495 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3496 /* Encrypt session data */
3497 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3500 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
3504 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3506 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
3509 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3510 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3513 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3515 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3516 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3517 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3519 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3521 /* number of bytes to write */
3523 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3528 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3529 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3533 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3534 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3535 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3539 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3541 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
3544 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3545 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3546 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3549 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3550 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3554 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3557 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3558 /* message length */
3559 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3561 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3562 /* length of OCSP response */
3563 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3564 /* actual response */
3565 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3566 /* number of bytes to write */
3567 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3568 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3572 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3573 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3576 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3578 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3579 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3581 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3584 int proto_len, padding_len;
3586 const unsigned char *p;
3589 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3590 * extension in their ClientHello
3592 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
3593 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
3594 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3595 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3599 /* See the payload format below */
3600 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3601 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3602 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3603 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
3609 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
3610 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
3611 * ssl3_get_finished).
3613 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3614 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3615 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3620 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3621 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3624 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3627 * The payload looks like:
3629 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3630 * uint8 padding_len;
3631 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3634 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) {
3635 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3638 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3639 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) {
3640 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3644 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3645 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
3646 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3647 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3650 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3651 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;