1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
184 ssl_undefined_function,
185 ssl3_get_server_method)
187 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
190 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
191 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
193 int new_state,state,skip=0;
195 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
199 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
201 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
202 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
204 /* init things to blank */
206 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
220 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
222 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
226 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
227 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
230 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
232 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
237 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
239 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
241 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
246 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
254 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
262 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
264 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
265 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
267 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
269 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
270 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
271 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
273 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
274 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
276 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
277 * client that doesn't support secure
280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
281 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
287 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
288 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
289 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
290 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
294 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
295 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
298 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
299 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
300 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
301 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
304 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
307 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
311 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
312 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
313 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
316 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
317 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
320 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
324 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
325 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
326 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
327 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
328 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
331 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
332 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
334 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
338 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
341 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
345 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
346 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
347 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
348 /* normal PSK or KRB5 */
349 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
350 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
351 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
353 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
354 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
355 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
356 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
357 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
359 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
364 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
371 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
376 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
377 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
378 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
380 /* clear this, it may get reset by
381 * send_server_key_exchange */
382 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
384 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
385 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
387 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
388 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
389 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
390 * be able to handle this) */
391 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
393 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
396 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
397 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
399 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
401 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
402 * message only if the cipher suite is either
403 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
404 * server certificate contains the server's
405 * public key for key exchange.
407 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
408 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
409 * hint if provided */
410 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
411 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
413 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
414 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
415 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
416 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
417 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
418 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
424 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
425 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
430 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
434 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
435 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
436 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
437 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
438 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
439 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
440 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
441 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
442 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
443 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
444 * and in RFC 2246): */
445 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
446 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
447 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
448 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
449 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
450 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
451 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
452 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
453 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
455 /* no cert request */
457 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
458 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
462 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
463 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
464 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
465 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
466 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
468 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
469 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
475 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
476 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
477 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
478 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
479 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
480 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
484 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
486 /* This code originally checked to see if
487 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
488 * and then flushed. This caused problems
489 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
490 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
491 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
492 * still exist. So instead we just flush
496 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
497 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
502 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
504 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
507 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
508 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
509 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
510 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
514 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
516 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
518 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
519 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
522 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
526 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
527 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
528 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
533 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
534 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
535 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
536 * message is not sent.
537 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
538 * the client uses its key from the certificate
541 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NPN)
542 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
544 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
545 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
547 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
556 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
559 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
560 * a client cert, it can be verified
561 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
562 * should be generalized. But it is next step
564 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
565 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
567 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
568 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
572 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
573 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
584 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
585 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
587 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
588 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
589 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
591 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NPN)
592 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
594 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
595 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
597 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
602 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NPN)
603 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
604 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
605 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
606 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
608 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
612 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
613 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
614 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
615 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
616 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
617 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
618 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
619 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
627 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
631 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
632 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
633 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
634 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
635 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
636 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
640 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
641 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
642 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
643 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
644 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
650 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
651 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
653 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
654 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
655 { ret= -1; goto end; }
657 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
658 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
660 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
661 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
664 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
665 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
673 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
674 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
675 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
676 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
677 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
678 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
679 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
680 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
683 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NPN)
684 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
686 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
687 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
689 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
693 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
698 /* clean a few things up */
699 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
701 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
704 /* remove buffering on output */
705 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
709 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
711 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
712 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
716 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
718 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
720 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
722 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
730 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
736 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
740 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
745 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
749 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
756 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
760 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
764 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
768 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
770 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
771 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
776 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
777 /* number of bytes to write */
782 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
783 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
786 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
791 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
792 * so permit appropriate message length */
793 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
799 if (!ok) return((int)n);
800 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
801 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
803 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
804 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
805 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
806 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
807 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
808 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
810 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
811 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
819 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
821 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
822 unsigned int cookie_len;
825 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
827 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
830 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
832 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
833 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
834 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
835 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
838 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
840 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
843 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
844 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
845 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
846 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
847 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
850 if (!ok) return((int)n);
852 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
854 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
855 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
856 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
859 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
860 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
862 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
863 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
865 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
866 s->version = s->client_version;
868 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
872 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
873 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
874 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
876 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
878 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
880 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
881 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
883 if (cookie_length == 0)
887 /* load the client random */
888 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
891 /* get the session-id */
895 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
896 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
897 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
898 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
899 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
900 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
901 * an earlier library version)
903 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
905 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
910 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
912 { /* previous session */
919 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
926 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
932 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
933 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
934 * does not cause an overflow.
936 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
939 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
940 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
944 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
945 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
948 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
950 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
952 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
955 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
956 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
957 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
960 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
962 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
963 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
965 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
966 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
967 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
978 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
980 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
981 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
982 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
987 /* not enough data */
988 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
989 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
992 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
999 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1000 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1003 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1006 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1008 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1010 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1012 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1013 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1021 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1023 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1024 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1025 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1026 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1027 * enabled, though. */
1028 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1029 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1031 s->session->cipher = c;
1037 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1038 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1039 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1040 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1049 /* not enough data */
1050 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1051 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1057 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1064 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1069 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1071 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1073 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1075 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1076 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1080 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1085 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1086 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1087 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1088 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1092 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1093 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1095 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1097 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1102 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1104 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1106 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1107 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1108 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1111 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1112 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1116 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1117 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1118 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1120 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1125 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1128 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1130 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1131 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1133 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1134 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1139 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1140 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1141 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1142 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1143 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1144 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1145 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1147 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1148 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1149 /* Can't disable compression */
1150 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1152 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1156 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1157 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1159 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1160 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1162 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1166 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1168 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1172 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1173 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1175 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1180 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1187 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1188 { /* See if we have a match */
1189 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1191 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1192 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1194 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1207 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1212 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1213 * using compression.
1215 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1217 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1223 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1228 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1229 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1231 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1233 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1234 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1235 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1236 if (ciphers == NULL)
1238 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1243 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1244 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1248 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1252 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1256 /* Session-id reuse */
1257 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1258 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1259 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1260 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1262 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1264 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1265 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1267 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1268 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1270 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1274 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1275 else if (ec != NULL)
1276 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1278 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1282 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1285 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1288 /* we now have the following setup.
1290 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1291 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1292 * compression - basically ignored right now
1293 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1294 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1295 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1296 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1303 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1306 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1310 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1313 unsigned char *p,*d;
1316 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1320 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1322 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1323 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1324 p=s->s3->server_random;
1325 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1326 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1328 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1331 /* Do the message type and length last */
1334 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1335 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1338 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1339 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1341 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1342 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1343 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1344 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1345 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1346 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1347 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1349 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1350 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1351 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1352 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1353 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1356 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1358 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1360 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1361 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1367 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1370 /* put the cipher */
1371 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1374 /* put the compression method */
1375 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1378 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1381 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1384 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1389 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1398 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1401 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1402 /* number of bytes to write */
1407 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1408 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1411 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1415 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1417 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1420 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1425 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1426 /* number of bytes to write */
1431 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1432 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1435 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1437 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1441 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1444 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1448 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1449 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1452 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1455 unsigned char *p,*d;
1465 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1466 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1468 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1473 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1476 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1479 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1481 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1482 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1483 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1486 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1495 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1501 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1505 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1506 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1509 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1510 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1511 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1512 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1515 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1520 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1523 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1527 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1534 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1535 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1536 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1538 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1547 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1548 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1549 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1550 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1562 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1563 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1565 const EC_GROUP *group;
1567 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1568 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1570 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1571 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1572 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1576 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1581 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1583 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1584 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1588 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1594 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1601 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1602 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1603 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1604 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1606 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1608 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1613 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1614 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1615 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1617 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1621 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1622 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1624 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1628 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1629 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1630 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1633 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1640 /* Encode the public key.
1641 * First check the size of encoding and
1642 * allocate memory accordingly.
1644 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1645 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1646 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1649 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1650 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1651 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1652 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1659 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1660 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1661 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1662 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1664 if (encodedlen == 0)
1666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1670 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1672 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1673 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1674 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1675 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1680 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1681 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1689 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1690 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1691 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1693 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1694 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1697 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1699 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1703 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1705 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1709 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1710 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1712 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1715 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1718 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1726 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1728 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1731 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1734 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1742 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1744 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1745 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1746 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1747 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1748 * the actual encoded point itself
1750 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1758 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1759 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1761 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1766 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1767 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1769 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1770 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1771 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1772 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1779 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1780 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1781 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1782 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1786 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1788 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1789 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1790 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1791 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1792 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1793 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1794 (unsigned int *)&i);
1798 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1799 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1801 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1809 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1810 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1813 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1814 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1815 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1816 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1817 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1818 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1820 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1828 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1829 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1831 /* let's do ECDSA */
1832 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1833 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1834 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1835 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1836 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1837 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1839 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1848 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1849 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1850 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1855 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1858 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1864 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1865 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1866 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1868 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1870 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1871 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1872 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1874 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1878 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1880 unsigned char *p,*d;
1882 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1886 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1890 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1892 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1894 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1903 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1907 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1909 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1910 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1911 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1916 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1917 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1920 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1927 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1928 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1934 /* else no CA names */
1935 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1938 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1939 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1942 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1947 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1948 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1951 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1958 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1961 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1962 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1967 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1971 unsigned long alg_k;
1973 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1975 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1977 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1981 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1983 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1985 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1986 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1987 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1988 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1989 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1992 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1993 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1994 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1995 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1999 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2000 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2002 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2004 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2005 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2007 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2008 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2010 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2011 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2012 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2013 * be sent already */
2016 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2017 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2024 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2025 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2026 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2027 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2029 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2030 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2036 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2037 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2042 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2044 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2054 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2058 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2060 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2061 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2064 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2066 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2067 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2068 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2069 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2070 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2072 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2073 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2074 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2076 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2077 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2079 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2080 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2081 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2082 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2083 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2084 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2085 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2091 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2092 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2093 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2095 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2096 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2097 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2098 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2102 s->session->master_key_length=
2103 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2104 s->session->master_key,
2106 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2110 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2111 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2116 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2118 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2128 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2130 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2131 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2136 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2138 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2139 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2143 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2146 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2149 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2153 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2157 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2161 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2166 s->session->master_key_length=
2167 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2168 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2169 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2174 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2176 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2177 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2178 krb5_data authenticator;
2180 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2181 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2182 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2183 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2184 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2185 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2187 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2188 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2190 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2192 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2195 enc_ticket.length = i;
2197 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2199 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2200 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2204 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2205 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2208 authenticator.length = i;
2210 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2213 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2217 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2218 p+=authenticator.length;
2222 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2225 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2228 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2231 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2235 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2236 enc_pms.length + 6))
2238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2239 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2243 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2247 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2248 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2250 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2251 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2257 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2258 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2260 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2261 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2264 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2265 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2267 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2268 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2274 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2281 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2282 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2284 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2288 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2290 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2293 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2296 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2297 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2300 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2303 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2305 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2306 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2309 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2311 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2312 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2316 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2319 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2322 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2324 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2325 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2326 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2327 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2328 * the protocol version.
2329 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2330 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2332 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2335 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2340 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2342 s->session->master_key_length=
2343 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2344 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2346 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2348 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2349 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2351 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2352 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2357 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2358 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2359 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2360 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2364 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2366 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2367 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2372 const EC_GROUP *group;
2373 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2375 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2376 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2379 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2383 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2384 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2386 /* use the certificate */
2387 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2391 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2392 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2394 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2397 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2398 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2400 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2401 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2408 /* Let's get client's public key */
2409 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2411 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2412 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2418 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2420 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2422 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2423 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2426 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2428 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2430 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2431 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2432 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2433 * never executed. When that support is
2434 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2435 * received in the certificate is
2436 * authorized for key agreement.
2437 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2438 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2441 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2443 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2447 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2448 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2450 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2454 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2458 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2459 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2461 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2464 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2468 /* Get encoded point length */
2471 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2472 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2478 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2479 * currently, so set it to the start
2481 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2484 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2485 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2486 if (field_size <= 0)
2488 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2492 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2500 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2501 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2502 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2503 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2504 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2505 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2507 /* Compute the master secret */
2508 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2509 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2511 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2516 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2517 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2519 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2520 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2521 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2523 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2525 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2531 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2534 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2537 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2540 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2542 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2543 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2547 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2548 * string for the callback */
2549 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2550 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2551 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2552 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2553 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2555 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2558 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2561 else if (psk_len == 0)
2563 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2565 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2566 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2570 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2571 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2573 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2575 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2579 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2580 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2581 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2582 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2584 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2585 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2589 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2590 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2591 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2592 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2593 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2596 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2600 s->session->master_key_length=
2601 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2602 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2605 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2611 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2614 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2615 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL;
2616 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2617 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2619 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2620 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(s->cert->key->privatekey,NULL);
2621 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2622 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2623 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2624 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2625 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2626 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2627 if (client_pub_pkey)
2629 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2632 /* Decrypt session key */
2633 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2635 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2643 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2653 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2656 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2659 /* Generate master secret */
2660 s->session->master_key_length=
2661 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2662 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2663 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2664 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2669 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2670 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2678 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2680 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2686 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2687 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2690 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2691 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2692 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2693 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2694 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2695 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2700 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2702 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2709 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2710 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2711 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2716 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2718 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2720 peer=s->session->peer;
2721 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2722 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2730 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2732 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2733 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2735 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2746 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2750 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2752 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2753 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2757 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2759 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2760 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2764 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2765 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2766 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2767 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2768 * signature without length field */
2769 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2770 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
2780 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2781 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2785 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2786 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2788 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2789 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2793 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2794 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2796 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2797 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2801 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2807 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2808 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2814 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2815 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2817 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2818 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2819 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2823 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2824 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2830 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2831 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2833 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2834 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2835 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2839 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2840 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2841 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2847 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
2848 { unsigned char signature[64];
2850 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
2851 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
2853 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
2855 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
2856 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
2858 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
2859 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2862 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2863 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2864 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2870 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2871 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2880 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2883 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2887 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2889 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2891 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2892 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2894 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2896 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2903 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2905 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2907 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2908 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2910 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2911 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2914 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2915 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2917 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2918 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2921 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2925 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2927 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2928 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2931 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2933 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2935 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2942 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2943 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2946 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2949 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2951 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2952 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2957 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2960 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2965 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2966 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2969 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2971 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2978 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2980 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2981 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2983 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2984 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2987 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2988 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2989 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2991 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2992 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2998 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3001 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
3007 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3008 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3009 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3010 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3012 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3013 * when we arrive here. */
3014 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3016 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3017 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3019 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3023 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3024 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3025 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3026 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3027 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3035 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3038 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3039 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3043 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3048 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3050 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3053 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3054 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3055 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3062 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
3063 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3068 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3069 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3071 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3072 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3074 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3076 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3081 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3082 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3083 unsigned char key_name[16];
3085 /* get session encoding length */
3086 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3087 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3092 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3093 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3094 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3095 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3096 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3097 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3099 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3100 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3101 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3103 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
3107 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3109 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3111 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3112 /* Skip message length for now */
3114 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3115 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3116 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3117 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3120 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3122 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3131 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3132 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3133 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3134 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3135 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3136 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3138 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
3139 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3141 /* Output key name */
3143 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3146 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3147 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3148 /* Encrypt session data */
3149 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3151 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3153 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3155 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3156 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3157 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3160 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3162 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3163 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3164 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3166 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3168 /* number of bytes to write */
3170 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3175 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3176 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3179 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3181 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3184 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3185 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3186 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3189 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3192 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3195 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3196 /* message length */
3197 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3199 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3200 /* length of OCSP response */
3201 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3202 /* actual response */
3203 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3204 /* number of bytes to write */
3205 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3206 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3210 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3211 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3214 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NPN
3215 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3216 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3217 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3220 unsigned proto_len, padding_len;
3222 const unsigned char *p;
3224 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3225 * extension in their ClientHello */
3226 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3232 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3233 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3234 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3242 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3243 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3244 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3245 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3252 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3254 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3256 /* The payload looks like:
3258 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3259 * uint8 padding_len;
3260 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3263 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3265 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3266 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3269 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3270 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3275 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3276 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;