2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 # include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 # include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
176 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
178 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
179 return (SSLv3_server_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
186 ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method)
188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
189 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
191 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
193 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
195 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
196 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
197 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
199 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
203 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
205 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
212 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
215 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
216 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
218 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
220 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
224 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
225 cb = s->info_callback;
226 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
227 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
229 /* init things to blank */
231 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
234 if (s->cert == NULL) {
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
240 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
241 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
244 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
245 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
254 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
256 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
260 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
261 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
267 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
269 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
272 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
274 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
275 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
277 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
280 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
283 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
289 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
291 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
296 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
297 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
299 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
301 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
303 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
305 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
306 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
308 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
310 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
314 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
315 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
316 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
317 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
319 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
321 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
322 * support secure renegotiation.
324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
325 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
326 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
328 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
332 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
335 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
336 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
340 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
341 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
344 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
347 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
348 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
351 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
354 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
355 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
358 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
360 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
363 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
364 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
368 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
371 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
373 * callback indicates firther work to be done
375 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
378 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
379 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
381 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
382 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
384 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
387 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
394 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
398 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
399 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
400 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
403 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
405 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
406 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
408 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
412 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
415 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
419 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
420 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
421 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
422 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
425 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 |
427 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
428 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
432 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
433 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
435 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
438 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
444 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
449 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
450 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
451 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
454 * clear this, it may get reset by
455 * send_server_key_exchange
457 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
460 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
461 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
462 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
463 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
464 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
469 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
473 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
476 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
477 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
479 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kEDH))
480 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
481 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
482 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
483 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
484 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
485 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
486 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
491 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
497 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
501 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
503 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
504 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
506 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
507 * during re-negotiation:
509 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
510 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
512 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
513 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
516 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
518 * ... except when the application insists on
519 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
522 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
524 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
526 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
527 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
528 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
530 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
533 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
534 /* no cert request */
536 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
537 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
538 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
539 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
540 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
545 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
546 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
549 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
550 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
552 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
553 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
559 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
561 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
564 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
565 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
569 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
572 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
573 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
574 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
575 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
576 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
580 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
581 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
585 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
587 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
590 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
591 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
592 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
593 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
597 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
599 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
600 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
605 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
609 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
610 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
611 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
616 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
617 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
618 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
619 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
621 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
622 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
624 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
625 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
627 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
630 } else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
631 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
633 if (!s->session->peer)
636 * For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer at this point and
637 * digest cached records.
639 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
641 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
644 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
645 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
646 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
653 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
657 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
658 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
659 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
662 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
663 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
664 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
668 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
669 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
672 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
681 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
683 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
692 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
693 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
694 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
698 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
699 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
701 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
702 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
704 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
709 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
710 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
711 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
713 * Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
714 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the
715 * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be
717 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
718 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
719 * the client's Finished message is read.
721 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
722 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
724 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
728 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
732 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
733 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
735 * Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has
736 * already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
737 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
738 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
739 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
740 * the client's Finished message is read.
742 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
743 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
744 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
745 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
749 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
750 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
751 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
752 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
755 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
759 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
760 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
761 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
762 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
765 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
769 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
770 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
771 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
774 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
780 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
781 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
783 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
784 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
786 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
790 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
792 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
796 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
799 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
800 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
803 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
809 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
810 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
811 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
812 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
813 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
815 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
817 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
820 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
822 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
823 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
825 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
826 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
828 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
831 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
836 /* clean a few things up */
837 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
839 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
842 /* remove buffering on output */
843 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
847 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
852 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
854 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
856 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
859 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
874 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
876 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
880 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
881 new_state = s->state;
883 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
884 s->state = new_state;
890 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
894 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
898 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
902 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
903 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
904 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
909 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
910 /* number of bytes to write */
915 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
916 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
919 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
925 * this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
926 * so permit appropriate message length
928 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
931 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
934 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
935 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
937 * We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
940 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE) {
941 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO,
942 SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
946 * Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
947 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
949 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
950 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
951 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
952 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
955 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
956 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
957 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
958 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
961 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
967 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
969 int i, j, ok, al, ret = -1, cookie_valid = 0;
970 unsigned int cookie_len;
973 unsigned char *p, *d, *q;
975 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
976 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
978 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
981 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
982 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
983 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
984 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
986 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
987 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
990 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
991 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
992 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
993 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
994 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
999 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1002 * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
1003 * for session id length
1005 if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) {
1006 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1007 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1012 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
1013 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
1015 s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
1018 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
1019 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) {
1020 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1021 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
1022 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
1024 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
1027 s->version = s->client_version;
1029 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1034 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
1035 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
1038 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1039 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
1041 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1043 if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= (d + n) - p) {
1044 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1048 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
1050 if (cookie_length == 0)
1054 /* load the client random */
1055 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1056 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1058 /* get the session-id */
1061 if ((d + n) - p < j) {
1062 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1067 if ((j < 0) || (j > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) {
1068 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1075 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1076 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1077 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1078 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1079 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
1080 * for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1081 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1082 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1083 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1084 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
1087 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1088 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1091 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1093 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1095 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1096 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1097 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1098 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1099 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1101 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous
1108 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1115 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
1117 if ((d + n) - p < 1) {
1118 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1119 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1122 cookie_len = *(p++);
1124 if ((d + n ) - p < cookie_len) {
1125 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1126 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1131 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1132 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1133 * does not cause an overflow.
1135 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
1137 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1142 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1143 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
1144 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1146 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1147 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1149 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1150 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1151 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1154 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1156 /* default verification */
1157 else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1158 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1159 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1169 if ((d + n ) - p < 2) {
1170 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1177 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1178 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1182 /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
1183 if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) {
1184 /* not enough data */
1185 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1189 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) {
1194 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1197 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1200 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1201 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1203 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1204 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1206 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1207 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1215 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
1219 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1220 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
1222 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
1223 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
1224 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
1225 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
1226 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
1228 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1229 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
1230 s->session->cipher = c;
1237 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1240 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1242 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1249 if ((d + n) - p < i) {
1250 /* not enough data */
1251 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1256 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
1264 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1268 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1269 /* TLS extensions */
1270 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1271 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d + n, &al)) {
1272 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1277 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
1278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1283 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1284 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1285 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1286 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1290 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1291 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1292 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1297 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1298 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1300 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1301 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1302 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1304 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1306 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1307 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1311 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1313 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1318 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1319 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1324 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1327 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1329 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1330 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1332 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1333 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1339 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1340 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1341 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1343 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1345 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1346 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1347 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1348 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1349 /* Can't disable compression */
1350 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
1351 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1352 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1353 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1356 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1357 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1358 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1359 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1360 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1364 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1365 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1366 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1367 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1370 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1371 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
1372 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1376 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1378 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1383 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1384 /* See if we have a match */
1385 int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
1387 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1388 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1389 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1391 for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
1401 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1407 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1408 * using compression.
1410 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1411 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1418 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1422 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1423 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1425 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1427 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1428 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1429 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1430 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1431 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1436 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1439 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1443 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1445 /* Session-id reuse */
1446 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1447 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1448 SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL;
1449 SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL;
1451 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) {
1452 sk = s->session->ciphers;
1453 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
1454 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
1455 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1457 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1461 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc;
1462 else if (ec != NULL)
1463 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec;
1465 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1468 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1471 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION
1472 || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1473 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
1474 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1480 * we now have the following setup.
1482 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1483 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1484 * compression - basically ignored right now
1485 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1486 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1487 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1488 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1491 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1492 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1493 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1494 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1499 ret = cookie_valid ? 2 : 1;
1502 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1504 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1507 if (ciphers != NULL)
1508 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1512 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1515 unsigned char *p, *d;
1519 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
1520 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1521 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1522 p = s->s3->server_random;
1523 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1524 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1528 /* Do the message type and length last */
1531 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1532 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1535 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1536 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1539 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1540 * back in the server hello:
1541 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1542 * we send back the old session ID.
1543 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1544 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1545 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1546 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1548 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1549 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1550 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1551 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1554 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1556 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1558 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1559 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1561 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1565 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1568 /* put the cipher */
1569 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1572 /* put the compression method */
1573 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1576 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1579 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1581 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1582 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1584 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1588 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p,
1589 buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) ==
1591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1592 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1599 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1602 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1603 /* number of bytes to write */
1604 s->init_num = p - buf;
1608 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1609 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1612 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1616 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
1617 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1620 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1625 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1626 /* number of bytes to write */
1631 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1632 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1635 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1641 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1644 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1645 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1647 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1648 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
1649 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1652 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1655 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1656 unsigned char *p, *d;
1666 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1667 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
1668 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1673 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1675 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1676 if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
1677 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
1678 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1679 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1680 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1682 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1685 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1686 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1687 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1691 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
1694 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1696 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1701 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
1704 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1705 if (type & SSL_kEDH) {
1707 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1708 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1709 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1711 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1714 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1716 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1720 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1722 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1726 if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1732 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1742 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
1743 const EC_GROUP *group;
1745 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
1746 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1747 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1748 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1750 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
1751 s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1753 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1754 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1756 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1760 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1762 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1766 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1767 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1768 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1771 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
1772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1776 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
1777 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1778 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1779 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
1780 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
1781 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1787 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1788 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1789 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
1790 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1794 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1795 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1796 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1797 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1802 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1803 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1807 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1809 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1810 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1815 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1816 * allocate memory accordingly.
1818 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1819 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1820 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1823 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1824 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
1825 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1826 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
1827 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1828 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1832 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1833 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1834 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1835 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1837 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1842 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1846 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1847 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1848 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1854 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1855 * can set these to NULLs
1862 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1863 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1864 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1866 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1868 n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1870 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1871 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1872 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1873 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1874 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1875 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1876 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1877 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1880 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1881 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1882 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1883 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1887 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1888 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1889 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1892 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1893 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1895 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1902 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1903 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
1904 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1906 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1909 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1915 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + 4 + kn)) {
1916 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1919 d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1922 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1923 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1924 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1934 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1935 if (type & SSL_kEECDH) {
1937 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1938 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1939 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1940 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1942 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1950 memcpy((unsigned char *)p,
1951 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1952 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1953 encodedPoint = NULL;
1958 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1959 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1960 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1961 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1962 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
1963 strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1964 p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1971 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1972 * points to the space at the end.
1974 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1975 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
1976 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1979 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1980 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1981 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1982 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,
1983 (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5
1986 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1987 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1988 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1989 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1990 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n) <= 0
1991 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q,
1992 (unsigned int *)&i) <= 0) {
1993 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1995 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2001 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
2002 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
2003 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
2012 * For TLS1.2 and later send signature algorithm
2014 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
2015 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
2016 /* Should never happen */
2017 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2019 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2025 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2027 if (EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
2028 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2029 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2030 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2031 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2032 || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[4]), n) <= 0
2033 || EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
2034 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) {
2035 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
2036 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2041 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2044 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2045 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2046 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2047 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2052 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
2056 * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off
2058 s->init_num = n + 4;
2062 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2063 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2064 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2066 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2068 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2069 if (encodedPoint != NULL)
2070 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2071 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2073 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2074 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2078 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2080 unsigned char *p, *d;
2081 int i, j, nl, off, n;
2082 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2086 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
2089 d = p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
2091 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2093 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
2098 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
2099 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
2109 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2112 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2113 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2114 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2115 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, 4 + n + j + 2)) {
2116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2120 p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4 + n]);
2121 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) {
2123 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2128 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2137 /* else no CA names */
2138 p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4 + off]);
2141 d = (unsigned char *)buf->data;
2142 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
2146 * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off
2149 s->init_num = n + 4;
2151 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2152 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) {
2153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2156 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2159 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2166 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2169 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2170 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2172 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2176 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2180 unsigned long alg_k;
2182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2184 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2192 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2194 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2195 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2196 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2197 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2198 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2201 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2202 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2203 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2204 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
2208 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2210 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2213 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2214 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2216 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2219 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2220 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
2221 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2222 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2224 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2227 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2229 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2234 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2235 if ((pkey == NULL) ||
2236 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2237 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2239 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2242 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2245 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2246 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2249 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
2250 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2252 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2261 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2262 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2263 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2264 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2265 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2267 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2268 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2270 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2275 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2276 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2277 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2278 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2279 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2282 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2283 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2286 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2290 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2291 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2294 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2297 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2298 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2299 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2300 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2301 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2302 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2305 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2307 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2310 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2311 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2312 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2313 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2314 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2315 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2318 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2319 unsigned char workaround_good;
2321 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2323 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2324 version_good |= workaround_good;
2328 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2329 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2331 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2334 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2335 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2336 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2337 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2339 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2340 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
2341 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2344 s->session->master_key_length =
2345 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2347 session->master_key,
2350 (rand_premaster_secret));
2351 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2354 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2355 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2358 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
2359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2360 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2368 if (n == 0L) { /* the parameters are in the cert */
2369 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2370 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2371 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2374 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
2375 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2377 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2380 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
2383 pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
2385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2389 i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
2392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2397 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2398 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
2402 s->session->master_key_length =
2403 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2405 session->master_key,
2407 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2410 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2411 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
2412 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2413 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2414 krb5_data authenticator;
2416 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2417 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2418 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2419 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2420 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2422 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2423 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2426 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2429 kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2432 enc_ticket.length = i;
2434 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) {
2435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2436 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2440 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2441 p += enc_ticket.length;
2444 authenticator.length = i;
2446 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) {
2447 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2448 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2452 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2453 p += authenticator.length;
2457 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2458 p += enc_pms.length;
2461 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
2463 if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) {
2464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2465 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2469 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2470 enc_pms.length + 6)) {
2471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2472 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2476 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2479 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2480 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2482 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2483 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2489 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
2490 * return authtime == 0.
2492 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2493 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) {
2495 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2496 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2498 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2499 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2504 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) {
2505 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2509 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2510 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2512 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2516 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2518 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) {
2519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2520 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2523 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl,
2524 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2526 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2527 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2531 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2533 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2537 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
2538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2539 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2544 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2546 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2550 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8))
2551 && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
2553 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2554 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
2555 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
2556 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
2557 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If
2558 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2559 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
2562 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
2563 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2564 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2570 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2572 s->session->master_key_length =
2573 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2575 session->master_key,
2578 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) {
2579 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2580 if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) {
2581 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2582 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ,
2587 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2588 * but it caused problems for apache.
2589 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2590 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2594 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, sizeof(pms));
2598 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2600 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2601 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2605 const EC_GROUP *group;
2606 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2608 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2609 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2610 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2614 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2615 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2616 /* use the certificate */
2617 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2620 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2621 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2623 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2626 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2627 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2629 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2630 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2635 /* Let's get client's public key */
2636 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
2637 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2642 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2644 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
2645 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2646 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2647 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2650 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2651 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
2653 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2654 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2655 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2656 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2657 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2658 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2660 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2662 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2666 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2667 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
2669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2672 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2675 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2676 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2678 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
2679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2680 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2684 /* Get encoded point length */
2688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2691 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
2692 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2696 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
2699 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2702 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2703 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2704 if (field_size <= 0) {
2705 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2708 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
2711 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2715 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2716 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2717 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2718 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2719 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2720 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2722 /* Compute the master secret */
2723 s->session->master_key_length =
2724 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2726 session->master_key,
2729 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2733 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2734 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2735 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2736 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
2737 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2739 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2741 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2748 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2749 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2750 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2753 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2754 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2755 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2760 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
2762 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2763 memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
2764 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2766 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2767 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1);
2769 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2770 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2772 } else if (psk_len == 0) {
2774 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2777 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2778 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2782 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2783 pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
2785 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2787 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2791 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2792 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2793 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i);
2794 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2799 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2800 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2801 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2802 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2803 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
2804 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2808 s->session->master_key_length =
2809 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2811 session->master_key,
2816 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2821 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2822 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2827 if (param_len > n) {
2828 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2830 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2833 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
2834 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2837 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2838 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2839 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2840 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2841 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2844 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2845 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2846 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2847 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2848 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2852 if ((s->session->master_key_length =
2853 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
2854 s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
2855 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2861 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2862 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2864 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2865 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2866 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2867 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2868 unsigned long alg_a;
2872 /* Get our certificate private key */
2873 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2874 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2875 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2876 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2877 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2879 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2880 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2881 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2882 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2885 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2886 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2890 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2891 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2892 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2893 * client certificate for authorization only.
2895 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2896 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2897 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2900 /* Decrypt session key */
2902 ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
2903 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2904 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2905 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2906 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2911 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2912 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2914 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2917 /* Generate master secret */
2918 s->session->master_key_length =
2919 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2921 session->master_key,
2922 premaster_secret, 32);
2923 OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret));
2924 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2925 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2926 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2931 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2932 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2938 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2939 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2945 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2946 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2949 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2950 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2951 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2952 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2953 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2954 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2956 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2960 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2962 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2964 int al, ok, ret = 0;
2968 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2970 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2973 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received
2974 * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non
2975 * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even
2976 * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static
2977 * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the
2978 * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here.
2980 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2985 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2986 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2987 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2988 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
2989 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
2994 peer = s->session->peer;
2995 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2996 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2998 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2999 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3000 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3001 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3005 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3006 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3007 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3009 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
3012 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3013 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) {
3016 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3017 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
3018 /* Should never happen */
3020 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3021 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3024 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
3025 if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) {
3026 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3027 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3028 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3031 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
3033 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
3034 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3038 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3046 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3047 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3051 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3052 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
3053 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3054 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3058 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3061 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3062 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
3063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3064 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3068 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3071 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3072 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
3073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3074 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3078 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
3079 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3080 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3084 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3085 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
3086 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3087 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3090 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3095 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3096 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3101 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3102 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3103 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3104 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3105 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
3108 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3109 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3114 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3115 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3116 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3117 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3118 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
3121 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3122 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3127 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
3128 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3129 unsigned char signature[64];
3131 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3133 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3137 if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) <= 0) {
3138 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3139 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3144 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i);
3146 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
3147 signature[63 - idx] = p[idx];
3149 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3151 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3153 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3158 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3159 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3166 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3167 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3170 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3171 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3172 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3173 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3175 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3176 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3180 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3182 int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
3184 unsigned long l, nc, llen, n;
3185 const unsigned char *p, *q;
3187 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3189 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3192 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
3197 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
3198 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3199 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3201 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3202 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3206 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
3208 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
3209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3210 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3211 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3214 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3218 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
3219 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3220 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3223 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3225 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3231 if (llen + 3 != n) {
3232 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3236 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
3237 if (nc + 3 > llen) {
3238 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3240 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3244 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
3245 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3247 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3252 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l);
3254 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3258 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3260 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3263 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3271 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3272 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3273 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3274 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3276 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3279 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3280 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3281 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3282 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3283 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3284 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3287 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3288 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
3289 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3293 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3295 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3296 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3297 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
3302 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3303 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3304 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3305 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3308 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
3311 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3312 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3313 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3318 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3319 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3320 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
3322 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3323 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3331 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3333 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3339 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3343 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3348 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
3349 x = ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3351 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3352 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3353 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) {
3354 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
3355 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3356 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3361 l = ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, x);
3363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3364 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3367 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3368 s->init_num = (int)l;
3372 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3373 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3376 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3377 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3378 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3380 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3384 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
3385 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
3386 const unsigned char *const_p;
3387 int len, slen_full, slen;
3390 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3391 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3392 unsigned char key_name[16];
3394 /* get session encoding length */
3395 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3397 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3400 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3401 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3404 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3406 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3410 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3411 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3414 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3418 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3421 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3424 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3426 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3427 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3428 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3432 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3433 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3436 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3439 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3440 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3441 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3442 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3443 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3444 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3446 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3447 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3448 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3451 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3453 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3454 /* Skip message length for now */
3457 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3458 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3460 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3461 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3465 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
3467 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3468 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3470 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3471 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL))
3473 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3477 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3478 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3479 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3481 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3483 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3485 /* Output key name */
3487 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3490 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3491 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3492 /* Encrypt session data */
3493 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3496 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
3500 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3502 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
3505 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3506 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3509 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3511 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3512 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3513 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3515 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3517 /* number of bytes to write */
3519 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3524 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3525 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3529 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3530 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3531 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3535 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3537 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
3540 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3541 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3542 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3545 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3546 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3550 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3553 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3554 /* message length */
3555 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3557 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3558 /* length of OCSP response */
3559 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3560 /* actual response */
3561 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3562 /* number of bytes to write */
3563 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3564 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3568 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3569 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3572 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3574 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3575 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3577 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3580 int proto_len, padding_len;
3582 const unsigned char *p;
3585 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3586 * extension in their ClientHello
3588 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
3589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
3590 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3591 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3595 /* See the payload format below */
3596 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3597 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3598 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3599 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
3605 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
3606 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
3607 * ssl3_get_finished).
3609 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3610 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3611 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3616 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3617 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3620 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3623 * The payload looks like:
3625 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3626 * uint8 padding_len;
3627 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3630 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) {
3631 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3634 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3635 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) {
3636 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3640 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3641 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
3642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3643 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3646 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3647 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;