2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
116 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
117 #include <openssl/evp.h>
118 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
119 #include <openssl/rand.h>
121 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
122 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
125 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
126 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
127 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
128 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
129 defined(__INTEL__) ) \
131 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
132 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
135 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s)
138 SSL3_RECORD_clear(&rl->rrec);
139 SSL3_RECORD_clear(&rl->wrec);
142 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
144 unsigned char *rp, *wp;
150 read_ahead = rl->read_ahead;
151 rp = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&rl->rbuf);
152 rlen = SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&rl->rbuf);
153 wp = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&rl->wbuf);
154 wlen = SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&rl->wbuf);
155 memset(rl, 0, sizeof (RECORD_LAYER));
156 SSL3_BUFFER_set_buf(&rl->rbuf, rp);
157 SSL3_BUFFER_set_len(&rl->rbuf, rlen);
158 SSL3_BUFFER_set_buf(&rl->wbuf, wp);
159 SSL3_BUFFER_set_len(&rl->wbuf, wlen);
161 /* Do I need to do this? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
162 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
165 rl->read_ahead = read_ahead;
166 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
170 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
172 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
173 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
174 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->wbuf))
175 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
176 SSL3_RECORD_release(&rl->rrec);
179 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
181 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
184 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
186 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf) != 0;
189 int RECORD_LAYER_set_data(RECORD_LAYER *rl, const unsigned char *buf, int len)
191 rl->packet_length = len;
193 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
194 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
195 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(rl->s))
199 rl->packet = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&rl->rbuf);
200 SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(&rl->rbuf, buf, len);
205 void RECORD_LAYER_dup(RECORD_LAYER *dst, RECORD_LAYER *src)
208 * Currently only called from SSL_dup...which only seems to expect the
209 * rstate to be duplicated and nothing else from the RECORD_LAYER???
211 dst->rstate = src->rstate;
214 int ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
216 if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
219 return (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec) == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
220 ? SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec) : 0;
223 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
227 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
228 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
231 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
234 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
244 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
248 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
249 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
252 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
255 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
265 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
268 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
269 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
270 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
271 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
272 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
282 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
284 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
288 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
289 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
290 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
294 /* start with empty packet ... */
297 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
299 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
302 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
303 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
304 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
306 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
307 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
308 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
309 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
310 * overrun can be triggered.
312 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
316 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
317 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
318 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
322 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
323 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
326 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
327 if (left == 0 && extend)
329 if (left > 0 && n > left)
333 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
335 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
341 /* else we need to read more data */
343 len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
344 pkt = rb->buf + align;
346 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
347 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
349 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt) { /* len > 0 */
350 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left);
351 s->rlayer.packet = pkt;
352 rb->offset = len + align;
355 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) { /* does not happen */
356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
360 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
361 if (&s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
362 /* ignore max parameter */
367 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
368 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
373 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
374 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
379 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
380 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
381 i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
389 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
391 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
396 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
397 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
398 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
400 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
402 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
406 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
409 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
410 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
416 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
417 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
419 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
421 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
424 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
425 unsigned int max_send_fragment;
427 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf;
429 unsigned int u_len = (unsigned int)len;
432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_NEGATIVE_LENGTH);
436 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
437 OPENSSL_assert(s->rlayer.wnum <= INT_MAX);
438 tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
441 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) {
442 i = s->handshake_func(s);
446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
452 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
453 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
454 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
455 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
456 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
457 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
458 * report the error in a way the user will notice
461 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
466 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
467 * will happen with non blocking IO
470 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->s3->wpend_tot);
472 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
473 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
476 tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */
478 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
480 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
481 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
482 * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the
483 * compromise is considered worthy.
485 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
486 u_len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
487 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
488 !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
489 EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) &
490 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
491 unsigned char aad[13];
492 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
495 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
496 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
497 max_send_fragment -= 512;
499 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
500 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
502 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
503 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
504 max_send_fragment, NULL);
506 if (u_len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
511 wb->buf = OPENSSL_malloc(packlen);
513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
517 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
518 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
525 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
526 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
531 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
532 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
534 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
539 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
540 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
542 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
544 memcpy(aad, s->s3->write_sequence, 8);
546 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
547 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
554 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
555 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
556 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
558 if (packlen <= 0 || packlen > (int)wb->len) { /* never happens */
559 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
564 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
565 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
568 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
569 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
570 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
573 s->s3->write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
574 if (s->s3->write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
576 while (j >= 0 && (++s->s3->write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
582 s->s3->wpend_tot = nw;
583 s->s3->wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
584 s->s3->wpend_type = type;
585 s->s3->wpend_ret = nw;
587 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw);
589 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
590 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);
593 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
597 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
606 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
607 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
608 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
615 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
616 nw = s->max_send_fragment;
620 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
622 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
623 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
628 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
629 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
631 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
632 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
634 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
636 if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
638 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
648 int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
649 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
651 unsigned char *p, *plen;
652 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
657 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf;
661 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
662 * will happen with non blocking IO
665 return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
667 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
668 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
669 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
672 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
676 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
679 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
682 wr = &s->rlayer.wrec;
685 if ((sess == NULL) ||
686 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
687 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
688 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
691 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
697 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
699 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
701 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
702 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
705 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
707 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
708 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
709 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
712 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
717 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
719 /* insufficient space */
720 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
725 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
728 if (create_empty_fragment) {
729 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
731 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
732 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
733 * payload, then we can just pretent we simply have two headers.
735 align = (long)wb->buf + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
736 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
740 } else if (prefix_len) {
741 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
743 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
744 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
745 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
751 /* write the header */
753 *(p++) = type & 0xff;
756 *(p++) = (s->version >> 8);
758 * Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
759 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
761 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
762 && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
765 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
767 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
770 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
771 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
772 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
773 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
774 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
778 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
779 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
780 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
786 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
787 wr->data = p + eivlen;
788 wr->length = (int)len;
789 wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf;
792 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
795 /* first we compress */
796 if (s->compress != NULL) {
797 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) {
798 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
802 memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length);
803 wr->input = wr->data;
807 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
808 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
812 if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
813 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + eivlen]), 1) < 0)
815 wr->length += mac_size;
823 * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err;
825 wr->length += eivlen;
828 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1) < 1)
831 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
832 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, p + wr->length, 1) < 0)
834 wr->length += mac_size;
837 /* record length after mac and block padding */
838 s2n(wr->length, plen);
841 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen - 5, 5, s,
842 s->msg_callback_arg);
845 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
848 wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
849 wr->length += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
851 if (create_empty_fragment) {
853 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
859 /* now let's set up wb */
860 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
863 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
866 s->s3->wpend_tot = len;
867 s->s3->wpend_buf = buf;
868 s->s3->wpend_type = type;
869 s->s3->wpend_ret = len;
871 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
872 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
877 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
878 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
882 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf;
885 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
886 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
887 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
888 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) {
889 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
895 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
896 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
897 i = BIO_write(s->wbio,
898 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
899 (unsigned int)wb->left);
901 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
907 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
908 return (s->s3->wpend_ret);
910 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
912 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
913 * using a datagram service
925 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
926 * 'type' is one of the following:
928 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
929 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
930 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
932 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
933 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
935 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
936 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
937 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
938 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
939 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
940 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
941 * Change cipher spec protocol
942 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
944 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
946 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
947 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
948 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
949 * Application data protocol
950 * none of our business
952 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
957 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
959 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&s->rlayer.rbuf)) {
960 /* Not initialized yet */
961 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
965 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
966 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
968 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
973 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
974 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
976 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
977 unsigned char *dst = buf;
982 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
985 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
988 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
989 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
990 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
995 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
998 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) {
999 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1000 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1004 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1009 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1012 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
1013 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
1014 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1015 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
1017 rr = &s->rlayer.rrec;
1019 /* get new packet if necessary */
1020 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
1021 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1026 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1028 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1029 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1030 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1031 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1032 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1037 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1040 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1042 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1046 if (type == rr->type) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1047 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1049 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1050 * doing a handshake for the first time
1052 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1053 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1054 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1055 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1062 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1065 n = (unsigned int)len;
1067 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1071 if (rr->length == 0) {
1072 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1074 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
1075 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0)
1076 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1083 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1084 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
1088 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1089 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1092 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1093 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1094 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1096 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1097 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1098 dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1099 dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
1100 } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1101 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1102 dest = s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1103 dest_len = &s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len;
1105 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1106 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) {
1107 /* We can ignore 0 return values */
1108 if(tls1_process_heartbeat(s, SSL3_RECORD_get_data(&s->rlayer.rrec),
1109 SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec)) < 0) {
1113 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1115 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1116 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1117 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1122 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1123 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1125 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1127 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1129 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1133 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1134 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1139 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1140 * s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1141 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1144 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1146 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1147 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1148 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1149 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1151 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1152 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1153 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
1154 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1159 if (s->msg_callback)
1160 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1161 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment, 4, s,
1162 s->msg_callback_arg);
1164 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1165 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1166 !s->s3->renegotiate) {
1167 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1168 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
1169 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1174 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1178 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1179 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0) {
1180 /* no read-ahead left? */
1183 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1184 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1185 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1186 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1188 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1189 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1190 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1191 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1198 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1199 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1204 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1205 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1206 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1209 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1210 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1211 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1212 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1213 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1214 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1215 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1217 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1220 if (s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
1221 int alert_level = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[0];
1222 int alert_descr = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[1];
1224 s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len = 0;
1226 if (s->msg_callback)
1227 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1228 s->rlayer.alert_fragment, 2, s,
1229 s->msg_callback_arg);
1231 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1232 cb = s->info_callback;
1233 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1234 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1237 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1238 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1241 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1242 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1243 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1244 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1248 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1249 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1250 * alert because if application tried to renegotiatie it
1251 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1252 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1253 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1255 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1256 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1260 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1261 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1264 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1267 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1268 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1270 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1271 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1272 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1273 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
1276 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1284 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1286 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1291 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1293 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly
1294 * what the record payload has to look like
1296 if ((rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1297 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
1298 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1303 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1304 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
1305 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1310 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) {
1311 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1316 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
1320 if (s->msg_callback)
1321 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1322 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1324 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
1325 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1332 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1334 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) {
1335 if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1336 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
1337 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1341 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1349 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1350 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0) {
1351 /* no read-ahead left? */
1354 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1355 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1356 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1357 * problems in the blocking world
1359 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1360 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1361 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1362 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1372 * TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: TLS v1.2 give
1373 * an unexpected message alert.
1375 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
1379 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1382 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1384 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1386 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1387 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not
1388 * happen when type != rr->type
1390 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1393 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1395 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1396 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1397 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1398 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1399 * started), we will indulge it.
1401 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1402 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1403 (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1404 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1405 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1406 ) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1407 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1408 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1411 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1414 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1422 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);