2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
116 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
117 #include <openssl/evp.h>
118 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
119 #include <openssl/rand.h>
121 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
122 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
125 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
126 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
127 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
128 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
129 defined(__INTEL__) ) \
131 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
132 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
135 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s)
138 SSL3_RECORD_clear(&rl->rrec);
139 SSL3_RECORD_clear(&rl->wrec);
142 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
144 unsigned char *rp, *wp;
150 read_ahead = rl->read_ahead;
151 rp = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&rl->rbuf);
152 rlen = SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&rl->rbuf);
153 wp = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&rl->wbuf);
154 wlen = SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&rl->wbuf);
155 memset(rl, 0, sizeof (RECORD_LAYER));
156 SSL3_BUFFER_set_buf(&rl->rbuf, rp);
157 SSL3_BUFFER_set_len(&rl->rbuf, rlen);
158 SSL3_BUFFER_set_buf(&rl->wbuf, wp);
159 SSL3_BUFFER_set_len(&rl->wbuf, wlen);
161 /* Do I need to do this? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
162 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
165 rl->read_ahead = read_ahead;
169 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
171 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
172 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
173 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->wbuf))
174 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
175 SSL3_RECORD_release(&rl->rrec);
178 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
180 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
183 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
185 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf) != 0;
188 int RECORD_LAYER_set_data(RECORD_LAYER *rl, const unsigned char *buf, int len)
190 rl->s->packet_length = len;
192 rl->s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
193 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
194 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(rl->s))
198 rl->s->packet = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&rl->rbuf);
199 SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(&rl->rbuf, buf, len);
204 int ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
206 if (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
209 return (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec) == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
210 ? SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec) : 0;
213 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
216 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
217 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
218 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
219 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
220 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
230 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
232 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
236 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
237 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
238 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
242 /* start with empty packet ... */
245 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
247 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
250 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
251 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
252 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
254 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
255 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
256 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
257 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
258 * overrun can be triggered.
260 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
264 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
265 s->packet_length = 0;
266 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
270 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
271 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
274 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
275 if (left == 0 && extend)
277 if (left > 0 && n > left)
281 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
283 s->packet_length += n;
289 /* else we need to read more data */
291 len = s->packet_length;
292 pkt = rb->buf + align;
294 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
295 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
297 if (s->packet != pkt) { /* len > 0 */
298 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len + left);
300 rb->offset = len + align;
303 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) { /* does not happen */
304 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
308 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
309 if (!RECORD_LAYER_get_read_ahead(&s->rlayer) && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
310 /* ignore max parameter */
315 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
316 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
321 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
322 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
327 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
328 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
329 i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
337 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
339 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
344 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
345 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
346 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
348 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
350 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
354 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
357 s->packet_length += n;
358 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
364 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
365 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
367 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
369 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
372 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
373 unsigned int max_send_fragment;
375 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf;
377 unsigned int u_len = (unsigned int)len;
380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_NEGATIVE_LENGTH);
384 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
385 OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX);
389 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) {
390 i = s->handshake_func(s);
394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
400 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
401 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
402 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
403 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
404 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
405 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
406 * report the error in a way the user will notice
409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
414 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
415 * will happen with non blocking IO
418 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->s3->wpend_tot);
420 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
424 tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */
426 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
428 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
429 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
430 * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the
431 * compromise is considered worthy.
433 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
434 u_len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
435 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
436 !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
437 EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) &
438 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
439 unsigned char aad[13];
440 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
443 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
444 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
445 max_send_fragment -= 512;
447 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
448 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
450 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
451 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
452 max_send_fragment, NULL);
454 if (u_len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
459 wb->buf = OPENSSL_malloc(packlen);
461 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
465 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
466 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
473 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
474 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
479 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
480 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
487 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
488 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
490 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
492 memcpy(aad, s->s3->write_sequence, 8);
494 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
495 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
502 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
503 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
504 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
506 if (packlen <= 0 || packlen > (int)wb->len) { /* never happens */
507 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
512 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
513 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
516 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
517 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
518 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
521 s->s3->write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
522 if (s->s3->write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
524 while (j >= 0 && (++s->s3->write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
530 s->s3->wpend_tot = nw;
531 s->s3->wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
532 s->s3->wpend_type = type;
533 s->s3->wpend_ret = nw;
535 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw);
537 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
538 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);
545 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
554 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
555 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
556 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
563 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
564 nw = s->max_send_fragment;
568 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
570 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
576 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
577 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
579 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
580 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
582 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
584 if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
586 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
596 int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
597 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
599 unsigned char *p, *plen;
600 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
605 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf;
609 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
610 * will happen with non blocking IO
613 return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
615 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
616 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
617 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
620 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
624 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
627 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
630 wr = &s->rlayer.wrec;
633 if ((sess == NULL) ||
634 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
635 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
636 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
639 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
645 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
647 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
649 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
650 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
653 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
655 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
656 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
657 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
660 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
665 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
667 /* insufficient space */
668 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
673 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
676 if (create_empty_fragment) {
677 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
679 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
680 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
681 * payload, then we can just pretent we simply have two headers.
683 align = (long)wb->buf + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
684 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
688 } else if (prefix_len) {
689 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
691 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
692 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
693 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
699 /* write the header */
701 *(p++) = type & 0xff;
704 *(p++) = (s->version >> 8);
706 * Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
707 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
709 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
710 && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
713 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
715 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
718 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
719 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
720 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
721 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
722 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
726 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
727 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
728 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
734 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
735 wr->data = p + eivlen;
736 wr->length = (int)len;
737 wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf;
740 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
743 /* first we compress */
744 if (s->compress != NULL) {
745 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) {
746 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
750 memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length);
751 wr->input = wr->data;
755 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
756 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
760 if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
761 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + eivlen]), 1) < 0)
763 wr->length += mac_size;
771 * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err;
773 wr->length += eivlen;
776 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1) < 1)
779 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
780 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, p + wr->length, 1) < 0)
782 wr->length += mac_size;
785 /* record length after mac and block padding */
786 s2n(wr->length, plen);
789 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen - 5, 5, s,
790 s->msg_callback_arg);
793 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
796 wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
797 wr->length += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
799 if (create_empty_fragment) {
801 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
807 /* now let's set up wb */
808 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
811 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
814 s->s3->wpend_tot = len;
815 s->s3->wpend_buf = buf;
816 s->s3->wpend_type = type;
817 s->s3->wpend_ret = len;
819 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
820 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
825 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
826 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
830 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf;
833 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
834 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
835 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
836 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) {
837 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
843 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
844 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
845 i = BIO_write(s->wbio,
846 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
847 (unsigned int)wb->left);
849 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
855 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
856 return (s->s3->wpend_ret);
858 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
860 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
861 * using a datagram service
873 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
874 * 'type' is one of the following:
876 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
877 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
878 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
880 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
881 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
883 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
884 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
885 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
886 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
887 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
888 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
889 * Change cipher spec protocol
890 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
892 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
894 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
895 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
896 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
897 * Application data protocol
898 * none of our business
900 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
905 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
907 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&s->rlayer.rbuf)) {
908 /* Not initialized yet */
909 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
913 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
914 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
916 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
917 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
921 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
922 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
924 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
925 unsigned char *dst = buf;
930 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
933 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
936 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
937 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
938 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
943 * Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
946 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) {
947 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
948 i = s->handshake_func(s);
952 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
957 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
960 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
961 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
962 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
963 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
965 rr = &s->rlayer.rrec;
967 /* get new packet if necessary */
968 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
969 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
974 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
976 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
977 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
978 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
979 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
980 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
985 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
988 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
990 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
994 if (type == rr->type) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
995 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
997 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
998 * doing a handshake for the first time
1000 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1001 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1002 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1003 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1010 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1013 n = (unsigned int)len;
1015 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1019 if (rr->length == 0) {
1020 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1022 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
1023 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0)
1024 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1031 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1032 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
1036 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1037 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1040 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1041 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1042 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1044 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1045 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1046 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1047 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1048 } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1049 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1050 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1051 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1053 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1054 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) {
1055 /* We can ignore 0 return values */
1056 if(tls1_process_heartbeat(s, SSL3_RECORD_get_data(&s->rlayer.rrec),
1057 SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec)) < 0) {
1061 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1063 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1064 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1065 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1070 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1071 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1073 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1075 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1077 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1081 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1082 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1087 * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1088 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1089 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1092 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1094 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1095 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1096 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1097 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1099 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1100 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1101 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
1102 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1107 if (s->msg_callback)
1108 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1109 s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s,
1110 s->msg_callback_arg);
1112 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1113 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1114 !s->s3->renegotiate) {
1115 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1116 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
1117 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1122 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1126 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1127 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0) {
1128 /* no read-ahead left? */
1131 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1132 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1133 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1134 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1136 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1137 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1138 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1139 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1146 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1147 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1152 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1153 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1154 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1157 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1158 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1159 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1160 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1161 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1162 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1163 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1165 * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1168 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1171 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
1172 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1173 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1175 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1177 if (s->msg_callback)
1178 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1179 s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1181 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1182 cb = s->info_callback;
1183 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1184 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1187 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1188 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1191 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1192 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1193 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1194 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1198 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1199 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1200 * alert because if application tried to renegotiatie it
1201 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1202 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1203 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1205 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1206 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1207 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1210 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1211 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1214 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1217 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1218 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1220 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1221 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1222 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1223 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
1226 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1234 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1236 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1241 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1243 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly
1244 * what the record payload has to look like
1246 if ((rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1247 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
1248 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1253 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1254 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
1255 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1260 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) {
1261 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1266 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
1270 if (s->msg_callback)
1271 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1272 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1274 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
1275 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1282 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1284 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) {
1285 if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1286 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
1287 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1291 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1299 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1300 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0) {
1301 /* no read-ahead left? */
1304 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1305 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1306 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1307 * problems in the blocking world
1309 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1310 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1311 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1312 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1322 * TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: TLS v1.2 give
1323 * an unexpected message alert.
1325 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
1329 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1332 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1334 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1336 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1337 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not
1338 * happen when type != rr->type
1340 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1343 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1345 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1346 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1347 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1348 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1349 * started), we will indulge it.
1351 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1352 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1353 (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1354 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1355 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1356 ) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1357 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1358 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1361 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1364 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1372 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);