2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include <openssl/evp.h>
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include "record_locl.h"
20 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
21 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
24 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
25 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
26 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
27 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
29 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
30 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
33 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s)
36 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer);
37 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
40 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
44 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
47 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
48 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
53 rl->packet_length = 0;
55 memset(rl->alert_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->alert_fragment));
56 rl->alert_fragment_len = 0;
57 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
58 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
64 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
65 for (pipes = 0; pipes < rl->numwpipes; pipes++)
66 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->wbuf[pipes]);
69 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
71 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
72 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
75 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
78 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
80 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
81 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
82 if (rl->numwpipes > 0)
83 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
84 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
87 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
89 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
92 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
94 return (rl->numwpipes > 0)
95 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0;
98 int RECORD_LAYER_set_data(RECORD_LAYER *rl, const unsigned char *buf,
101 rl->packet_length = len;
103 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
104 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
105 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(rl->s))
109 rl->packet = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&rl->rbuf);
110 SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(&rl->rbuf, buf, len);
115 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
117 memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence));
120 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
122 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
125 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
129 if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
132 for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) {
133 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i])
134 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
136 num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]);
142 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len)
144 ctx->default_read_buf_len = len;
147 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len)
149 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len);
152 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
154 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
155 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
156 return "read header";
157 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
159 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
166 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
168 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
169 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
171 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
173 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
181 * Return values are as per SSL_read()
183 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t max, int extend, int clearold,
187 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
188 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
189 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
190 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
191 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
192 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
193 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
195 size_t len, left, align = 0;
202 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
204 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
208 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
209 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
210 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
214 /* start with empty packet ... */
217 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
219 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
222 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
223 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
224 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
226 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
227 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
228 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
229 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
230 * overrun can be triggered.
232 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
236 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
237 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
238 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
241 len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
242 pkt = rb->buf + align;
244 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
245 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
247 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) {
248 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left);
249 s->rlayer.packet = pkt;
250 rb->offset = len + align;
254 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
255 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
258 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
259 if (left == 0 && extend)
261 if (left > 0 && n > left)
265 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
267 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
274 /* else we need to read more data */
276 if (n > rb->len - rb->offset) { /* does not happen */
277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
281 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
282 if (!s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
283 /* ignore max parameter */
288 if (max > rb->len - rb->offset)
289 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
297 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
298 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
303 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
304 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
305 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
306 ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
316 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
318 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
323 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
324 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
325 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
327 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
329 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
333 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
336 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
337 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
343 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
344 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
346 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len,
349 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
351 size_t n, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
352 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
353 size_t max_send_fragment, nw;
355 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
359 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
360 tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
362 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
363 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
364 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
365 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
366 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
367 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
368 * report the error in a way the user will notice
370 if (len < s->rlayer.wnum) {
371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
377 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
378 i = s->handshake_func(s);
382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
388 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
389 * will happen with non blocking IO
392 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot,
395 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
396 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
399 tot += tmpwrit; /* this might be last fragment */
401 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
403 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
404 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
405 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
406 * compromise is considered worthy.
408 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
409 len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
410 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
411 !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
412 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) &
413 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
414 unsigned char aad[13];
415 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
419 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
420 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
421 max_send_fragment -= 512;
423 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
424 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
426 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
427 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
428 (int)max_send_fragment, NULL);
430 if (len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
435 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) {
436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
439 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
440 /* free jumbo buffer */
441 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
448 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
449 /* free jumbo buffer */
450 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
454 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
455 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
457 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
462 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
463 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
465 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
467 memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
469 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
470 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
477 packleni = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
478 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
479 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
480 packlen = (size_t)packleni;
481 if (packleni <= 0 || packlen > wb->len) { /* never happens */
482 /* free jumbo buffer */
483 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
487 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
488 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
491 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
492 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
493 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
496 s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
497 if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
499 while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
505 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
506 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
507 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
508 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
510 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw, &tmpwrit);
512 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
513 /* free jumbo buffer */
514 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
516 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
520 /* free jumbo buffer */
521 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
522 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
530 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
531 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
532 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
540 split_send_fragment = s->split_send_fragment;
542 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
543 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
544 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
547 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
548 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) {
550 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
557 || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL
558 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx))
559 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
560 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
562 if (s->max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment > s->max_send_fragment
563 || split_send_fragment == 0) {
565 * We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send
566 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
573 size_t pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain;
579 numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1;
580 if (numpipes > maxpipes)
583 if (n / numpipes >= s->max_send_fragment) {
585 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
588 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
589 pipelens[j] = s->max_send_fragment;
592 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
593 tmppipelen = n / numpipes;
594 remain = n % numpipes;
595 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
596 pipelens[j] = tmppipelen;
602 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0,
605 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
606 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
611 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
612 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
614 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
615 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
617 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
619 if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
621 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
623 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
632 int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
633 size_t *pipelens, size_t numpipes,
634 int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written)
636 WPACKET pkt[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
637 SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
638 unsigned char *recordstart;
639 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
640 size_t prefix_len = 0;
645 size_t totlen = 0, len, wpinited = 0;
648 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++)
649 totlen += pipelens[j];
651 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
652 * will happen with non blocking IO
654 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer))
655 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
657 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
658 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
659 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
662 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
665 if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes)
666 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0))
669 if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
674 if ((sess == NULL) ||
675 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
676 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
679 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
680 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
686 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
688 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
690 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
691 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
694 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
696 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
697 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
698 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
701 size_t tmppipelen = 0;
704 ret = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1, &prefix_len);
709 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
710 /* insufficient space */
711 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
716 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
719 if (create_empty_fragment) {
720 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
721 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
723 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
724 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
725 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
727 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
728 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
730 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
731 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
732 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
733 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) {
734 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
738 } else if (prefix_len) {
739 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
740 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
741 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
742 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)
743 + prefix_len, NULL)) {
744 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
749 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
750 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j];
751 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
752 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
753 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
755 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
756 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[j], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
757 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
758 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[j], align, NULL)) {
759 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
766 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
767 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
768 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
769 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
770 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
771 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
774 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
775 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
776 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
777 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
778 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
783 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
784 memset(wr, 0, sizeof wr);
785 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
786 unsigned int version = s->version;
787 unsigned char *compressdata = NULL;
789 unsigned int rectype;
791 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr[j], type);
793 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
796 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
797 rectype = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
801 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
802 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
804 if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
805 && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
806 version = TLS1_VERSION;
808 maxcomplen = pipelens[j] + (s->compress != NULL
809 ? SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD : 0);
810 /* write the header */
811 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&pkt[j], rectype)
812 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&pkt[j], version)
813 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&pkt[j])
815 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[j], eivlen, NULL))
817 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(&pkt[j], maxcomplen,
819 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
823 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
824 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr[j], compressdata);
825 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(&wr[j], pipelens[j]);
826 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(&wr[j], (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]);
827 totlen += pipelens[j];
830 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
833 /* first we compress */
834 if (s->compress != NULL) {
836 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make sure we prevent compression!!!
838 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, &wr[j])
839 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[j], wr[j].length, NULL)) {
840 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
844 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt[j], wr[j].input, wr[j].length)) {
845 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
848 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
851 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
852 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&pkt[j], type)) {
853 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
856 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], 1);
858 * TODO(TLS1.3): Padding goes here. Do we need an API to add this?
859 * For now, use no padding
864 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
865 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
869 if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
872 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[j], mac_size, &mac)
873 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr[j], mac, 1)) {
874 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
880 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption.
881 * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using
882 * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case.
884 if(!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(&pkt[j], SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE,
887 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
890 || !WPACKET_get_length(&pkt[j], &len)) {
891 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
895 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
896 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt[j]) - len;
898 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr[j], recordstart);
899 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
900 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(&wr[j], len);
903 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1)
906 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
909 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
910 if (!WPACKET_get_length(&pkt[j], &origlen)
911 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
912 || origlen > wr[j].length
913 || (wr[j].length > origlen
914 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[j],
915 wr[j].length - origlen, NULL))) {
916 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
919 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
922 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[j], mac_size, &mac)
923 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr[j], mac, 1)) {
924 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
927 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], mac_size);
930 if (!WPACKET_get_length(&pkt[j], &len)
931 || !WPACKET_close(&pkt[j])) {
932 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
936 if (s->msg_callback) {
937 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt[j]) - len
938 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
939 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, recordstart,
940 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
941 s->msg_callback_arg);
944 if (!WPACKET_finish(&pkt[j])) {
945 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
950 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
953 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr[j], type); /* not needed but helps for
955 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
957 if (create_empty_fragment) {
959 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
963 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
964 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
967 *written = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr);
971 /* now let's set up wb */
972 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j],
973 prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr[j]));
977 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
980 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen;
981 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
982 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
983 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen;
985 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
986 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
988 for (j = 0; j < wpinited; j++)
989 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt[j]);
993 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
995 * Return values are as per SSL_write()
997 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
1001 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf;
1005 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len)
1006 || ((s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf) &&
1007 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
1008 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
1009 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1014 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
1015 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0
1016 && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) {
1021 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
1022 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
1023 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1024 i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)
1025 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf])
1026 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]),
1027 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]));
1031 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
1034 if (i > 0 && tmpwrit == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) {
1035 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1036 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1037 if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes)
1039 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1040 *written = s->rlayer.wpend_ret;
1042 } else if (i <= 0) {
1043 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1045 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1046 * using a datagram service
1048 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1052 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1053 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1058 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1059 * 'type' is one of the following:
1061 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1062 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1063 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1065 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1066 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1068 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1069 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
1070 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
1071 * argument is non NULL.
1072 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1073 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1074 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1075 * Change cipher spec protocol
1076 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1078 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1079 * Handshake protocol
1080 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1081 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1082 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1083 * Application data protocol
1084 * none of our business
1086 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
1087 size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes)
1090 size_t n, curr_rec, num_recs, totalbytes;
1093 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
1095 rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
1097 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) {
1098 /* Not initialized yet */
1099 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
1103 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1104 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
1106 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
1107 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1111 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1112 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1114 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1115 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1120 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1123 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
1126 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1127 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1128 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1130 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1131 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1138 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1141 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1142 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1143 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1152 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1155 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1156 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1157 * rr[i].data, - data
1158 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1159 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1161 rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
1162 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1165 /* get new records if necessary */
1166 if (num_recs == 0) {
1167 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1170 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1171 if (num_recs == 0) {
1172 /* Shouldn't happen */
1173 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1174 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1178 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1180 curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]);
1182 if (curr_rec == num_recs) {
1183 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0);
1187 } while (num_recs == 0);
1191 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1192 * record that isn't an alert.
1194 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
1195 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0)
1196 s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
1198 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1200 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1201 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1202 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1203 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1209 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1212 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1213 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1214 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1218 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
1219 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1220 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) {
1222 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1223 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1224 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1227 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1228 * doing a handshake for the first time
1230 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1231 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1232 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1237 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1238 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1239 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
1240 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1245 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1246 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
1253 if (len - totalbytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1254 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
1256 n = len - totalbytes;
1258 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1261 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
1262 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1263 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1265 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
1266 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1267 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
1268 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1269 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
1270 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1273 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0
1274 || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) {
1279 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs
1280 && totalbytes < len);
1281 if (totalbytes == 0) {
1282 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1285 if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs
1286 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1287 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0)
1288 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1289 *readbytes = totalbytes;
1294 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1295 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1296 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1300 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1302 if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
1304 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1305 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1306 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1307 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1309 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1314 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1315 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1317 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1318 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1319 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1320 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1322 s->version = rr->rec_version;
1323 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1329 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1330 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1333 size_t dest_maxlen = 0;
1334 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1335 size_t *dest_len = NULL;
1337 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1338 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1339 dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1340 dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
1341 } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1342 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1343 dest = s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1344 dest_len = &s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len;
1347 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1348 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1349 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
1350 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
1352 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1354 dest[(*dest_len)++] =
1355 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)];
1356 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, 1);
1357 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -1);
1360 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) {
1361 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1362 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1368 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1369 * s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1370 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1373 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1375 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1376 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1377 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1378 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1380 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1381 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1382 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
1383 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1388 if (s->msg_callback)
1389 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1390 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment, 4, s,
1391 s->msg_callback_arg);
1393 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1394 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1395 !s->s3->renegotiate) {
1396 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1397 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
1398 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1402 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1406 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1407 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
1408 /* no read-ahead left? */
1411 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1412 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1413 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1414 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1416 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1417 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1418 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1419 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1426 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1427 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1432 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1433 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1434 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1437 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1438 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1439 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1440 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1441 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1442 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1443 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1444 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1445 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1446 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1449 if (s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
1450 int alert_level = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[0];
1451 int alert_descr = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[1];
1453 s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len = 0;
1455 if (s->msg_callback)
1456 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1457 s->rlayer.alert_fragment, 2, s,
1458 s->msg_callback_arg);
1460 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1461 cb = s->info_callback;
1462 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1463 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1466 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1467 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1470 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1471 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1472 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1474 s->rlayer.alert_count++;
1475 if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
1476 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
1481 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1482 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1486 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1487 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1488 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1489 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1490 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1491 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1493 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1494 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1498 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1499 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1502 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1505 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1506 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1507 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1508 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1509 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1510 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1511 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1512 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1515 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1523 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1525 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1526 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1527 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1531 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1532 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1538 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1540 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
1541 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
1542 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1543 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
1544 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1548 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1556 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1557 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
1558 /* no read-ahead left? */
1561 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1562 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1563 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1564 * problems in the blocking world
1566 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1567 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1568 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1569 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1576 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
1579 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1580 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1581 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1582 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1583 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1585 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1586 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1588 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1590 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1592 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1593 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1594 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1596 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1599 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1601 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1602 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1603 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1604 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1605 * started), we will indulge it.
1607 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
1608 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1611 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1619 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1623 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
1627 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
1635 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1636 * format and false otherwise.
1638 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1640 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]);
1644 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1646 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1648 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]);