2 * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
14 #include <openssl/evp.h>
15 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
16 #include <openssl/rand.h>
17 #include "record_locl.h"
18 #include "../packet_locl.h"
20 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
21 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
22 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
23 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
25 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
26 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
29 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s)
32 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer);
33 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
36 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
38 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
41 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
42 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
47 rl->packet_length = 0;
49 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
50 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
56 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
57 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
59 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
61 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
62 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
65 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
68 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
70 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
71 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
72 if (rl->numwpipes > 0)
73 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
74 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
77 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
78 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
80 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
83 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
84 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
86 size_t curr_rec = 0, num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl);
87 const SSL3_RECORD *rr = rl->rrec;
89 while (curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]))
92 return curr_rec < num_recs;
95 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
97 return (rl->numwpipes > 0)
98 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0;
101 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
103 memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence));
106 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
108 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
111 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
115 if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
118 for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) {
119 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i])
120 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
122 num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]);
128 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len)
130 ctx->default_read_buf_len = len;
133 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len)
135 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len);
138 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
140 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
141 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
142 return "read header";
143 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
145 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
152 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
154 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
155 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
157 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
159 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
167 * Return values are as per SSL_read()
169 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t max, int extend, int clearold,
173 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
174 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
175 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
176 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
177 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
178 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
179 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
181 size_t len, left, align = 0;
188 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
190 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) {
191 /* SSLfatal() already called */
196 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
197 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
198 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
202 /* start with empty packet ... */
205 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
207 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
210 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
211 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
212 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
214 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
215 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
216 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
217 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
218 * overrun can be triggered.
220 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
224 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
225 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
226 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
229 len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
230 pkt = rb->buf + align;
232 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
233 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
235 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) {
236 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left);
237 s->rlayer.packet = pkt;
238 rb->offset = len + align;
242 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
243 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
246 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
247 if (left == 0 && extend)
249 if (left > 0 && n > left)
253 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
255 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
262 /* else we need to read more data */
264 if (n > rb->len - rb->offset) {
265 /* does not happen */
266 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,
267 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
271 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
272 if (!s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
273 /* ignore max parameter */
278 if (max > rb->len - rb->offset)
279 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
287 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
288 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
293 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
294 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
295 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
296 ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
300 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,
301 SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
307 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
309 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
314 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
315 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
316 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
318 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
320 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
324 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
327 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
328 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
334 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
335 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
337 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len,
340 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
342 size_t n, max_send_fragment, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
343 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
346 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
350 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
351 tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
353 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
354 * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for
355 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
356 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
357 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
358 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
359 * report the error in a way the user will notice
361 if ((len < s->rlayer.wnum)
362 || ((wb->left != 0) && (len < (s->rlayer.wnum + s->rlayer.wpend_tot)))) {
363 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,
368 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
369 && !early_data_count_ok(s, len, 0, 1)) {
370 /* SSLfatal() already called */
377 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in
378 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those
381 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)
382 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING) {
383 i = s->handshake_func(s);
384 /* SSLfatal() already called */
393 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
394 * will happen with non blocking IO
397 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
398 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot,
401 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
402 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
405 tot += tmpwrit; /* this might be last fragment */
407 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
409 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
410 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
411 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
412 * compromise is considered worthy.
414 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
415 len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s)) &&
416 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
417 !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
418 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) &
419 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
420 unsigned char aad[13];
421 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
425 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
426 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
427 max_send_fragment -= 512;
429 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
430 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
432 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
433 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
434 (int)max_send_fragment, NULL);
436 if (len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
441 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) {
442 /* SSLfatal() already called */
445 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
446 /* free jumbo buffer */
447 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
454 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
455 /* free jumbo buffer */
456 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
460 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
461 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
463 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
464 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
469 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
470 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
472 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
474 memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
476 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
477 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
484 packleni = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
485 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
486 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
487 packlen = (size_t)packleni;
488 if (packleni <= 0 || packlen > wb->len) { /* never happens */
489 /* free jumbo buffer */
490 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
494 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
495 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
498 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
499 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
500 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
503 s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
504 if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
506 while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
512 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
513 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
514 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
515 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
517 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw, &tmpwrit);
519 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
520 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
521 /* free jumbo buffer */
522 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
524 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
528 /* free jumbo buffer */
529 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
530 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
537 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK */
538 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
539 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
540 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
548 max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s);
549 split_send_fragment = ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s);
551 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
552 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
553 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
556 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
557 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) {
559 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
562 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,
563 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
567 || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL
568 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx))
569 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
570 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
572 if (max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment == 0
573 || split_send_fragment > max_send_fragment) {
575 * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send
576 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
578 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,
579 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
584 size_t pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain;
590 numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1;
591 if (numpipes > maxpipes)
594 if (n / numpipes >= max_send_fragment) {
596 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
599 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
600 pipelens[j] = max_send_fragment;
603 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
604 tmppipelen = n / numpipes;
605 remain = n % numpipes;
606 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
607 pipelens[j] = tmppipelen;
613 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0,
616 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
617 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
618 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
623 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
624 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
626 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
627 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
629 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
631 if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
633 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
635 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
644 int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
645 size_t *pipelens, size_t numpipes,
646 int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written)
648 WPACKET pkt[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
649 SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
652 unsigned char *recordstart;
653 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
654 size_t prefix_len = 0;
659 size_t totlen = 0, len, wpinited = 0;
662 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++)
663 totlen += pipelens[j];
665 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
666 * will happen with non blocking IO
668 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
669 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
670 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
673 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
674 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
675 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
677 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
680 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
683 if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes) {
684 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0)) {
685 /* SSLfatal() already called */
690 if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
695 if ((sess == NULL) ||
696 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
697 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
700 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
701 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
703 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
704 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
710 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
712 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
714 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
715 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
718 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
720 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
721 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
722 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
725 size_t tmppipelen = 0;
728 ret = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1, &prefix_len);
730 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
735 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
736 /* insufficient space */
737 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
738 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
743 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
746 if (create_empty_fragment) {
747 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
748 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
750 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
751 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
752 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
754 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
755 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
757 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
758 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
759 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
760 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) {
761 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
762 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
766 } else if (prefix_len) {
767 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
768 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0],
769 SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
770 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
771 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)
772 + prefix_len, NULL)) {
773 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
774 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
779 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
782 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j];
783 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
784 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
785 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
787 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
788 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
789 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
790 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, align, NULL)) {
791 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
792 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
799 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
800 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && !SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)) {
801 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
802 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
803 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
804 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
807 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
808 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
809 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
810 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
811 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
816 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
817 memset(wr, 0, sizeof(wr));
818 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
819 unsigned int version = SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_VERSION : s->version;
820 unsigned char *compressdata = NULL;
822 unsigned int rectype;
827 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type);
829 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
832 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
833 rectype = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
837 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
838 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
840 if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
841 && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
842 version = TLS1_VERSION;
844 maxcomplen = pipelens[j];
845 if (s->compress != NULL)
846 maxcomplen += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
848 /* write the header */
849 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, rectype)
850 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt, version)
851 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt)
853 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, eivlen, NULL))
855 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, maxcomplen,
857 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
858 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
862 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
863 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, compressdata);
864 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, pipelens[j]);
865 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr, (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]);
866 totlen += pipelens[j];
869 * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into
873 /* first we compress */
874 if (s->compress != NULL) {
875 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, thiswr)
876 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, thiswr->length, NULL)) {
877 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
878 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
882 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt, thiswr->input, thiswr->length)) {
883 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
884 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
887 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
890 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
891 size_t rlen, max_send_fragment;
893 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, type)) {
894 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
895 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
898 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, 1);
900 /* Add TLS1.3 padding */
901 max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s);
902 rlen = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
903 if (rlen < max_send_fragment) {
905 size_t max_padding = max_send_fragment - rlen;
906 if (s->record_padding_cb != NULL) {
907 padding = s->record_padding_cb(s, type, rlen, s->record_padding_arg);
908 } else if (s->block_padding > 0) {
909 size_t mask = s->block_padding - 1;
912 /* optimize for power of 2 */
913 if ((s->block_padding & mask) == 0)
914 remainder = rlen & mask;
916 remainder = rlen % s->block_padding;
917 /* don't want to add a block of padding if we don't have to */
921 padding = s->block_padding - remainder;
924 /* do not allow the record to exceed max plaintext length */
925 if (padding > max_padding)
926 padding = max_padding;
927 if (!WPACKET_memset(thispkt, 0, padding)) {
928 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
929 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
932 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, padding);
938 * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from
939 * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points
943 if (!SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
946 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
947 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
948 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
949 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
955 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption.
956 * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using
957 * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case.
959 if (!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE,
962 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
965 || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)) {
966 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
967 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
971 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
972 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len;
974 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, recordstart);
975 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr);
976 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, len);
979 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
980 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY) {
982 * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to
983 * send early data - so we need to use the tls13enc function.
985 if (tls13_enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1) {
986 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
987 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
991 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1) {
992 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
993 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
998 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
1004 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
1005 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &origlen)
1006 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
1007 || origlen > thiswr->length
1008 || (thiswr->length > origlen
1009 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt,
1010 thiswr->length - origlen, NULL))) {
1011 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1012 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1015 if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
1018 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
1019 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
1020 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1021 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1024 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, mac_size);
1027 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)
1028 || !WPACKET_close(thispkt)) {
1029 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1030 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1034 if (s->msg_callback) {
1035 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len
1036 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1037 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, recordstart,
1038 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1039 s->msg_callback_arg);
1041 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
1042 unsigned char ctype = type;
1044 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE,
1045 &ctype, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1049 if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt)) {
1050 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1051 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1056 * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which
1057 * is thiswr->length long
1059 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type); /* not needed but helps for
1061 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
1063 if (create_empty_fragment) {
1065 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1069 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
1070 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1071 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1074 *written = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
1078 /* now let's set up wb */
1079 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j],
1080 prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr));
1084 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1087 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen;
1088 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
1089 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
1090 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen;
1092 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1093 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
1095 for (j = 0; j < wpinited; j++)
1096 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt[j]);
1100 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
1102 * Return values are as per SSL_write()
1104 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
1108 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf;
1112 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len)
1113 || ((s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf) &&
1114 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
1115 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
1116 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,
1117 SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1122 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
1123 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0
1124 && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) {
1129 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
1130 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
1131 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1132 i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)
1133 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf])
1134 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]),
1135 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]));
1139 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,
1143 if (i > 0 && tmpwrit == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) {
1144 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1145 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1146 if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes)
1148 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1149 *written = s->rlayer.wpend_ret;
1151 } else if (i <= 0) {
1152 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1154 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1155 * using a datagram service
1157 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1161 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1162 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1167 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1168 * 'type' is one of the following:
1170 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1171 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1172 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1174 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1175 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1177 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1178 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
1179 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
1180 * argument is non NULL.
1181 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1182 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1183 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1184 * Change cipher spec protocol
1185 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1187 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1188 * Handshake protocol
1189 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1190 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1191 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1192 * Application data protocol
1193 * none of our business
1195 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
1196 size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes)
1199 size_t n, curr_rec, num_recs, totalbytes;
1202 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
1204 rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
1206 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) {
1207 /* Not initialized yet */
1208 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) {
1209 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1214 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1215 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
1217 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
1218 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1219 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1223 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1224 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1226 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1227 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1232 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1235 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
1238 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1239 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1240 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1242 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1243 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1250 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1253 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1254 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1255 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1256 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1263 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1266 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1267 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1268 * rr[i].data, - data
1269 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1270 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1272 rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
1273 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1276 /* get new records if necessary */
1277 if (num_recs == 0) {
1278 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1280 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
1283 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1284 if (num_recs == 0) {
1285 /* Shouldn't happen */
1286 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1287 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1291 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1293 curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]);
1295 if (curr_rec == num_recs) {
1296 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0);
1300 } while (num_recs == 0);
1304 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1305 * record that isn't an alert.
1307 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
1308 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0)
1309 s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
1311 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1313 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1314 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1315 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1316 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1317 SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1322 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1325 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1326 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1327 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1331 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
1332 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1333 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL
1334 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1336 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1337 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1338 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1341 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1342 * doing a handshake for the first time
1344 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1345 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1346 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1347 SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1351 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1352 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1353 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
1354 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1355 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1359 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1360 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
1364 * Mark a zero length record as read. This ensures multiple calls to
1365 * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause
1366 * SSL_pending() to report data as being available.
1368 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1369 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1375 if (len - totalbytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1376 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
1378 n = len - totalbytes;
1380 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1383 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
1384 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1385 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1387 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
1388 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1389 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
1390 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1391 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
1392 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1395 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0
1396 || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) {
1401 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs
1402 && totalbytes < len);
1403 if (totalbytes == 0) {
1404 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1407 if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs
1408 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1409 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0)
1410 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1411 *readbytes = totalbytes;
1416 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1417 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1418 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1422 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1424 if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
1426 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1427 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1428 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1429 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1431 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1432 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1436 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1437 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1439 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1440 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1441 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1442 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1444 s->version = rr->rec_version;
1445 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1446 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1451 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1452 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1455 size_t dest_maxlen = 0;
1456 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1457 size_t *dest_len = NULL;
1459 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1460 dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment);
1461 dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1462 dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
1465 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1466 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1467 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
1468 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
1470 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1471 memcpy(dest + *dest_len,
1472 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr) + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr), n);
1473 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1474 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
1476 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1477 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1479 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1480 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1485 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1486 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1490 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1491 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1492 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1495 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1496 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1498 (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) &&
1499 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1500 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1501 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1502 ((!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1503 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) ||
1504 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1505 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1506 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1507 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1510 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1511 unsigned int alert_level, alert_descr;
1512 unsigned char *alert_bytes = SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)
1513 + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr);
1516 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert, alert_bytes, SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1517 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_level)
1518 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_descr)
1519 || PACKET_remaining(&alert) != 0) {
1520 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1521 SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT);
1525 if (s->msg_callback)
1526 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_bytes, 2, s,
1527 s->msg_callback_arg);
1529 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1530 cb = s->info_callback;
1531 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1532 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1535 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1536 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1539 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1540 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1541 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1543 s->rlayer.alert_count++;
1544 if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
1545 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1546 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
1550 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1551 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1555 * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3
1556 * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore.
1558 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && alert_descr != SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED) {
1559 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1560 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1564 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1565 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1566 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1567 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1568 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1569 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1571 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1572 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1573 SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1576 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1579 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1580 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1581 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1582 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1583 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1584 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1585 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1586 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1587 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1590 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1591 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1598 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1600 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1601 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1602 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1606 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1607 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1608 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1613 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
1614 * protocol violation)
1616 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
1617 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
1618 int ined = (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING);
1620 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
1621 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1623 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1624 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
1632 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a
1633 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read
1634 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now.
1639 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1640 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
1641 /* no read-ahead left? */
1644 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1645 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1646 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1647 * problems in the blocking world
1649 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1650 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1651 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1652 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1659 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
1662 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1663 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1664 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1665 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1666 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1668 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1669 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1671 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1673 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1675 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1676 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1677 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1679 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1680 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1682 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1684 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1685 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1686 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1687 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1688 * started), we will indulge it.
1690 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
1691 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1693 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) {
1695 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
1696 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
1697 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
1698 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
1699 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
1700 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
1703 if (!early_data_count_ok(s, rr->length,
1704 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) {
1705 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1708 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1711 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1712 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1718 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
1722 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
1730 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1731 * format and false otherwise.
1733 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1735 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]);
1739 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1741 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1743 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]);