1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 /* ====================================================================
58 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
61 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
64 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
65 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
68 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
69 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
72 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
73 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
74 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
75 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
78 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
79 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
80 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
83 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
84 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
89 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
92 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
93 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
94 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
95 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
96 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
97 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
98 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
99 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
100 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
101 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
102 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
103 * ====================================================================
105 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
106 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
107 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
115 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
116 #include <openssl/evp.h>
117 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
118 #include <openssl/rand.h>
119 #include "record_locl.h"
121 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
122 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
125 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
126 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
127 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
128 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
129 defined(__INTEL__) ) \
131 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
132 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
135 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s)
138 SSL3_RECORD_clear(&rl->rrec);
139 SSL3_RECORD_clear(&rl->wrec);
142 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
146 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
148 /* Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
149 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
154 rl->packet_length = 0;
156 memset(rl->alert_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->alert_fragment));
157 rl->alert_fragment_len = 0;
158 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
159 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
163 rl->wpend_buf = NULL;
165 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
166 for(pipes = 0; pipes < rl->numwpipes; pipes++)
167 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->wbuf[pipes]);
169 SSL3_RECORD_clear(&rl->rrec);
170 SSL3_RECORD_clear(&rl->wrec);
172 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
173 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
176 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
179 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
181 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
182 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
183 if (rl->numwpipes > 0)
184 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
185 SSL3_RECORD_release(&rl->rrec);
188 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
190 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
193 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
195 return (rl->numwpipes > 0)
196 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes-1]) != 0;
199 int RECORD_LAYER_set_data(RECORD_LAYER *rl, const unsigned char *buf, int len)
201 rl->packet_length = len;
203 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
204 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
205 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(rl->s))
209 rl->packet = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&rl->rbuf);
210 SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(&rl->rbuf, buf, len);
215 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
217 memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence));
220 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
222 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
225 int RECORD_LAYER_setup_comp_buffer(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
227 return SSL3_RECORD_setup(&(rl)->rrec);
230 int ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
232 if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
235 return (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec) == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
236 ? SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec) : 0;
239 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
243 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
244 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
247 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
250 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
260 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
264 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
265 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
268 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
271 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
281 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
284 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
285 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
286 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
287 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
288 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
298 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
300 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
304 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
305 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
306 align = (0-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
310 /* start with empty packet ... */
313 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
315 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
318 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
319 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
320 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
322 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
323 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
324 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
325 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
326 * overrun can be triggered.
328 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
332 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
333 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
334 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
338 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
339 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
342 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
343 if (left == 0 && extend)
345 if (left > 0 && n > left)
349 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
351 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
357 /* else we need to read more data */
359 len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
360 pkt = rb->buf + align;
362 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
363 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
365 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt) { /* len > 0 */
366 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left);
367 s->rlayer.packet = pkt;
368 rb->offset = len + align;
371 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) { /* does not happen */
372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
376 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
377 if (!s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
378 /* ignore max parameter */
383 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
384 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
389 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
390 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
395 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
396 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
397 i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
399 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
405 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
407 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
412 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
413 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
414 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
416 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
418 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
422 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
425 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
426 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
432 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
433 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
435 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
437 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
440 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
441 unsigned int max_send_fragment, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
442 unsigned int u_len = (unsigned int)len;
444 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_NEGATIVE_LENGTH);
452 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
453 tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
455 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
456 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
457 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
458 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
459 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
460 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
461 * report the error in a way the user will notice
463 if ((unsigned int)len < s->rlayer.wnum) {
464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
471 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
472 i = s->handshake_func(s);
476 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
482 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
483 * will happen with non blocking IO
486 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot);
488 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
489 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
492 tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */
494 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
496 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
497 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
498 * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the
499 * compromise is considered worthy.
501 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
502 u_len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
503 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
504 !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
505 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) &
506 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
507 unsigned char aad[13];
508 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
511 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
512 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
513 max_send_fragment -= 512;
515 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
516 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
518 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
519 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
520 max_send_fragment, NULL);
522 if (u_len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
527 wb->buf = OPENSSL_malloc(packlen);
528 if (wb->buf == NULL) {
529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
533 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
534 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
541 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
542 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
547 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
548 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
550 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
555 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
556 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
558 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
560 memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
562 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
563 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
570 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
571 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
572 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
574 if (packlen <= 0 || packlen > (int)wb->len) { /* never happens */
575 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
580 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
581 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
584 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
585 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
586 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
589 s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
590 if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
592 while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
598 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
599 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
600 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
601 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
603 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw);
605 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
606 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);
609 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
613 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
622 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
623 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
624 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
631 split_send_fragment = s->split_send_fragment;
633 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
634 * 1 pipeline. Similaraly if the cipher does not support pipelined
635 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
638 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
639 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) {
641 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
644 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
648 || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL
649 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx))
650 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
651 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
653 if (s->max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment > s->max_send_fragment
654 || split_send_fragment == 0) {
656 * We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send
657 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
664 unsigned int pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain;
665 unsigned int numpipes, j;
670 numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1;
671 if (numpipes > maxpipes)
674 if (n / numpipes >= s->max_send_fragment) {
676 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
679 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
680 pipelens[j] = s->max_send_fragment;
683 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
684 tmppipelen = n / numpipes;
685 remain = n % numpipes;
686 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
687 pipelens[j] = tmppipelen;
693 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0);
695 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
696 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
701 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
702 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
704 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
705 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
707 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
709 if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
711 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
721 int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
722 unsigned int *pipelens, unsigned int numpipes,
723 int create_empty_fragment)
725 unsigned char *outbuf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], *plen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
726 SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
727 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
733 unsigned int totlen = 0;
736 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++)
737 totlen += pipelens[j];
739 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
740 * will happen with non blocking IO
742 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer))
743 return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen));
745 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
746 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
747 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
750 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
753 if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes)
754 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes))
757 if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
762 if ((sess == NULL) ||
763 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
764 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
765 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
768 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
774 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
776 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
778 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
779 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
782 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
784 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
785 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
786 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
789 unsigned int tmppipelen = 0;
791 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1);
796 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
798 /* insufficient space */
799 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
804 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
807 if (create_empty_fragment) {
808 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
809 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
811 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
812 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
813 * payload, then we can just pretent we simply have two headers.
815 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
816 align = (0-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
818 outbuf[0] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + align;
819 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
820 } else if (prefix_len) {
821 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
822 outbuf[0] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)
825 for (j=0; j < numpipes; j++) {
826 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j];
827 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
828 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
829 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
831 outbuf[j] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + align;
832 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
836 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
837 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
838 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
839 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
840 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
844 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
845 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
846 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
847 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)
848 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
856 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
857 memset(wr, 0, sizeof wr);
858 for (j=0; j < numpipes; j++) {
859 /* write the header */
860 *(outbuf[j]++) = type & 0xff;
861 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr[j], type);
863 *(outbuf[j]++) = (s->version >> 8);
865 * Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
866 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
868 if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
869 && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
870 *(outbuf[j]++) = 0x1;
872 *(outbuf[j]++) = s->version & 0xff;
874 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
878 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
879 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr[j], outbuf[j] + eivlen);
880 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(&wr[j], (int)pipelens[j]);
881 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(&wr[j], (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]);
882 totlen += pipelens[j];
885 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
888 /* first we compress */
889 if (s->compress != NULL) {
890 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, &wr[j])) {
891 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
895 memcpy(wr[j].data, wr[j].input, wr[j].length);
896 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
900 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
901 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
905 if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
906 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr[j],
907 &(outbuf[j][wr[j].length + eivlen]), 1) < 0)
909 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], mac_size);
913 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr[j], outbuf[j]);
914 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
918 * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err;
920 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], eivlen);
924 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1)
927 for (j=0; j < numpipes; j++) {
928 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
929 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr[j],
930 outbuf[j] + wr[j].length, 1) < 0)
932 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], mac_size);
935 /* record length after mac and block padding */
936 s2n(SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr[j]), plen[j]);
939 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen[j] - 5, 5, s,
940 s->msg_callback_arg);
943 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
946 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr[j], type); /* not needed but helps for debugging */
947 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
949 if (create_empty_fragment) {
951 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
955 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
956 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
959 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr);
962 /* now let's set up wb */
963 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j],
964 prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr[j]));
970 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
973 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen;
974 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
975 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
976 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen;
978 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
979 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen);
984 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
985 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
989 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf;
990 unsigned int currbuf = 0;
993 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > (int)len)
994 || ((s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf) &&
995 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
996 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
997 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1002 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
1003 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0
1004 && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) {
1009 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
1010 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
1011 i = BIO_write(s->wbio,
1012 (char *)&(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf])[
1013 SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]),
1014 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]));
1016 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
1019 if (i == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) {
1020 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1021 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], i);
1022 if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes)
1024 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1025 return (s->rlayer.wpend_ret);
1026 } else if (i <= 0) {
1027 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1029 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1030 * using a datagram service
1032 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1036 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], i);
1037 SSL3_BUFFER_add_left(&wb[currbuf], -i);
1042 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1043 * 'type' is one of the following:
1045 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1046 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1047 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1049 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1050 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1052 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1053 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
1054 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
1055 * argument is non NULL.
1056 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1057 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1058 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1059 * Change cipher spec protocol
1060 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1062 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1063 * Handshake protocol
1064 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1065 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1066 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1067 * Application data protocol
1068 * none of our business
1070 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
1076 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
1078 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&s->rlayer.rbuf)) {
1079 /* Not initialized yet */
1080 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
1084 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1085 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
1087 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
1088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1092 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1093 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1095 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1096 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1101 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1104 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
1107 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1108 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1109 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1111 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1112 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1118 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1121 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1122 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1123 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1127 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1132 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1135 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
1136 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
1137 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1138 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
1140 rr = &s->rlayer.rrec;
1142 /* get new packet if necessary */
1143 if ((SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1144 || (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
1145 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1150 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1152 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1153 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1154 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1155 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1156 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1161 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1164 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1165 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1166 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1170 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
1171 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1172 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) {
1174 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1175 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1176 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1179 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1180 * doing a handshake for the first time
1182 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1183 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1184 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1189 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1190 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1191 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
1192 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1197 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1198 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
1203 if ((unsigned int)len > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1204 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
1206 n = (unsigned int)len;
1208 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1210 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -n);
1211 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1212 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
1213 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1214 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
1215 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
1216 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0)
1217 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1224 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1225 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1226 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1229 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1230 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1236 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1238 if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
1240 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1241 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1242 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1243 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1245 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1250 if(s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1251 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1253 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1254 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1255 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1256 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1258 s->version = rr->rec_version;
1259 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1265 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1266 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1269 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1270 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1271 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1273 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1274 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1275 dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1276 dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
1277 } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1278 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1279 dest = s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1280 dest_len = &s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len;
1283 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1284 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1285 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
1286 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
1288 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1290 dest[(*dest_len)++] =
1291 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)];
1292 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, 1);
1293 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -1);
1296 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1297 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1302 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1303 * s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1304 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1307 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1309 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1310 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1311 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1312 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1314 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1315 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1316 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
1317 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1322 if (s->msg_callback)
1323 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1324 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment, 4, s,
1325 s->msg_callback_arg);
1327 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1328 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1329 !s->s3->renegotiate) {
1330 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1331 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
1332 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1337 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1341 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1342 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0) {
1343 /* no read-ahead left? */
1346 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1347 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1348 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1349 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1351 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1352 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1353 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1354 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1361 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1362 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1367 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1368 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1369 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1372 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1373 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1374 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1375 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1376 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1377 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1378 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1379 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1380 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1383 if (s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
1384 int alert_level = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[0];
1385 int alert_descr = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[1];
1387 s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len = 0;
1389 if (s->msg_callback)
1390 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1391 s->rlayer.alert_fragment, 2, s,
1392 s->msg_callback_arg);
1394 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1395 cb = s->info_callback;
1396 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1397 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1400 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1401 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1404 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1405 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1406 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1407 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1411 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1412 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1413 * alert because if application tried to renegotiatie it
1414 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1415 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1416 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1418 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1419 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1423 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1424 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1427 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1430 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1431 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1433 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1434 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1435 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1436 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
1439 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1447 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1449 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1450 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1454 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1455 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1461 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1463 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
1464 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
1465 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1466 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
1467 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1471 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1475 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1479 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1480 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0) {
1481 /* no read-ahead left? */
1484 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1485 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1486 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1487 * problems in the blocking world
1489 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1490 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1491 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1492 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1499 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
1502 * TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: TLS v1.2 give
1503 * an unexpected message alert.
1505 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
1506 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1509 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1512 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1514 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1516 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1517 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1518 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1520 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1521 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1523 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1525 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1526 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1527 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1528 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1529 * started), we will indulge it.
1531 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
1532 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1535 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1543 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1547 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
1551 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
1559 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1560 * format and false otherwise.
1562 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1564 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec);
1568 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1570 unsigned int RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1572 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec);