2 * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
14 #include <openssl/evp.h>
15 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
16 #include "record_locl.h"
18 int DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
22 if ((d = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*d))) == NULL)
27 d->unprocessed_rcds.q = pqueue_new();
28 d->processed_rcds.q = pqueue_new();
29 d->buffered_app_data.q = pqueue_new();
31 if (d->unprocessed_rcds.q == NULL || d->processed_rcds.q == NULL
32 || d->buffered_app_data.q == NULL) {
33 pqueue_free(d->unprocessed_rcds.q);
34 pqueue_free(d->processed_rcds.q);
35 pqueue_free(d->buffered_app_data.q);
44 void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_free(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
46 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
47 pqueue_free(rl->d->unprocessed_rcds.q);
48 pqueue_free(rl->d->processed_rcds.q);
49 pqueue_free(rl->d->buffered_app_data.q);
54 void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
58 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
59 pqueue *unprocessed_rcds;
60 pqueue *processed_rcds;
61 pqueue *buffered_app_data;
65 while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) != NULL) {
66 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
67 OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
68 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
72 while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->processed_rcds.q)) != NULL) {
73 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
74 OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
75 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
79 while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->buffered_app_data.q)) != NULL) {
80 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
81 OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
82 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
86 unprocessed_rcds = d->unprocessed_rcds.q;
87 processed_rcds = d->processed_rcds.q;
88 buffered_app_data = d->buffered_app_data.q;
89 memset(d, 0, sizeof(*d));
90 d->unprocessed_rcds.q = unprocessed_rcds;
91 d->processed_rcds.q = processed_rcds;
92 d->buffered_app_data.q = buffered_app_data;
95 void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_saved_w_epoch(RECORD_LAYER *rl, unsigned short e)
97 if (e == rl->d->w_epoch - 1) {
98 memcpy(rl->d->curr_write_sequence,
99 rl->write_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
100 memcpy(rl->write_sequence,
101 rl->d->last_write_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
102 } else if (e == rl->d->w_epoch + 1) {
103 memcpy(rl->d->last_write_sequence,
104 rl->write_sequence, sizeof(unsigned char[8]));
105 memcpy(rl->write_sequence,
106 rl->d->curr_write_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
111 void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_resync_write(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
113 memcpy(rl->write_sequence, rl->read_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
116 void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl, unsigned char *seq)
118 memcpy(rl->write_sequence, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE);
121 static size_t have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
124 /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
125 static int dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
127 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
129 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
131 SSL3_BUFFER_release(&s->rlayer.rbuf);
133 s->rlayer.packet = rdata->packet;
134 s->rlayer.packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
135 memcpy(&s->rlayer.rbuf, &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
136 memcpy(&s->rlayer.rrec, &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
138 /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
139 memcpy(&(s->rlayer.read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6);
144 int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
146 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
149 /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
150 if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
153 rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*rdata));
154 item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
155 if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL) {
158 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
162 rdata->packet = s->rlayer.packet;
163 rdata->packet_length = s->rlayer.packet_length;
164 memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &s->rlayer.rbuf, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
165 memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &s->rlayer.rrec, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
170 /* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
171 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
172 (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
173 || SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED)) {
174 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO,
175 sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
179 s->rlayer.packet = NULL;
180 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
181 memset(&s->rlayer.rbuf, 0, sizeof(s->rlayer.rbuf));
182 memset(&s->rlayer.rrec, 0, sizeof(s->rlayer.rrec));
184 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
185 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
186 OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
192 /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
193 if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL) {
194 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
195 OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
204 int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
208 item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
210 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
212 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
222 * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not
225 #define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
226 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
227 &((s)->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds))
229 int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
234 DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
235 unsigned int is_next_epoch;
238 item = pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q);
240 /* Check if epoch is current. */
241 if (s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch)
242 return 1; /* Nothing to do. */
244 rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
246 rb = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
248 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rb) > 0) {
250 * We've still got data from the current packet to read. There could
251 * be a record from the new epoch in it - so don't overwrite it
252 * with the unprocessed records yet (we'll do it when we've
253 * finished reading the current packet).
258 /* Process all the records. */
259 while (pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
260 dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
261 bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
262 if (bitmap == NULL) {
264 * Should not happen. This will only ever be NULL when the
265 * current record is from a different epoch. But that cannot
266 * be the case because we already checked the epoch above
268 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS,
269 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
273 /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
274 if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
278 * Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. We did this
279 * check once already when we first received the record - but
280 * we might have updated the window since then due to
281 * records we subsequently processed.
283 replayok = dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap);
286 if (!replayok || !dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) {
287 /* dump this record */
289 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
293 if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds),
294 SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(s->rlayer.rrec)) < 0)
300 * sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records have been
303 s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds.epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch;
304 s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch + 1;
310 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
311 * 'type' is one of the following:
313 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
314 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
315 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
317 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
318 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
320 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
321 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
322 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
323 * argument is non NULL.
324 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
325 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
326 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
327 * Change cipher spec protocol
328 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
330 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
332 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
333 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
334 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
335 * Application data protocol
336 * none of our business
338 int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
339 size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes)
344 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
346 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&s->rlayer.rbuf)) {
347 /* Not initialized yet */
348 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
352 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
353 (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) ||
354 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
355 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
360 * check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting
362 ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len);
364 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
370 * Now s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if
371 * type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
374 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
376 * Continue handshake if it had to be interrupted to read app data with
379 if ((!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) ||
380 (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))
381 && ossl_statem_in_sctp_read_sock(s)
382 && s->s3->in_read_app_data != 2))
384 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s))
387 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
388 i = s->handshake_func(s);
392 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
398 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
401 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
402 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
403 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
404 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
409 * We are not handshaking and have no data yet, so process data buffered
410 * during the last handshake in advance, if any.
412 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
414 item = pqueue_pop(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data.q);
416 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
417 /* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
418 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
419 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
420 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO,
421 sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
425 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
427 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
432 /* Check for timeout */
433 if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
436 /* get new packet if necessary */
437 if ((SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
438 || (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
439 iret = dtls1_get_record(s);
441 iret = dtls1_read_failed(s, iret);
442 /* anything other than a timeout is an error */
451 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
452 * record that isn't an alert.
454 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
455 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0)
456 s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
458 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
460 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
461 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
462 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
464 * We now have application data between CCS and Finished. Most likely
465 * the packets were reordered on their way, so buffer the application
466 * data for later processing rather than dropping the connection.
468 if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data),
469 SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(rr)) < 0) {
470 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
473 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
478 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
481 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
482 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
483 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
487 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
488 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
489 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) {
491 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
492 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
493 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
496 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
497 * doing a handshake for the first time
499 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
500 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
501 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
502 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
506 if (recvd_type != NULL)
507 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
512 if (len > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
513 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
517 memcpy(buf, &(SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)]), n);
519 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
520 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
521 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
522 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
523 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
526 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
528 * We were about to renegotiate but had to read belated application
529 * data first, so retry.
531 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
532 SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
533 ossl_statem_in_sctp_read_sock(s)) {
534 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
535 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
536 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
540 * We might had to delay a close_notify alert because of reordered
541 * app data. If there was an alert and there is no message to read
542 * anymore, finally set shutdown.
544 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
545 s->d1->shutdown_received
546 && !BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
547 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
556 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
557 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
561 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
562 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
565 size_t k, dest_maxlen = 0;
566 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
567 size_t *dest_len = NULL;
569 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
570 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment;
571 dest = s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment;
572 dest_len = &s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len;
573 } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
574 dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment);
575 dest = s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment;
576 dest_len = &s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len;
578 /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
579 else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
581 * Application data while renegotiating is allowed. Try again
584 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
586 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
587 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
588 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
589 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
590 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
594 /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
595 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
596 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
600 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
602 * XDTLS: In a pathological case, the Client Hello may be
603 * fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes
605 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < dest_maxlen) {
606 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
608 * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
609 * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
610 * non-existing alert...
614 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
615 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
619 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
620 for (k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++) {
621 dest[k] = SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)];
622 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, 1);
623 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -1);
625 *dest_len = dest_maxlen;
630 * s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
631 * s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
632 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
635 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
637 (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
638 (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
639 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
640 s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
642 if ((s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
643 (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
644 (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
645 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
646 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
651 * no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages
655 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
656 s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment, 4, s,
657 s->msg_callback_arg);
659 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
660 !s->s3->renegotiate) {
661 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
664 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
665 i = s->handshake_func(s);
669 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
673 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
674 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0) {
675 /* no read-ahead left? */
678 * In the case where we try to read application data,
679 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
680 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
681 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
683 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
684 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
685 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
686 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
693 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
694 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
699 if (s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH) {
700 int alert_level = s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment[0];
701 int alert_descr = s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment[1];
703 s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len = 0;
706 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
707 s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment, 2, s,
708 s->msg_callback_arg);
710 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
711 cb = s->info_callback;
712 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
713 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
716 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
717 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
720 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
721 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
723 s->rlayer.alert_count++;
724 if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
725 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
726 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
730 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
731 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
733 * With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data
734 * after a close_notify alert. We have to check this first so
735 * that nothing gets discarded.
737 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
738 BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
739 s->d1->shutdown_received = 1;
740 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
741 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
742 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
746 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
750 /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
751 /* now check if it's a missing record */
752 if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) {
754 unsigned int frag_off;
755 unsigned char *p = &(s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment[2]);
760 dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
761 dtls1_get_queue_priority
762 (frag->msg_header.seq, 0), frag_off,
764 if (!found && SSL_in_init(s)) {
766 * fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s));
769 * requested a message not yet sent, send an alert
772 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING,
773 DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
777 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
780 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
781 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
782 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
783 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
784 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
785 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
786 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
789 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
790 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
797 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
799 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
800 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
804 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
806 * We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake messages
807 * are still missing, so just drop it.
809 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
814 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
816 if ((s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
817 !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
818 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
820 /* this may just be a stale retransmit */
821 dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
822 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_epoch(rr) != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch) {
823 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
828 * If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the client
829 * here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
831 if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
832 if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
835 dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
836 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
840 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s)) {
841 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
845 i = s->handshake_func(s);
849 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
853 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
854 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0) {
855 /* no read-ahead left? */
858 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
859 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
860 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
861 * problems in the blocking world
863 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
864 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
865 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
866 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
873 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
875 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
876 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) {
877 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
880 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
881 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
883 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
885 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
887 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
888 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
889 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
891 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
892 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
894 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
896 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
897 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
898 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
899 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
900 * started), we will indulge it.
902 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
903 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
904 ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
905 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
908 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
909 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
916 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
921 * this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
924 static size_t have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
928 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
929 && (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
930 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
932 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment;
933 unsigned char *dst = buf;
938 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
941 s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len--;
944 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
945 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
946 s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
954 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
955 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
957 int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, size_t len,
962 OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
963 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
964 i = do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0, written);
968 int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
969 size_t len, int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written)
971 unsigned char *p, *pseq;
972 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
973 size_t prefix_len = 0;
979 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
982 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
983 * will happen with non blocking IO
985 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(wb) != 0) {
986 OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
987 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len, written);
990 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
991 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
992 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
995 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
998 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
1003 if ((sess == NULL) ||
1004 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
1010 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
1015 p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + prefix_len;
1017 /* write the header */
1019 *(p++) = type & 0xff;
1020 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr, type);
1022 * Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we
1023 * haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version 1.0
1024 * header: otherwise some clients will ignore it.
1026 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1027 s->max_proto_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
1028 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
1029 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff;
1031 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1032 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1035 /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
1039 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
1040 if (s->enc_write_ctx) {
1041 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
1042 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
1043 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
1047 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
1048 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
1049 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1050 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)
1051 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1057 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1058 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr, p + eivlen); /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
1059 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(&wr, len);
1060 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(&wr, (unsigned char *)buf);
1063 * we now 'read' from wr.input, wr.length bytes into wr.data
1066 /* first we compress */
1067 if (s->compress != NULL) {
1068 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, &wr)) {
1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1073 memcpy(SSL3_RECORD_get_data(&wr), SSL3_RECORD_get_input(&wr),
1074 SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr));
1075 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr);
1079 * we should still have the output to wr.data and the input from
1080 * wr.input. Length should be wr.length. wr.data still points in the
1084 if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
1085 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr,
1086 &(p[SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr) + eivlen]),
1089 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr, mac_size);
1092 /* this is true regardless of mac size */
1093 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr, p);
1094 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr);
1097 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr, eivlen);
1099 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, &wr, 1, 1) < 1)
1102 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
1103 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr,
1104 &(p[SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr)]), 1))
1106 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr, mac_size);
1109 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1111 * if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && !
1115 /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
1117 s2n(s->rlayer.d->w_epoch, pseq);
1121 * else s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq);
1124 memcpy(pseq, &(s->rlayer.write_sequence[2]), 6);
1126 s2n(SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr), pseq);
1128 if (s->msg_callback)
1129 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, pseq - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
1130 DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1133 * we should now have wr.data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1136 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr, type); /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1137 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
1139 ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->rlayer.write_sequence[0]));
1141 if (create_empty_fragment) {
1143 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1146 *written = wr.length;
1150 /* now let's set up wb */
1151 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(wb, prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr));
1152 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, 0);
1155 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1158 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = len;
1159 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
1160 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
1161 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = len;
1163 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1164 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len, written);
1169 DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
1170 unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
1175 /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
1176 if (rr->epoch == s->rlayer.d->r_epoch)
1177 return &s->rlayer.d->bitmap;
1180 * Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch and only if we
1181 * have already processed all of the unprocessed records from the last
1184 else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->rlayer.d->r_epoch + 1) &&
1185 s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch &&
1186 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1188 return &s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap;
1194 void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
1197 unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->rlayer.read_sequence);
1199 if (rw & SSL3_CC_READ) {
1200 seq = s->rlayer.read_sequence;
1201 s->rlayer.d->r_epoch++;
1202 memcpy(&s->rlayer.d->bitmap, &s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap,
1203 sizeof(s->rlayer.d->bitmap));
1204 memset(&s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap, 0, sizeof(s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap));
1207 * We must not use any buffered messages received from the previous
1210 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
1212 seq = s->rlayer.write_sequence;
1213 memcpy(s->rlayer.d->last_write_sequence, seq,
1214 sizeof(s->rlayer.write_sequence));
1215 s->rlayer.d->w_epoch++;
1218 memset(seq, 0, seq_bytes);