3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
6 /* ====================================================================
7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 * ====================================================================
54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
59 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
60 * All rights reserved.
62 * This package is an SSL implementation written
63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
67 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
74 * the code are not to be removed.
75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
76 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
84 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
86 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
87 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
89 * must display the following acknowledgement:
90 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
91 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
92 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
93 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
95 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
96 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
101 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
112 * copied and put under another distribution licence
113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
119 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
121 #include <openssl/rand.h>
122 #include <openssl/objects.h>
123 #include <openssl/evp.h>
124 #include <openssl/x509.h>
126 #define RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(msg_len) (((msg_len) + 7) / 8)
128 #define RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(bitmask, start, end) { \
129 if ((end) - (start) <= 8) { \
131 for (ii = (start); ii < (end); ii++) bitmask[((ii) >> 3)] |= (1 << ((ii) & 7)); \
134 bitmask[((start) >> 3)] |= bitmask_start_values[((start) & 7)]; \
135 for (ii = (((start) >> 3) + 1); ii < ((((end) - 1)) >> 3); ii++) bitmask[ii] = 0xff; \
136 bitmask[(((end) - 1) >> 3)] |= bitmask_end_values[((end) & 7)]; \
139 #define RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(bitmask, msg_len, is_complete) { \
141 OPENSSL_assert((msg_len) > 0); \
143 if (bitmask[(((msg_len) - 1) >> 3)] != bitmask_end_values[((msg_len) & 7)]) is_complete = 0; \
144 if (is_complete) for (ii = (((msg_len) - 1) >> 3) - 1; ii >= 0 ; ii--) \
145 if (bitmask[ii] != 0xff) { is_complete = 0; break; } }
148 # define RSMBLY_BITMASK_PRINT(bitmask, msg_len) { \
150 printf("bitmask: "); for (ii = 0; ii < (msg_len); ii++) \
151 printf("%d ", (bitmask[ii >> 3] & (1 << (ii & 7))) >> (ii & 7)); \
155 static unsigned char bitmask_start_values[] =
156 { 0xff, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0xf8, 0xf0, 0xe0, 0xc0, 0x80 };
157 static unsigned char bitmask_end_values[] =
158 { 0xff, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x3f, 0x7f };
160 /* XDTLS: figure out the right values */
161 static const unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = { 1500, 512, 256 };
163 static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off,
164 unsigned long frag_len);
165 static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p);
166 static void dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
168 unsigned short seq_num,
169 unsigned long frag_off,
170 unsigned long frag_len);
171 static long dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max,
174 static hm_fragment *dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len,
177 hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
178 unsigned char *buf = NULL;
179 unsigned char *bitmask = NULL;
181 frag = (hm_fragment *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(hm_fragment));
186 buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len);
193 /* zero length fragment gets zero frag->fragment */
194 frag->fragment = buf;
196 /* Initialize reassembly bitmask if necessary */
199 (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len));
200 if (bitmask == NULL) {
206 memset(bitmask, 0, RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len));
209 frag->reassembly = bitmask;
214 void dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
217 if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs) {
218 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(frag->msg_header.
219 saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx);
220 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(frag->msg_header.
221 saved_retransmit_state.write_hash);
224 OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
225 if (frag->reassembly)
226 OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
230 static int dtls1_query_mtu(SSL *s)
232 if (s->d1->link_mtu) {
234 s->d1->link_mtu - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));
238 /* AHA! Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
239 if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) {
240 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
242 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
245 * I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
246 * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number
248 if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) {
250 s->d1->mtu = dtls1_min_mtu(s);
251 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU,
261 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
262 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
264 int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
267 unsigned int curr_mtu;
269 unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize, used_len;
271 if (!dtls1_query_mtu(s))
274 OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu(s)); /* should have something
277 if (s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
278 OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num ==
279 (int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
280 DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
283 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
287 if (s->enc_write_ctx &&
288 (EVP_CIPHER_mode(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
289 blocksize = 2 * EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
294 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
296 /* s->init_num shouldn't ever be < 0...but just in case */
297 while (s->init_num > 0) {
298 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && s->init_off != 0) {
299 /* We must be writing a fragment other than the first one */
302 /* This is the first attempt at writing out this fragment */
304 if (s->init_off <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
306 * Each fragment that was already sent must at least have
307 * contained the message header plus one other byte.
308 * Therefore |init_off| must have progressed by at least
309 * |DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 1| bytes. If not something went
316 * Adjust |init_off| and |init_num| to allow room for a new
317 * message header for this fragment.
319 s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
320 s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
323 * We must have been called again after a retry so use the
324 * fragment offset from our last attempt. We do not need
325 * to adjust |init_off| and |init_num| as above, because
326 * that should already have been done before the retry.
328 frag_off = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.frag_off;
332 used_len = BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
333 + mac_size + blocksize;
334 if (s->d1->mtu > used_len)
335 curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - used_len;
339 if (curr_mtu <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
341 * grr.. we could get an error if MTU picked was wrong
343 ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
345 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
348 used_len = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + mac_size + blocksize;
349 if (s->d1->mtu > used_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
350 curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - used_len;
352 /* Shouldn't happen */
358 * We just checked that s->init_num > 0 so this cast should be safe
360 if (((unsigned int)s->init_num) > curr_mtu)
365 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
370 * XDTLS: this function is too long. split out the CCS part
372 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
373 if (len < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
375 * len is so small that we really can't do anything sensible
380 dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off,
381 len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
383 dtls1_write_message_header(s,
384 (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->
388 ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
392 * might need to update MTU here, but we don't know which
393 * previous packet caused the failure -- so can't really
394 * retransmit anything. continue as if everything is fine and
395 * wait for an alert to handle the retransmit
397 if (retry && BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
398 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED, 0, NULL) > 0) {
399 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
400 if (!dtls1_query_mtu(s))
402 /* Have one more go */
412 * bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake message
413 * got sent. but why would this happen?
415 OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret);
417 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && !s->d1->retransmitting) {
419 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
420 * we'll ignore the result anyway
423 (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off];
424 const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
427 if (frag_off == 0 && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
429 * reconstruct message header is if it is being sent in
432 *p++ = msg_hdr->type;
433 l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
434 s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
436 l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
437 p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
440 p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
441 xlen = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
444 ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, xlen);
447 if (ret == s->init_num) {
449 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
450 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
451 s->msg_callback_arg);
453 s->init_off = 0; /* done writing this message */
460 ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
464 * We save the fragment offset for the next fragment so we have it
465 * available in case of an IO retry. We don't know the length of the
466 * next fragment yet so just set that to 0 for now. It will be
467 * updated again later.
469 dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off, 0);
476 * Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1), maximum
477 * acceptable body length 'max'. Read an entire handshake message. Handshake
478 * messages arrive in fragments.
480 long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
483 struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr;
485 unsigned long msg_len;
488 * s3->tmp is used to store messages that are unexpected, caused by the
489 * absence of an optional handshake message
491 if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message) {
492 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 0;
493 if ((mt >= 0) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt)) {
494 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
495 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
499 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
500 s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size;
504 msg_hdr = &s->d1->r_msg_hdr;
505 memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
508 i = dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, max, ok);
509 if (i == DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT || i == DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY) {
510 /* bad fragment received */
512 } else if (i <= 0 && !*ok) {
516 if (mt >= 0 && s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt) {
517 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
518 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
522 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
523 msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
525 /* reconstruct message header */
526 *(p++) = msg_hdr->type;
528 s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
531 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
532 p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
533 msg_len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
536 ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, msg_len);
538 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
539 p, msg_len, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
541 memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
543 /* Don't change sequence numbers while listening */
545 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
547 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
551 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
556 static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr,
559 size_t frag_off, frag_len, msg_len;
561 msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
562 frag_off = msg_hdr->frag_off;
563 frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
565 /* sanity checking */
566 if ((frag_off + frag_len) > msg_len) {
567 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
568 return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
571 if ((frag_off + frag_len) > (unsigned long)max) {
572 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
573 return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
576 if (s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) { /* first fragment */
578 * msg_len is limited to 2^24, but is effectively checked against max
581 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
582 (s->init_buf, msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
583 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
584 return SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
587 s->s3->tmp.message_size = msg_len;
588 s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = msg_len;
589 s->s3->tmp.message_type = msg_hdr->type;
590 s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type = msg_hdr->type;
591 s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = msg_hdr->seq;
592 } else if (msg_len != s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len) {
594 * They must be playing with us! BTW, failure to enforce upper limit
595 * would open possibility for buffer overrun.
597 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
598 return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
601 return 0; /* no error */
604 static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
607 * (0) check whether the desired fragment is available
609 * (1) copy over the fragment to s->init_buf->data[]
610 * (2) update s->init_num
617 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages);
621 frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
623 /* Don't return if reassembly still in progress */
624 if (frag->reassembly != NULL)
627 if (s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq) {
628 unsigned long frag_len = frag->msg_header.frag_len;
629 pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages);
631 al = dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s, &frag->msg_header, max);
633 if (al == 0) { /* no alert */
635 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
636 memcpy(&p[frag->msg_header.frag_off], frag->fragment,
637 frag->msg_header.frag_len);
640 dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
648 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
657 * dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes
658 * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but
659 * may be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it.
661 static unsigned long dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s)
663 unsigned long max_len =
664 DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
665 if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list)
666 return s->max_cert_list;
671 dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr, int *ok)
673 hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
675 int i = -1, is_complete;
676 unsigned char seq64be[8];
677 unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
679 if ((msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len ||
680 msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
684 return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
686 /* Try to find item in queue */
687 memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be));
688 seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq >> 8);
689 seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)msg_hdr->seq;
690 item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be);
693 frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(msg_hdr->msg_len, 1);
696 memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
697 frag->msg_header.frag_len = frag->msg_header.msg_len;
698 frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
700 frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
701 if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) {
709 * If message is already reassembled, this must be a retransmit and can
710 * be dropped. In this case item != NULL and so frag does not need to be
713 if (frag->reassembly == NULL) {
714 unsigned char devnull[256];
717 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
720 sizeof(devnull) ? sizeof(devnull) :
726 return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
729 /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
730 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
731 frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off,
733 if ((unsigned long)i != frag_len)
738 RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off,
739 (long)(msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len));
741 RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->msg_len,
745 OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
746 frag->reassembly = NULL;
750 item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
756 item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
758 * pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted. However,
759 * |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were, |pqueue_find|, above,
760 * would have returned it and control would never have reached this
763 OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
766 return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
769 if (frag != NULL && item == NULL)
770 dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
776 dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr,
780 hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
782 unsigned char seq64be[8];
783 unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
785 if ((msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
788 /* Try to find item in queue, to prevent duplicate entries */
789 memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be));
790 seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq >> 8);
791 seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)msg_hdr->seq;
792 item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be);
795 * If we already have an entry and this one is a fragment, don't discard
796 * it and rather try to reassemble it.
798 if (item != NULL && frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
802 * Discard the message if sequence number was already there, is too far
803 * in the future, already in the queue or if we received a FINISHED
804 * before the SERVER_HELLO, which then must be a stale retransmit.
806 if (msg_hdr->seq <= s->d1->handshake_read_seq ||
807 msg_hdr->seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq + 10 || item != NULL ||
808 (s->d1->handshake_read_seq == 0 && msg_hdr->type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED))
810 unsigned char devnull[256];
813 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
816 sizeof(devnull) ? sizeof(devnull) :
823 if (frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
824 return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok);
826 if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
829 frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len, 0);
833 memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
837 * read the body of the fragment (header has already been read
839 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
840 frag->fragment, frag_len, 0);
841 if ((unsigned long)i != frag_len)
847 item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
851 item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
853 * pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted. However,
854 * |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were, |pqueue_find|, above,
855 * would have returned it. Then, either |frag_len| !=
856 * |msg_hdr->msg_len| in which case |item| is set to NULL and it will
857 * have been processed with |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, above, or
858 * the record will have been discarded.
860 OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
863 return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
866 if (frag != NULL && item == NULL)
867 dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
873 dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
875 unsigned char wire[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
876 unsigned long len, frag_off, frag_len;
878 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
881 /* see if we have the required fragment already */
882 if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s, max, ok)) || *ok) {
884 s->init_num = frag_len;
888 /* read handshake message header */
889 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, wire,
890 DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 0);
891 if (i <= 0) { /* nbio, or an error */
892 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
896 /* Handshake fails if message header is incomplete */
897 if (i != DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
898 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
899 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
903 /* parse the message fragment header */
904 dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr);
906 len = msg_hdr.msg_len;
907 frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off;
908 frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len;
911 * We must have at least frag_len bytes left in the record to be read.
912 * Fragments must not span records.
914 if (frag_len > s->s3->rrec.length) {
915 al = SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
916 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
921 * if this is a future (or stale) message it gets buffered
922 * (or dropped)--no further processing at this time
923 * While listening, we accept seq 1 (ClientHello with cookie)
924 * although we're still expecting seq 0 (ClientHello)
926 if (msg_hdr.seq != s->d1->handshake_read_seq
927 && !(s->d1->listen && msg_hdr.seq == 1))
928 return dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(s, &msg_hdr, ok);
930 if (frag_len && frag_len < len)
931 return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, &msg_hdr, ok);
933 if (!s->server && s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0 &&
934 wire[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
936 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- we are
937 * doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if their format is
938 * correct. Does not count for 'Finished' MAC.
940 if (wire[1] == 0 && wire[2] == 0 && wire[3] == 0) {
942 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
943 wire, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
944 s->msg_callback_arg);
948 } else { /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */
950 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,
952 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
957 if ((al = dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s, &msg_hdr, max)))
962 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
964 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
965 &p[frag_off], frag_len, 0);
968 * This shouldn't ever fail due to NBIO because we already checked
969 * that we have enough data in the record
972 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
980 * XDTLS: an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the handshake
983 if (i != (int)frag_len) {
984 al = SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
985 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT, SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
993 * Note that s->init_num is *not* used as current offset in
994 * s->init_buf->data, but as a counter summing up fragments' lengths: as
995 * soon as they sum up to handshake packet length, we assume we have got
998 s->init_num = frag_len;
1002 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1009 int dtls1_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen)
1011 unsigned char *p, *d;
1015 if (s->state == a) {
1016 d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1017 p = &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
1019 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1021 s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
1022 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
1023 memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
1028 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
1030 if (s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT) {
1031 OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
1032 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
1033 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i;
1035 OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
1036 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
1037 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i;
1040 #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16
1042 * MSVC 1.5 does not clear the top bytes of the word unless I do
1048 d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, l, 0, l);
1049 s->init_num = (int)l + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1052 /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
1053 dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
1058 /* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */
1059 return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1063 * for these 2 messages, we need to
1064 * ssl->enc_read_ctx re-init
1065 * ssl->s3->read_sequence zero
1066 * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret re-init
1067 * ssl->session->read_sym_enc assign
1068 * ssl->session->read_compression assign
1069 * ssl->session->read_hash assign
1071 int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b)
1075 if (s->state == a) {
1076 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1078 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
1079 s->init_num = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
1081 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
1082 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
1083 s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq, p);
1089 dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, SSL3_MT_CCS, 0,
1090 s->d1->handshake_write_seq, 0, 0);
1092 /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
1093 dtls1_buffer_message(s, 1);
1098 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */
1099 return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC));
1102 static int dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x)
1107 n = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
1108 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, (int)(n + (*l) + 3))) {
1109 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1112 p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]);
1120 unsigned long dtls1_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x)
1124 unsigned long l = 3 + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1127 /* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */
1129 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, 10)) {
1130 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1134 X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
1136 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, s->ctx->cert_store, x, NULL)) {
1137 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
1141 X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
1142 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
1144 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++) {
1145 x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i);
1147 if (!dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x)) {
1148 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
1152 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
1154 /* Thawte special :-) */
1155 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(s->ctx->extra_certs); i++) {
1156 x = sk_X509_value(s->ctx->extra_certs, i);
1157 if (!dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x))
1161 l -= (3 + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
1163 p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
1166 p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[0]);
1167 p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l, 0, l);
1169 l += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1173 int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code)
1176 fprintf(stderr, "invalid state reached %s:%d", __FILE__, __LINE__);
1180 if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s)) {
1182 * not a timeout, none of our business, let higher layers handle
1183 * this. in fact it's probably an error
1187 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1188 /* done, no need to send a retransmit */
1189 if (!SSL_in_init(s) && !s->tlsext_hb_pending)
1191 /* done, no need to send a retransmit */
1192 if (!SSL_in_init(s))
1195 BIO_set_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_FLAGS_READ);
1198 #if 0 /* for now, each alert contains only one
1200 item = pqueue_peek(state->rcvd_records);
1202 /* send an alert immediately for all the missing records */
1206 #if 0 /* no more alert sending, just retransmit the
1207 * last set of messages */
1208 if (state->timeout.read_timeouts >= DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT)
1209 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING,
1210 DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
1213 return dtls1_handle_timeout(s);
1216 int dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs)
1219 * The index of the retransmission queue actually is the message sequence
1220 * number, since the queue only contains messages of a single handshake.
1221 * However, the ChangeCipherSpec has no message sequence number and so
1222 * using only the sequence will result in the CCS and Finished having the
1223 * same index. To prevent this, the sequence number is multiplied by 2.
1224 * In case of a CCS 1 is subtracted. This does not only differ CSS and
1225 * Finished, it also maintains the order of the index (important for
1226 * priority queues) and fits in the unsigned short variable.
1228 return seq * 2 - is_ccs;
1231 int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s)
1233 pqueue sent = s->d1->sent_messages;
1239 iter = pqueue_iterator(sent);
1241 for (item = pqueue_next(&iter); item != NULL; item = pqueue_next(&iter)) {
1242 frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
1243 if (dtls1_retransmit_message(s, (unsigned short)
1244 dtls1_get_queue_priority
1245 (frag->msg_header.seq,
1246 frag->msg_header.is_ccs), 0,
1247 &found) <= 0 && found) {
1248 fprintf(stderr, "dtls1_retransmit_message() failed\n");
1256 int dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs)
1260 unsigned char seq64be[8];
1263 * this function is called immediately after a message has been
1266 OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
1268 frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num, 0);
1272 memcpy(frag->fragment, s->init_buf->data, s->init_num);
1275 OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
1277 DTLS1_VERSION) ? DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH : 3) ==
1278 (unsigned int)s->init_num);
1280 OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
1281 DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
1284 frag->msg_header.msg_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
1285 frag->msg_header.seq = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.seq;
1286 frag->msg_header.type = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.type;
1287 frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
1288 frag->msg_header.frag_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
1289 frag->msg_header.is_ccs = is_ccs;
1291 /* save current state */
1292 frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
1293 frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash = s->write_hash;
1294 frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress = s->compress;
1295 frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session = s->session;
1296 frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
1298 memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be));
1301 char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq,
1302 frag->msg_header.is_ccs) >> 8);
1305 char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq,
1306 frag->msg_header.is_ccs));
1308 item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
1310 dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
1314 fprintf(stderr, "buffered messge: \ttype = %xx\n", msg_buf->type);
1315 fprintf(stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tlen = %d\n", msg_buf->len);
1316 fprintf(stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tseq_num = %d\n", msg_buf->seq_num);
1319 pqueue_insert(s->d1->sent_messages, item);
1324 dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, unsigned long frag_off,
1328 /* XDTLS: for now assuming that read/writes are blocking */
1331 unsigned long header_length;
1332 unsigned char seq64be[8];
1333 struct dtls1_retransmit_state saved_state;
1334 unsigned char save_write_sequence[8];
1337 OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 0);
1338 OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
1341 /* XDTLS: the requested message ought to be found, otherwise error */
1342 memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be));
1343 seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(seq >> 8);
1344 seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)seq;
1346 item = pqueue_find(s->d1->sent_messages, seq64be);
1348 fprintf(stderr, "retransmit: message %d non-existant\n", seq);
1354 frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
1356 if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs)
1357 header_length = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
1359 header_length = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1361 memcpy(s->init_buf->data, frag->fragment,
1362 frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length);
1363 s->init_num = frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length;
1365 dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, frag->msg_header.type,
1366 frag->msg_header.msg_len,
1367 frag->msg_header.seq, 0,
1368 frag->msg_header.frag_len);
1370 /* save current state */
1371 saved_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
1372 saved_state.write_hash = s->write_hash;
1373 saved_state.compress = s->compress;
1374 saved_state.session = s->session;
1375 saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
1376 saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
1378 s->d1->retransmitting = 1;
1380 /* restore state in which the message was originally sent */
1381 s->enc_write_ctx = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx;
1382 s->write_hash = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash;
1383 s->compress = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress;
1384 s->session = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session;
1385 s->d1->w_epoch = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch;
1387 if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch ==
1388 saved_state.epoch - 1) {
1389 memcpy(save_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence,
1390 sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1391 memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->d1->last_write_sequence,
1392 sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1395 ret = dtls1_do_write(s, frag->msg_header.is_ccs ?
1396 SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC : SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
1398 /* restore current state */
1399 s->enc_write_ctx = saved_state.enc_write_ctx;
1400 s->write_hash = saved_state.write_hash;
1401 s->compress = saved_state.compress;
1402 s->session = saved_state.session;
1403 s->d1->w_epoch = saved_state.epoch;
1405 if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch ==
1406 saved_state.epoch - 1) {
1407 memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence,
1408 sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1409 memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, save_write_sequence,
1410 sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1413 s->d1->retransmitting = 0;
1415 (void)BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
1419 /* call this function when the buffered messages are no longer needed */
1420 void dtls1_clear_record_buffer(SSL *s)
1424 for (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages);
1425 item != NULL; item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) {
1426 dtls1_hm_fragment_free((hm_fragment *)item->data);
1431 unsigned char *dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p,
1432 unsigned char mt, unsigned long len,
1433 unsigned long frag_off,
1434 unsigned long frag_len)
1436 /* Don't change sequence numbers while listening */
1437 if (frag_off == 0 && !s->d1->listen) {
1438 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
1439 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
1442 dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, mt, len, s->d1->handshake_write_seq,
1443 frag_off, frag_len);
1445 return p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1448 /* don't actually do the writing, wait till the MTU has been retrieved */
1450 dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
1451 unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num,
1452 unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len)
1454 struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
1457 msg_hdr->msg_len = len;
1458 msg_hdr->seq = seq_num;
1459 msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off;
1460 msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len;
1464 dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off,
1465 unsigned long frag_len)
1467 struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
1469 msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off;
1470 msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len;
1473 static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
1475 struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
1477 *p++ = msg_hdr->type;
1478 l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
1480 s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
1481 l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_off, p);
1482 l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_len, p);
1487 unsigned int dtls1_link_min_mtu(void)
1489 return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) /
1490 sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0])) - 1]);
1493 unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s)
1495 return dtls1_link_min_mtu() - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));
1499 dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr)
1501 memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
1502 msg_hdr->type = *(data++);
1503 n2l3(data, msg_hdr->msg_len);
1505 n2s(data, msg_hdr->seq);
1506 n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_off);
1507 n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_len);
1510 void dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char *data, struct ccs_header_st *ccs_hdr)
1512 memset(ccs_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct ccs_header_st));
1514 ccs_hdr->type = *(data++);
1517 int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s)
1520 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1523 wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s);
1524 if (wbio != NULL && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(wbio) &&
1525 !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)) {
1526 ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(wbio);
1531 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 1,
1535 ret = ssl3_shutdown(s);
1536 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1537 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 0, NULL);
1542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1543 int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
1545 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
1546 unsigned short hbtype;
1547 unsigned int payload;
1548 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
1550 if (s->msg_callback)
1551 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
1552 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
1553 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1555 /* Read type and payload length first */
1556 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
1557 return 0; /* silently discard */
1558 if (s->s3->rrec.length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
1559 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
1563 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
1564 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
1567 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
1568 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
1569 unsigned int write_length = 1 /* heartbeat type */ +
1570 2 /* heartbeat length */ +
1574 if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
1578 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte message type,
1579 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
1581 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length);
1584 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
1585 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
1587 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
1589 /* Random padding */
1590 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding) < 0) {
1591 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
1595 r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length);
1597 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
1598 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
1599 buffer, write_length, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1601 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
1605 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
1609 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
1610 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
1614 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
1615 dtls1_stop_timer(s);
1617 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
1624 int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
1626 unsigned char *buf, *p;
1628 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
1629 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
1631 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
1632 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
1633 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
1634 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
1638 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
1639 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
1640 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
1644 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
1645 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
1646 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1651 * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
1652 * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
1654 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
1657 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
1658 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
1659 * some random stuff.
1660 * - Message Type, 1 byte
1661 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
1662 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
1663 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
1666 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
1669 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
1670 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
1672 /* Sequence number */
1673 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
1674 /* 16 random bytes */
1675 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16) < 0)
1678 /* Random padding */
1679 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding) < 0)
1682 ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
1684 if (s->msg_callback)
1685 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
1686 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
1687 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1689 dtls1_start_timer(s);
1690 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;